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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the European Community (EC) as a strategic actor in the 
International Political Economy (IPE). Rivalry or competition in the IPE has traditionally 
been analysed with a central focus on the state. Yet, with the advent of factors such 
globalisation and interriationalisation, the trend towards the formation of regional trading 
blocs, and the emergence of firms as powerful political actors, the notion of states' 
autonomy and strategic action capacities has increasingly been at odds with the realities 
of social, economic and political life. This thesis captures the complex interactions of 
state actors in today's IPE by adopting the concept of state economic functions and 
creating a level playing field upon which their interactions can be analysed. In order to 
evaluate strategic action capacities, the thesis identifies a range of key political, market 
and social variables and synthesises them into a research framework for the study of 
strategic action in the IPE. The research framework consists of four interactive elements: 
international relations, institutional capacity, decision-making capacity and market 
structure. Reflecting the need to analyse strategic action capacities on a sectoral basis, the 
research framework is applied to a longitudinal case study of EC policy-making in the 
steel sector from the 1970s to the 1990s. The thesis shows that the focus on state 
economic functions enables the researcher to move beyond traditional state-centric 
analysis and to incorporate non-state actors such as the EC into the analysis. The 
application of the research framework to the case of the EC shows that it emerged as a 
'parallel' or 'joint' provider of state economic functions and that it has evolved into one of 
the most powerful actors in the IPE. The empirical analysis of EC policy-making in steel 
produces not only produces insights into the EC's strategic action capacities, but also 
insights into the strategic action capacities of other actors in IPE, the factors that restrict 
actor's capacity to act strategically, a: nd the policies that should be adopted in order to 
improve strategic action capacities. By approaching the EC from the perspective of 
strategic action, the thesis offers a new approach to on-going research that tries to 
conceptualise the role and capacities of the EC in IPE, the evolution of the EC into a 
powerful international actor, and insights into the factors that shape the strategic action 
capacities of actors in the IPE. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most salient features of today's international political economy (1PE) is 
frictions over trade issues. In today's globalised world economy, conflicts arise over 
issues as diverse as bananas, foreign investment, intellectual services, market access 
issues, and protectionist trade policies. These frictions involve a multitude of different 
actors, including states, firms, and various international organisations, each of which 
draws on their own sets of resources. Located at the interface between their external 
and internal environments, actors pursue their interests by both acting and interacting 
on and across a variety of levels and by employing a variety of instruments and 
strategies. Interactions between actors take place within a number of bilateral and 
multilateral fora and these to varying degrees structure the nature, actions and 
outcomes of the interactions of actors in the international political economy. As 
Underhill concludes in a recent introduction on political economy and the changing 
global order: 
The exercise of power in the international political economy ... takes place in a 
setting characterised by the complex interdependence among states, their 
societies, and economic structures at domestic and international levels of 
analysis. This occurs largely through an integrated system of governance 
operating simultaneously through the mechanisms of the market and the 
multiple sovereignties of a system of competitive states. Interdependence, as 
well as anarchy, is an integral part of the international environment within 
which states attempt to promote their sovereign' interests and those of their 
domestic constituencies. Unterdepcndencies necessitate a focus on the linkages 
among actors] and political interaction is the substance of these linkages. The 
outcome is determined by the complex interaction of systemic and domestic 
structural and process variables. (Underhill, 1999: 19) 
These increasingly complex and multi-layered interactions of actors in the 
international political economy have attracted a considerable number of scholars, who 
approached the problem of explaining outcomes in the global economy from a 
number of perspectives (for instance Cohen, 1990; Conybeare, 1987; Cox, 1987; Frey, 
1984; Gilpin, 1981,1987; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Gourevitch, 1986; Keohane 
1989; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Krasner, 1976,1978, Milner, 1988a, Morgenthau, 
1960, Murphy and Tooze, 1991; Odell, 1990, Rosenau. and Czempiel, 1992; Stopford 
and Strange, 1991; Strange, 1986,1996, Waltz, 1979). Using the concept of strategic 
action, generally defined as the ability to act in a way that influences the behaviour of 
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others in a fashion favourable to one's own preferences (derived from Schelling, 
1960), this thesis captures the complexity of interactions IPE by systematically 
generating a framework to evaluate actor's strategic action capacities. 
Among the actors in IPE, the European Community (EC) is a particularly taxing case 
of an actor (see Allen and Smith, 1990; Hill, 1993; Keohane and Hoffinann, 1991; 
Rummel, 1990; Sandholtz, 1992; Sandholtz and Zysmann, 1989; Sj6stedt, 1977, 
Smith, 1994a, 1996,1998; Taylor, 1982; Wallace 1990; Dent, 1997; Hayes, 1993; 
Heidensohn, 1996; Piening, 1997). Since its inception, the EC assumed an ever 
growing weight in the world economy, became a participant in a wide range of 
international institutions, and a central element in the policy concerns of most states in 
the international arena. As Smith recently put it: 
It is an entity which in many respects mimics the actions and performance of 
states and national governments, but which in some crucial aspects is different. 
In the global arena, this raises questions about the capacity for action, influence 
and leadership of the Union; in the EU itself, it raises questions about the 
process of trade policy-making and about the tensions between EU and other 
levels of economic action. (Smith, 1999: 275) 
Yet, the EC is not a state and can therefore not be analysed by the means of state- 
centric analysis. In order to overcome this conceptual problem and to create a level 
playing field upon which the actions of actors in IPE can be evaluated, the thesis 
adopts the concept of state economic functions as developed by Murray (1971). Using 
this idea, it is possible to move away from traditional state-centric analysis and to 
incorporate non-state actors such as the EC into a framework for analysis. A review of 
the literature identifies a range of key political, market and social variables and 
synthesises them into a framework for the study of strategic action in IPE. Reflecting 
the need to account for both the location of actors at the interface of internal and 
external environments and sectoral variations, the framework consists of four 
interactive elements. These are international relations, institutional capacity, decision- 
making capacity and market structure. A first application of the research framework 
shows that the EC has emerged as a 'parallel' or 'joint' provider of state economic 
functions and that the EC has developed the strategic action capacities to pursue state 
economic functions in the global economy, with a capacity to act strategically second 
only to that of the US. VNIe these initial insights have been made previously, the 
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application of the research framework to the EC nevertheless generates insights into 
the internal and external constraints on the EC's strategic action capacities. It is in this 
context that a case study approach is developed in order to put the research framework 
to a further test. Focusing firmly on investigating the factors involved in EC decision- 
making that have an impact on the EC's capacity to act strategically, how these have 
changed over time, and what insights can be gained on the EC's capacity to act 
strategically in IPE, the thesis undertakes a longitudinal study of EC policy-making in 
steel from the 1970s to the 1990s. 
The thesis asserts that the analysis of strategic action capacities and the focus on state 
economic functions enables the researcher to analyse the complex factors that are 
behind outcomes in IPE. Furthermore, the empirical analysis of the EC's experience of 
policy-making in steel not only produces insights into the EC's strategic action 
capacities, but also insights into the strategic action capacities of other actors in IPE, 
the factors that restrict actors' capacity to act strategically, and the policies that should 
be adopted in order to improve actors' strategic action capacities. This thesis is 
therefore concerned with 'applied IPEI. In adopting this approach, it does not seek to 
derive new insights into EPE, but attempts to reduce the complexity of interactions in 
IPE by developing a framework for analysis and applying it to the case of the EC in 
IPE. By doing so it offers a fresh approach to the puzzle of what the EC is capable of 
achieving in IPE, what it is has achieved in the past, insights into the factors that 
shape the development of future strategic action capacities. 
In terms of structure, the thesis is divided into four parts, each consisting of two 
chapters. Part I develops the research framework (chapter one) and, in a first test of it, 
applies it to the case of the EC in the global economy and introduces the case study on 
the European steel industry (chapter two). Part II consists of a ba6kground chapter on 
the steel industry (chapter three) and analysis of EC policy-making in the steel sector 
up until the late 1970s (chapter four). In the concluding two parts, EC policy-making 
in steel is analysed at the crisis points of the 1980s and the 1990s respectively, and a 
distinction maintained between external and internal policy-making. Part III deals 
with internal policy making during the 1980s steel crisis (chapter five) and extemal 
EC policy-making in steel (chapter six). Part IV extends this structure and deals with 
internal policy making during the 1990s steel crisis (chapter seven) and with external 
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policy-making (chapter eight). Whereas in chapter 4 the focus is on the development 
of EC involvement in the steel sector, and particularly the evolution of the 
Commission into a relevant industrial-political actor, chapters five and seven focus on 
the interactions between the Commission, the Member States and steel firms. 
Chapters six and eight focus on the interactions between the EC and the US both on 
the bilateral and multilateral plane. Each part is concluded by an evaluation of the 
EC's strategic action capacities during the period under investigation and feed into the 
overall conclusions. The conclusions offer insights gained from the longitudinal study 
of policy-making in steel related to conclusions about the EC as a strategic actor in 
IPE. On the basis of these insights, generalisations are drawn about strategic action in 
IPE. Finally, reflections on the thesis are presented together with suggestions for 
ftuther research. It is suggested that the analysis of strategic action capacities in 1PE is 
a useful way of explaining outcomes in IPE. 
In order to develop the framework for the evaluation of strategic action capacities, the 
thesis undertakes a comprehensive review of the literature on International Relations 
(IR) and its subfields IPE and foreign economic policy-making (FEP), but also draws 
on the literature on International Politics (IP) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). In 
the application of the framework to the EC, the thesis draws mostly on approaches to 
European integration as evolved by IR and comparative politics and policy analysis 
approaches, but also uses literature on EC trade policy and primary sources produced 
by the GATT and the WTO. The longitudinal study of the European steel industry 
uses a wide range of primary and secondary sources on the world and European steel 
industry. These sources include a collection of newspaper and journal cuttings, 
compiled from European Press Documentation Centres in Hamburg and Mannheim 
and the libraries of Glasgow University, Edinburgh University, Loughborough 
University, and Chatham House (London). Material drawn from the Internet adds 
further detail. Finally, a series of semi-structured interviews, conducted by the author 
in Germany and Brussels, not only provides further detail but. also helped to structure 
the case study approach. The appendix, compiled from primary and secondary 
sources, supplements and further illustrates the steel case study with a selection of 
tables and graphs. 
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PART 1: FRAMEWORKS 
In this first part, a framework for the evaluation of strategic action capacities is 
developed and applied to the case of the EC as an Actor in the international political 
economy. Chapter one investigates the interactions of actors in the international 
political economy, introduces the concept of state economic functions and generates 
the research framework for the evaluation of strategic action capacities. In chapter 
two, this framework is broadly applied to the case of the EC and a case study 
approach is introduced that suggests to study the evolution of the EC's strategic action 
capacities by analysing EC policy-making in steel on a longitudinal basis. 
II 
CHAPTER ONE: STRATEGIC ACTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Commerce, which ought naturally be, among nations, as among individuals, 
a bond of union andfriendship, has become a mostfertile source of discord 
and animosity. 
Adam Smith' 
The 1990s will probably be regarded as important to historians not only as 
the decade when Soviet Communism reached a dead end, but also as the 
point at which commercial competition and trade conflicts among the 
Western allies replaced political competition between ideological blocs as 
the dominant theme in international relations. 
Howell, T. R. and Wolff, A. W. 2 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to develop a research framework that allows for the 
evaluation of strategic action capacities in the international political economy. In 
order to generate this framework, the chapter begins with an outline of the broad 
context of interactions in today's international political economy. Against the 
background of increasing globalisation and intemationalisation, the first section deal 
with both the changing roles and the changing capacities of actors and introduce the 
two main angles that are central to this thesis: the nature of interactions between state 
actors in the international political economy and the nature of their interactions with 
firms. 
In the second section, the concept of state economic functions is introduced as a way 
of creating a level playing field upon which the actions of actors in IPE can be 
assessed. It is argued that all modem industrialised states are concerned with the 
provision of state economic functions to their constituencies. Furthermore, it is argued 
that, despite the effects of globalisation and internationalisation of production on the 
capacities of actors, the relationship between states and firms remains central to states' 
ability to provide their constituencies with state economic functions, but that their 
1 Smith (1937: 460). 
2 Howell and Wolff (1992a: 5). 
12 
relative action capacities as well as strategies have undergone some significant 
changes as a result of globalisation and internationalisation. 
In the third section, the concept of strategic action as well as the forms of strategic 
action that are at work in today's international political economy are investigated. The 
concept of strategic action that is presented here is a means by which actors in the 
international political economy attempt to fulfil state economic functions for their 
constituencies. By way of a literature review, the chapter identifies of the ways in 
which existing international political economy approaches have dealt with issues 
relating to the performance of state economic functions. The findings are then 
summarised into a comprehensive framework for the evaluation of strategic action 
capacities. 
1.1. Setting the Stage: Interstate Rivalry in IPE 
State rivalry is one of the most consistent features of the global political economy, 
with priorities predominantly defined in geopolitical terms. In the past, states sought 
to improve their national welfare by both the conquest of territory through the use of 
military force (i. e. to conduct a war in order to gain access to another state's resources 
and natural assets) and through economic development sustained by foreign trade. 
Against a background of world-wide structural change including globalisation, 
intemationalisation, the emergence of transnational firms, and the end of the old two- 
superpower system, however, the conduct of war ceased in its importance as a means 
of increasing national welfare 3, giving way to foreign trade as the main means for 
achieving such objectives and an increasing entanglement of commercial policy 
considerations with wider foreign and security concerns. 
1.1.1 The Shift to the Economic Battlefield 
The security links that evolved after the Second World War between the major 
industrialised nations developed a magnitude that reduced the possibilities for war. In 
the wake of these security ties, economic, political and social interactions among the 
main industrial states grew to unprecedented degrees and were facilitated and 
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strengthened by increasing globalisation and the internationalisation of production. 
Europe, North America and Japan may have been competitors in the marketplace, 
divided by their divergent commercial and financial interests, but they did not permit 
themselves to forget that they shared a common interest in maintaining security links. 
Hence, economic rivalries, no matter how potentially explosive, were never allowed 
seriously to endanger the underlying foundations of the Western Alliance. On the 
other hand, even areas of 'hard' security are increasingly penetrated by economics 4, 
with the result that foreign policy is by now largely driven by trade and investment 
considerations. Given the unstable economic and political state of the Soviet Union in 
the late 1990s, there is further reason to believe that the security links will continue to 
matter. Nevertheless, with the waning of the Soviet threat the perceived value of the 
postwar alliance system started to erode and gave way to an intensification of national 
self-interest at the local, national and regional level. With states devoting less 
attention to collective interests, they were increasingly tempted to 'free-ride' in 
international economic relations. Therefore, despite security considerations still being 
a means of identifying the centres of international power, the growing importance of 
trade considerations seems almost irreversible. 
The picture of inter-state rivalry that we are confronted with is thus one that is largely 
played out on what has sometimes been called the 'economic battlefield'. Since states 
are competing more for the means to create wealth within their territory than for 
power over territory (Stopford and Strange, 1991), a situation has developed in which 
conflicts between states increasingly arise in environments that seem strategic. These 
include most visibly high-technology sectors, but are certainly not confined to these 
sectors since, as it is argued below, a global economy and the rise in regional 
regulation of markets render all sectors of the economy subject to a much larger 
playing field. As Bhagwati (1991: 16) explains, with expanding trade and investment 
the globalised world economy has turned into a veritable spider's web, 'where 
everyone is now in everybody else's backyard, making import competition in one's 
own market and export competition in the other's market and in third markets ever 
more fierce'. 
3 Holm and Sorensen (1995) even described the emergence of'post-modem. statcs'between which warfare is 
unthinkable. 
4 For the distinction between 'soft' and'hard'power see Hoffmann (1966). 
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1.1.2 Sources of Trade Friction 
The argument concerning a shift of conflict to the economic battleground makes trade 
frictions the main site for inter-state rivalry. Access to markets has become one of the 
crucial sources of friction in today's global economy. Under the broad title of issues of 
market access, a whole host of potential frictions can be identified, including the 
application of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, the use of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties, rules of origin, import quotas, government procurement, 
industrial subsidies and targeting, standards and testing procedures, research and 
development (R&D) policies, intellectual property protection and traditional forms of 
government intervention and national principles underlying trade and competition 
policy. While many national trade remedies, including anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty laws, act more as a buffer or interface mechanism between 
different economic systems than as a response to traditional trade barriers (Jackson, 
1989: 220-1), the rules of a market place now take a special position in the 
considerations of all market participants and have increasingly become subject to 
considerable controversy. National differences in these rules can be both a barrier to 
trade and transnational investment and a source of competitive advantage or 
disadvantage for companies in particular markets. From this list of trade barriers, it 
becomes apparent that trade barriers encompass trade policy instruments which go far 
beyond traditional border measures and fall into the realm of commercial policy 
instruments. 
A second category of trade conflict emanates from national differences in a wide 
variety of policies and institutions that affect the terms of international competition. 
Here, numerous issues affecting the global regulation of trade are at stake and 
conflicts arise in arenas such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
now the World Trade Organisation (WTO), or the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Moreover, as a consequence of the dramatic 
growth of trade and transnational investment, the concept of trade conflict needs to be 
broadened in order to encompass national structural differences, since even when not 
designed to advantage one set of national producers over another, national structural 
differences play a role in these conflicts. Broad structural differences influence the 
nature and terms of international competition in two ways. Firstly, structural 
differences affect the accessibility of different national markets to foreign 
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competitors. Posing very real structural impediments, national differences in 
regulatory institutions, in antitrust laws and their enforcement may have large though 
not necessarily intended effects on the ability of foreign firms to compete in a 
particular national market. Secondly, structural differences create different incentive 
environments and behavioural tendencies for firms of different nationalities. As Tyson 
(1992: 31) and Ostry (1990) note, competition between firms gestated in different 
national systems is, to some extent, competition among the systems themselves. 
1.1.3 The State andits'Firms: Triangular Diplomacy and the Rise ofRegulation 
Since technology, intellectual investment, and corporate culture have become the 
main driving forces behind the creation of wealth. These factors are now also 
intrinsically linked to state action and conflict in the global economy. As a result, 
world trade is presently much more dynamic and no longer confined to the static 
principle of comparative advantage (Porter, 1998) and a state's competitive advantage 
is not only a function of its factor endowment, but also a function of strategic 
interactions between firms and government and between them and the firms and 
governments of other nations. 
For states, these developments implied a general reduction of sovereignty. 
Governance in the international system used to be constructed around the principle of 
sovereign statehood, with sovereignty according each state supreme, comprehensive 
and exclusive role over its territorial jurisdiction. Owing largely to the growth of 
transnational firms, the meaning of sovereignty has changed to encompass the 
retention of state influence in a given area of regulation, since transnational firms 
have deprived contemporary states not only complete and exclusive control of the 
national currency and associated capital markets, but also of many sectors of 
production. Fearing that if they do not provide sufficiently appealing regulatory 
conditions then firms will desert them, contemporary states depend on transnational 
firms to provide them with important revenues ' including for instance new 
technologies for the creation of new value-adding production activities as well as 
employment opportunities. Subsequently, the role of government is progressively 
shifting towards the provision of an appropriate enabling environment for private 
enterprise and assistance in expanding their business activities into new markets. In 
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the words of Cox (1993: 260) states have become 'transmission belts from the global 
to the national economic spheres'. 
Given the increased movement of factors around the globe and the subsequent 
increase in the importance of creating a suitable environment for businesses to operate 
in, globalisation has contributed to making the area of regulatory policy-making one 
of increasing importances. Accordingly, the regulation of a common market 
increasingly moved into the centre of foreign economic policy-making. Since business 
and states are intrinsically linked in the creation of wealth, it is one of the basic 
premises of this thesis that policy-making with strategic objectives is increasingly 
taking place on what Bressand and Nicolaides (1990) called the 'regulatory middle 
ground'. Here, the changing nature of rules and rule-making processes shape 
interaction processes between the actors involved. The increasingly complex patterns 
of interaction, reflecting the domestic-international linkages and mutual dependencies 
among policy-participants, have been described by Strange and Stopford (1991) as 
'triangular diplomacy', with firms pursuing their own agendas and governments 
pursuing international competitiveness and greater market shares. As it is on the 
regulatory middle ground where transnational strategies and economic diplomacy 
meet, regulation cannot simply be regarded as being a mere technical appendage of 
the political sphere. Rather, regulation can be perceived as 'a central steering 
mechanism overlapping with both the political and the economic sphere as 
traditionally deflned and contributing to the blurring of borders between them' 
(Bressand and Nicolaides, 1990: 3 1). 
1.1.4 The State, Multilateralism and Regionalism 
The diminishment of state sovereignty was also influenced by a growth of multilateral 
governance arrangements after 1945 (see for instance Keohane, 1990; Ruggie, 1992, 
and contributions to Ruggie, 1993). In abandoning unilateral approaches for collective 
regulation of various aspects of world political and economic affairs, governments 
have played key roles in variously facilitating, curbing and otherwise shaping 
transnational activities. Cases of collective economic management have developed 
5 Regulation, as it is used here, covers all rules governing market interactions short of macro-economic steering by 
governments. 
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among governments of the most industrialised countries and include the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), the OECD, the Group of Seven (G-7) consultations, 
as well as world-wide organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (RVIF), 
the World Bank, the GATT and its successor the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
On various occasions these collective initiatives have given states the opportunity to 
establish greater surveillance of and control over transborder processes. For instance, 
governments have used G-7 consultations and RAF meetings to enhance their efforts 
to achieve targets related to inflation, employment, interest levels, balance of 
payments etc. Nevertheless, in multilateral initiatives also limited state's sovereignty 
and authority in the pursuit of greater initiative vis-a-vis transnational business. For 
instance, the IMF and World Bank can exercise a great influence on a government's 
monetary and fiscal policy when designing and monitoring structural adjustment 
programmes. The WTO, on the other hand, commits members to alter their statutes 
and procedures to conform with world trade law. Moreover, in trade disputes, a WTO 
ruling is binding unless every member of the organisation votes to overturn the 
judgement. In these ways and in others, many decisions concerning the regulatory 
environment for trade and investment now come to rather than from the state. 
A different facet of multilateralism can be found in regional economic integration and 
regional co-operation (see for instance Ohmae, 1993,1995; Rosecrance, 1991; Taylor, 
1993; Schott, 1991). Since the late 1980s, the world has witnessed a resurgence of 
regionalism in world politics. The number, scope, and diversity of regionalist schemes 
have grown significantly since the last major regionalist 'wave' in the 1960s. Then, 
Nye (1968) pointed to two major classes of regionalist activity: on the one hand, 
microeconomic organisations involving formal economic activity; and on the other, 
macro-regional organisations concerned with controlling conflict. Today, micro- 
regional schemes for economic integration stand together with arguments for macro- 
economic or 'bloc regionalism' built around the most prominent trading places, the 
EC, the US and Japan, and the regional trade agreements associated and supported by 
them. In pursuing integration with other (neighbouring) economies, states not only 
seek protection from stiff competition by more productive competitors from third 
countries, but also seek the modernisation of their own economies in the face of 
increasing competition from new internal competitors. Depending on the size of the 
gaps in competitiveness, the determination of the pursuit of these aims varies in its 
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degrees. If the competitive advantages of third countries are large, the protective 
function of integration dominates. Under pressure from a hegemonial power or in the 
case of a domination of competitive sectors within an integrated economic space the 
modernisation function dominates (Junne, 1996). The EC/EU, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) are the most prominent examples of states using international agreements as a 
means of pursuing domestic economic goals within a regional framework, with the 
EC/EU being the most advanced experiment into regional integration. In the system of 
quasi trading blocs that emerged in the world economy, each member thrives to 
achieve their goals in a competitive - co-operative three way economic game, or, in 
other words, in a head-to-head race for economic superiority (Thurow, 1992). 
1.1.5 The Changing Role of the State 
Increasing globalisation and intemationalisation of production have also led to 
recurring speculation about the role of the state in the world economy, with many 
writers arguing that the logic of modem economic development is making states 
increasingly powerless to control their economic well-being, if not redundant6. While 
Kindleberger suggested in the late 1960s that 'the nation state is just about through as 
an economic unit'7 , today authors 
like Ohmae (1995) and Naisbitt (1994) advance the 
case that, with the rise of globalisation, the state had seen its day. On the other hand, 
authors such as Hirst and Thompson (1996) or Zysman (1996) refute these arguments, 
arguing that the effects of globalisation on the state have been exaggerated and that 
states maintain many crucial capacities for governance. According to Julius (1997), 
the net effect of globalisation on governments is likely to be an increasing 
concentration of their efforts on a smaller set of more critical tasks, including the 
creation of an environment that enables firms to flourish, the provision of legal, 
justice and price stability as well as infrastructure services. Similarly, Strange (1996) 
described important shifts in the quality as well as quantity of state power and 
authority and Cemy (1989) traced the transition from the welfare state to the 
'competition state' in advanced industrial economies, with governments attempting to 
6 Already early in the twentieth century both Leninists and certain liberal internationalists forecasted the demise of 
the state. Later this century, functionalist theory of international integration reiterated this prediction and in the 
1970s the argument was recycled by some versions of what was called 'transnationalism'. 
7 Quoted from Murray (1971: 85). 
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respond, shape and control growing international interpenetration. Weiss (1997: 13) 
points to the adaptability of states and their differential capacity, built on historically 
framed national institutions and explains that: 
the problem with the 'powerlessness' argument of states is not that it is 
wrong about the new constraints on governments' capacity to make and 
implement policy. Rather it is the assumption that such constraints are 
absolute rather than relative, and that they represent 'the end of history' 
rather than an evolving history of state adaptation to both external and 
internal challenges. 
Consequently, she advances an image of states adapting and reconstituting themselves 
in order to respond to the pressures of globalisation and internationalisation less by 
relying on their own resources than by assuming a dominant role in coalitions of 
states, transnational institutions and private-sector alliances in domestic markets. 
What emerges is a view of the relationship between the state and the global economy 
in terms of subtle interplays of continuity and change, mainly characterised by broad 
underlying continuity in so far as the state and interstate relations persist at the core of 
governance arrangements in IPE. Nevertheless, there is a notable change in the 
character of the state with regard to its capacities, its constituencies, its policy-making 
process, policy content and the strategies it pursues. 
Given that the main object of this investigation is the EC, which by no means can be 
analysed in terms of a state-centric analysis, this leaves the analyst with the 
conceptual problem of having to find a platform or vehicle to analyse the interactions 
between the main actors in the international political economy. In order to bridge this 
gap, the following section makes a case for using the concept of the capacity of 
performing state economic functions in order to create a level playing field. Taking 
into account the effects of globalisation and internationalisation of relative actor 
capacities, this will be done on a general level in order to show that the concept of 
state economic functions enables us to move away from (in the case of the EC 
restricting) state-centric analysis. 
1.2. The Concept of State Economic Functions 
Since there is an increasing non-coincidence of finns and states in the territorial sense, 
the rapid expansion of international firms has raised problems concerning the 
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relationship between political and economic organisation. In the early 1970s, Murray 
made an attempt to deal with this problem by analysing the relationship between the 
state and firms in terms of the performance of state economic functions. He suggested 
that: 
capitalism cannot be analysed as a system without talcing account of the role 
of the state, and that, more particularly, in the process of capitalist 
production and reproduction the state has certain economic functions which 
it will always perform, though in different fonns and to different extents. 
(Murray, 1971: 87) 
In his model, state economic functions for any given capital or coherent body of 
capitals did not need to be exercised by a single authority, though he assumed that 
there generally would be a common authority. Furthermore, the body or bodies that 
perform these state economic functions were not necessarily the governing authorities 
of nation states. In using the term state economic functions, he referred to what he 
called the 'economic respublica, i. e. those economic matters that are public, external 
to individual private capitals (Murray, 1991: 88). 
State economic functions, according to Murray (1971: 87-92) encompass the states' 
role in guaranteeing property rights, economic libcralisation, economic orchestration, 
input provision, intervention for social consensus, and the management of external 
relations. The guaranteeing ofproperty rights is backed by the forces of law and is 
one of the primary functions of the state. In modem times, intellectual property rights 
or fishery rights arc just two interesting areas of application. In economic 
liberalisation the function of the state involves the establishment of conditions for 
free and competitive exchange among the actors of a market place. Hence, the state is 
concerned with the abolition of restrictions on the four freedoms, as well as the 
standardisation. of currency, economic law and product safety standards. Murray 
himself cites the Common Market, as established through the Treaty of Rome, as an 
example of such liberalisation (Murray, 1971: 88). Within advanced industrial 
countries economic liberalisation is primarily regressive in character and, amongst 
others, takes the form of anti-monopoly legislation, action against restrictive practices 
and other barriers to trade. In the area of economic orchestration the function of the 
state includes the regulation of business cycles as well as economic planning and 
steering. The role of public bodies in this case contrasts with their retiring role in 
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economic liberalisation and is a more active form of intervention. A fourth state 
function is the provision of input. Here, public agencies have the function of securing 
the availability of labour, land, capital, technology, economic infrastructure, and 
general manufactured goods. The state has furthermore the function of interveningfor 
social consensus. Here the state is concerned with the mollyfication of the most 
disruptive effects of economic processes on the national constituencies. This area 
involves state activity directed at the negative effects of disruptions such as the effects 
of pollution, wide regional disparities, or unequal work conditions. Lastly, the state 
has the function to manage the external relations of a market place. Since there is no 
closed economic system in an increasingly interdependent world, the organisation of 
the market and political interest spheres of a system vis-ii-vis foreign systems is a 
prime function of states. In respect to business, the public bodies have both an 
aggressive and a defensive function. The first is designed to help domestic businesses 
in their expansion into foreign markets and includes the dismantling of discriminatory 
practices in other economic areas, i. e. tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, as well as 
generally supporting the activities of businesses in foreign markets. The latter consists 
of defending market-dominating positions of domestic business relative to foreign 
business, and thus involves for instance maintenance of discriminations against 
foreign competitors, tariffs, or maintaining preferential trading agreements favourable 
to domestic business. As the instruments used in the performance of state economic 
functions, Murray (1971: 92-3) short-lists military power, aid or foreign public 
assistance (used to assist national firms engaged in foreign competition through 
lowering costs or, by threatening to withdraw established aid flows, to protect the 
property rights of domestic firms abroad as well as to induce the receiving country to 
lower trade discriminations), commercial sanctions, financial sanctions in terms of the 
blocking offunds, and government controls within the domestic territory (such as 
reserving certain sectors for domestic industry and the prevention of particular take- 
overs or discriminatory buying policies). 
Building on Murray's framework, it is argued that in an increasingly globalised and 
internationalised world state actors have to concentrate on the provision of state 
economic functions vis-ti-vis their constituencies in order to secure their economic 
well-being. It is assumed that although all state actors are concerned with the 
performance of these state economic functions, they may not perform the same ones 
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and may differ in the strategies applied in order to perform these. Moreover, 
differences among state actors in their internal preferences and political institutions 
have an impact on the overall performance of state economic functions. As the 
processes of globalisation and intemationalisation affect the action capacities of all 
actors to a greater or lesser extent and in different ways, it is therefore proposed to 
concentrate on the concept of state economic functions as it enables the analyst to 
move away from traditional state-centric analysis and to create an analytical level 
playing field upon which inter-state rivalry/competition in today's international 
political economy is carried out and can be evaluated. In particular, in the context of 
an investigation into the ECs strategic action capacities (in chapter two), the concept 
of state economic functions offers a way of analysing the presence and impact of the 
non-state entity of the EC in an increasingly globalised economy that nonetheless 
continues to be quantitatively dominated by the interplay of state actors 8. 
First, however, the concept of state economic functions needs to be brought into the 
context of interactions in the international political economy on a general level. 
Taking into account that the nature of commercial interactions has undergone some 
significant developments since Murray suggested his framework, the framework 
needs to be adapted to the the circumstances of the current IPE. Using the concept of 
state economic functions as an analytical tool therefore requires a more detailed 
analysis of the relationship between the main actors, governments and firms, linked as 
they are in the formulation and implementation of wealth-creating policies. In 
particular, attention has to be given to the changes that this relationship underwent 
and to implications for their capacities under conditions of increasing globalisation 
and internationalisation. 
1.2.1 The Relationship between States and Business 
The relationship between the state and business is traditionally at the very heart of 
wealth-creating policies. As has been argued above, increasing globalisation and 
internationalisation have two important consequences on the relationship between the 
two: firstly, business has outgrown national boundaries, thereby creating tensions 
8 This approach is nevertheless limited to assessing advanced and industrialised states as it degenerates somewhat 
when it comes to less developed countries and newly developed countries. 
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between the way the world is organised politically and the way it is organised 
economically. Secondly, globalisation has led to a reduction of national autonomy in 
the determination of wealth-creating policies, as a consequence of which the process 
of generating and implementing wealth-creating policies have been re-configured. In 
other words, though governments and businesses remain intrinsically linked in 
wealth-creating policies, the nature and forms of interactions between them have been 
redefined. At the same time that governments not only find it increasingly difficult to 
legislate effectively on behalf of the national electorate and to intervene in the process 
of wealth-creation, firms generally enjoy greater freedom in the determination of their 
strategies. 
The argument of globalisation holds that there is a general tendency toward 
transnationalism, implying that firms have become footloose and detach themselves 
from their traditional national state institutional environment should these hinder, 
rather than support them sufficiently in their business activity, or fail to provide them 
with an environment that enables their activities to flourish. Under such 
circumstances, the argument goes, firms simply switch their operating environment by 
moving their business activity into a different environment. States and national 
governments are forced to watch powerlessly. It is the view of this author that such 
arguments are exaggerated. For a start, the number of truly transnational firms is 
relatively small. Secondly, there are studies that show that the importance of the 
homebase remains the rule, not the exception (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Sally, 
1996). Subsequently, there is a suggestion that the advantages of maintaining a firm 
home or regional base may actually be stronger than ever and perhaps for most 
companies outweigh those of gains from going global. Third, while money and 
finance can certainly be regarded as global in scope and practice, the same can 
certainly not be said of production, trade or corporate practice, all of which are not yet 
as mobile as the former (Zysman, 1996; Gurnmet, 1996). Fourth, while firms can 
threaten to exit a given economy, there are many reasons to believe that firms are not 
simply undifferentiated corporate actors, but are closely linked to their suppliers and 
banks as well as they are intimately engaged in the formulation and implementation of 
public policies (Porter, 1998: 126-8). In a nutshell, national embeddedness still 
matters. What changed, however, is firms' ability to play 'sophisticated political 
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games', which has increased and opened up their room for manoeuvre in their 
interactions with governments. 
The globalisation argument holds that states have become virtually powerless to make 
policy choices (Ohmae, 1995; Naisbitt, 1994), i. e. that they are victims of 
globalisation. The view adopted here sees the notion of the powerless state as 
misleading, since states have always existed under circumstances of continuity and 
change, requiring them to engage in a constant bargaining relationship with society. 
Since states are organisations that would like to survive, they are forced to change, 
adapt and bargain with societal and economic actors. As Tilly (1985: 172) noted in his 
work on European state building, leaders of nascent states engaged in war with 
adjacent powerholders, needed to extract resources from local producers and traders, 
forcing them to establish regular access to capitalists who could supply and arrange 
credit. As capitalists were capable of movement, it was important for state officials to 
form alliances with various social classes and to foster capital accumulation. They 
were thus confronted with a double-edged imperative of having to harness domestic 
wealth so as to strengthen the state's foreign position, and to do so in a way that would 
not scare off capitalists or diminish economic growth. The logic of the state 
bargaining with society is no less relevant for an analysis of states in the 
contemporary IPE. There is a constant pressure for national adjustment to 
international change, produced by constant differential change. As Gilpin (1981: 13) 
noted: 
In every international system there are continual occurrences of political, 
economic and technological changes that promise gains and losses for one or 
another actors ... In every system, therefore, a process of 
disequilibriurn and 
adjustment is constantly taldng place. 
This differential change may involve system-wide economic upheavals, such as the 
oil crisis in the 1970s, or may be more gradual, as in the the changing competitive 
position of particular industrial sectors in advanced industrialised economies. The 
state will therefore either generate new opportunities for aggressive domestic response 
to international change or will generate pressure for defensive action to preserve 
existing domestic arrangements (Gilpin, 1981; see also Jones, 1981; Vasquez and 
Mansbach, 1983). Rather than counterposing nation state and globalisation as 
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antinomies, globalisation is therefore seen here as a by-product of states promoting 
the internationalisation strategies of businesses and sometimes 'internationalising' 
state capacities (Weiss, 1997). 
The argument thus put forward here concerning the power of states in a globalised 
world emphasises the following points (cf. Weiss, 1997: 18-26): Firstly, state 
adaptation rather than a decline of functions. The capacity for domestic adjustment 
strategy does not stand or fall with macro-economic capacity, rather it rests on 
industrial strategy and the ability of policy-making authorities to mobilise savings and 
investment and to promote their deployment for the generation of higher value-added 
activities. Furthermore, a state's capacity for a co-ordinated and strategic response 
primarily rests on institutional arrangements. The institutional arrangements bring 
together state and industry in close, albeit not tension-free, co-operation and underpin 
rapid structural change and technological learning (Weiss, 1997: 18-20). Secondly, 
that strong states are facilitators and not victims of internationalisation. states are not 
simply victims, but may well be facilitators of so-called globalisation. Evidence 
drawn from East Asia in particular (Weiss, 1997: 18-20) suggests that some states are 
acting increasingly as catalysts for the internationalisation strategies of businesses. 
Japan and other newly industrialised countries (NICs) provide a wide array of 
incentives to finance and assist overseas operations, promote technological alliances 
between national and foreign firms, and encourage regional relocation of production 
networks. While it is not suggested that all states are engaged in facilitating the 
internationalisation of business, the point is that the most industrially dynamic and 
highly co-ordinated market economies are and that this attests to state adaptiveness. 
Thirdly, states are undergoing changes in their power and capacities, but these have to 
do with the reconstruction of power around the consolidation of domestic and 
international linkages (and not with the diminution of state power and capacities). To 
the extent that states are seeking to adapt and reconstitute themselves they can be seen 
as catalytic states that seek to achieve their goals by using collaborative power 
arrangements to create more real control over their economies and by assuming a 
dominant role in a coalition of states, transnational institutions and businesses. Thus 
the notion of catalytic states is used to highlight the tendency of states to seek 
adaptation to new challenges by forging or developing partnerships with other state 
and non-state actors. These coalitions take place primarily on the regional and 
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international level between states (examples of which include the EC/EU, NAFTA 
and APEC), but also between states and businesses (examples of which can be found 
particularly in East Asia, but also in the EC's market access initiative). The responses 
of states to the pressures of globalisation have therefore not been uniform, but varied 
according to political and institutional differences and have generally involved the 
pursuit of two strategies, namely the strengthening of power alliances both upwards 
(inter-state coalitions) and downwards (state-business alliances)(Weiss, 1997: 24-6). 
It emerges that in the globalised world the most successful states will be those which 
can improve their conventional power resources with collaborative power and engage 
with other states and businesses to form co-operative agreements and form interest 
coalitions for action on changing issue areas (Weiss, 1997: 26). As the relationship 
between firms and government is at the very heart of state capacity and wealth- 
creating policies, it is the most important partnership for state actors. One important 
feature of the gobalised international political economy is that interactions between 
the two increasingly shifted to the 'regulatory middleground' (Bressand and 
NicolaYdis, 1990), where transnational strategies and economic diplomacy meet in 
order to write the rules of a market place. Rules now tend to be both generated by 
actors as an intrinsic part of the routine of economic interactions and tailored to the 
specific interactions to which they apply. As a result, it is not only political decisions 
that matter in the writing of the rules of a market place, but also the logic of 
custornised regulatory interactions as they bring together public and private actors into 
synergetic interactions. Regulating any aspect of economic life in a market place thus 
brings together public and private actors in internal and strategic bargaining games. 
Moreover, regulatory policy-making does not only shape the running of market 
places, but also has an external dimension as it supplements commercial policy 
instruments, such as the setting of tariffs and countervailing trade measures. 
Consequently, it is argued here that regulatory policy-making and commercial policy 
instruments have become complementary means of pursuing internally generated 
objectives of a (territorial) market place. The latter attracts considerably more 
attention as they are the stuff of international trade disputes due to their often 
aggressive and protectionist use. It is therefore suggested that regulatory policy- 
making and the application of commercial policy instruments be viewed as the tools 
of inter-state rivalry. 
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Up to this point, it has been argued that globalisation and internationalisation have 
affected the action capacities of actors and changed the nature of interactions between 
them. It has been stressed that state actors have adapted the functions they perform, 
acting as facilitators of the internationalisation strategies of domestic actors and 
consolidating national and regional networks in order to perform state economic 
functions. Furthermore, it has been argued that state actors' capacities crucially rest on 
industrial policy, institutional arrangements and the capacity to promote business 
activities abroad. In the course of this reconfiguration process, state actors have 
moved away from power politics based purely on national resources and have 
reconstructed their capacities around the consolidation of domestic and international 
linkages. In the pursuit of state economic functions, state actors have therefore come 
to act as catalysts, using collaborative power arrangements. The shift away from the 
use of national power resources to the use of collaborative power arrangements 
implies an increased reliance on bargaining, involving an increased set of actors and 
international institutions, and the consideration of a different set of factors in the 
determination of wealth-creating policies. Consequently, state actors have to devise a 
set of often complex strategies in order to pursue state economic functions. It is this 
reliance on strategies and strategic action capacities that will now be analysed. 
1.3. The Concept of Strategic Action in IPE 
The conception of the state as a strategic actor goes back at least as far Machaivelli 
and is at the heart of the realist version of international relations. Realist tradition, 
however, has primarily been concerned with the state's struggle for power, wealth and 
survival, whereas this thesis has made a case for concentrating on the provision of 
state economic functions given the changing nature of interactions between actors in 
the international political economy and the entanglement of commercial policy 
considerations with wider foreign policy and security concerns. It is thus concerned 
with the idea of purposive actors in the international political economy, lodged 
between national and international arenas and pursing state economic functions via 
regulatory, commercial and industrial policy-making. The remainder of this chapter is 
devoted to developing a comprehensive framework for the evaluation of the strategic 
action capacities of actors in the international political economy. 
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1.3.1 Forms ofStrategic Action in IPE 
The notion of strategy has traditionally been applied to warfare between states, but 
today it is also applied to all sorts of economic situations and commercial games 
(Brodie, 1968: 28 1). In his seminal work, The Strategy of Conjlict, Schelling (1960: 15) 
defines a strategy as one that: 
takes conflict for granted, but also assumes common interests between the 
adversaries; it assumes a 'rational' value-maximising mode of behaviour; and 
it focuses on the fact that each participant's best choice of action depends on 
what he expects the other to do, and that 'strategic behaviour' is concerned 
with influencing one's choice by working on his expectation of how one's 
own behaviour is related to his'. (Quotation marks in the original). 
Adopted to the purpose of this study, Schelling's definition implies that world-wide 
interdependence structures interactions and that interactions are characterised by the 
co-existence of conflict and common interests. The assumed 'rational' value- 
maximising mode of behaviour reduces the scope of using military resources in the 
pursuit of state economic functions. Thus, war is only one option, but may not be an 
option at all. Given that adversaries are experienced in dealing with one another, the 
choice of the course of action will take potential (expected) counter-responses into 
account and is mainly concerned with getting others to do what they would otherwise 
not do. 
Flamm (1996) identified three distinct though related forms of state strategic action in 
the international political economy. The first one holds that states may adopt strategic 
policies in order to protect their national defence base. Such an argument posits that in 
a given economy there are some sectors of eminent importance for the national 
defence base. The rationale of these policies under conditions of globalisation are 
certainly questionable, since economic realities render any attempt to achieve a broad 
self-sufficiency too costly to sustain and the developments in communications and 
transport make it increasingly difficult to speak of purely national capacities (cf. 
Flamm, 1996). Yet they are still commonly found in the 1990s. The second and 
probably best known concept of strategic action is based on Schelling's (1960) 
Strategy of Conj7ict and is derived from the field of game theory. It defines strategic 
actions as those actions that are intended to influence the moves of other players. 
Schelling's approach recently found its application in an investigation of transatlantic 
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bargaining processes by Meunier (1997), which showed that in these negotiations a 
strength in the EC's negotiation stance can be found that is derived from the 
Commission's inability to seal deals. In other words, the institutional constraints of the 
EC can - somewhat paradoxically - also be used to achieve strategic objectives. The 
third type of strategic action is also derived from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict and 
finds its expression in the pursuit of strategic trade policies. The theory of strategic 
trade policies has been developed by scholars like Krugman (1986) and, like the first 
conception, it posits the existence of sectors of strategic importance in a given 
economy. The difference is that these sectors are not necessarily linked to defence, but 
deemed to be of central importance to the functioning of an economy due to their 
linkages with other sectors. Again, its economic feasibility and justification is 
questionable (Flamm 1996: 372-3). Yet it has also been acknowledged that under 
certain conditions, namely the existence of trade barriers in oligopolistic sectors and 
the case of spill-overs creating externalties that result in economic benefits, strategic 
trade policies appear justifiable and feasible. Designed to alter the behaviour of 
foreign companies and governments in what is deemed to be a strategic environment, 
they are mostly found in oligopolistic sectors, where the number of market actors 
making independent decisions is relatively small (for example aviation), or in so- 
called infant industries (high-technology sectors). Nevertheless, they also find 
application in sectors with numerous market actors and a special importance to the 
self-sufficiency of the economy as a whole (for example telecommunications). 
In the previous two sections of this chapter, the analysis was placed in the context of 
increasing globalisation and internationalisation, with actors forced to adopt a set of 
strategies in order to perform state economic functions. It therefore follows that the 
problems in a states' political and economic position within the larger international 
environment are a basic source of state behaviour and international conflict. The 
nexus of the internal and the external has been the subject of previous studies 
attempting to explain international outcomes of conflict through the development of 
detailed bargaining models. For instance, in their work Conflict Among Nations: 
Bargaining, Decision-Making and System Structure in International Crises, Snyder 
and Diesing (1977) showed that the manoevering of states within national and 
international arenas can be conceived of as controlled by strategies that states develop 
to cope with adaptation problems. Inspired by Schelling's (1968) work on strategic 
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bargaining and Young's (1968) work on bargaining during international crisis, this 
work presented a theory of international crisis behaviour, conceived chiefly as 
bargaining behaviour, and included the effects of international system structures and 
the decision-making activities of the actors on the bargaining process. They conceive 
of both 'the international system and domestic systems as embracing different sets of 
relatively static factors that constrain and shape the dynamic processes of interstate 
bargaining and internal decision-making' (Snyder and Diesing, 1977: 31). The 
domestic factors they had in mind were 'such things as national style in foreign policy, 
governmental structures, political party philosophies, bureaucratic roles, the 
personalities of decision-makers and public opinion' (Snyder and Diesling, 1977: 3 1). 
External systemic variables, on the other hand, affect the bargaining process through 
their impact on the minds of decision-makers and stand in relation to the internal 
variables as sources of 'general compulsions and constraints that establish the range of 
choice within which the internal forces peculiar to each state combine to produce 
decisions' (Snyder and Diesling, 1977: 31). Subsequently, the actors concerned with 
the provision of state economic functions can be perceived as strategists in the context 
of domestic and international arenas. Furthermore, there are limits to their freedom of 
action imposed by domestic and international structural constraints. 
1.3.2 Identifying the Parameters OfStrategic Action Capacities 
In order to generate a research framework that allows for the evaluation of strategic 
action capacities of actors in IPE, domestic and international constraints and factors 
that determine the capacity of actors to pursue state economic functions need to be 
investigated further. For this reason, analysis now turns to the literature on IPE and 
foreign economic policy-making (FEP), from which additional insights can be derived 
concerning the factors that should be taken into account in order to evaluate strategic 
action capacities. In order to manage the vast and complex material that is available, 
the existing approaches are grouped into five categories consisting of 
systemic/structural approaches, societal approaches, institutionalist approaches, statist 
approaches, and cognitive and belief-centred approaches (see Mercado, 1995). 
Collectively, these identify a range of political, market and social variables at 
international and domestic levels of analysis. The purpose of this review is not so 
much to provide a detailed discussion of the validity, shortcomings or merits of these 
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approaches, but rather to identify the key parameters on which an evaluation of 
strategic action capacities should rest. 
1.3.2.1 System iclStructural, 4pproaches 
These approaches work from the 'outside-in! and focus on the sovereign state as the 
principal actor, i. e. as a rational and unitary actor (Waltz, 1979), and theoretical 
propositions are derived from the inter-relationships between states for whom 
opportunities are afforded and constraints imposed by their relative capabilities or 
power as units in an 'anarchic' international system (cf. Ikenberry et al., 1988: 3). In 
the study of FEP, emphasis is placed on the international forces and relative state 
capacities in an 'anarchic' international system that limits the action capacities of 
states (structural realism) and the extent to which states are limited in their 
international pursuits by external institutions (neo-liberal institutionalism). Here, the 
international political economy is conceived as a system of institutional and structural 
constraints that limit the choices of states in the international arena (Ramesh, 
1994: 79). The size of its economy and the scale of trade interdependence as well as 
structural strength determine the position a state occupies in the international sphere. 
According to structural-realist analysis, foreign economic policy rests with the realist 
premise that international relations are a 'recurring struggle for wealth and power 
among independent actors in a state of anarchy' (Gilpin, 1981: 7). For example, 
Krasner (1976) suggests that foreign economic policy is primarily set to increase 
economic and competitive power in accordance with state priorities and the pursuit of 
the national interest and that a nation's trade policy reflects its foreign policy. One 
variant of realism, hegemonic, stability theory, asserts that a concentration of power 
resources in a single state will lead to stability and openness in the international 
economy and that the desire and capacity of states to create an open trading system 
can be attributed to the existence of a hegemonic power (Kindleberger, 1973, Lake 
1988, Gowa, 1993). However, controversy has arisen over many aspects of 
hegemonic stability theory (Strange, 1987). In particular, the role of the hegemon can 
be seen in two different lights (Snidal, 1985), contributing to a split in the literature 
between a coercive view of the hegemon and a more benign one. The key features of 
this perspective are thus the relegation of economic policy-making to a wider foreign 
32 
policy and security interests, the notion of hegemony, and the assumption that states 
in positions of strength can persuade weaker states to do what they would not 
otherwise do. 
Neo-liberal institutionalist theory also places great emphasis on the necessity of a 
hegemon for the provision of international public goods, but draws particular attention 
to systemic limits on state behaviour relating to the existence of exogeneous 
institutions as opposed to capabilities and interests alone. The structure of institutions, 
such as the GATT and the IMF, is described as 'persistent and connected sets of rules 
(formal and informal) that prescribe behaviour rules, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations' (Keohane, 1989: 163). This structure, which draws attention to the 
constraining role played by institutions such as the GATT, the legal framework 
governing trade, and to the relative capacities of states to set, enforce and act outside 
of GATT codes, does not detennine state behaviour, but limits policy choices and 
constrains what states can do in the international arena in relation to state capacities. 
Ramesh (1994: 80), for instance, points out that the GATT sets the parameters of the 
signatory states' choices in trade policy and that the extent to which states are 
circumscribed by international institutions varies according to their position in the 
intemational political economy. Again, the position and protectionist capacity of 
states is determined by the size of the economy and the form and level of trade 
dependence. Subsequently, smaller and trade-dependent economies are vulnerable to 
retaliation by trading partners and constrained in their capacity to impose trade 
barriers ruled out under the GATT. Conversely, larger economies enjoy greater 
freedom of action from institutionalised intemational rules and greater coercive 
power. 
Stressing how states are driven by the pursuit of power and wealth (in other words the 
falfilment of state economic functions), structural realist and liberal institutional 
approaches are an essential component for any analysis of strategic action capacities 
as they show how states are constrained by both their relative capacities vis-b-vis 
other states and international institutionalised rules and codes. The impact of domestic 
politics is not taken into consideration by these approaches, apart from a few 
exceptions that incorporate domestic market and domestic political variables (for 
instance Lake, 1988). They generally fail to explain why particular policy outcomes 
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emerge in a universe of possible outcomes conditioned by structural forces and 
institutionalised orders. 
1.3.2.2 Society-Centred. 4pproaches 
Society-centred approaches generally take an 'insight-out' approach. In highlighting 
the importance of domestic politics in explaining outcomes, approaches grouped 
under this headline encompass the study of markets, micro-politics and socio- 
economic interests and subsequently relax the notion of the state as a unitary actor. In 
contrast to the 'outside-in' way of analysis of systemic and global/structural 
approaches, these approaches reverse the process and analyse the demands of 
corporate actors and sectors in changing macro-market conditions on government. 
There are two distinct approaches in this field. The first approach aims at explaining 
government behaviour and responsiveness to societal pressures in terms of organised 
societal coalitions that underpin political administrations (Gourevitch 1986). The 
anchor point of this approach is the effective control of government and policy by 
identified dominant social coalitions. Here, government receptivity to private interests 
is dependent upon changes in coalitions and the composition and interests of a 
coalition at a given time. The second approach, and one adopted more widely, is 
essentially a micropolitical analysis focusing on firstly, interest group studies and 
corporate preference models, and secondly, on explanations of producer group 
pressures for protection, showing that corporate groups are often driven by market 
conditions. These public choice approaches concentrate on the distribution of tariff 
and trade restrictions and on the character of trade and import policies and interpret 
political action, i. e. corporate lobbying and the actions of politicians, as utility 
maximising behaviour in the face of shifting market conditions. 
Magee and Young (1987), for instance, suggest that macro-economic factors such as 
cyclical variables (i. e. unemployment levels, real exchange and inflation rates), 
shifting factor endowments and terms of trade underpin domestic lobbying. 
Subsequently, when inflation increases, domestic forces oppose trade restrictions. 
Conversely, rising unemployment has the opposite effect. Milner (1988a, b), on the 
other hand, developed an explanation of industrial lobbying and preference-ordering 
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that postulates competition between protectionist and anti-protectionist interests. In 
analysing US trade policies, she identifies macro-economic pressures and changing 
degrees of international economic integration as influencing corporate trade 
preferences. Here, inter-industry variations in terms of a degree of support for 
protectionist intervention are explained through the key variables of international 
linkage and export reliance. As domestic market conditions worsen for industries 
focused upon the home market and increased import penetration erodes those 
indigenous industries' market shares, incentives for lobbying for protection are great. 
Yet even in industries which face heightened import penetration an interest is 
maintained in open exchange that in many cases is powerful enough to stimulate 
counter-demands against protectionst policies and actions (Milner, 1988: 361-2). 
There is a strong case for the value of a sectoral approach in considering the influence 
of transnational relations (see also Strange, 1976; or Underhill, 1990: 188-92), but 
Milner brings the point home: 
(the] proliferation of domestic policy structures indicates that trade policy is 
not made within one structure. Many economic actors are involved, and they 
bring their complaints and pressures to bear on different political actors. 
Moreover, no single, coherent national trade policy exists. The policy 
relating to one sector of the economy may differ completely from that 
concerning another. Moreover, for each of these industries, the influence of 
Congress, the executive, and the International Trade Commission varies. A 
knowledge of the relevant domestic actors and their trade preferences is 
essential to understanding the influence of the particular policy structure for 
that sector on the policy outcome. (Milner, 1988b: 359-60) 
On the whole, society-centred approaches identify domestic political structure, 
characterised by rent-seeking by politicians and special interests, as important 
variables of trade policy. Moreover, they advance a case for identifying industrial 
profiles and macro-economic conditions as they are favourable or unfavourable for 
protection. As such, they capture in some sense at least the balance of political forces 
that enter the trade policy-making process and provide us with greater knowledge of 
the political expression of protectionist and free-trade interests. Society-centred 
approaches are clearly complementary to systemic and global approaches. In the 
context of the study of actors' strategic action capacities, they enlarge the focus to the 
identification of domestic decision-making structures and sectoral industrial profiles, 
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changing macro-market conditions, and the competition between protectionist and 
free-trade interests of socio-economic actors. 
1.3.2.3 StatistApproaches 
Statist theories of FEP focus on executive actors, state strength, and the defence of the 
national interest. According to Cowhey (1990: 225), statist theory holds that: 
an elite group of executive branch institutions and officials tries to steer 
foreign policy in accord with the dictates of the competitive environment of 
international relations. Domestic politics may sometimes thwart their efforts 
but the dynamics of these institutional guardians of foreign policy provide 
the continuity and direction of the heart of foreign economic policy. 
It is thus an analysis that highlights how key state actors may, under international and 
internal constraints, be prominent figures in the shaping of policies and subsequently 
focuses on goal-purposive behaviour and personal ambition of key individuals. 
Furthermore, it treats the state as an actor seeking a national interest formed not by 
social pressures or a bargaining game between social forces and elements of the state, 
but according to autonomous ideologies, preferences and perceptions of the state elite. 
Confronted with the preferences of social actors, the ideological and policy 
preferences of decision-makers are seen as generally transcendent and autonomous 
from social pressures. 
Nevertheless, their capacity to steer policy along the lines of their autonomous 
preferences relates fundamentally to the strength of the state in question. The strength 
of a state, according to Krasner (1978) and Zysman (1983) is a function of the degree 
of centralisation of state structures, the insulation of the executive from other actors, 
and the centrality and autonomy of bureaucratic organisations capable of 
programmatic policy planning. In this context, static theory applies a weak/strong 
state concept, with Krasner (1978) showing the authority of the executive in so-called 
'weak' states where the subject of policy is highly strategic. Here, the foreign 
economic policy area is one of the key policy domains, with Mastanduno (1988) 
pointing out that if trade issues are judged to be of direct national security 
significance, state officials are likely to enjoy even greater authority. 
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Ikenberry's (1986) study of the state and its strategies of adjustment justifies particular 
attention. It generally falls into the realm of statist analysis because of its focus on 
state elites as the crucial actors within the adjustment process of states in IPE. 
Focusing on the manoevering of states between national and international arenas, he 
explores the basis upon which adjustment choices are made and identifies two 
dimensions along which these choices are made, i. e. the location of adjustment 
(international or domestic arenas) and offensive and defensive strategies (Ikenberry, 
1986: 57-9). The strategy of offensive international adjustment involves the creation of 
new rules of the game for international interactions in bodies such as the GATT. 
Defensive international adjustment strategies focus on the mitigation of adverse 
effects of international economic change. Here, international agreements are used in 
order to protect existing domestic industries, with a number of countries co-operating 
by means such as the negotiation of trade quotas and orderly market arrangements. A 
domestic offensive strategy aims at changing the structure of national industries and 
institutions in an effort to cope with new international realities. This may involve 
phasing out or encouraging the growth of particular industries or creating new 
institutions and arrangements that facilitate domestic economic adjustment. On the 
one hand, this strategy may involve vigorous and anticipatory government action, 
such as investment in research and development or devices to encourage or coerce 
private firms to alter their behaviour in order to gain an advantage over competitors. 
On the other hand, the government may abstain from intervention, let market forces 
run their course and act as a 'gate keeper'. Domestic defensive adjustment is of a 
protectionist nature, seeks to avoid change, and comes in the form of erecting barriers 
to international competition or other forms of change. Where choices are available, 
the study predicts that state elites will adopt these strategies in the same sequence as 
they are presented here. This preference ranking predicts what states will seek to 
achieve, but there are domestic and international structural constraints that determine 
what is possible. Furthermore, structure ultimately limits adjustment strategy. The 
term structure is defined from the perspective of the actor itself. Subsequently,: 
domestic structure determines the ability of states to alter the behaviour of 
domestic actors, and international structure defines the access of the state to 
international rules and norms. Structure may be different for different states: 
A small state with few resources will find structures at the international level 
more inflexible than a larger state with resources capable of changing 
international regimes and arrangements. Domestic structures also differ. 
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Some states will find their domestic institutions and groups less tractable 
than others. Structural properties attached to these differences in the 
configuration of their domestic economic and political institutions ... provide 
powerful constraints on the exercise of state action. (Ikenberry, 1986: 65) 
Yet, the concentration of statist theory on the relationship between executive official 
and state structure and on the goal-purposive behaviour of the executive, leaves open 
the question as to the role of intra-institutional dynamics and bureaucratic politics in 
commercial policy-making and negotiations. Frieden (1988: 88), for instance refutes 
the autonomy of state actors from societal demands and argues that the national 
interest is not a blank slate written upon at will, but is 'internally determined by the 
socio-economic evolution of the nation in questioe. Similarly, the notion of strong 
and weak states is challenged by several studies (for instance NEIner, 1988a and 
1988b), showing that in so-called strong states legislatures' specialised interests have 
reversed the judgements of state officials and blocked their power to shape outcomes. 
There is also a branch of statist literature that encompasses institutionalist ideas in an 
essentially state-centric analysis (for instance Skocpol, 1985; Goldstein, 1989,1993; 
and Ikenberry, 1988a and 1988b), but these do not fully account for organisational 
bases and complex bureaucratic policies of trade policy making. Although these 
encompass the view that institutions have a major effect on the process of domestic 
politics and that institutional structure is influential upon foreign economic policy, 
they are primarily concerned with the 'state as an actor' rather than the 'state as a 
structure'. Static literature may take the analytical middleground between reducing 
foreign economic policy to bureaucratic politics and externally-driven rational 
governance (Cowhey, 1990: 229), but it does not necessarily account for the 
bureaucratic layer of the state. For example, given that the EC policy-making system, 
as shown by Patterson (1983), is characterised by bureaucratic policy-making, there is 
a case for a fuller institutional approach to the understanding of trade policies, 
including as a central element an attention to inter-organisational or 'intra-branch' 
politics and to bureaucratic organisation within institutional complexes. 
1.3.2.4 Cognitive Approaches 
The cognitive perspective begins with the premise that 'political behaviour is partly a 
function of leader's and public's values, policy beliefs, and ideologies, and that 
38 
differences and changes in these ideas will shift policies accordingly' and assumes that 
'policy ideas, while affected by material interests, are not simply reducible to them; 
values and beliefs have more complex origins and can have independent effects on 
policy content' (Odell, 1990: 149). As Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 12) point out: 
By ordering the world, ideas may shape agendas, which can profoundly 
shape outcomes. Insofar as ideas put blinders on people, reducing the 
number of conceivable options, they serve as switchmen, not only by turning 
action onto certain tracks rather than others ... but also by obscuring the other 
tracks from the agent's view. 
The idea of a cognitive impact on trade policy formulation is increasingly spreading 
into trade studies. Rohrlich's (1987) 'cognitive dynamics model', for instance, 
contends not only that decision-makers' preferences and generally dominant beliefs 
are important in their definition of a situation, but also that there are broad influential 
social perceptions or philosophies that 'guide' policy-making. Thus the entire policy- 
making community is subject to and constrained by an economic culture which 
legitimates the methods and goals involved in the ordering of the states' economic life. 
He develops the concept of an economic culture that is the confluence of cultural 
legacy, historic experience and contemporary circumstance (1987: 92). More recently, 
Haas (1992) and Drake and NicolaYdes -(1992) developed the idea of 'epistemic 
communities' (communities of experts and technocrats) and stressed the idea of 
intellectual innovation of policy entrepreneurs and experts as agents in shaping and 
reshaping the interpretations of decision-makers. The body of literature on epistemic 
communities represents a valuable complement to competitive and belief-centred 
approaches by adding specification on how ideas emerge, spread and change. 
Epistemic communities, interactive with national and transnational bureaucracy, 
'function more or less as cognitive baggage handlers as well as gatekeepers governing 
the entry of new ideas into institutions' (Haas, 1992: 27). These channel advice and 
expertise at times of uncertainty among policy-makers, as shown by developments in 
international economic co-operation and international trade. For instance, in the field 
of regulation, where policy and governmental responsibility meet over ever more 
complex issues, there is convincing evidence of policy-maker's use of networks of 
communities of specialists9. In specific issue areas, this body of analysis suggests how 
9 See Drake and Nicolaidis (1992) for an example of the influential role of such communities in framing the 
discussions over international trade in services in the context of the Uruguay Round. 
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states identify their interests as a function of how their problems are understood and 
that this understanding is heavily influenced by those to whom they turn for advice 
and by those who can illuminate the salient dimensions of an issue (Haas, 1992: 4). In 
this view, state interests are seen to have a non-systemic origin and state actors are 
seen to be 'uncertainty reducers' as well as power and wealth producers. On the other 
hand, transnational linkages between epistemic communities are identified as a source 
of international co-operation and internationalised policy co-ordination. Shared beliefs 
within transnational networks are thus a key factor in enhanced international policy 
convergence. However, only select issues stimulate sufficient uncertainty among 
policy-makers to give central importance to the advice of experts in the calculation of 
state interest. Moreover, it is very likely that leaders will only defer to technical 
expertise if that expertise dovetails with established objectives, existing preferences 
and calculated political expediency. Yet, in conditions of uncertainty and in less 
politically motivated cases, sufficient evidence exists to conclude that epistemic 
community members can circumscribe boundaries, delimit options, and influence the 
actual choice of policies. 
A similar approach falling into this realm focuses on 'policy frames' and 'policy 
advocacy coalitions' (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier 1998; Dudley and 
Richardson, 1996,1999; Rein and Sch6n, 1991; Hall, 1993). This approach holds that 
in the form of 'policy frames' ideas can reshape the way in which actors consider 
existing policy problems and subsequently 'bias' the options search which follows. A 
frame is defined by Rein and Sch6n (1991: 263) as a perspective from which an 
amorphous, ill-defined problematic situation can be made sense of and acted upon. In 
this fonn, ideas can be transplanted across national boundaries and into supranational 
arenas via interests, which take the form of advocacy coalitions and individual policy 
entrepreneurs. These approaches suggest that the policy-making process can be 
structured by a particular set of ideas and that the role played by policy advocacy 
coalitions can be a useful aid to understand how the flow of new ideas penetrates a 
particular sector. According to Sabatier (1998: 103), policy advocacy coalitions 
operate within policy subsystems and consist of 'actors from various governmental 
and private organizations who both (a) share a set of normative and causal beliefs and 
(b) engage in a non-trivial degree of co-ordinated activity over time'. They strive to 
translate values, such as interventionist or free-market values, into a material form 
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and, in the absence of significant disturbances external to the system, such as changes 
in socio-economic conditions, system-wide governing coalitions or policy output from 
other subsystems, tend to be stable over a long period of time (Sabatier, 1993: 34). An 
endogenous factor bringing change into policy advocacy coalitions is the role of 
policy entrepreneurs, defined as advocates for proposals or the prominence of an idea 
(Kingdon, 1995: 122), who 'perceive the world through a lens consisting of their 
preexisting beliefs' (Sabatier, 1998: 109). Policy entrepreneurs can be found in or out 
of government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research 
organisations, with their defining characteristic being their willingness to invest 
resources of time, energy, reputation and sometimes money in the hope for a future 
return (Kingdon, 1995: 122). 
Specifying further the dynamics inherent in decision making processes and 
maintaining the focus on key individuals and groups, cognitive approaches provide 
further insights into how strategic action capacities are formed. They point to the 
confluence of cultural legacy, historic experience and contemporary circumstance in 
deflning actors economic culture, which legitimises the methods and goals involved in 
the ordering of the states' economic life. They furthen-nore draw attention to the ways 
in which ideas are channeled and acted upon through 'epistemic communities', 'policy 
advocacy coalitions' and key 'policy entrepreneurs' as they shape the ordering of 
preferences and objectives. While state actors are seen as having the function of both 
'uncertainty reducers' and power and wealth producers, linkages between 'epistemic 
communities' or 'policy advocacy coalitions' are identified as a source of co-operation 
and policy-co-ordination. 
1.3.2.5 InstitutionalistApproaches 
Institutionalist approaches advocate the conception of the state as an organisational 
structure, consisting of institutions of government and rules and laws. While the 
underlying argument of these approaches is that state structure affects the possibilities 
of policy outcomes (Skocpol, 1985), i. e. that institutions rather than individuals come 
first, they focus on the relationship between institutions and their embedded values, 
on the constraining effect institutions have on state officials, and on the relationship 
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between institutional structures and international and societal pressures. In its 
strongest variant, according to Odell (1990: 153), institutions are seen to: 
establish and defend the particular order and initial distribution of property 
rights under which market exchanges take place. Individuals' very 
conceptions of their place and potential in this social order are learned partly 
from within their particular historical and institutional environment, so that 
economic liberalization can have fundamentally different effects in different 
settings. At a minimum, the political behaviour of individuals and industries 
responds to the constraints and opportunities presented by these institutions. 
Over the long run, national political institutions may crumble or shift in 
response to market conditions, new ideas, or international structural change - 
but the long run may take some time. 
The basic assumption upon which institutionalist-led approaches rest are as follows. 
Firstly, institutions and rules affect the distribution of power of the political actors and 
help to mould political preferences, interest and outcomes. Institutions hold structural 
qualities, establishing them as more than mere conduits and enabling them to shape 
interests, dialogue and the possibilities for successful group action. Hence, state 
structure is not simply an institutional terrain upon which situated groups compete and 
through which social and international pressures are channelled. Secondly, domestic 
organisational structures are a 'historical product', with the effect that policy-making 
takes place in an institutional setting constituted by individual structures that have 
emerged episodically within a particular evolution. Thirdly, 'institutional structures, 
once established, are difficult to change even when underlying social forces continue 
to evolve' (Ikenberry 1988a: 223). They are generally defended and preserved by 
functionaries and representatives seeking to preserve their own missions. Fourthly, in 
mature state structures, policy outcomes are influenced by inter-branch dynamics and 
a contest of ideas and policy innovations within state structures. Here, the institutions 
of a state provide a setting for policy experts, politicians, and executive officials to 
generate ideas and policy programmes. 
The formal properties and structures of organisation thus matter in institutionalist 
analysis. In investigating international economic, trade and development strategies as 
well as US foreign trade policy, institutionalist analysis shows the role of relatively 
autonomous domestic institutional structure in economic and foreign policy 
formulation. There is no universal treatment of public institutions or their policy 
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influence, but a universal assertion of the role of domestic structure in the shaping of 
foreign economic policy and in particular international trade policy. 
Research in this area is historically based and focuses on the institutional dynamics 
and relations accompanying the development of policy over given periods or on the 
policy implications of 'institutional shift', often at point of crisis. The most powerful 
conceptual frameworks in the institutional analysis of FEP are Goldstein (1988, 
1989), Ikenberry (1988ab), Mares (1990) Haggart (1988), and Destler (1986). These 
incorporate the notion of the state as an actor and realise a more systematic address of 
socio-group interest and cognitive factors than elsewhere achieved in statist analysis 
and the traditional FEP literature. However, elements of the institutionalist literature 
treat the political power and role of ideas as a central variable in the explanation of 
foreign economic and trade policy outcomes. Goldstein (1988,1989), in particular, 
shows how contradictory beliefs in free, fair and redistributive principles have been 
embedded in a decentralised state structure (the US) of multiple game-playing 
institutions and bureaucratic organisations and identifies the crucial 'ideas-institution 
nexus', while Destler (1986) shows the permeation of ideas in the organisational 
structure. 
This body of work has highlighted that in the study of strategic action capacities 
political institutions should take a central position along the need for focusing on the 
formal properties and structures of state organisation. It persuasively suggests that 
political institutions are more than simple mirrors of social forces or passive registers 
for domestic and international pressure. It also demonstrates how state structures and 
complex institutionalised relations influence the way that actors perceive interests, 
enforce normative limits on the range of political dialogue and limit the capacities of 
actors to influence and/or carry out policies. 
1.3.2.6Summary 
In summary, then, from structural/systemic analysis we can derive important insights 
into the structure of the international enviromnent in which actors operate and interact 
with one another. Their international environment, characterised by multilateral and 
bilateral (political, economic) interaction processes between states, structures the 
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nature of interactions while international institutions provide a 'persistent and 
connected set of formal and informal rules that prescribe behaviour roles, constrain 
activity and shape expectations' (Keohane, 1989: 163). In order to explain the 
constraints imposed by the international environment and to qualify the notion of 
'anarchy' in the international system, we also have to address the question as to the 
effectiveness of these international institutions in setting limits to actors' scope for 
action. Society-centred approaches complement the focus on the international 
environment and suggest a concentration on the interplay between mobilised socio- 
economic interest, market forces and societal structure. In particular, we learn of the 
importance of micropolitical analysis, incorporating most notably the study of 
changing market conditions and intra-industry variations (characterised by the key 
variables of international linkages and export reliance), in explaining the influence of 
organised interests and demands for protection. Statist approaches shed more light on 
the dynamics inherent in the decision-making processes within domestic structures. 
They identify goal-purposive behaviour and personal ambition of key individuals as 
influential factors in the determination of actors interest. In applying the concept of 
state strength they point to the importance of institutional capacity, here captured by 
factors such as the degree of centralisation of state structures, the insulation of the 
executive from other actors, the centrality and autonomy of bureaucratic organisations 
capable of programmatic policy planning. Fourth, from cognitive approaches to policy 
and policy changes we learn about the role of ideas and beliefs in policy formation, 
the relationship between evolving bodies of knowledge, communities of experts and 
political outcomes, and economic culture as the confluence of cultural legacy, historic 
experience and contemporary circumstance. Not only is our attention drawn to 
lepistemic communities' and the idea of intellectual innovation of policy entrepreneurs 
and experts as agents in shaping and reshaping the interpretations of decision-makers, 
but also to the increasing role of regulatory policy-making. This makes the study of 
the relationship between ideas (as knowledge), state institutional structure, and 
bureaucratic policies another key element of strategic action capacities. Lastly, 
institutionalist-led approaches reinforce the need to conceptualise the state as an 
organisational structure. Given that political institutions should be centralised in 
explanations of foreign economic policy formulation, this suggests a historically 
based focus on the institutional dynamics and institutional shift accompanying the 
development of policy over given periods, especially at points of crisis. 
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In attempting to explain international trade outcomes these approaches and their 
contributions, despite their individual limitations, provide us with valuable insights 
for the study of strategic action capacities. The five perspectives reviewed may all 
have a certain utility for furthering our understanding, but, when taken in isolation, 
they are all insufficient to answer the questions posed in the context of this study. 
Each views actions from a different angle or alternative concentration and as a result 
of these respective concentrations we learn in greater detail of the policy effects of 
varied forces. It becomes clear that the performance of state economic functions and 
strategic action are central to ideas of IPE and FEP. Yet, it transpires that state 
economic functions and strategic action are concepts that can be applied to all actors 
in IPE. 
1.4 Synthesis: A Research Framework for the Evaluation of Strategic Action 
Capacities 
In this section, the thesis turns to expressing the relationship between the notion of 
catalytic actors, state economic functions and strategic action and to integrate them 
into a comprehensive research framework. For this purpose, this section first provides 
a synthesis of the argument on strategic action and then presents a framework, which 
integrates the insights into trade policy formulation we have gained, in order to 
evaluate actors strategic action capacities. 
The first strand of my argument is that all state actors in the globalised international 
political economy pursue state economic functions. To recap, state economic 
functions include the guaranteeing of property rights, economic liberalisation, 
economic orchestration, the provision of input, intervention for social consensus and 
the management of external relations. Although all state actors are concerned with the 
provision of these, not all of them pursue the same ones and differ in both the extent 
to which they pursue these and their choice of strategies. This in turn allows a move 
away from traditional state-centric analysis and, crucially, to incorporate non-state 
actors such as the EC into our analysis. 
The second strand of my argument is that in the pursuit of state economic functions, 
the actors in IPE rely less on their macro-economic power resources and more on 
collaborative power arrangements in order to create more real control over the 
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economies they preside over. Subsequently, they strive to assume a dominant role in 
coalitions with other state and non-state actors. These coalitions take place primarily 
on the regional and international level between states and on the domestic level with 
socio-economic groups. The responses of actors to the pressures of globalisation and 
intemationalisation have certainly not been uniform, but varied according to political 
and institutional differences and generally involved the pursuit of two strategies, 
namely the strengthening of power alliances upwards (inter-state coalitions) and/or 
downwards (state-business alliances). It follows that the most successful actors in the 
international political economy, measured in terms of their ability to perform state 
economic functions, are those who complement their conventional power resources 
with collaborative powers. 
Extending the previous point, the third strand of my argument concerns the 
relationship between the actors in the international political economy and domestic 
socio-economic actors. This relationship remains at the core of wealth-creating 
policies. However, while actors in IPE have always been forced to engage in a process 
of constant dialogue with domestic socio-economic groups, under conditions of 
increasing globalisation and internationalisation the relationship between the two has 
been reconfigured given the increased pressure for adjustment. Whereas socio- 
economic groups now enjoy greater freedom of action, actors in IPE were forced 
away from the pursuit of power and wealth based on their own resources and now act 
as catalysts in the pursuit of state economic functions. Their catalytic activities vis-a- 
vis domestic socio-economic groups include the provision of incentives and support 
for overseas operations, the promotion of technology alliances, and the 
encouragement of regional relocation and production networks. Their capacity to 
provide state economic functions vis-a-vis their constituencies thus relies on industrial 
policy and the generation of higher value-added activities. Within domestic 
institutional arrangements and decision-making processes, state and industry are 
therefore engaged in close, but not tension-free, (regulatory) co-operation. 
The fourth strand of my argument is that the main instruments in the pursuit of state 
economic functions are collaborative power arrangements, regulatory, industrial and 
competition policy. These forms of domestic policy-making complement foreign trade 
policy based on conventional commercial policy instruments. The use of military 
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resources in order to assist business expansion is excluded in this view as a 'rational' 
value-maximising mode of decision-making is assumed. 
The central idea of this thesis is therefore one of purposive and strategic actors in IPE, 
pursuing the performance of state economic functions vis-6-vis their constituencies. 
Under conditions of globalisation and internationalisation, which have altered 
traditional means of acquiring wealth based on the conquest for territory through 
military force, strategic action is the means through which actors strive to perform 
state economic functions. Actors determine their strategies within a framework 
compromising a complex set of external and internal structural factors, including the 
formation of alliances with other actors in IPE and domestic socio-economic actors, 
and act strategically by relying on their strategic action capacities. It is these strategic 
action capacities that the argument now turns to. 
In the above review of approaches to EPE, it has been asserted that structural 
constraints (domestic and international) determine strategic action capacities. In 
considering the extent to which state economic functions can be pursued by any actor 
in the international political economy, the following range of factors must be 
considered: 
Firstly, the constraints and opportunities afforded by the international enviromnent 
actors operate in; 
Secondly, the institutional capacities of actors (including commercial policy 
instruments); 
Thirdly, the structure and processes affecting the decision-making processes of actors; 
Fourthly, constraints and opportunities afforded by the (sectoral) market structure. 
One way of organising these research areas is to construct a framework through which 
the strategic action capacities of actors can be evaluated. In doing so, the existing 
approaches are integrated into the four broad elements of international relations, 
institutional capacity, decision-making capacity and sectoral market structure. 
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Size of the economy 
Interactions with and within international 
organisations 
Interactions with other actors 
Level of trade interdependence 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
Organisational and legal arrangements 
Conduct of international trade policy 
Interplay of functional policies 
Actor's 
Strategic Action 
Capacities in 
IPE 
General characteristics of sector 
Macro-econornic variables affecting sector 
Distribution of tariffs and trade restrictions 
Degree of internationalisation 
International linkage of sector 
Import/export patterns 
STRUCTURE 
Structure of decision-making process 
Capacities and preferences of actors 
General economic culture 
Contest of ideas and beliefs 
DECISION-MAMNG CAPACITY 
Table 1: Framework for the Evaluation of Actor's Strategic Action Capacities in IPE 
The first element of the framework is the international environment actors operate in 
and from here on reference will be made to international relations. Derived from the 
systemic/structural and statist approaches to IPE, the international relations of an actor 
are marked by interactions with international institutions and other actors. 
International institutions limit policy choices and constrain what actors can do in the 
international political economy. Actors' relative capacities and freedom of action in 
their interactions with both international institutions and other actors depend on the 
size of the economy they represent and the level of trade interdependence. Offensive 
strategies of actors in this arena involve the creation of new rules of the game for 
international interactions in bodies such as the GATT. Defensive strategies, on the 
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other hand, aim at mitigating the adverse affects of international economic change, by 
using international agreements in order to protect existing domestic industries through 
trade quotas and orderly market arrangements. Lastly, the existence of a hegemon in 
the international political economy may limit actors' choices and set additional 
constraints on actors' freedom of action. 
Derived mainly from institutional analysis and linking into the argument concerning 
collaborative power arrangements made above, the second element of the framework 
is institutional capacity. Internally, the legal and organisational arrangements of 
institutions impose constraints on the behaviour of individuals and industries. 
Analysis is thus focused on their conduct of industrial and competition policy and 
their interactions with other domestic actors in sectoral decision-making processes in 
the area of regulatory policy-making. Externally, institutions are entrusted with the 
conduct of foreign economic policy and international trade policy, suggesting a 
further focus on the availability and effectiveness of commercial policy-making 
instruments. 
The third element of the framework is decision-making capacity, which is mainly 
derived from societal and cognitive approaches to IPE and also links into the 
argument concerning collaborative power arrangements. Here, we refer to the location 
of the decision-making within the institutional structure of an actor and the nature of 
interactions of domestic actors. Since trade policy is not made within one single 
structure, decision-making capacity is differentiated according to the sector of the 
economy and the actors involved in the process. Analysis here concentrates on the 
structure of sectoral decision-making processes, the positions, roles and capacities of 
domestic actors within it, and the preferences they hold. Within the structure of 
sectoral decision-making processes, interaction processes between the actors are 
influenced by the economic culture of the sectoral policy-making process as well as 
by the contest of ideas and philosophies held by the actors. The latter are channeled 
through epistemic communities, policy advocacy coalitions and individual policy 
entrepreneurs, with the boundaries between them being fluid and membership 
potentially overlapping. Decision-making processes within domestic structures are 
closely connected and interactive with sectoral market structure and institutional 
capacity, because the former bears directly on the preferences of domestic actors 
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participating in the decision-making process and the latter shapes the course of the 
internal bargaining process. 
The fourth element of the framework is market structure and is derived from society- 
centred approaches to IPE. The need to treat market structure on a sectoral basis 
emanates from the fact that the trade policy of an actor is not uniform, but 
differentiated according to the sectors of the economy. This area is highly interactive 
with the decision-making process as changes in the economic conditions affecting the 
sector under investigation bear directly on the preferences of the actors involved and 
their behaviour. Analysis here thus concentrates on general characteristics of a sector, 
macro-economic variables affecting the sector (unemployment levels, real exchange, 
inflation rates, changes in the business cycle), the sectoral distribution of tariffs and 
trade restrictions, the degree of international integration, international linkages of the 
sector and export reliance. 
To conclude this section, it has been asserted that state actors in IPE act strategically 
in order to provide their constituencies with state economic functions. Any actor's 
strategic action capacities in the pursuit of state economic functions can be 
appreciated by evaluating actor's international relations, their domestic decision 
making capacity, their institutional capacity and the sectoral market structure, while 
analysis benefits from adopting a sectoral approach. The (strategic) instruments 
employed in the pursuit of state economic functions are collaborative power 
arrangements with other international actors and domestic socio-economic actors; 
regulatory, industrial and competition policy, and conventional foreign trade 
(commercial) policy instruments. 
Conclusions 
Placed into the context of globalisation and internationalisation, the opening chapter 
has provided a sketch of the nature of inter-state competition in IPE and the processes 
involved. It has been asserted that the processes of globalisation and 
internationalisation have led to a shift in the strategies pursued by actors in order to 
improve their national economic situation. It is argued that as a result, and rather than 
by relying on their own power resources and military means, actors in IPE are now 
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relying on a mix of conventional foreign trade instruments and collaborative power 
arrangements with other domestic and international actors in order to provide state 
economic functions. Actors in the international political economy are therefore 
perceived as purposive and strategic actors pursuing state economic functions. 
Drawing on a review of existing approaches to IPE, a framework for the evaluation of 
strategic action capacities has been generated that can be applied to any actor in the 
international political economy. In the following chapter, the ways in which the EC's 
presence in IPE can be investigated through this approach will be explored. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE EC AND STRATEGIC ACTION 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it has been asserted that state actors in a changing 
international political economy are acting strategically in order to provide their 
respective constituencies with state economic functions. Furthermore, a framework 
has been developed in order to evaluate their strategic action capacities in the IPE. In 
this chapter, the thesis turns to an exploration of how the EC can be investigated 
through the approach adopted in chapter one. Following on from chapter one, this 
chapter examines the EC's role in a changing international political economy and its 
action capacities in the pursuit of state economic functions. As it is essential to take 
account of the fact that in the case of the EC we are dealing with an 'unusual' provider 
of state economic functions, a conceptualisation of the EC is generated by way of a 
literature review of previous approaches to the study of the EC (section 2.1). This 
conceptualisation then informs subsequent sections on the EC as a provider of state 
economic functions (section 2.2) and the exploration of the EC through the research 
framework (section 2.3). The results of the exploration of the EC's strategic action 
capacities are evaluated and surnmarised in section 2.4 and a case study approach 
outlined in the section 2.5. 
2.1 Conceptualising the EC 
Since its inception, the EC has evolved into an important economic and political 
player. Yet it still carries the label of an 'incomplete political system' (Wallace, 
1996: 541). Given that it is neither a state, nor a straightforward supranational 
organisation or an intergovernmental regime, its international status is naturally 
ambiguous (Hill, 1993). On the one hand, in the context of its foreign policy, Hill 
(1993: 315) has pointed to the 'capability-expectations' gap, arguing that the EC 'has 
been talked up - to a point that it is not capable of fulfilling the new expectations ... 
held of it'. On the other hand, authors such as Allen and Smith have suggested that the 
disparity between the EC's economic weight and its capacity to exercise power 
through state-like policies is not necessarily as disabling as might be thought (Allen 
and Smith, 1990; Smith, 1994a). While the EC has state-like competences in key 
areas of external commercial policy, the basis of the distinctive institutional and 
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political structures and processes upon which it conducts its foreign and foreign 
economic policy resist direct comparison with the usual attributes of state governance. 
In addition, there is the conceptual problem that the EC has been approached from 
two distinct but overlapping perspectives, i. e. an international relations perspective 
and a comparative politics perspective, with concentrations on the study of European 
integration and on the analysis of EC politics respectively. As subfields of political 
science they have a certain amount of literature in common, but because of their focus 
on diametrically opposed areas of the discipline their respective discourse has grown 
apart (Hix, 1994: 23). As a consequence, international relations approaches may be 
more appropriate in areas where Member States remain sovereign, whereas 
comparative politics approaches may be more applicable in areas in which decisions 
involve transnational actors as well. In the following, a conceptualisation of the EC 
that can be used in order to inform the exploration of the EC's strategic action 
capacities in subsequent sections is generated from a brief review of the literature. 
In the 1960s, realism dominated the study of International Relations (IR) and the 
debate about how to understand the EC formed part of a more general debate on the 
nature of the international system. The central piece of work was Hans Morgenthau's 
(1960) Politics Among Nations which emphasised that the central role of states as 
unitary actors pursuing clearly defined national interests in conflict with other states. 
Structural realism sees the international system, in which states calculate the effect of 
their actions on the reactions of other states, as the primary constraint on state 
autonomy. Realism has been subject to much criticism due to its concentration on the 
international system and neglect of domestic politics. Its contribution to the 
understanding of European integration was consequently limited. 
When applied to IR, pluralism, an analysis that stressed the importance of the 
decision-making process on decision makers challenged realist assumptions that states 
could be treated as homogeneous actors and the view that national interest was 
somehow independent of the political process. The state was dissected to reveal the 
role of interest groups and bureaucratic actors in the process of formulating what 
constituted the national interest (Little and Smith, 1991: 182-211). As a consequence 
of the extension of activities of these internal actors and their involvement in 
transnational networks, pluralists argued that the autonomy of decision-makers was 
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restricted. Pluralism went on to argue that interest groups and bureaucratic actors also 
extended their activities beyond the boundaries of the state, with interest organisations 
interacting in transnational networks that had a separate existence from official state- 
to-state contact and bureaucrats maintaining routine contact with their counterparts in 
other states through participation in international organisations such as the RAF and 
regional organisations such as the EC. Pluralist approaches, such as Deutsch et al. 
(1957) and Jacob and Toscano (1964), were widely criticised but influnential on 
subsequent work on European integration. 
As just one part of a wider pluralist critique of realist assumptions, neofunctionalism 
subsequently dominated the study of the EC in the 1960s. Pioneered by Ernst Haas 
(1958,1968), neo-functionalism is an explanatory theory that aspires to prediction. It 
asserts functional, political and geographical spill-over effects that would have a 
snowball-like dynamic and would spill into other areas and sectors once the first steps 
towards integration were taken. Interest groups, which by way of interaction with 
other participants would come to appreciate the benefits of integration, and the 
Commission, in the role of a bureaucratic actor that manipulates the pressures that 
arise from sectoral integration, were seen as the crucial actors in the policy-making 
process. National governments were seen as having very little autonomy and, as a 
result of their position between domestic and supranational pressures, would be 
obliged to agree to more and more integration. As the ECSC 'spilled-over' into the 
EEC providing a good example of 'sectoral spill-over, a growing number of EFTA 
countries applied for EEC membership indicating the beginning of 'regional spill- 
over,, and interest groups mobilised around the issue of CAP evidencing 'political 
spill-over', it initially appeared that neo-functionalism had rather neatly encapsulated 
the process of European integration. However, with the negative effects of De Gaulle 
vetoing UK membership and the 1973 oil crisis on both political spill over and on 
sectoral spill-over, the study of European integration in terms of neo-functionalism 
became less fashionable and in the US entered a 'doldrums period' (Caporaso and 
Keeler, 1995: 36). In recognising that integration was not a an inexplorable process, in 
which governments found themselves caught up, but a process that could spill 'back' 
and 'around', several authors (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; Nye, 1968; Sclunitter, 
1970) then attempted to revitalise neo-functionalism by revising Haas' original work 
and succeeded in providing many insights into the process of European integration as 
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well as the basis for latter studies of both the integration process and the functioning 
of the EC as a polity or system of governance. 
Intergovernmentalism, a critique of neofunctionalism put forward by Hoffinann 
(1964,1966) draws on realist assumptions but maintains that states are uniquely 
powerful actors in the process of European integration. Spill-overs would only happen 
in technical functional sectors, but not spill over into the areas of so-called high 
politics (national security and defence). By questioning the logic of neofunctionalist's 
spill-over effects, the intergovernmentalist's assumption is that actors are all of the 
same weight. While stressing the legal sovereignty and political legitimacy of states, 
authors in this tradition argue that the process of European integration was essentially 
intergovernmental and that states have much more power than neofunctionalists 
believed. With European integration stagnating in the late 1960s and early 1970s and 
the automaticity of spill-over failing to materialise, the intergovemmentalist school of 
thought gathered momentum and also let to re-orientation of scholars to the use of old 
and new approaches. In the 1990s, intergovernmentalism was further developed by 
Moravcsik (1991), who in considering supranational institutionalism (with 
explanatory factors such as pressure from the European Parliament (EP) and the 
European Court of Justice (EJC), lobbying by transnational business interests, and the 
political entrepreneurship of the Commission) and intergovernmental institutionalism 
(stressing lowest common denominator bargaining between states and the protection 
of sovereignty in 'history-making' decisions or major integrative advances) as broad 
explanations that further European integration re-asserted the notion that states are the 
most powerful actors in decision-making processes. He stressed the importance of 
domestic politics in influencing the changing interests of states, but maintained that 
governments played two-level games as part of an international bargaining process 
(cf. Putnam 1988). He later developed the theoretical underpinnings of his approach 
and labelled it 'liberal intergovernmentalism' (Moravcsik, 1993), arguing that the EC 
could be explained with reference to general theories of IR as an example of a 
successful international regime. 
In the 1990s, neofunctionalism experienced another revival with authors such as 
Sandholtz and Zysman (1989: 96) asserting that the success of the 1992 programme 
and the signing of the SEA suggests that neofunctionalism might still be of 
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explanatory force. This claim was derived from both the role of the Commission as a 
central bureaucratic actor manipulating circumstances to further integration and 
exercising policy leadership as well as the role played by leading industrialists in 
launching and sustaining the Single Market programme by putting pressure on 
Member State governments (see also Agnelli, 1989; Green-Cowles, 1995a, 1995b). 
The revived perspective also took account of some of the earlier criticism that it had 
focused on the regional level to the neglect of the wider international system. In this 
context, Sandholtz and Zysman (1989: 127) pointed out that the success of the 1992 
programme has to be seen against the background of changing international and 
domestic conditions, the rise of Japan, the relative decline of the US, and apparent 
failure of existing national economic policies. Subsequently, they concluded that 
'structural situations create the context of choice and cast up problems to be resolved, 
but they do not dictate the decisions and strategies' and suggested that the global 
setting can be understood in neo-realist terms, but the political processes triggered by 
changes in the system must be analysed in other than structural terms. 
Institutionalist approaches to FEP analysis are premised on the conception of the state 
as an organisational structure consisting of institutions of government and sets of rules 
and laws. The base line argument is that state structure affects the possibilities for 
policy outcomes (Skocpol, 1985). While IR based institutionalist approaches 
emphasise the neutrality of institutions (Hix, 1994: 10-12), recent work drawing on 
comparative politics focuses on policy-making within institutions and shows how EC 
institutions have indeed influenced agenda setting, policy formulation and 
implementation processes (Peters, 1994; Sbragia, 1992, Bulmer, 1994, Peterson, 
1995a, b) In uncovering the role played by European institutions and assessing their 
interactions with each other and with others within the policy process, these 
approaches offer a conceptualisation of the EC system as a polity characterised by a 
multi-tiered system of governance with dense and dynamic networks of institutional 
actors, organisations, and bureaucracies in which ideas and interests are forceful 
cross-currents at several levels. The study of political institutions is also a central 
pillar of scholars like Weiler (1982,1996) and Wincott (1995,1996) who advocate a 
case for paying attention to the importance of law to any study of the European 
integration process. In particular, they argued that the role of the ECJ and the impact 
of European law making in the integration process had fashioned a constitutional 
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framework in the EC that required further examination as legal and institutional 
elements condition both the magnitude and the spatial scope of integration. These 
approaches assert that the political system of the EC rests on a fairly firm legal basis, 
with the main elements of the EC's 'constitution' being the 'undisputed supremacy 
clause', the direct influence of EC regulations and immediate enforceability of certain 
directives, the growing case law rights of EC citizens, and the ECs powers of judicial 
review of all other organs of the EC. Dehousse and Weiler (1990: 242) thus made the 
point that '[n]either the nature of the European Community nor its role in the Europe 
of today can be understood without a reference to its legal and institutional structure. ' 
The work on transnational relations by IR scholars reveals a multi-levelled, 
institutionalised process of complex relations and domestic structures cutting across 
'domestic-international' and 'state-society' divisions. Here, some scholars have used 
policy networks as a metaphor to describe the EC/EU, characterising it as a 'set of 
networks' ornetwork form of organisation (Bressand and Nicolaidis, 1990, Keohane 
and Hoffmann, 1991: 13; Wallace, 1990b: 19; Schneider et al., 1994; Peterson, 1992, 
1995; Kassim, 1994). Grown out of increasing dissatisfaction with the neo- 
functionalist-intergovenimentalist dichotomy to study European governance, the 
concept of multi-level governance is probably the most prominent approach that 
developed (Marks, 1993; Marks et al., 1996, Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996). It is 
asserted that the functioning of the EC policy-making process is complex and 
characterised by a multiplicity of linkages and interactions connecting a large number 
and variety of public and private actors at and across several levels. Approaches 
located in this field suggest the critical importance of a nexus of public and private 
actors, policy ideas, and interests in a multi-level setting, but allow for distinctions 
between different policy sectors and networks across the EC. Networks imply clusters 
of organised actors, representing a host of variable public and private organisations 
and acting at and across the various levels, that interact with one another and have a 
stake in outcomes in particular policy sectors. The multi-level and cross-level 
interactions identified by policy network approaches include domestic interactions, 
i. e. between government and societal actors at the domestic level, transnational 
interactions, i. e. between governments on the intergovernmental level, and diagonal 
interactions (Schneider et al., 1994), between types of actors situated on different 
levels. As networks are dominated by different actors or institutions depending on the 
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degree of integration, resource dependency, rights of initiative, roles and 
competences, these approaches give the institutions of the EC considerable 
importance as actors in their own right. Yet these are located within a set of complex 
arenas and geared towards the intermediation or reconciliation of interests and the 
sharing of information. As Peterson (1995b: 400) points out, policy network 
approaches are particularly useful to explaining policy-shaping decisions at a 
relatively low level where the Commission usually must allow national governments, 
private actors and other EC institutions a voice in policy formulation and where it 
encourages the development of fora, for the facilitation of bargaining and resource 
exchanges. While the notion of separable if overlapping policy networks across 
different sectors provides for some flexibility in order to capture the variances of EC 
policy-making, these approaches also allows for the incorporation of the role of ideas, 
knowledge and expertise (Richardson, 1996: 4). 
Since the EC/EU belies comparisons with the state, the conceptual tools that have 
conventionally been applied to the analysis of foreign in the international system 
appear unsuited to explore the EC/EU's complex policy process (Smith, 1994a: 284-8; 
Allen and Smith, 1990). In effect, the EC in many respects is acting like a state, but 
crucially it has no government. Moreover, no single theory can explain EU 
governance at all levels of analysis (Richardson, 1996: 4-5; Peterson, 1995a). While 
broad approaches such as neo-functionalism and state-centric intergovernmentalist 
approaches are useful to explain 'history-making' decisions, they lose their 
explanatory power when it comes to 'policy setting' or 'policy shaping' decisions. 
Therefore, in order to incorporate the roles and capacities of all participating actors, 
the nature of interactions in dense information and co-operation networks across 
national borders, the effect of the European institutions on the policy-making process 
and the impact of law making, it is useful to conceptualise the EC as a multi-level 
structure of governance, with private, governmental, transnational and supranational 
actors dealing with each other in highly complex networks of varying density, as well 
as horizontal and vertical depth (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 62-3). 
2.2 The EC as a Provider of State Economic Functions 
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That the EC has indeed emerged as a provider of state economic functions can be 
demonstrated by taking a broad look at its activitieslo: The EC's concern with the 
guaranteeing of property rights backed by the force of law can be observed in the 
gradual development of the legal structures and practices of EC law (see Weiler 1982; 
Hartley, 1988; Kapstein and van Themat, 1990). Although the guaranteeing of 
property rights is mainly upheld through national legislation, the EC, related to its 
economic activity as laid down in Art 3 EEC Treaty, nevertheless touches on these 
issues for instance in the area of intellectual property rights. The influence the EC can 
exercise by speaking with one voice vis-a-vis the rest of the world in defending these 
property rights is considerably greater than a single Member States'power to press for 
the regulation of these increasingly more important issues. Derived from Art. 3 EEC 
Treaty, the role of the EC in economic liberalisation is clearly visible. The EC 
operates a system that ensures that competition in the internal market, characterised 
by the abolition of obstacles to the free movement the four flows among the Member 
States, is not distorted. With the Common/Single Market and the development of an 
economic and monetary union (EMU) as examples par excellence, the double process 
of the abolition of restrictions and standardisation has been the principle characteristic 
of the role of the EC ever since the establishment of the EEC treaty (see Heidensohn, 
1996; Pelkmans and Winter, 1988, Swann, 1992). The EC's activities in respect to 
economic orchestration and the provision of input is clearly visible from its activities 
in industrial policies. The steel sector, for instance, is a clear example of a sector in 
which the EC has acted in order to mitigate the effects of the business cycle and 
worked towards the harmonisation of production. The fact that the EC plays a key role 
in areas such as high-technology, transport and industry in order to secure the EC's 
international competitiveness (see Nicolaides, 1993b; Swann, 1992; N'Guyen and 
Owen, 1992), provides flirther substance of the view that the EC has increasingly 
become the level on which many state economic functions are provided. The EC is of 
course also active in the area of intervention for social consensus (see Leibfiried, 
1993; Ferge and Kohlberg, 1992), as for instance its activities surrounding the 
10 It should be noted here that this is not the first time that the EC's presence or actomess in the international 
system has been approached by looking at the functions it perforrns. For instance, Hill (1993: 310-15) identifies 
four functions the Community performs (the stabilising of Western Europe, managing world trade, principle voice 
of the developed world in relations with the South, and providing a second Western voice in international 
diplomacy) and six which it might perform in the future (replacing the USSR in the global balance of power, 
regional pacification, global intervention, mediation of conflicts, bridge between rich and poor, andjoint 
supervision of the world economy). 
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structural and regional funds show (Armstrong, 1993). Lastly, the management of 
external relations is of course the prime function of the EC. It performs this role on 
the basis of its exclusive competence in the field of commercial policy-making and 
exercises it by speaking with one voice in fora such as the GATT and negotiations 
with other states. 
This broad look at the activities the EC shows that it emerged as a provider of state 
economic functions. Of course, just like any other actor concerned with the provision 
of state economic functions, the EC varies in ability and extent to which these 
functions are performed. While economic liberalisation and the management of 
external relation are at the very centre of its activities, it performs others indirectly 
and in shared competences with the Member States, and differs in the strategies 
applied in order to perform them. Furthermore, it can be argued that the EC-level is 
also the most suitable level to provide state functions for Member States and 
European businesses alike. 
Firstly, the single most important reason for resorting to the EC as providers of 
economic functions is that co-ordinating preferences within the framework of the EC 
gives both Member States and domestic business much greater weight in the face of 
competition from other players in the world economy. Failing or feeling unable to 
counteract the demands of intemationalisation and globalisation on their national 
competitiveness, Member State governments and business alike therefore turned their 
attention to the EC-level for the provision of state economic functions. Within the 
complex mix of factors that determined the course of European integration, increased 
economic interdependence and the need for modernisation played a crucial role in 
increasing the momentum for integration, resulting in the slow and complex process 
of upgrading the ECs capacity to perform state economic functions. The inclusion of 
more and more economies certainly adds to the complexity of decision-making 
processes and causes co-ordination problems within the EC, yet the size and 
importance of the European market provide for a very significant incentive for all 
involved actors to deal with these problems as part of a co-ordination process. 
Secondly, the established decision-making structures in the EC provide for a basic co- 
ordination mechanism to deal with competitive pressures. Indeed, from the very 
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beginning of European integration, the decision-making structures within the EC have 
already been used as a basis to deal with competitive pressures. The complex web of 
formal and informal networks that has developed over the past 40 or so years has led 
to the establishment of institutionalised forms of exchange between policy 
participants and provides for a long common experience in dealing with one another. 
Facilitated by moves towards the establishment of a common European market, intra- 
European co-ordination of policies involving actors from various levels has over time 
become a reality in more and more sectors, facilitating the assertion of 'European' 
preferences in the world economy. 
Thirdly, the existence of international market failures, such as negative externalities 
and monopoly power, failures of information or insufficient provision of public 
goods, require the co-ordination of policies on a higher level. Today, the pressures on 
national competitiveness are derived from inside the EC through the construction and 
functioning of the Internal Market, the EC's main competitors in the trade triangle, the 
emerging newly industrialised countries and segments of industrial goods from 
Eastern Europe. However, the roots of competitive pressures can be traced back to the 
enormously increased volume of world trade, the internationalisation of production, 
and fluctuations and uncertainties associated with currency exchange rates and 
international monetary arrangements. Dealing with these effectively is beyond the 
scope of national governments given the vast amounts of information that are needed 
in order to shape policies in a global and interdependent world. National governments 
transfer powers to the EC because they are unwilling or incapable of taking into 
account the international effects of their actions, have insufficient knowledge of other 
player's intentions, cannot cope with the high costs of organising and monitoring the 
required level of policy co-ordination, and tend to distrust other's inclination to 
implement joint agreements. Linked to this point, there is of course the very logic of 
regional integration, namely the perception that net gains are producible for a group of 
countries from a unified or integrated conduct of certain policy instruments (tariff, 
commercial, fiscal or even monetary). 
Lastly, there is no other appropriate level that could provide state economic functions 
more effectively. The potential conflicts between Western Europe, the US and Japan 
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within the OECD make it unlikely that it is possible to perform state economic 
functions in a better way than on the EC-level in the foreseeable future. 
Although much of the initial thrust for European integration stemmed from factors 
related to the desire to secure peace and security in Europe (see section 3.2), the 
competitive pressures that governments face in an increasingly globalised world 
economy thus triggered the 'retreat of the state' in Europe (cf. Strange, 1996) and the 
actions of the Member States of the EC especially since the mid-1980s provide for a 
powerful example of this trend. Not possessing the political and economic resources 
to continue meaningfully to shape the direction of political and economic 
development in line with national preferences, the Member States reinforced the 
momentum for integration and gradually delegated more competences to the EC. 
There is, as has been shown, a powerful rationale for the management of state 
economic functions at the EC-level, but the process of transferring competences in 
order to enable the EC to pursue state economic functions has necessarily been a slow 
and by no means linear process. Of course, this is not to argue that the EC has 
emerged as the sole provider of these functions or that the EC is better suited to 
deliver state economic functions per se. Rather, it is suggested that the EC has 
emerged as a 'parallel' or 'joint' provider of state economic functions and that this is 
reflected in the overall shift of competences in more and more sectors to the EC level 
and the increase of EC regulatory policy-making. The conceptualisation of the EC as 
a complex and multi-level system of governance already suggests that the provision of 
state economic functions is shared between the EC and the Member States. Since the 
desire to control their economic and political destiny sets limits to the Member States' 
willingness to transfer competences and because the perceived national interest by 
Member States often counteracts the Community interest in areas under EC 
competence, the provision of state economic is therefore naturally contested. 
Notwithstanding these issues concerning competence and effectiveness, it appears that 
in the light of the changes in the global economy state economic functions will 
continue to be provided in shared competence between the EC and Member States. 
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2.3 Exploring the EC's Strategic Action Capacities 
In this section, the research framework for the evaluation of strategic action capacities 
is applied to the case of the EC. Based on the conceptualisation of the EC as a system 
of governance, the EC as an actor in 1PE is analysed following the four elements set 
out in the research framework, i. e. the international relations of the EC, the EC's 
institutional capacity, its decision-making capacity and the its market structure. It 
should be noted that due to the interconnectedness of the four elements, it is inevitable 
that certain overlaps occur in the analysis. Moreover, although an effort has been 
made to account for the evolution of the EC in the treatment of each element, the 
exploration of the EC in terms of the framework can only be indicative and provide 
for a snap shot as in the case of the EC. Furthermore, the exploration of the EC in 
terms of the research framework can only be indicative and provide for a snapshot as 
in the case of the EC the analyst is dealing with what has sometimes been called an 
actor sui generis. 
2.3.1 The ECs International Relations 
The size of the combined European economies naturally makes the EC a major 
international player. Like its competitors in the international political economy, 
however, the EC in its strategic planning and decision-making must accommodate a 
set of pressures and constraints stipulated by the nature of the international system it 
operates in. In the determination of its strategies, the EC therefore has to consider a 
number of international pressures and developments, including macroeconomic 
developments, trends in commercial practices, and new issues in international trade 
(such as trade related investment measures and intellectual property rights, a set of 
external codes and trade regimes primarily associated with the GATTIWTO, and the 
trade policies of others major players). Within the international environment, the EC 
is engaged in interactions with many other actors. These are taking place in many 
fora: within international frameworks, with other regional groupings, and single 
states. A helpful way of conceptualising this set of relationships on a general level is 
to think of the EC's relations with the global system as concerning the 'politics of 
compatibility'; to think of the EC's relations with developing countries as concerning 
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'politics of dependency'; and to think of the EC's relation with industrial nations as 
concerning 'politics of interdependence and interpenetrating' (Smith 1999: 282). 
2.3.1.1 The ECs Economic Weight in the World 
EC trade policy is carried out in a highly interdependent world that is characterised by 
a substantial volume of international trade, to which the EC contributes substantially. 
Figures from the WT011, which include both intra-Community trade and extra- 
Community trade, show the place of the EC in the world economy: In 1995, the 
Member States of the EC accounted for 41.5 percent of the world's exports, by value, 
as against 26.6 percent for Asia, 15.9 percent for North America, 4.6 percent for Latin 
America, 2.9 percent for the Middle East, 3.1 percent for the Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECS) and the former USSR, and 2.1 percent for Africa. In 
1995, six of the EC's Member States were ranked among the world's 10 leading 
exporters and importers of goods, with Germany just behind the US with a global 
market share of 10.1 percent. In terms of commercial services, seven Member States 
of the EC were in the top ten. 
In direct investment, the international importance of the EC finds further 
enhancement. In 1994, the 15 Member States received the equivalent of ECU 20 
billion in direct investment from the world. Over the period 1992-4, the main 
investors in the EC were the US (51.1 percent), the four EFTA states, (17.1 percent) 
and southern and east Asia, including Japan (10.4 percent). The rest of the world 
accounted for 21.4 percent of direct investment in the EC's 15 Member States. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the attractiveness of emerging markets, such figures may 
be misleading in the sense that, although still impressive, the EC' importance both as a 
source of and destination for international foreign direct investment is declining, as is 
the case for all members of the Trade Triangle. The EC now invests more abroad 
(ECU 21.6 billion in 1994, as compared with 24.4 billion in 1993, but 17.8 billion in 
1992), than foreigners do in the EC. North America alone accounted for 43.3 percent 
of EC investment abroad between 1992 and 1994. If internal investments were 
included (ECU 37.4 billion in 1994), the importance of Europe would be even greater. 
"The data presented in the following three paragraphs is quoted from the Commission (1997). Other accounts that 
detail the ECs economic weight in the world include Tsoukalis (1993), Dent (1997) and Heidensohn (1996). 
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The majority of European trade is still conducted with the developed industrialised 
countries, yet their share is continuously decreasing. In the last decade, these countries 
lost about 10 percent in market share in the EC15, although they still accounted for 
more than 40 percent of EC15 imports and exports. The US is the main trading 
partner by quite a long way, accounting for almost one fifth of the EC's exports (18.3 
percent) and imports (19.4 percent) in 1996. Japan alone accounts for 9.1 percent of 
exports and 5.7 percent of imports. Statistically, the shift towards less trade with old 
industrialised countries is re-enforced by recent enlargements of the EC (the number 
of EFTA countries was reduced as well as their share in EC trade), because the 
integration of new Member States both increased the overall volume of foreign trade 
and reduced intra-zone trade. In general, the global trade balance of the EC15, which 
in 1991 showed a deficit of 70.2 billion, has been positive since 1993, with constant 
and regular increases since then (+ ECU 3.2 billion in 1994, + ECU 26 billion in 
1995, and +ECU 43.9 billion in 1996). 
There are a number of factors related to the economic weight of the EC worth 
considering in evaluating the EC's significance in international trade. Firstly, the 
single most important feature of the way in which the EC conducts itself in 
international trade is that it acts as a single bloc, implying that it is able to bring its 
very considerable economic weight as outlined above to bear on other actors. 
Secondly, in terms of population its Single Market with over 340 million people, is 
much larger than both the US market and the Japanese market (around 250 and 125 
million respectively) and the size and economic importance of the Single Market 
increasingly enables the EC to press for reciprocity in its relations with its 
competitors. Considering the old axiom in world politics that posits that those who 
control access to the biggest markets write the rules of trade, the establishment of the 
Single European Market theoretically gives the Europeans a strategic advantage in 
race for economic superiority (Thurow, 1992). Already in the 1980s, the SEA and the 
White Paper on the Internal Market (COM(85) 310 of 14 June 1985) enabled the EC 
to call for reciprocity in the context of the second banking directive. The power to 
give or deny access to the Single Market as well as the power to shape and structure 
competition within it, thus provides the EC with great strategic international leverage. 
While reciprocity generally improves the likelihood of co-operation among states, it 
can also be argued that in cases of an unequal distribution of powers (i. e. unequal 
65 
market sizes) reciprocity improves the chances for co-operation in terms of forcing 
others into concessions and changes in the way others conduct their trade policies, 
especially vis-a-vis smaller competitors. Nonetheless, among the Big Three, 
equivalence of measures and actions seems to have become the basis of interaction 
given that these three dominate the world economy and, to a greater or lesser extent, 
are able to exercise roughly the same amount of power. Thirdly, the EC, like its main 
competitors, can exercise what Nye (1990: 191) termed 'soft-power, i. e. it can 
structure a situation in a way that other actors develop preferences or define their 
interests in a way consistent with those of the EC. Of course, this 'soft power' 
connects directly with the notion of strategy developed in section 1.3.1, which defines 
'strategic behaviour' as behaviour concerned with influencing other's choices. Soft 
power, in contrast to hard power (i. e. military might), is buttressed on factors such as 
the size and institutional magnitude of a given economy in the international system. 
Although Nye argues that the US has more 'co-optive' power than others in the 
international system, the notion of 'co-optive' power clearly increasingly applies to the 
EC and can be witnessed in the way the EC exercises power in its relationship with 
EFTA countries, third world countries, or CEECs. Fourthly, with the provision of the 
Maastricht Treaty calling for the establishment of a single European currency in order 
to complement the Single Market, European integration has gained a further 
dimension and so has the EC's capacity for strategic action as it adds to the weight 
that the EC can exert internationally through its Single Market. Internally, the Euro 
has the effect of facilitating European businesses' expansion into other Member State 
markets, increasing investment and promoting convergence between European 
economies by intensifying competition and forcing the modernisation of Member 
State economies. Externally, the Euro from the outset had the potential to profoundly 
change the existing monetary order, thereby threatening both the dominant positions 
of the Dollar and the Yen (Nelson and Kenberry, 1993; Cerny, 1993). Since EMU is 
still far from its conclusion and remains a highly politicised issue, it is difficult to 
estimate its final implications in detail, but it must be appreciated that the project of 
establishing a single European currency has already contributed to the magnitude of 
the EC. Fifthly, many of the countries and groupings with which the EC negotiates on 
trade matters are heavily reliant on the its market for their exports, either for reasons 
of geography (in the case of non-members from within Europe and including CEECs), 
or for reasons of historical linkage (most notably former French and UK colonies). 
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Furthermore, the EC has uses trade concessions and sanctions in order to shape 
international. developments. For instance, in granting GSP status to South Affica 
following the success of the apartheid movement it handed out a reward for political 
achievements, whereas in the case of Serbia and Montenegro it applied trade sanctions 
as a form of protest or leverage. This of course underlines the intersection of 
commercial policy-making with wider foreign policy and security considerations. 
As for constraints of the EC in international relations, the degree of international 
competitive pressure contributes to the EC's commercial calculations and policy 
initiatives. Over the last decade, the EC has lost market share in a range of 
manufactured products both in high-technology and labour intensive, low R&D 
sectors, with its strength seeming to lie in the upmarket end of relatively weak 
demand sectors (textiles, clothing, footwear, furniture and motor vehicles), select 
areas of dynamic merchandise trade (industrial machinery, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals), and a range of commercial services (Tsoukalis, 1993: 256). The 
existence of a global trading deficit in merchandising with the rest of the world 
between 1987 and 1993 and associated protectionist pressures had a considerable 
impact in the EC's trading calculations and strategy. Furthermore, the fact that 
Member States vary in their trade specialisation patterns and levels of national 
employment, output and payments patterns, of course bears on sectoral policy-making 
and strategy along the lines of protectionist and free-trade pressures respectively. 
Since these variations bear on firm and Member State trade preferences, they are 
subsequently also an aspect of the regional economic environment and a source of 
policy pressure. Lastly, it should be considered that macroeconomic conditions of the 
day, at national, regional and international levels, have a significant impact on the 
minds of policy-makers in the EC. As the WTO (1995) pointed out, in 1993/1994 
overall trade developments in the EC were 'strongly influenced by a number of 
macroeconomic developments: first, the EC recession and the ensuing recovery; 
secondly, the strong pick-up in world trade outside the EQ and thirdly, competitive 
positions reflecting exchange rate movements. 
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2.3.1.2 Multilateral Relations 
The multilateral trade regime imposes effective limitations on the ECs freedom of 
action in the areas of tariff protection, non-tariff barriers, safeguards and unilateral 
remedies. The EC speaks with one voice in multilateral negotiations such as the 
OECD and the GATT. Within the GATT, the EC has also a special status in that in 
signed a number of international trade agreements despite the fact that the individual 
Member States and not the EC are the contracting parties to the GATT. Like other 
signatories of the GATT, the EC is obliged to transpose principles of multilateral 
agreements into the EC legislation. After each Round, the new GATT rules become 
part of the EC 'acquis communitaire' via amendments of and additions to EC law and 
the restraining effects of GATT rules on EC policy-makers increased considerably 
with the deepening of the internal market (Pellanans and Carzaniga, 1996: 95). 
Moreover, several of its legal codes, practices and instruments have been developed in 
the context of the EC's membership of the GATT as well as under threat of censure 
and penalty by GATT panels. It has also been the case that EC trade policy has 
followed the leadership of the US, as can be seen in the US initiative on multilateral 
trade talks and their focus in the early to mid-1980s. On the other hand, the EC, under 
pressure of lobbies and in the knowledge that GATT rules were weakly enforced, has 
deviated from and indeed contravened GATT codes in a wide range of areas, 
including quantitative restrictions, safeguards and discriminatory treatments. For 
instance, over the period 1980-92, the EC was involved in more than two-fifths of all 
GATT Art. XXHI complaints (GATT, 1993: 233-4), but in the GATT Uruguay Round, 
experience with and confidence in the SEM enabled the EC to initiate and exercise 
leadership in fields such as services (Paemen and Busch, 1995). The rules and norms 
upheld and developed by the GATT therefore govern the EC's (and others) 
interactions in IPE and help to shape its behaviour by proscribing and discouraging 
certain actions and promoting others. Yet the EC is not constrained or driven to the 
extent that its actions are simply determined by GATT provisions. While international 
institutions limit its policy choices and constrains what the EC can do in the 
international arena, there is thus also a significant amount of freedom for action and 
leverage the EC can exercise in its international environment. 
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2.3.1.3 The ECs System of Trade Agreements 
A second layer of interactions between the EC and its international environment is the 
complex system of trade arrangements, set up over the years and encompassing the 
EC's regional periphery as well as trade agreements with countries further away. Here, 
a pyramid of preferences establishes a hierarchy of 'friends', 'lesser friends' and 'foes'. 
The closest in terms of proximity is the European Economic Area (EEA), which in the 
beginning of 1994 replaced the bilateral agreements that had been in force with the 
EC and the EFTA states since 1972. EFTA has enormous commercial importance to 
the EC. Exports from the EC to the US and Japan combined amount to less than EC 
exports to EFTA. According to Heidensohn (1996), in 1992 EFTA absorbed one 
quarter of the EC's exports (in comparison, the US and Japan absorbed 22 percent) 
and provided nearly a quarter on all imports to the EC (the US provided for 18 and 
Japan for 11 percent). While the EC clearly holds the upper hand in its relations with 
EFTA countries, as it is the most important trading partner of EFTA states, the idea 
behind the EEA was to enable EFTA countries to participate in the benefits derived 
from the SEM. The prospect that the EC increasingly absorbs these countries holds 
out the promise of enormous long-run benefits, since enlargement will enhance the 
size of the Single Market, the economics of scale which can be achieved by European 
industry, and the political and economic weight of the EC in the world. Yet the 
incorporation of more and more economies into the EC, raise fundamental question as 
to the future direction of European integration and questions relating to the 
effectiveness of the decision-making process. 
Other trade and co-operation agreements of the EC can generally by distinguished by 
preferential and non-preferential agreements. A group of Mediterranean countries, 
including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia) benefit from 
a preferential co-operation agreement with the EC, which allows them, inter alia, free 
access for industrial products and raw materials to the Single Market without 
reciprocal obligations. The Lome Convention., is another preferential agreement that 
allows developing countries (ACP countries) to enter industrial and agricultural 
products unless they are covered by the CAP, which they usually are. Of course, the 
non-preferential co-operation agreements with developing countries in Asia and Latin 
America are even more limited in scope. Nevertheless, these countries benefit from 
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the EC's generalised system of preferences (GSP), which, though subject to 
quantitative ceilings and safeguard provisions, offers duty-free access to the EC for a 
wide range of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. Again derived from its 
economic weight, the leverage the EC can exercise on these small states is 
considerable and with trial and error the EC has eventually induced many countries to 
liberalise their trade policies. 
2.3.1.4 EC- US Relations 
The EC's relationship with the US is traditionally close and has been subject to large 
amount of research (Hocking and Smith, 1997; Peterson, 1993,1996; Smith and 
Woolcock, 1993; Featherstone and Ginsberg, 1996; Coffey, 1993; Smith, 1998; 
Woolcock, 1991)12 . Transatlantic economic relations consist of a huge number of 
political, cultural and military-strategic ties. In particular, European economic 
structures are, as a result of American involvement in Europe after the Second World 
War, inspired and organised according to the American model and closely 
interconnected with the latter. The security ties that surrounded the transatlantic 
relationship provided the basis for the establishment of close economic ties between 
them (Sandholtz & Zysman, 1989: 101; Smith, 1992: 105). 
EC-US relations are highly institutionalised, with Transatlantic dialogue taking place 
on numerous levels: within NATO institutions, in international economic 
organisations, within the framework of the G-7. EC-US dialogue used to be held 
between European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the US. Due to the inconsistent 
policies of EPC, however, the US was often able to make use of a 'strategy of 
manoeuvre'. Like Japan, the US could manipulate the individual Member States 
through bilateral agreements, make use of the ties which result from the binding of the 
EC to NATO and use multilateral nature of the EC (Santoro, 1989: 1070. Since 1990, 
the Transatlantic Declaration fonns the basis of regular consultations of EC 
institutions with the American government and administration (Peterson, 1996). The 
Transatlantic Declaration then provided for a new foundation of EC-US relations and 
assured the good-will of the US for EC steps towards further integration as well as 
12 Because of the overriding role and capacity of the US in the international system, the thesis concentrates on EC- 
US relations. 
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marking a new step towards the status of completely equal partners (Krenzler and 
Kaiser, 1991: 371). Devuyst (1991: 28) points out that European aversion to blunt 
American attempts at interference in EC affairs is one of the reasons why the EC 
decided not to enter into a legally binding treaty with the US which would have given 
the US a formal voice in EC decision-making. Since 1995, EC-US relations take place 
in the context of the Transatlantic Agenda and the EU-US Action Plan. Here, 
specifically the process of communication between the EC and the US, as opposed to 
communication between Member States and the US, was instrumental in concluding 
these agreements (Smith, 1998: 570). Although the institutionalisation of EC-US 
relations suggests a picture of strategic consensus between the EC-US (Smith, 
1998: 571), the relationship between the EC and the US characterised by both 
elements of co-operation and conflict. 
Disputes between the EC and the US have a long history and arise mainly in the 
economic and trade area. Highly politicised trade issues therefore play a great role in 
EC-US relations, with the EC and the US clashing heavily on selected trade issues 
especially in the context of the GATT. On issues such as agriculture, aerospace, steel 
and the SEM, GATT litigation has indeed been dominated by EC-US trade disputes as 
both have been particularly active in the 1980s in bringing complaints against each 
other (Woolcock, 1991, Coffey, 1993). Given the intensity of trade interdependence 
and interpretation between them, however, it is not surprising at all that there will be a 
continuous flow of disputes between them (Smith, 1995). The EC's trade with the US 
is broadly based and there are no cases in which trade in one sector is of 
overwhelming importance to EC-US relations. The size and importance of the US 
market makes it important to virtually all sectors of industry within the EC and vice 
versa (Woolcock, 1991: 7) Contogeorgis (1989: 88) argued that since the percentage of 
trade exchanges between the EC and the US which have suffered from protectionist 
measures accounted for less than 2% of the total trade involved, this proves that trade 
between the EC and the US was 'almost entirely free of problems'. As the recent 
banana dispute demonstrated, this statement simplifies the issue, but it nevertheless 
helps to understand that trade disputes can be 'fashionable' given that certain issues 
draw over-proportional attention that may lead the general public to underestimate 
how close and effective relations are. Hence, both sides are well aware of the 
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vulnerability that results from their close economic ties, especially since the SEM 
lifted the EC on the same level in economic terms. 
The US has traditionally been the most important single actor in the global economy, 
capable of exercising its influence in a hegemonic, fashion in bilateral and multilateral 
relations. The emphasis of US trade policy has been on the promotion of competition 
as an end in itself. Given the role of the US as the 'prime mover' in eight successive 
GATT Rounds, its trade policy can generally be viewed as pursuing the goal of 
multilateral trade liberalisation, involving the extension of multilateral discipline into 
sectors such as agriculture, textiles, services, and intellectual property. Moreover, the 
GATT system itself can be regarded as a reflection of US domestic trade law, 
designed to foster trade liberalisation, but under certain circumstances capable of 
granting temporary protection to industries. Notionally, there is not a lot involved in 
the formulation of trade policy under either the US or the GATT system, as the US 
ideology of free trade provides that it is imperative to maintain open borders, but 
provides little if any direction. Since its dominant laissez-faire ideology 'does not 
provide guidance as to what should be done so much as guidance as to what should 
not be done' (Wolff, 1992: 488), however, US trade policy formulation has become 
dominated by domestic producer interest. 
In practice, US trade policies since the 1980s can thus more accurately be described as 
a mix of multilateralism, bilateralisin and unilateralism (Heidensohn, 1996: 127). US 
bilateralism. is evident in the numerous measures that the US have taken in order to 
force other countries to 'voluntarily' restrain their exports to the US. On the other 
hand, given its tendency to unilaterally decide what constitutes unfair trade practice 
and to expect other countries to liberalise their trade with the US on a unilateral basis, 
US trade policy has been described as 'aggressive unilateralism' (Bhagwhati and 
Patric, 1990; Bayard and Elliott, 1992). The apparent modification of US trade policy 
over time has been explained by two factors (Ostrey, 1990: 90): Firstly, US trade 
policy is a response to pressures by strong US sectoral pressure groups, calling for 
either the protection of domestic markets and the opening of third country markets or 
for the reduction of the US trade deficit. Secondly, although an open trading system 
has been the overall goal of US trade policy, the openness in world trade has been 
linked to the principle of a'level playing field'. Therefore, failure or unwillingness by 
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other countries to reduce their trade barriers or to eliminate export promoting 
strategies (in particular export subsidies) have often provided a rationale for the US 
government to develop and maintain a trade regime that protected its domestic 
industries from what was labellcd'unfaie competition. 
The US dominant economic power is reflected in both its commercial weaponry and 
the system of trade and co-operation agreements that ties other states to the US. As for 
the latter, trade agreements and arrangements were formed with Israel in 1985, with 
Canada in 1989, with 24 Caribbean countries in 1983 and 1990 (based on the 
Caribbean Economic Recovery Act of 1983 and the Caribbean Economic Recovery 
Expansion Act of 1990), with four Andean countries in 1991 (granting trade 
preferences to Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, and with Peru on the basis of the 1991 
Andean Trade Preferences Act). In 1994, the US also created the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a free-trade area compromising the US, Canada and 
Mexico. Equally, the US has used award or denial of MFN status as a trade policy 
instrument by maintaining substantial differences between MFN and non-MFN tariffs. 
As for the first, over the years the US has introduced a number of trade acts that 
enabled the administration to take protectionist measures 13 . Increased protectionism 
and aggressive unilateralism, however, became possible on the basis of amendments 
to section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. While only about one tenth of all section 301 
actions actually resulted in the US taking retaliatory actions (Bayard and Elliott, 
1992: 689), Japan and particularly the EC found themselves as the targets of 301 
actions. No other single country has recourse to similar trade policy weaponry, and in 
addition to these aggressive trade policy instruments, the US has applied a large 
number of measures and strategies to improve its exports, including import duties, 
export subsidies, anti-dumping duties, import quotas, and VRAs. 
2.3.2 The ECs Institutional Capacity 
Understanding the particular qualities and content of the EC's institutional capacity 
for trade policy formulation requires an appreciation of the unique aspects of its 
internal structures, processes and policies, and of its unique representation of by now 
13 Including the 1930 Tariff Act, the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, the 1974 Trade Act, the 1979 Trade Agreements 
Act, the 1984 and Trade and Tariff Act, the 1985 Food Security Act, and the 1990 Customs and Tariff Act. 
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15 national economies. What has emerged in the case of the EC is not simply a model 
of policy formulation and management that is extremely institutional by international 
comparison, but one in which internalised policy agreements and processes (such as 
consultation mechanisms, formal procedures, voting rules, inter-organisational 
dynamics and actor bargaining) have a significant influence on trade policy outcomes 
(Devuyst, 1992; Howell et al, 1992; Hayes, 1993; Collinson, 1999). 
The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) has been designed to attain the two broad 
objectives of ensuring efficient international specialisation and promoting an open 
world system. These two goals are not necessarily compatible and in the 1980s the 
Community found it increasingly difficult to reconcile the two in a world dominated 
by intra-industry trade, natural oligopolies and market rigidities (Yannopoulos, 
1986: 451-4, Smith 1994b: 251). In general, the EC derives its trade policy authority 
from the 1951 Treaty of Paris, establishing the ECSC, and the 1957 Treaty of Rome, 
establishing the EEC 14 Yet there are some tensions between the ECSC and EEC 
Treaty regarding commercial policy as Art. 71 ECSC explicitly mentions that in 
matters of commercial policy the powers of the Member States are not affected. Over 
time, this has created a number of uncertainties, not least because of the sensitive 
nature of industrial and competition policy and their increasing international 
ramifications (Kapstein and van Themat, 1990; M6ny and Wright, 1987; Benyon and 
Bourgeois, 1984). From a trade policy standpoint, however, the EEC Treaty is more 
significant as it provides for the establishment of a customs union among the Member 
States with a common external tariff and the progressive elimination of intra- 
Community barriers to the four freedoms. The question of competence is a central one 
in EC commercial policy-making and given the nature of the interplay of EC 
institutions in the formulation of EC commercial policy the EC encountered some 
difficulties in moving towards a comprehensive and coherent policy over the years. 
Since the inception of the EEC in the Treaty of Rome, the Member States have 
progressively invested the Commission with an almost exclusive competence in the 
area of external economic relations 15 . The term almost is used because the Maastricht 
14 It should be noted that the Treaty Articles referred to in the following stem from the original Treaties and have 
been re-numbered under TEU and further re-numbered under the Amsterdam Treaty. 15 Progress towards the goal of eventual integration of the Member State economies stalled following the 
completion of the customs union and momentum was only regained during the 1980s with the adoption of the 1985 
White Paper and the 1987 SEA. 
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Treaty did not bring any further expansion of the Commission's competences and 
because some areas of commercial policy making are subject to shared competences 
between the Member States and the Commission (see below). Nevertheless, the EC 
possesses a range of common trade policy powers and instruments akin to those of the 
most powerful states in the global political economy. 
2.3.2.1 Yhe ECs Commercial Competences 
Art. 113 EEC is the centrepiece of the Treaty of Rome and establishes a CCP based 
on uniform principles, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements and measures to 
protect trade. It empowers the Commission to make recommendations on overall trade 
policy to the national representatives in the Council of Ministers, while the Member 
States accept defitre the limitation of their rights to independent negotiation in this 
area. Together with the provisions of Art. 116 EEC, which establishes that the 
Member States shall proceed only by common action within the framework of 
international organisations of an economic character concerning matters of particular 
interest to the Common Market (dropped under the Maastricht Treaty), these two 
articles have been supported by a number of further articles. Since the EC's inception, 
their initial provisions have, in due course, been supplemented by case law, 
periodically revised import regulations and restrictions, and major treaty revisions 
(most notably the SEA and the TEU). Central to the EC's competence in the area of 
commercial policy-making are furthermore Art. 3-9 (the establishment of the CET), 
Art. 110 (definition of purposes), Art. 112 (aid for exports), and Art. 115 (safeguards 
and the deflection of trade). The substance of these articles has remained unchanged 
since the Treaty of Rome. Moreover, the EC's influence and authority in this area is 
extended further under Art. 131 (enabling trade and aid benefits to former colonies 
and overseas territories), Art. 228 (negotiation of trade and tariff accords with non- 
members), Art. 229 (inter-institutional management) and Art. 238 (association 
agreements with non-members). 
2.3.2.1.1 Procedure: Tensions between the EC and the Member States 
In procedures relating to both commercial policy-making and regulatory policy- 
making in the EC, we witness the tensions between the Commission and the Member 
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States. The Commission must conduct its negotiations in consultations with a special 
Committee of Member States (the Art. 113 Committee). Where agreements with third 
countries are to be negotiated, the Commission makes recommendations to the 
Council, which can then authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations 
(Art. 228). Any agreement negotiated by the Commission has to be approved by a 
unanimous Council decision. Since Art. 113 does not limit the type of action that may 
be taken, the EC may use any form of legislative act authorised under Art. 189, i. e. 
regulations, directives, or decisions to implement policies in this area. While 
regulations directly become EC law and decisions are binding only on the parties 
addressed (Member States, companies or individuals), directives set compulsory 
objectives that Member States must translate into national legislation. 
Recommendations and opinions have no binding effect. 
In the past, the EC's sole Competence in the area of commercial policy-making has 
been challenged by the Member States on several occasions and on selected issues. 
This usually concerned issues where their national interests are not served and 
resulted in internal crises and confusion for negotiation partners. However, while legal 
cases in 1971 and 1976 have affirmed the effective exclusivity of EC competence in 
virtually all matters of commercial policy, the Court of Justice (EJC Court Opinion 
1/94 of 15 November 1994) provided some clarity as to the exact scope of EC 
competence in commercial matters in the light of the expansion of multilateral codes 
and negotiations into areas where integration and harmonisation are as yet incomplete. 
The Court ruled that though the exclusive competence in the trade of goods and 
agriculture is firmly established under EC law, its full competence to sign multilateral 
codes on behalf of the Member States in certain aspects of transfrontier services trade 
and intellectual property rights is not yet fully established. Despite the EC's 
comprehensive commercial policy mandate, this leaves the EC with an anomaly in its 
external representation (Hilf, 1995: 247). For instance, the EC represented the Member 
States in GATT negotiations in some areas such as the codes on technical standards 
and anti-dumping. In other areas, such as air transport services, the EC has a clear 
responsibility to ensure the establishment of the Single Market, but lacks a 
corresponding mandate with respect to trade with the rest of the world. The EJC's key 
1/94 ruling therefore set the stage for future disputes over competences and may well 
76 
affect the future effectiveness of the EC in international trade negotiations (Meunier, 
1997: 45). 
There are also certain areas that allow for Member State deviations from EC policy. 
Actions taken under Art. 113 to implement the CCP are proposed by the Commission 
to the Council and must be adopted by the Council by a qualified majority 16 . Since the 
Council needs to achieve unanimity in order to deviate from a Commission proposal, 
the Commission's power is considerable (Nicolaides, 1993a). On the basis of Art. 115, 
however, which allows for such deviations only in cases where a Member State faces 
economic difficulties in applying EC policy, Member States may obtain the 
permission of the Commission to deviate from their obligation to apply uniform 
principles or the policies adopted by the EC as a whole. While this has resulted in a 
number of cases where Member States restricted imports of certain sensitive products 
such as steel, textiles, footwear and some electronics products, the removal of internal 
border controls under the Single Market Programme made the administration of 
nationally administered import restrictions virtually ineffective. Furthermore. ' Art 133 
declares that the common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles. 
Since the article does not offer a precise definition of the scope of policies, this has 
meant that Member States retained some autonomy in concluding certain 
arrangements with third countries. While no Member State can enter into any bilateral 
agreement with third countries in an area that falls under the competence of the EC, in 
areas where there is no exclusive Community competence, arrangements have to be 
undertaken by the EC and the Member States as 'mixed agreements'. 
Obtaining a negotiation mandate is another important issue which reflects the tensions 
between Commission and Member States and the room for debate about the 
Commission's rights and obligations is considerable (Smith, 1994b: 253). Even when 
no mandate is required, the Commission must still obtain authorisation to commence 
negotiations with third countries. Since in order to reach a common position a process 
of internal bargaining needs to take place, the EC faces some disadvantages 
(Yannopolous, 1986: 461): Firstly, compromises are usually struck at the lowest 
16 Since the 1987 SEA, agreements must also receive the assent of the EP (Art. 238). The Council can also approve 
agreements with third countries on the basis of Art. 235, which requires only the favourable opinion of the EP. For 
example, the Association Agreements with East European countries were negotiated on the basis of Art. 238, while 
their predecessors, the more narrow Trade and Cooperation Agreements, were based on Art. 235. 
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common denominator, which is often a protectionist, i. e. conflictual, position. 
Secondly, commercial policy issues are often linked to internal policy issues, which 
often leads to the externalisation of the resulting conflicts and pressures. As the 
common commercial policy is the result of a political bargain, policy positions are 
often rigid and inflexible, and therefore difficult to adjust. As a consequence, the 
Commission is often regarded as an inflexible negotiator and dealing with the EC in 
international fora can often become complex and time-consuming. Since EC 
competence is not a static concept (Smith 1994b: 254), the Commission in practice 
frequently negotiates without a mandate, 'ostensibly conducting 'talks' in its area of 
competence but actually addressing and resolving trade issues' (Howell et al., 
1992: 407). 
The ambiguity contained in the EC's institutional capacity reveals a lack of coherence 
in external trade policies and perhaps helps to explain the EC's reluctance to use 
GATT dispute procedures during the 1980s. The EC thus often gave the impression 
that 'it prefer[ed] 'power diplomacy' rather than 'rule diplomacy' in the settlement of 
international trade disputes' (Yannopoulos, 1986: 462). Notwithstanding, Meunier 
(1997: 10) and Howell et al. (1992: 401) noted that it might be possible for the EC to 
use some of its institutional flaws as an external leverage or strategically in order to 
gain concessions from its negotiating opponents. 
2.3.2.2 The ECs Commercial Policy Instruments 
In addition to the complex web of international trade diplomacy and trade relations 
(see section 2.3.1.3) and emanating from the essential grant of trade policy 
competence, the EC pursues its objectives through threatening or applying its wide 
range of commercial policy instruments. The Community's trade policy is 
characterised by both elements of free trade and protectionism and it is important to 
keep in mind that the EC's trade policy has not only been determined by historical 
influences and the international political economy, but also by the 'tortuous process of 
integration' Pelkmans and Carzaniga, 1996: 81). Furthermore, in view of the present 
study, it is important to note that there are sectoral differences in the application of 
commercial policy instruments. Thus, the following section provides a selective 
overview of the EC's major commercial policy instruments (for a more detailed 
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analysis of EC commercial instruments see GATT, 1993; Nicolaidis, 1993a, 
Commission, 1993). 
During the first decades of its existence, the Commission's implementation of trade 
policy did not differ dramatically from the prior practices of some of the larger 
Member States (Howell et al. 1992: 410). It concluded preferential EC-wide 
agreements with fonner European colonies, which superseded comparable 
arrangements between the colonies and the mother countries, reached discriminatory 
bilateral arrangements restricting trade with a number of third countries and utilised 
little-publicised 'understandings' to regulate market shares and pricing policies in a 
number of key sectors. However, while the development of the EC's commercial 
policy instruments faced problems relating to a slow progress of harmonisation and 
Member State reluctance to transfer to EC institutions, the Community for a long time 
lacked commercial policy instruments that were appropriate responses to the trade 
distorting policies of other countries (Yannopoulos, 1986: 454-60). In addition, the EC 
was criticised by writers and the GATT alike for its propensity to work out bilateral 
and sectoral deals as these undermined and posed a threat to the multilateral system 
(GATT, 1991; Paterson, 1983: 230-1). In the late 1980s, however, with the Single 
Market Initiative and the ascendancy of economic liberals within the Commission, the 
Commission! s policy instruments were modified and the EC's trade diplomacy of 
back-room deals was replaced by a regime emphasising legal mechanisms with a 
larger degree of transparency (Howell et al., 1992: 410). In due course, an array of 
new trade and trade related rules were put into place as well as existing mechanisms, 
such as anti-dumping law, were utilised more vigorously. 
The Common Customs Tariff (CCT) used to be the single most important trade policy 
instrument. It covers all imported goods into the EC and is applied on a most-favoured 
nation basis to all GATT members unless special bilateral agreements provide for 
more favourable treatment. The importance of tariffs has diminished as a consequence 
of reductions negotiated during successive GATT rounds. Since the EC has stuck to 
the GATT aim of binding tariffs (i. e. ensuring that tariffs can only go down and not 
up) and because tariff levels have been reduced so substantially, the CCT has lost its 
importance as an effective and flexible policy instrument. 
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With the reduction in importance of the CCT, quantitative restrictions and Voluntary 
Restraint Agreements (VRAs) became increasingly important and were used in order 
to curb third country imports. Legally questionable under the GATT, restrictions on 
imports have largely been remnants of Member States' trade regimes from before the 
enactment of the EEC Treaty and have therefore been levied at the national level. At 
the end of the 1980s, the Member States restricted imports of more than 120 industrial 
products, with France and Italy accounting for virtually all of them (Heidensohn, 
1996: 5). On the basis of the Single Market Programme, the EC in the early 1990s 
started to 'communizise' previous national restrictions, with cases including bananas 
and a temporary car consensus with Japan. In a shift-away from 'residual' national 
restrictions to a system of EC-wide restrictions and Community administration, 
national restriction invoked under Art. 115 are thus hardly authorised anymore, while 
the Single Market now makes an effective administration of both virtually impossible 
(Nicolaidis, 1993a). Nevertheless, quantitative measures remain a weapon in the 
Commission's trade arsenal and it has fought in the GATT safeguards negotiations to 
preserve its freedom of action in this area (Howell, et al. 1992: 418). VRAs, on the 
other hand, have to be eliminated or have to comply with the GATT Uruguay Round 
agreement on 'grey-area measures' within four years from 1 January 1995 (GATT, 
1994). 
Despite this shift, the Member States retain the possibility to request the Commission 
to put in place import surveillance measures where imports may cause difficulties for 
indigenous industries or the Community interest requires it. In practice, such measures 
usually follow specific requests from anxious producers or manufacturers and 
frequently lead to the imposition of trade defence measures. In cases of urgency, the 
Commission can immediately impose quantitative restrictions, but measures can 
potentially be amended or revoked by qualified majority. Importantly, surveillance 
measures are attractive to policy-makers not only because they are less overtly 
protectionist, but also because the Commission has the authority to impose such 
measures without Council approval (Howell, et al., 1992: 419). Moreover, as Murphy 
(1990: 56) points out, the initiation of surveillance measures alone my encourage third 
countries to voluntary curb their exports to the EC. 
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Given that protection via tariffs, quantitative restrictions and VRAs are increasingly 
proscribed by the GATT/WTO, the choice falls on the three instruments of contingent 
protection - antidumping actions, safeguards and compensatory measures (Pelkmans 
and Carzaniga, 1996: 89). While the recent changes introduced by the Uruguay Round 
to the GATT Anti-Dumping Code did not entail radical modifications of EC anti- 
dumping procedures, the threat or application of anti-dumping legislation is the most 
used trade defence instrument of the EC and central to its commercial policy making. 
EC anti-dumping action has traditionally taken the form of penalty duties with, since 
basic regulation 2423/88/EEC and decision 2424/88/ESCS (L209 of 2 August 1988a 
and b), multiple examples of tariff imposistion at often prohibitive rates. Between 
1980 and 1991, the EC initiated 440 anti-dumping investigations, of which 330 were 
terminated with a positive finding (Nicolaides, 1993a). In the 1990s, the EC continues 
to be one of the most frequent users of anti-dumping procedures (WTO, 1996: 63), 
wielding them as a (strategic) weapon against what are deemed or proven 'unfaie 
imports and against import penetration in vulnerable industries. Anti-dumping 
measures are the most frequently used trade instrument of the EC, although it only 
applies to less than I percent of its trade (COM(96) 146firt. of 8 May 1996: 3). 
Commission officials see anti-dumping law as a key policy tool and in some of its 
anti-dumping decisions) such as the 1988 case of Japanese and East Asian 
photocopiers, the Commission has indeed referred to the strategic importance of 
industries (Howell, et al. 1992: 414). Ultimately, producers exporting into the EC who 
have reason to believe that they might be accused of dumping have a strong incentive 
to raise prices or to modify their competitive practices in order to avoid anti-dumping 
action. As the 1991 GATT Trade Policy Review (GATT, 1991: 70-75) pointed out, 
exporters into the EC have largely preferred to enter VRAs in order to avoid anti- 
dumping action. However, as it is the Council of Ministers that has the final say on 
anti-dumping actions, there is an internal political edge to the Commission 
administration of anti-dumping action, posing a problem to the Commission's 
otherwise mechanical and legalistic processing of these measures. Although the anti- 
dumping instrument has undergone some modifications in recent years towards a 
speedier and smoother operation, it remains the case that any provisional duties 
become definite only after majority vote in the Council, if now by simple as opposed 
to qualified majority. This implies that in contrast to before its reform, and despite the 
increasing importance of the Community interest (Kempton, 1996), the coalition of 
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northern free-trade states (UK, the Netherlands, Denmark and Germany) cannot bloc 
the imposition of anti-dumping duties anymore. 
Safeguards and countervailing duty actions have been used more sparingly than anti- 
dumping actions. In the period 1960-89, there were only 17 safeguard actions, 
affecting mostly agricultural or textile products (Nicolaides, 1993a). Since the 1990s, 
these measures have been firmly established under GATT/WTO provisions, with the 
remainder of the 1990s being an effective period of transition towards their 
elimination in many areas. While Regulation No. 3283/94 (L349 of 22 December 
1994) now governs countervailing and anti-dumping action and provides definitions 
of subsidies, the EC has nevertheless incorporated safeguard provisions into 
preferential trade agreements such as the Europe Agreements (EAs). In general and 
reflecting its internal state-aids regime which reflects Member States' greater 
propensity to subsidise than their American and Japanese counterparts, the EC 
believes that subsidies should be looked at on the basis of the distortive effect they 
have on a market (Pelkman and Carzaniga, 1996: 89). 
In connection with the regulatory impact of the SEM, the Commission in recent years 
has put increasing emphasis on local content requirements and rules of origin. The EC 
has used rules of origin since 1968 and operates specific rules for about 14 products 
(Nicolaides, 1993a). These have emerged as a significant policy instrument and their 
use is likely to increase because of the key role they play in the implementation of 
other trade and industrial measures (Howell, et al., 1992: 412). In connection to anti- 
dumping rules, they have, as the cases of photocopiers and screwdriver plants 
illustrate, been used to force investment in the EC by third country suppliers wishing 
to avoid punitive action. They have also become central to EC competition vis-a-vis 
Japan and to the EC's trade regime vis-a-vis third countries as all bilateral preferential 
trade agreements require the determination of origin. 
In the 1980s, the EC created a different type of commercial instrument, designed to 
remove specific problems of export markets and subsequently of an aggressive 
(market-opening) character. Similar to the powers conferred upon the US President by 
the 1974 US Trade Act and partly designed in response to US sanctions against the 
EC because of its exports of materials for the construction of the Siberian gas pipeline 
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(Schoneveld, 1992), the New Cormnercial Policy Instrument established by regulation 
No 2641/84/EEC (L252 of 20 September 1984) gave the EC the means to take 
retaliatory action against illicit commercial practice. It is strictly GATT conforming 
and remained so in the 1994 revision (L56 of 6 March 1996). The trade barriers 
regulation (TBR), established by regulation No. 3286/94 (L308 of 29 July 1996), 
provides EC industries and enterprises, as well as Member States, with access to a 
procedure by which they can request the EC to obtain the enforcement of international 
trade rules where non-EC countries are adopting or maintaining trade barriers. It 
differs from other EC trade policy instruments as it is applicable to a much wider 
range of situations, is not confined to the defence of the internal market, and is not 
primarily intended to result in measures imposed at the EC's frontiers. Both have been 
used sparingly to date (see section 8.3.2). 
2.3.3 The ECs Decision-Making Capacity 
Given the conceptualisation of the EC/EU as a complex and multi-level system of 
governance with varying stakeholders across sectors and time, the focus of this 
section can only be on the broad features that characterise the EC decision-making 
system. Following a number of initial observations on the EC decision-making system 
that help to further illuminate the capacities of the EC in this area, this section 
analyses first the co-ordination of preferences within the EC decision-making process 
and then the roles, cpacities and strategies of the main actors (Commission, Member 
States and Firms). 
The EC/EU has acquired for itself at least the policy-making attributes of a modem 
state and this across an increasingly wide range of policy sectors. However, rather 
than amassing extensive and autonomous political authority, the EC/EU has gradually 
altered the exercise of national political authority by enmeshing the Member States in 
a web of collaboration and co-operation (Laffan, O'Donnell and Smith, 1999: 85). 
With a high proportion of what used to be regarded as purely domestic policy-making 
17 now taking place on the Community level , it becomes apparent that the locus of 
decision has shifted (Richardson, 1996: 3) and this is reflected in the stupendous 
growth in EC regulatory policy-making since the 1960s. The growth of the EC as a 
17 According to estimates of the German industry association, 60 percent of all legislation affecting industry is now 
made in Brussels, and not London, Paris or Bonn. Quoted from Cowles (1995c: 1). 
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'regulatory state' has received considerable attention in recent years (for instance 
Majone, 1990; 1996) and nowhere more than in the EC do regulations constitute and 
define the market (Wilks, 1996: 539). Although regulatory policy competences have 
not straight-forwardly been transferred to the Community level (see Hancher, 
1996: 66), the number of directives and regulations produced in Brussels increased 
almost exponentially. For example, by 1970 the average of directives and regulations 
produced in Brussels was 25 directives and 600 regulations per year. In 1991, 
Brussels issued 1,564 directives and regulations (Majone, 1996: 57). This quantitative 
growth can be explained by the prevalence of 'regulatory failure' at the international 
level and the low credibility of intergovernmental agreements that increases the 
willingness of Member States to delegate regulatory powers to the EC. Similarly, the 
transfer of regulatory powers to the Commission, by making stringent regulation more 
credible, improves both the behaviour of regulated firms and the strictness of 
enforcement (Majone, 1996: 271). 
Given that since its inception the EC decision-making system is characterised by 
continuing flux in terms of membership, policy competence, policy style and 
evolution, different sets of actors or factors have become dominant during different 
phases in the EC's development (Lodge, 1993: 1). Moreover, ever since the SEA the 
process of policy-making has become increasingly 'internationalised' or 
'Europeanised' (Andersen and Eliassen, 1993; Laffan, O'Donnell and Smith, 1999), 
with many domestic more actors operating in multiple areas and the 'nested games' 
(Tsebelis, 1990) within national arenas augmented by transnational 'connected games' 
(Marks et al., 1996). As a large array of firms, interest organisations, regions, cities 
and other actors have new strategic opportunities within the system, outcomes in the 
EC decision-making system are not purely the result of interstate bargaining among 
the Member States anymore. Considering the operations and influence of non- 
Community firms within the Internal Market (e. g. the influence of the American 
Chamber of Commerce), the emergence of complex global alignments of firms and 
cross-cutting interests that participate in EC decision-making, the identification of a 
'European interest' within this complex system is by no means guaranteed (Strange, 
1998; see below). Thus the EC policy-making process has increasingly developed into 
a series of strategic bargaining games, with all participating actors having the 
opportunity to pursue a number of strategies in order to maximise their gains. The 
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bargaining strength and capacities of actors vary over time and issue areas and depend 
on institutional arrangements and economic conditions. We are thus dealing with what 
game theory calls a 'mixed motive game' when analysing EC decision-making 
processes. 
With the relationships between the key institutions still in a state of flux, the EC 
decision-making system, though being quantitatively productive, cannot be regarded 
to be a stable one (Richardson, 1996: 4). In general, decision-making in the EC takes 
place within an institutional system that centres on the four major institutions, the 
Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Court of Justice (EJC) and the 
European Parliament (EP) and a number of associated dynamics. These have been 
well characterised in a number of studies (for instance Wallace et aL, 1983; Lodge, 
1993, Richardson, 1996, Laffan, O'Donnell, and Smith, 1999). This basic model of 
EC decision-making is differentiated in the various policy-making areas and shows 
some flexibility and variety, depending on decision-type, but is centred on the major 
governing institutions. Importantly, the institutions of the EC function as active 
components of this system, holding institutional interest, agendas and distinct action 
capacities and play an active role in the identification, formulation and promotion of 
ideas and interests. 
2.3.3.1 The Co-ordination Process 
Since the late 1970s, the Commission fostered the development of transnational 
networks and set up networks of experts, including for instance academics and 
business leaders, to monitor and advise the Commission on various parts of its work. 
Dominated by technocratic rationality and based on specialised technical knowledge, 
established negotiation styles and networks within the EC can reduce the complexity 
of the co-ordination process and fashion the co-ordination process positively. Co- 
ordination within these networks can vary along a continuum from 'policy- 
communities' to 'issue networks' (Peterson, 1995a). The process of accommodating 
the various interests participating in EC decision-making varies according to the 
institutional conditions and the specific phase of decision-making. The Commission, 
under the institutional conditions of the EC, functions as a gatekeeper and largely 
determines Member States chances to shape regulatory policy-making according to 
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their own traditions. A recent way of analysing the co-ordination process that takes 
place in the EC has been presented by H6retier (1996). She found a pattern of co- 
ordination that includes the strategic 'first mover', a phase of 'problem solving' in the 
early stages of drafting, and the linked pattern of 'negative co-ordination, bargaining 
and compensation' that dominates the formal decision-making process. 
After a 'first mover' has defined the problem in co-operation with the Commission, 
suggested a way of dealing with it and set the agendaig, a phase of 'problem-solving' 
occurs where actors concentrate on joint production and at least temporarily put aside 
distributive issues. In the problem-solving stage, technical, scientific and legal 
experts, interested in pragmatic problem-solving, dominate the scene. Expert 
committees, advisory committees, expert groups, conferences, seminars and 
workshops are all being used by the Commission to institutionalise the EC's 
consultation process. The advantages of these are twofold: on the one hand, they aid 
consensus-building, on the other, they can make the various policy stakeholders 
accept a certain frame (cf. Rein and Sch6n, 1991, quoted in Mazey and Richardson, 
1996: 210) for the solution of policy problems. Here, some specific institutional 
conditions of EC policy-making facilitate problem-solving: Firstly, working groups 
and committees do not make decisions, they simply have a consultative function. 
Secondly, it is ultimately the Commission that chooses between proposals and sets the 
agenda for the Council. Thirdly, the long-term nature of many committees and 
working groups during this stage facilitates development of 'epistemic communities' 
as well as mutual learning among national experts. During this stage, dominated by 
technocratic rationality and based on specialised technical knowledge, problems tend 
to be shared. 
Once the Commission has decided on a policy proposal, it is put forward for a 
decision in the Commission as a whole and then in the Council and the EP. Focusing 
on specific costs and benefits, the process of negative co-ordination, bargaining and 
compensation begins. Should an issue be considered as redistributive, the decision- 
making process rapidly becomes polarised, with clear-cut lines of conflict. Once the 
relative positions are clear, a bargaining process begins and compensations for the 
is On the dynamics and advantages of the'first movce see H6retier(1996: 151-4). 
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possible losers are being considered (Scharpf, 1993: 68). If there is only a choice 
between 'yes' and 'no' and monetary compensation seems unacceptable (Scharpf, 
1993: 70), a package deal may be struck in which a trade-off of benefits is sought over 
different issue areas. The more issues areas are involved in such a package deal, the 
higher the political level at which negotiations are conducted. 
If compensation in order to buy off opposition to a package deal has been agreed 
upon, the difficult process of considering whether the costs and benefits accruing to 
the various actors from different issue areas are equally and fairly distributed begins 
(Scharpf, 1993: 77). Here, the long-term nature of negotiations within EC decision- 
making processes helps in so far as each actor can expect to be compensated for a 
concession in future negotiations. This diffuse reciprocity works through informal 
mechanisms which are rooted in the competition among Member States and works to 
balance costs and benefits over issues and time (H6retier, 1996: 157). The institutional 
memory of the EC system of governance functions very well as the Member States 
jealously keep a record of when and to whom concessions have been made. The long- 
term nature of bargaining processes in the EC ensures that the participants think twice 
before ruthlessly maximising their gains. In addition, the stable institutional 
framework of EC decision-making ensures that Member States are economical in their 
opposition to proposed measures, since they know that they cannot constantly oppose 
all kinds of issues (Peters, 1992). Usually, the Member States first carefully decide on 
which issues they can make concessions, which are negotiable and which can be 
sacrificed altogether, and then strategically support those closest to their heart and 
which offer the highest economic and regulatory pay-off. 
Other institutional features of the EC decision-making machine also help to shape the 
co-ordination process positively. Voting rules affect the extent to which stakeholders 
are willing to make concessions. For instance, qualified majority voting, where 
applicable, helps to anticipate possible opposing coalitions and therefore helps to 
speed up negotiations (Scharpf, 1992: 25). Similarly, the Council Presidency can 
prepare package deals by setting the agenda, attaching priority to certain issues and 
arranging the list of items to be discussed. Mutual efficiency gains will thus be the 
result of an implicit consensus that collaboration does pay off despite considerable 
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conflicts. The interest in securing mutual gains and avoiding individual losses 
therefore ensures the continuation of bargaining games. 
Measured quantitatively, i. e. in terms of the amount of regulations and decisions that 
are produced in Brussels, the EC's decision-making capacity is considerable. Policy 
and issue networks and their inherent dynamics and co-ordination procedures ensure 
the functioning of the decision-making process. Nevertheless, the decision-making 
system that has developed in the EC is not stable, characterised by complexity, 
ambiguity, and constant compromise and decisions are often the result of hard fought 
internal negotiations and ultimately of compromise (Howell, et al, 1992: 401). In order 
to investigate the EC's decision-making capacity further, analysis now turns to the 
main actors (Commission, Member States and firms), their capacities and roles within 
the decision-making process, as well as to the strategies they pursue in the strategic 
bargaining game. 
2.3.3.2 The Commission 
Reflecting the Cominissioifs firm location at the very heart of the EC decision- 
making process, virtually every major EC policy in recent years has been associated 
in some way with the Commission (Peterson, 1995a; Cini, 1996; Nugent, 1996). 
Given that the majority of policies are technical and regulatory politics and associated 
with the Commission, the central position of the Commission becomes even clearer. 
The single most important feature of the Commission's central position in the EC 
decision-making system is its right of initiating legislation. It is very likely that 
legislation proposed by the Commission will eventually be adopted. There are a 
number of reasons for this: firstly, the Commission is unlikely to table any proposal 
unless it finds the approval of the Member States. Secondly, securing unanimity for 
rejection among the Member States has become difficult since the introduction of 
increasingly more majority voting. Thirdly, the Commission has the exclusive power 
to amend or withdraw a proposal at any stage of the legislative process. 
Notwithstanding, the Commission must ensure the common interest of the EC (as 
perceived by the Commission), but it is not compelled to seek or follow instructions 
from the Member States. In exercising its wide-ranging rule-making, supervisory, 
executive, managerial and bureaucratic functions, it does not simply execute the EEC 
Treaty, but interprets its spirit in a bold manner. It also exercises an important role as 
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mediator in inter-institutional dealings with the Council and the EP, which is part of 
its exercise of legislative authority in the EC. 
Based on its bureaucratic and political functions, the Commission exercises the role of 
a leader and policy entrepreneur. This implies that the Commission has to base its 
leadership on some formal or informal recognition. Formal recognition can be 
acquired by being handed the official mandate to act on behalf of the Community in a 
given policy-making area, i. e. Member States delegate competences to the EC, 
whereas informal recognition can be acquired by displaying superior problem-solving 
skills. In the latter case, it is probable that the main thrust for the Commission to take 
up a leadership role in a given sector comes from the firm level since the Commission 
is the only agency to perform this role. However, it has been noted that although the 
Commission has extensive administrative responsibilities, its capacity for policy 
management is considerably weaker than its capacity for policy entrepreneurship. Yet, 
in recent years a growing emphasis has been placed on the management and 
effectiveness of the Commission (Laffan, O'Donnell, and Smith, 1999: 81). 
In performing its leadership role, the Commission is relying on its resources. Nugent 
(1996) identified these as its constitutional powers, the background and skill of the 
Commissioners, its knowledge and expertise, its impartiality and neutrality, the engine 
role it performs in the integration process, the position of the President, relative 
cohesion of the Commission and its strategic position in the EC/EU system. While 
these resources undergo change over time, the Commission's leadership capacities are 
restrained by three aspects of the Commission's operating context. Firstly, the 
perception of the need for policy activity at the EC level, which depends on the 
political climate in Member States and the politicisation of issues within them. 
Secondly, the perceptions of the Member States as regards the role that the 
Commission should play. This often depends on whether Member States perceive the 
Commission's activity as 'doing a good job' and varies considerably according to 
national interests and priorities. Third, the institutional context in which the 
Commission operates contains a bias towards intergovernmental decision-making. 
Within its operating contexts and given its position in the often 'messy' distribution of 
powers in the EC policy-making process, however, the Commission has had to learn 
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to play strategic games in order to achieve policy innovations. There are, as Nugent 
(1996: 620) points out, occasions when the Commission 'plants' an initiative of its own 
with another institution if it is more likely to result in a policy advance. Yet it is often 
difficult to disentangle these from the complex decision-making process in the EC, in 
which inputs come from many sections of the policy-making arena. Similarly, the 
Commission also takes strategic decisions concerning the Treaty provisions it uses in 
order to advance proposals in the legislative process. In the context of the SEM, the 
Commission under Delors took advantage of a convergence of Member State interests 
and reasserted itself as a source of policy innovation (Laffan, O'Donnell, and Smith, 
1999: 78; Cini, 1996: 77-81). Here, the Commission adopted an approach that has been 
compared to a 'Russian doll' strategy, which implied 'iterated episodes of strategic 
action to seize upon openings in the political opportunity structure, resource 
accumulation through success, and reinvestment of these resources in new actions to 
capitalise on new opportunities (Ross, 1995: 39, quoted in Laffan, O'Donnell, and 
Smith, 1999: 78). 
The Commission's ability to successfully co-ordinate internal preferences becomes 
more complicated the larger the number of stakeholders and the more conflictual the 
preferences they hold are. The outcome of the co-ordination process also depends on 
the capacities and strategies of the stakeholders, which can include bluffs and threats. 
It is important that an accepted solution to a significant problem can be translated by 
the Commission into binding law. In other words, it must be capable of ensuring the 
compliance of the stakeholders. This is obviously even more important in sectors or 
policy-making areas where the Commission's competences are less clearly regulated. 
What follows is not only that the more regulated the Commission's competences, the 
more capable it is to introduce its own preferences into the bargaining game, but also 
the more internationally recognised the Commission will be as the 'flagship' of 
European trade preferences. The Commission therefore improves its own credibility 
by preventing the capture of the public policy process by partial interests and ensuring 
an equal distribution of gains among all stakeholders, and especially the Member 
States, in the policy-making process. This raises the issue of the generation of the 
common interest. Given the complexity of the EC policy-making process, opinions 
may obviously differ as to what objectives should be pursued and which policy is 
mutually beneficial to all interests. Compared to its international competitors, the 
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generation of a common interest appears even more contested in the EC. Though it is 
not possible to address all the problems relating to the generation of common interests 
within the present study, it seems that the Commission's leadership initiatives only 
need to rest on some conception of the common interest, as these will be naturally 
contested. Given the relative changes in powers of actors over time, it also highlights 
the importance of internal coalition-building between actors. An optimal promotion of 
the common interest therefore requires creativity, team work and a trusting exchange 
of information; in other words, a problem-solving negotiation style on part of the 
Commission. 
2.3.3.3 The Member States 
The Member States main influence on the EC decision-making process is of course 
through the Council of Ministers, which is often described as a supreme body united 
in defending national sovereignty against supranational. incursion, i. e. a break to 
further integration. Yet there are also other channels, including the European Council 
(and particularly the Council Presidency), Coreper, and the Art. 133 Committee, that 
are used by the Member States to influence the decision-making process. The 
Council, which is effectively the legislature of the EC (or co-legislature with the EP in 
areas that fall under the co-decision procedure), is the main place of interaction and 
competition among the Member States since virtually all proposals that touch on 
politically important/sensitive issues need Council approval in order to be adopted. 
Although the Council can only act on the basis of proposals forwarded by the 
Commission, in practice ways have been found that allow the Council a significant 
policy initiation role. According to Nugent (1994: 124-5), these include using Art. 152 
EC Treaty; the political weight the Member States can exercise through opinions, 
recommendations, and agreements; the exploitation of grey policy-making areas by 
moving into them; the Council machinery and particularly the Council Presidency; 
and Member States increasing willingness to base aspects of their co-operation on 
non-binding agreements and understandings rather the EC law. 
Apart from the constraints brought upon the capacities of the Member States by 
globalisation and internationalisation, their formal capacities have also been limited 
by the guarantee of the four freedoms within the Single Market. Thus they have 
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authority today to resolve economic or economically generated problems according to 
their preferences than 20 years ago (Scharpf, 1994: 219). For instance, the increased 
scope of EC legislation and industrial policy initiatives have increased the difficulties 
encountered by states to have their policy preferences translated into policy. Here, 
Member State initiatives aimed at achieving global competitiveness for domestic 
industries have been constraint by EC competition regulations as the convergence 
criteria contained in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) restricted their ability to 
fund industrial policies by means of deficit budgeting or increasing indebtedness. 
Incidentally, this also called into question the whole rationale for the maintenance of 
public ownership in industrial sectors. Furthermore, in some sectors the EC has been 
able to reshape the domestic political landscape, not only altering the behaviour of 
domestic actors, but also promoting the development of new ones. As a result, 
Member State governments often find themselves restrained by the behaviour of 
firms, which has altered as a result of the increasing relevance of EC legislation in 
sectors. On the one hand, Member States find themselves confronted with alliances 
between the Commission and domestic actors (e. g. such as French broadcasters that 
led the French government to back down from its intention to increase national quotas 
on French television from 40 to 50 percent). On the other, the re-orientation of 
domestic actors to Brussels brought with it an increasing transnationalisation of some 
interest representations. These push for European solutions to what they perceive as 
EC-level problems and further restrict the ability of Member States to act individually 
(Menon and Hayward, 1996: 268-70). 
Given this loosened relationship with domestic actors, the Member States have to 
increase their control over the external environment, i. e. the EC, and engage in 
regulatory competition with other Member States (II6retier, 1996). Since the Member 
State governments are not monolithic, they cannot hope to negotiate EC decision- 
making 
except by constantly seeking and forging alliances with other Member 
State governments, with factions within governing coalitions, 
governments departments and with bureaucratic, political and economic 
elites within and across national boundaries, within the EC and the 
Commission. (Lodge, 1993: 15) 
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The nature of the decision-making process thus places a premium on the particular 
alignments of groups of Member States on particular issues. The divisions among 
Member States can occur along multiple lines and influence their preferences and 
voting behaviour. Amongst others, classic lines of division include big vs. small 
states, centre vs. periphery states and pro vs. anti-supranationalism states (Lodge, 
1993: 3). However, there are no blocs of Member States that vote across the whole 
spectrum of issues. Nevertheless, as concerns industrial policy and trade, the original 
six core group is split along a rough North-South axis. For instance, observers such as 
Howell et aL (1992: 395) point out that the affluent northern states (Germany, 
Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands and occasionally Luxembourg) tended to advocate 
liberal trade policies as well as limits on government support for industry. On the 
other hand, southern Member States (Italy and France) tended to advocate more 
protectionist policies, limits on foreign investment and a distinct preference and 
practice of large-scale subsidisation to promote key industries. This latter group has 
been strengthened by the accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece, which tend to be 
more protectionist in outlook. 
The Member States therefore remain central actors in EC-decision-making processes, 
especially where so-called 'history-making' decisions are concerned (Peterson, 1995a). 
Yet they are forced to achieve their goals less by relying on their own resources. 
Rather they pursue their objectives by assuming a dominant role in the relationships 
with other Member States, transnational institutions and corporate actors, where they 
try to operationalise or replace their 'powerlessness' by acting strategically within their 
institutional environment. 
2.3.3.4 Firms 
The prominent position of firms in EC decision-making processes can in part be 
attributed to the increased scope of the Commission's regulatory and distributive 
competence, institutional changes that have facilitated direct lobbying, and the 
economic developments that made the EC the practical level of negotiation 
(Coen: 1997: 106). The EC policy-making process is very open to lobbying and a 
number of recent studies have revealed the crucial role that firms and interest groups 
play in the EC policy-making process. While Maria Green Cowles (1995a, 1995b) has 
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shown the growing importance of business leaders in the grander vision of Europe, 
others studied the increasing access of firms to the technical committees of the 
Commission (Gardner, 1991; Mazey and Richardson, 1993,1996). Although most of 
the literature has concentrated on European collective action and broad-based interest 
group representation (for instance Greenwood et al, 1992; McLaughlin and Jordan, 
1993) there is also a developing strand of literature focusing on the individual political 
interests of firms in the political process (McLaughlin et al, 1993, Grant et al., 1989, 
Coen, 1997; Cowles, 1995c). While it was suggested as early as 1980 that there has 
been a 'linkage between the extent to which Community policies exist in a given 
sector and the degree of co-operation and integration reached by European interest 
groups in that sector' (Kirchner, 1980: 115), it has recently been shown that as a result 
of integration have adjusted their lobbying activities to the EC level in the course of 
the 1980s in order 'shoot where the ducks are' (Mazey and Richardson, 1996: 200). 
Despite their intersection at all stages of the EC policy-making system, companies 
regard the Commission as 'best value' (Coen 1997: 40), because the Commission has 
the crucial privilege of initialising legislation and generally welcomes the views and 
expertise of firms due to its limited resources (Hull, 1993: 83). For firms wishing to 
influence EC decision-making it seems important to identify and make contacts with 
the correct level in the Commission. However, in contrast to the findings of national 
studies, observers argue that it is not the top level contacts, but the medium and 
particularly the low-level contacts, i. e. those officials that actually draft the 
legislation, which are of most importance in the EC (Andersen and Eliassen, 
1993: 390). 
The relationship between firms and the Commission is institutionalised and these 
institutionalised relations ensure that firm representatives negotiate regularly with 
Conunission officials to promote or withdraw particular legislation or distributive 
policies. The Commission has been very receptive to the input of businesses into the 
EC policy-making process, partly because it saw business participation as a 
countervailing influence to the Member States and partly because the understaffed 
Commission needed the input of firms to carry out its work (Mazey and Richardson, 
1996). Apart from technical advise and expertise, firms, and especially large firms and 
multinationals, increasingly negotiate with the Commission on political matters and 
are capable of what Coen (1997) termed 'sophisticated political games'. For example, 
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the Common Market was largely developed without the input and support of business, 
but in the early 1980s the situation changed when the members of the European 
Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) developed a new relationship with the 
Commission, met directly government leaders, and conducted private campaigns to 
launch the Single Market Programme (Cowles, 1995c: l; Coen, 1997; also Sandholtz 
and Zysmann, 1989). The ERT 'is recognised for its agenda-setting power in the EU. 
As a strategic player in EC matters, the ERT serves as 'an idea generator' in a number 
of regulatory areas such as social policy, employment and telecommunications' 
(Cowles, 1995c: 12; italics and quotation marks in the original). Similar to the ERT, 
large firms can get items onto the Commission's agenda or veto the pursuit of specific 
policies. For example, the 'warnings' by large firms such like Daimler Benz they 
would be forced to take investment elsewhere due to high wages and inflexible 
working practices in the EC have played a role in the Commission's decision not to 
pursue stronger social policy measures in the mid-1990s. The political influence that 
particularly large firms exert on the process of European integration has been 
followed up by market actions in the form of a surge of business deals, mergers and 
ventures. Finns give the European project an additional momentum and, in doing so, 
change and restructure the structure of competition (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). 
Though many of these actions were merely a response to business problems that 
inevitably would have had to be addressed, the process took on a life of its own, 
leading to the establishment of both an ever growing number of intra-European 
alliances and increasingly more 'European' firms. Although the Single Market 
programme only reinforced an on-going process that can be traced back to 1960s, it 
had the important effect that even in France, a country with a history of state-led 
efforts to secure national autonomy on the firm level, the formation of cross-national 
businesses became accepted, highlighting the change of government attitude towards 
the SEM all across the Member States as a result of the powerful influence of the 
business community (Sandholtz and Zysmann, 1992: 92-3). 
Despite the increasing importance of the EC in co-ordinating the policy-process, the 
relationship between national decision-makers and firms nevertheless remains close 
(McLaughlin et al. 1993). There are two main reasons for this: On the one hand, 
companies have an interest in continuing to benefit from established interaction with 
national policy-communities. There are a variety of reasons that can help to explain 
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this: firstly, these interactions are often channels that are readily available and based 
on long-term relationships between business and national decision-makers. Secondly, 
Member States have not delegated all powers to the EC, with the result that there is a 
need to continue close relations with business in some sectors. Thirdly, in a situation 
where EC policies do not favour a specific firm, the national level may prove helpful 
in order to seek amendments. Fourthly, in some sectors the fate of an entire region 
may be dependent upon the continuation of a firms operation. Fifthly, Member States 
can be helpful in assisting the lobbying activities of firms. In some Member States, 
such as Germany, there have been long traditions of incorporating business groups 
into decision-making processes most Member States. Others, such as France, have 
reacted to these changes and established similar patterns in order to facilitate the 
exchange of information between groups, officials and ministers at the Member State 
level. On the other hand, it is desirable if not essential to maintain good relations with 
national officials since national agendas are often quickly translated into European 
agendas (H6ritier, 1996). As part of their strategies, Member States themselves often 
seek an extension of their national regulations to the European level in order to 
achieve and create competitive advantages for the national industry. Member states 
are constantly engaged in such regulatory competition, yet seemingly only successful 
when their approach corresponds to the policy preferences of the Commission 
(Heretier et al.; 1994). As a consequence, a focus on either the EC-level of the 
Member State-level could be a risky strategy for businesses. 
It has been pointed out in the previous chapter that trade policy now is a bundle of 
industrial and regulatory policies and that there is a close link between the activities of 
firms and national or international regulatory regimes. However, in the EC and 
elsewhere, the business community is not a unified community and therefore holds 
divergent preferences and pursues divergent strategies in order to maximise their 
gains. Since firms are not all pursuing either market-opening or market-closing 
objectives, they are adding to the complexity of the co-ordination process. Their 
preferences are contingent on factors such as the nature of the firm and competition in 
the sectors concerned, and dependent on the individual company's structure of 
production. While some may have anti-protectionist preferences as a result of their 
cross border-production, technology transfers and intra-firm trade, others may seek 
protection from their home governments as a result of traditional links with the 
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national economy, where they enjoy the benefits of close links to national government 
agencies (Milner, 1988a). In the case of large multinational fmns, it is indeed possible 
that they pursue simultaneous market-opening and market closing strategies as their 
embeddedness varies between nations and regions (Sally, 1995). 
It becomes apparent that there is a strong institutionalised and sometimes 'symbiotic' 
relationship between the Commission and firms. This relationship is not only 
concerned with mere technical co-operation, but also incorporates elements of 
political influence and can work against or in favour of the Commission's preferences. 
The relationship is furthermore complicated by the fact that firms keep their options 
open and maintain strong links with the national level and the fact that firms have 
competing preferences. 
In summary, the EC has developed a very productive decision-making system, with a 
long-term co-ordination process ensuring the distribution of gains. The structure of 
the EC decision-making process determines the extent to which certain actors can 
shape policy decisions and succeed in the pursuit of their objectives. As the model of 
policy-making we are confronting in the case of the EC is highly complex, multi- 
levelled and varied depending on policy areas, the action capacities and bargaining 
powers of individual actors or institutions also vary from one policy area to the next. 
The formal and informal procedures and co-ordination mechanisms according to 
which policy is made define which actors participate in the process in one specific 
issue area, in which ways, and with what bargaining power. 
2.3.4 The EC in World Mark-cis 
Today, the EC is an advanced common market and set to become an economic and 
monetary union. Whereas in the mid-1960s the EC consisted of a basic form of 
internal liberalisation and a common agricultural regime, in the late 1990 the EU 
oversees extensive liberalisation and market regulation and a range of economic 
policies. The fact that the EC has established a CCP in connection to the Common 
Market does not imply that all goods and markets in the EC are treated equally. 
Externally, the CCP establishes a CET for all products and sectors of the Common 
Market, but there arc variations for individual products despite the reductions 
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achieved in successive GATT rounds that resulted in an estimated average tariff on 
industrial goods of 4.7 percent in 1987 (McDonald and Dearden, 19912: 148). 
Furthermore, there is also a distinction between market and industry. Even when there 
are segmented national markets, production is integrated internationally for many 
goods. In some sectors, some incumbent firms wish to preserve the geographic 
segmentation of die SEM, since the resulting price differentials produce high profits 
(e. g. airlines and cars). Thus, truly EC-wide markets are more common in 
commodities or intermediate inputs, than in consumer goods and many markets and 
industries remain national or even local (Laffan, O'Donnell and Smith, 1999: 115). 
Liberalisation of trade in the EC has been accompanied by extensive efforts to 
harmonise national policies and to create common policies. Yet within the EC a high 
concentration and asymmetrical market structures occur frequently (de Jong, 1993). In 
order to create a Single Market within Europe, all barriers to the flow of the four 
freedoms have to be eliminated. While tariff and import quotas had virtually been 
abolished for intra-European trade by the late 1970s, however, other barriers to trade 
continued to impede Europe's internal trade up the establishment of the 1992 SEM. 
The free movement of the four freedoms between the Member State economies was 
hindered by the existence of diverse national rules, regulations, taxation, and subsidy 
frameworks. This market segmentation in the EC was a result of cultural and regional 
factors leading to different qualities and specifications being demanded for goods and 
services (Davis et al., 1989). The main problem was the difficulty of reaching 
agreement about a whole host of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The EC attempted to 
eliminate these NTBs by creating a set of European laws and regulations to govern all 
aspects of economic activity and to create European standards for products. However, 
Member States could veto any proposal they thought was detrimental to their 
economics and little progress was made. Indeed, the large array of non-tariff barriers 
that existed in the period between 1958 and 1992 was a clear indication that the 
Member States were in the process of completing rather than having already achieved 
a customs union (Heidensohn, 1996: 33). 
Though characterised by some inconsistencies especially in these sectors, the major 
thrust of the Commission's policy during the late 1980s and 1990s has therefore been 
on the liberalisation of the European market place. Sectors that were traditionally 
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state-owned monopolies, such as telecommunications, water, energy and banking, 
were by no means exempt from the Commission's liberalisation efforts and ambitions. 
The manifestation of this drive was the development of the SEM. It enabled the EC to 
develop a major capacity in regulatory policy and standard setting and can be 
regarded as a large-scale example of strategic trade policy. Internally, the SEM has 
been of an enormous magnitude: it brought to an end endless debates over 
harmonisation, established a new regulatory approach at the EC-level, began a process 
of deregulation and liberalisation, and resulted in a strong emphasis on competition 
policy for reasons of transparency in the newly established market place. In particular, 
the SEM reduced the obstacles to the creation of European industries and, to a lesser 
degree, it made the segmentation of the market more difficult (Kay, 1990: 22-3). 
With market access as a crucial issue in the global economy, the SEM has an equally 
important external dimension which can be used as a powerful weapon or a source of 
influence as well as being a magnet for non-members in the global economy (for 
instance Thurow, 1992, Smith, 1999). Thus, the SEM not only raised important issues 
concerning the regulation of specific sectors within the EC, but also concerning the 
multilateral environment. Many of the areas in which the Single Market had most 
effect, such as regulatory issues and services, were also negotiated with the GATT 
Uruguay Round (Woolcock and Hocking, 1996; Paemen and Busch, 1995; Murphy, 
1990a, b). Nevertheless, the establishment of decision-making bodies in key economic 
areas entangled the EC immediately in the development of the global political 
economy and the integration process therefore had an external dimension from the 
very beginning (Smith 1999: 276). On the basis of this strong link between the 
'internal' and the 'external', the EC evolved in the context of the global market place 
but has also consistently been in tension with it. Furthermore, EC trade policy cannot 
be seen as independent from other external policies (e. g. development policy) or from 
the range of internal EC sectoral policies (e. g. agriculture) and functional policies 
(e. g. competition and industrial policy). This presents the Member State governments 
and EC institutions with the difficult task of finding a coherent and non-contradictory 
strategies in each of these areas (O'Donnell, 1994: 84; Brittan, 1992; Bourgeois, 1993). 
A first obvious tension results from the founding principles and objectives contained 
in the EEC Treaty. Although Art. 110 EEC stakes out that the EC's is committed to a 
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liberal approach to trade, i. e. supports a free multilateral trading regime and trade 
creation, the same article also establishes a customs union among the Member States, 
which is not illegal under the GATT, but against its spirit. The GATT makes 
provision for the creation of trading blocs such as the EC, but customs unions are 
clearly against the spirit of free multilateral trade and their existence amount to a 
departure from the fundamental most-favoured nation clause (MFN) of Art. I of the 
GATT. As a customs union, the EEC was therefore set up explicitly under Art. XXIV 
of the GATT and, less formally, with the acquiescence of the US19. Furthermore, the 
Dillon Round, but particularly the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, can be interpreted as 
attempts by the US and other industrialised nations to reduce the trade discriminating 
effects of the EC (Yannopoulos, 1986: 463). 
A consistent source of tension with the global economy can be found in the EC's 
sectoral trade policies. The common external policy of the EC has not always been 
concerned with the promotion of a free and open world trading system and the EC has 
often been engaged in protecting so-called sun-set industries or infant industries (such 
as for instance steel and semi-conductors). Although the GATT has always been a 
cornerstone of EC trade policy, the last four decades have been characterised by 
numerous sectoral trade policies that undercut multilateral objectives or violate GATT 
principles. Indeed, the evolution of EC trade policy has been characterised by 'a 
propensity for sector-specific solutions, resulting in large differences in the levels of 
protection across industries (GATT, 1991: 8-9). The fact that the Member States of 
the EC show variations in their trade specialisation patterns has a significant impact 
on EC trade policy-making and strategy (see Heidensohn, 1996; Tsoukalis, 1993). 
These specialisation patterns are of course linked to special interests and corporate 
lobbying. Producers and interest groups have influenced policy debates and contribute 
to the establishment of specific sectoral policies, which span from the CAP to the 
special provisions for 'sensitive industries' in recent EAs. Although a large number of 
European industries have established powerful associations for affecting policy at the 
EC level, it has been observed that 'only the sectoral. interests opposing liberalisation 
have consistently followed the intricacies of trade diplomacy' (Woolcock, 1993: 295). 
Leading to the establishment of specific sectoral policies and regimes, specialisation 
19 The forerunner of the EEC, i. e. the ECSC Treaty, is not a customs union but a free trade area and obtained a 
waiver under GATT Art. 25. 
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patterns and special interests result in contested sectoral polices and profoundly 
influence the EC's external policies. The EC has aimed at pursuing a common external 
trade policy, but as a number of national restrictions on imports have been in place as 
recently as 1992, it cannot be said that it has reached the stage where a harmonised 
approach to trade policy has been achieved (Heidensohn, 1996: 60). 
The EC's trade policy thus varies from sector to sector, with a number of sectors that, 
for strategic reasons, have been subjected to managed trade and selective industrial 
policies. These highly politicised and internationally contested sectors include most 
notably agriculture, electrical and electronic products, iron and steel, textiles, clothing 
and footwear, and transport equipment. During the 1970s and 1980s, the increasing 
exposure of domestic industry to international competition and the increasing salience 
of high-technology sectors produced a trend within the EC to intervene in these 
industries (McGuire, 1999: 81-3). As Japanese and other Asian states made significant 
inroads into traditional industries (e. g. cars, steel, shipbuilding, and textiles), and 
American and Japanese firms were pushing EC firms out of a variety of electronic 
sectors, the EC responded by increasing its protection. Given the absence of tariffs as 
an effective means to protect European firms, the EC's use of anti-dumping measures, 
national quantitative restrictions and VRAs proliferated substantially (see section 
2.3.2.2) while an active interventionist view was taken towards the competitive 
enhancement of European high technology. In contrast to the ECSC Treaty, the EEC 
does not endow the Commission with explicit powers to promote research, 
development or industry and the Member States implemented a variety of national 
industrial policies (see BeiJe et al. 1987). The EEC Treaty provided a range of policy 
powers that could be used to create a regulatory framework and helped shape the 
market environment, but no general policy framework was established for either 
industrial or technological policy. Since the Commission until the SEA could only 
operate through unanimous decisions of the Council of Ministers, it was often hostage 
to any national interest considered of over-riding importance (Sharp, 1993: 202). 
Regionally concentrated adjustment problems in particular made it socially and 
politically difficult to prevent distortive sectoral policies and aids by the Member 
States. The Commission resorted to sector-specific policies, such as the surveillance 
of state aids and crisis cartels, adjustment assistance from structural funds when 
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declining sectors were geographically concentrated and trade policy in order to secure 
the competitiveness of firms in these sectors. 
Another set of tensions can be found in the complex interplay of various functional 
EC policies, i. e. trade policy, industrial policy, the Internal Market policies and 
competition policy. These complement or conflict with each other (Pelkmans, 
1997: 187). For example, aiming at industrial change, industrial policies could be part 
of internal market provisions, competition policy, trade policy or trade policy 
initiatives aimed at technology and other areas. Notwithstanding the strong tradition 
of industrial policies among the Member States and Europe in general, the 
Commission in the 1990s has been moving away from selective industrial policies and 
towards a co-ordinated industrial policy (Kassim and Menon, 1996). The Maastricht 
Treaty contains Art. 130, which focuses on 'conditions necessary for the 
competitiveness of the Community's industry', but little if any basis for dirigisme or 
'picking winners' can be derived from this. Therefore, the emphasis is now on 
competition and consultation and co-operation between the Member States. Specific 
EC measures are only allowed in support of action taken in the Member States, and 
such measures are to be adopted with unanimity. In the areas in which Member States 
envisaged a fon-n of political or administrative power to intervene in respect of 
competition, the Commission has exercised a 'frighteningly efficient' competition 
policy on the basis of the omnipotence of DG IV (Cohen, 1996: 139-40). For instance, 
in the famous De Havilland case and the opening up of the telecommunications 
sector, one can see evidence for the Commission's success in challenging the 
industrial policy ambitions of the Member States. Nonetheless, the politicisation of 
some policies has sometimes weakened EC control over competition policy, with the 
Conunission clashing with the Member States on issues such as state aids. 
While these policies exert simultaneous pressures on the competitive process in the 
Single Market, their influence also extends into the global economy. For instance, the 
desire for economic cohesion at the EC-level, expressed in EC regional policy, 
various programmes for social action and elements of industrial policy, affects the 
EC's approach to multilateral negotiations on policy instruments such as for instance 
subsidies. Here, the EC finds itself in a situation where 'it supports a policy of 
controlling trade distorting effects of such measures but defends their use per se as 
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legitimate policy instruments' (Woolcock, 1993: 294). Similarly, the SEM 
automatically confers trading benefits through, inter alia, the removal of internal trade 
barriers and frontiers controls and the mutual recognition of standards. Thus, 
wherever an intra-Community regime is established, it has to be decided whether this 
regime should be extended to third countries (O'Donnell, 1994: 85). 
2.4 Evaluation of the Research Framework for the Case of the EC 
Although the above application of the research framework was predominately aimed 
at exploring the EC's strategic action capacities, it also provided further evidence for 
the EC's development into a provider of state economic functions and the complex 
context in which the EC pursues them. Especially in the exploration of the EC's 
institutional capacity and the ECs decision-making capacity, the view put forward of 
the EC and the Member States as 'parallel' or 'joint' provider of state economic 
functions is further substantiated, with firms possessing a considerable amount of 
freedom to pursue their objectives by utilising multiple strategies. The broad 
exploration of the EC's strategic action capacities thus shows that the EC has the 
credentials to be a major player in the IPE and that its strategic action capacities are 
rivalled only by those of the US. Individually, none of the Member States would be 
able to develop a magnitude or leverage comparable to that of the EC. Based on the 
size of the internal market and the associated right to grant or deny access to it and the 
application of commercial policy instruments, the EC can influence the actions of 
most other players, be it through bilateral or multilateral channels. Table 2 shows the 
research framework applied to the case of the EC. 
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS I INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
Combined Member State economies and size of EC holds almost exclusive commercial 
SEM make EC major player in IPE 
I 
competence, but shares some with Member States 
System of trade preferences divides between 
friends, lesser fhends and foes 
Preferences create tensions in exercise of 
competence 
GATT sets certain limits to EC actions Powerfifl array of commercial policy instruments 
member states' 
US is most powerful actor in IPE (former 
hegemon), but high limits of trade Certain tensions in functional polices 
interdependence set certain limits to us freedom 
of action 
Actor's 
Strategic Action 
Capacities in 
IPE 
Advanced common market 
Fragmented market structures and sectoral 
regimes 
Tensions with global markets in certain sectors 
Quantitatively productive, but highly complex 
system of governance 
Decision-making process is series of strategic 
bargaining games as capacities of actors vary over 
areas, issues and over time 
Co-ordination process based on coalition building 
and side-payments 
DECISION-NUKING CAPACITY 
Table 2: The EC's Strategic Action Capacities 
The size of the combined European economies and the large internal market naturally 
makes the EC a major international actor. Speaking with one voice in multilateral and 
bilateral relations, the EC can exercise considerable power over other actors in the 
global economy and press for reciprocity and trade liberalisation. Its system of trade 
preferences effectively establishes a hierarchy of 'friends', 'lesser friends' and 'foes' 
and the EC uses trade concessions and sanctions to shape international developments. 
The GATT sets some limits to the ECs freedom of action and policy choices, but 
neither are EC actions driven by GATT provisions, nor is it always adhering to the 
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GATT. While the EC developed legal codes, practices and instruments alongside the 
GATT and transfers new GATT rules into the acquis communitaire, it has also 
contravened GATT codes in a wide range of areas. However, the EC's freedom of 
action and power degenerates in relations with the US. Based on factors such its 
military might, its powerful trade legislation, its system of trade preferences and role 
as prime mover of successive GATT Rounds, the former hegemon remains the most 
powerful actor in the global economy. Although highly institutionalised and 
underpinned by numerous military, political and economic ties, EC-US relations are 
often characterised by highly politicised conflicts over selected trade issues. The US 
dominated the relationship up to the late 1980s, but in the 1990s the EC, based on the 
development of the SEM and associated developments, was able to assert itself much 
more vis-b-vis the US on both the bilateral and multilateral level. 
The EC's institutional capacities have undergone a significant development since its 
inception. Because the CCP contains conflictual objectives and because of 
uncertainties created by some tensions between the ECSC and the EEC Treaty, the EC 
has encountered some difficulties in moving to a coherent and comprehensive CCP. 
Although the Member States have progressively invested the Commission with an 
almost exclusive competence in the area of external economic relations, they have 
also frequently challenged the EC's competence in the course of the EC's 
development, particularly when their national interest was not served by common 
policies. This has not only resulted in a proliferation of national restrictions to imports 
of selective products during the 1980s, but also in special regimes in sectors where the 
EC's competence is not fully established. Moreover, the internal problems of the 
Member States are often externalised and result in protectionist and inflexible 
negotiation mandates for the Commission. Here, the Commission in practice often 
conducts 'talks' in areas of its competence that address and resolve some issues. In the 
1980s, the complexities involved in EC commercial policy-making and resulting 
sectoral variations have therefore led to a preference for 'power diplomacy' rather than 
'rule diplomacy'. Because of the reluctance of the Member Sates to transfer powers to 
the EC-level, the EC was slow to develop its commercial policy instruments. In the 
late 1980s, however, new trade and trade related rules were put in place and existing 
mechanisms were utilised more rigorously. Today, the EC presides over an arsenal of 
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trade policy instruments akin to that of the most powerful states -in the global 
economy. 
Over the years, Brussels has developed into the focus of EC decision-making and this 
is reflected in the EC's policy output and the re-orientation of corporate lobbying 
activities. Nevertheless, the EC decision-making process is characterised by 
continuous flux and a series of strategic bargaining games. While different sets of 
actors have been dominant at different points in time, there are also different sets of 
actors involved in the different policy areas or issue areas at any given time. A 
complex-multi-level co-ordination process based on networks and established 
negotiation styles ensures the functioning and continuity of the system, yet the very 
complexity of the system often causes EC policies to be characterised by compromise. 
The Commission is the central actor in the decision-making system and performs a 
number of roles: gatekeeper for the regulatory ambitions of the Member States; policy 
entrepreneur; leader and mediator. The Commission is not a neutral actor, but brings 
its own preferences into the policy process and often interprets the Treaties in a bold 
manner. Of course, the Commission varies in its capacity to perform these roles and 
like all other actors involved in EC decision-making, the Commission relies on its 
resources and acts strategically in order to achieve its objectives. The Member States 
may have been the crucial actors for most of the history of the EC and still hold 
important powers, such as control over macroeconomic policies, but over time they 
have become forced to act strategically in the EC decision-making system. As they 
find themselves restricted by the actions of the Commission and firms, they too have 
to pursue their objectives by seeking and forging alliances on issues with other actors. 
Firms have become an increasingly significant influence on EC policy-making, with 
their influence ranging from technical to political issues. They intersect at all stages of 
the EC decision-making processes and maintain institutionalised relationships with 
both the Commission and the Member States. Due to the Commission's central 
importance in the legislative process, they have focussed their lobbying activities on 
the Commission and often act as a countervailing influence to the Member States, not 
only in terms of policy but also in terms of market actions. Notwithstanding, they 
maintain good relations with the Member States and sometimes act against the 
Commission's interests. 
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Although the EC's internal market gradually developed from a common market for 
coal and steel to a Single European Market where the free flow of the four freedoms is 
formally established, in reality the EC's market structure remains fragmented with a 
number of sector-specific regimes that hinders the conduct of a harmonised EC trade 
policy. The EC oversees market regulation and liberalisation as well as a range of 
economic policies, but despite an increasing internationalisation of production within 
the EC, many markets remain regional or local, with some industries and product 
categories receiving a special treatment. Influenced by factors such as national 
specialisation patterns, structural change, and perceived strategic interests in some 
industries, the EC and the Member States particularly in the 1980s have been engaged 
in the protection of sunset industries or the promotion of infant industries. These 
sectoral regimes created a number of internal and external tensions for EC policy 
making. Internally, the range of EC policies (i. e. industrial policies, competition 
policy, Internal Market policies and trade policies) often clash with one another and 
affect the EC's foreign economic policy. Externally, the special treatment of some 
sectors resulted in often highly politicised tensions with the multilateral trading 
system and other actors in the global economy, notably the US. 
While the EC has without doubt developed into the second most important actor in the 
IPE, there are several constraints on the EC's capacity for strategic action. At least in 
part these can be attributed to the peculiarities and complexities inherent in the 
process-based system of governance that is at work in the EC and the segmentation of 
the EC's market structure. These make an exploration of EC strategic action a very 
complex and differentiated affair and the very nature of the EC, i. e. its location 
between changing global and national contexts, the sectoral variations of its trade 
polices, the complex decision-making process and the changing sets of actors 
involved, and the on-going development of its institutional capacities, only allows for 
a broad approximation of the EC's strategic action capacities. 
Two central observations that have emerged in this chapter help to take the analysis 
further: Firstly, the EC's strategic action capacities have undergone significant 
changes as the EC has evolved. Given the slow institutional development of the EC, 
the changing capacities of state and non-state actors in the context of increasing 
globalisation, the gradual development from the common market for coal and steel to 
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the SEM and the significant changes that occurred in the international environment 
since the Second World War, the EC's strategic action capacities show significant 
variations at different points in time. Secondly, despite the foundation of common 
policies on the Single Market, the EC deals with many trade issues on a sector- 
specific basis. The determination of sector specific policies and ultimately the EC's 
capacity to act strategically in these sectors depends on factors such as the market 
structure of the sector in question, the constellation of Preferences across the EC, the 
institutional framework and regulatory competences of the EC and the constraints set 
by the international environment in this sector. In order to accommodate these two 
qualifications in an assessment of the EC's strategic action capacity, it is suggested to 
apply the research framework to any given sector of the EC and to investigate the 
following four broad factors over time: 
Firstly, the EC's capacity to design and initiate strategic moves as part of its concern 
for European economic welfare or as a response to adjustment pressures. 
Secondly, the EC's capacity to induce specific forms of behaviour in its international 
environment (including the use of commercial policy instruments). 
Thirdly, the EC's capacity to set norms and standards in the interplay with Member 
States and finns. 
Fourthly, the EC's capacity to ensure compliance with negotiated agreements within 
the Community. 
This allows us to investigate the development of the EC into a provider of state 
economic functions and assess the development of the EC's strategic action capacities 
at different points of its development. In particular, the investigation of these factors 
allows for an exploration of the relationship between states and firms that has been 
asserted in chapter one as crucial for strategic action in the IPE. As has been shown, 
the provision of state economic functions is a complex process in the case of the EC, 
with the Member States and the Commission sharing competences in changing 
constellations over time. The process of making foreign trade policy is characterised 
by complex interactions between the Commission, the Member States and firms. 
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Despite the transfer of more and more powers to the EC, the history of the EC is 
marked by Member State challenges to and derogations from EC policies in order to 
cater for specific national interests or sectoral interests. Furthermore, the process of 
foreign trade policy-making is complicated by the interactions of the range of 
interdependent internal policies pursued by Commission and the Member States. It is 
therefore suggested that analysing the four factors allows us to capture the interwoven 
effects associated with internal processes and external constraints as they influence 
the EC's capacity to act strategically. 
2.5 The Case Study Approach: A Longitudinal Study of the Steel Industry 
Based on the research framework and in the light of the four factors presented in the 
previous section, the thesis now moves on to a longitudinal study of the European 
steel industry. The advantages of a sectoral approach have been highlighted in chapter 
one and the special characteristics of the steel sector make it an obvious candidate for 
such an exploration within the proposed framework for a number of reasons: 
Firstly, policy-making in the steel sector in the EC and elsewhere is taking place 
within a context of strong international and domestic economic and industrial 
constraints. While steel production has always been concentrated in national markets, 
steel trade became increasingly internationalised in the post-war era and due to an 
unparalleled demand for steel production during the same time production capacities 
were continuously expanded by new and old steel-producing countries alike. In the 
mid-1970s, the post-war boom transformed into a structural crisis resulted in the 
proliferation of protectionist policies, especially among the old steel-producing 
countries of Europe and the US. Adjustment was a painful experience for Western 
European states as the necessary contraction of the steel industry presented them with 
difficult socio-political, economic and financial choices. While the individual Member 
States tried to cater for their national interests, the EC became increasingly engaged in 
the regulation of steel trade and the restructuring of the Member States' steel 
industries. This constellation led to numerous tensions within the EC and between the 
EC and the US and the rest of the steel-producing world. This constellation makes the 
steel industry an obvious candidate for a test of the research framework that has been 
developed in this thesis. 
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Secondly, together with the coal sector, the steel sector is one of the core sectors of 
European integration and rests on a special institutional foundation. In the context of 
post-war developments in Western Europe, the ECSC has been given an institutional 
framework that renders more powers to Community institutions than can be found in 
any other sector. Once the steel sector was exposed to the forces of structural change 
in the late 1970s, the disparity between ECSC Treaty and EEC Treaty created a 
considerable deal of tension and confusion within the EC as regards the competence 
to regulate the industry. Furthermore, in the course of its supranational regulation, the 
steel sector has experienced considerable changes in policy-making (i. e. initial 
liberalisation measures during the 1960s, interventionist policy-making in the late 
1970 and 1980s, and deregulation and privatisation in the 1990s) and market 
structure. As it is set to be phased into the SEM by 2002, studying the steel sector thus 
allows for the study of the institutional tensions that bear on the EC's strategic action 
capacities in a sector that has been characterised by transition. Moreover, carrying out 
a longitudinal study of the steel sector allows for the analysis of strategic action 
capacities from the beginnings of European integration to a point where policy- 
making in steel almost dovetails with policy-making within the context of today's EU. 
Thirdly, the steel sector has traditionally been seen as a strategic sector and continues 
to attract special attention by policy-makers for a number of interrelated reasons 
(pseudo nationalistic, economic and financial, and socio-political ones). The high 
degree of government intervention in the steel industry, whether public or private, 
despite the supranational. regulation of the sector is particularly salient among the 
European states and makes it a good example to trace the interactions between the 
Commission, the Member States and firms. 
These characteristics feed into the organisation of the remainder of the thesis. The 
longitudinal case study is organised into three parts and consists of two chapters per 
part, with each part concluding with an evaluation of the EC's strategic action 
capacities in steel during the period under investigation. Chapter three shows the 
characteristics of steel sector in the global economy, the context of the establishment 
of the ECSC, the market structure of the European steel industry and the institutional 
and decision-making arrangements that are distinct to the ECSC. Chapter four shows 
the gradual intensification of EC involvement in the steel sector up until the late 
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1970s and the Commission's development into a relevant industrial-political actor. 
The following two parts examine EC-policy-making in steel during the 1980s and the 
1990s respectively and maintain an artificial, though conceptually useful, distinction 
between internal and external EC policy-making. 
The first chapters of parts two and three (chapters five and seven) each analyse 
internal EC policy-making in steel by focusing on EC efforts to regulate and 
restructure the EC steel sector in response to successive steel crises in the early 1980s 
and the early 1990s. In analysing market regulation, the focus is on the interactions 
between the Commission and steel firms, whereas in analysing restructuring efforts, 
the focus is on interactions between the Commission and the Member States. Chapters 
6 and 8 then analyse external EC policy-making in steel and focus on bilateral and 
multilateral interactions between the EC and the US during the 1980s and 1990s steel 
crises. The aim in each chapter is to identify the key actions, constraints and results 
since they will be feeding into an overall evaluation of the EC strategic action 
capacities in the pursuit of state economic functions. 
conclusions 
This chapter has made a starting point in the exploration of the case of the EC as a 
strategic actor in IPE. Following the general framework set out in chapter one, the 
chapter showed that the EC has emerged as a provider of state economic functions 
and that there is indeed a rationale for the provision of state economic functions on the 
EC level. In the course of the development of the EC, the Member States have 
increasingly, though reluctantly, rendered more and more competences to the EC. In 
parallel, the Commission especially in the 1980s has seized upon opportunities to 
expand its competences. As a result, the EC has emerged as a 'parallel' or 'joint' 
provider of state economic functions and the above exploration has provided evidence 
for the ways in which the EC, in the absence of macroeconomic powers, provides 
state economic functions through what has been termed collaborative power 
arrangements with the Member States and firms. The EC has also increasingly 
functioned as a catalyst and the TBR is just one example for the ways in which the EC 
assists business expansion, with other examples including the promotion of 
technology alliances and of course the SEM. 
ill 
The chapter then conceptualised the EC as a complex multi-level system of 
governance, with actor activity taking place on multiple levels and varying across 
sectors and over time. Based on this conceptualisation, the chapter then systematically 
explored the four elements of the research framework. It was found that the EC has 
evolved into the second most important actor in IPE, with its strategic action 
capacities second only to the US, but that its capacity to act strategically is subject to 
certain constraints and shows variations in sectors and over time. In order to trace the 
development of the EC's strategic action capacities further, a case has been made to 
undertake a longitudinal study of the European steel sector in the light of four broad 
factors. The remainder of the thesis is devoted to the detailed analysis of the 
development of the EC's strategic action capacities in the steel sector. 
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PART 11: TOWARDS STRATEGIC ACTION (FROM THE 1950S TO THE 
1970S) 
In the opening two chapters, the thesis has been concerned firstly, with the 
development of a comprehensive framework for the evaluation of strategic action 
capacities of actors in the international political economy (in chapter one), and 
secondly, with the application of this framework to the case of the EC (in chapter 
two). Following on from the conclusion derived in chapter one that strategic action 
capacities need to be studied on a sectoral basis, it has been proposed to study the 
strategic action capacities of the EC by concentrating on one of the core sectors of 
European integration, the sector, and to adopt a longitudinal approach in order to trace 
the EC's development of the EC strategic action capacities. 
The longitudinal case study of the European steel sector to which analysis now turns 
is organised in three parts (parts II, III, and IV), each consisting of two chapters and 
an evaluation of the period under investigation. The first chapter of part I primarily 
provides the background for subsequent chapters. It shows the historical, institutional, 
and market developments that affected the EC steel industry during the period from 
the 1950s to the 1970s. This chapter furthermore provides for a sketch of the market 
structure of the European steel industry and shows the division of competence 
between the relevant actors involved in ECSC decision-making processes. Following 
the research matrix, the second chapter begins the longitudinal case study by 
analysing the external and internal developments and factors that gave rise to the 
beginning of an active involvement of the EC in the steel sector in the context of the 
1970s steel crisis. The first part as a whole serves the purpose of both setting the 
context of the EC's management of the steel sector and testing the research framework 
further. 
In concentrating on the two main steel crises that affected the steel industry during the 
1980s and 1990s, parts III and IV provide a rigorous test of the research framework, 
with the individual chapters maintaining a division between external and internal 
policy-making. Subsequently, part III consists of two chapters on EC policy-making 
in steel in the 1980s and is divided into chapter five, dealing with internal 
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restructuring in the 1980s, and chapter six, dealing with the EC-US trade policy 
conflict in steel. Part IV consists of two chapters dealing with EC policy making in 
steel during the 1990s, and is divided into chapter seven, dealing with internal 
restructuring and the transition of the steel industry during the early/mid 1990s, and 
chapter eight, dealing with the renewed EC-US trade policy conflict in steel in 
the1990s. 
The first chapters of parts III and IV (chapters five and seven) each analyse internal 
EC policy-making in steel by focusing on EC efforts to regulate and restructure the 
EC steel sector in response to successive steel crises in the early 1980s and the early 
1990s. In analysing market regulation, the focus is on the interactions between the 
Commission and steel firms, whereas in analysing restructuring efforts, the focus is on 
interactions between the Commission and the Member States. Chapters six and eight 
then analyse external EC policy-making in steel and focus on bilateral and multilateral 
interactions between the EC and the US during the 1980s and 1990s steel crises. The 
aim in each chapter is to identify the key actions, constraints and results since they 
will be feeding into an overall evaluation of the EC strategic action capacities in the 
pursuit of state economic functions. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE GLOBAL STEEL INDUSTRY AND THE EC 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an outline of the fundamental features and institutional 
developments of EC policy-making in the steel sector since the establishment of the 
ECSC. Taking the development of international steel production and trade as a 
starting point in the first section, the second section will begin the in-depth analysis of 
the European steel industry by illuminating the political and economic considerations 
that provided the foundations of the establishment of the ECSC. In the third section, 
analysis turns to the market structure of the steel industry. Here, the main 
characteristics of steel production and its effects on steel trade will be under 
investigation. In the fourth section, the institutions of the ECSC and their policy- 
making structures will be analysed in connection to the institutional changes that 
occurred over time. Particular attention is given to the role and competence of the 
European Commission vis-b-vis the other actors in ECSC decision-making processes. 
This is followed in section five of this chapter by an analysis of the instruments that 
the Commission has at its disposal in designing and implementing its objectives. 
3.1 Steel and the Global Economy 
Politically and economically, the steel industry has been one of the most important 
industries in the world for the past one hundred years. It is said to have played a 
pivotal role in every advanced country and is generally recognised in these as a key 
industry ('iron is the state') that represented social status, political influence, and 
military strength. Similar to the textiles industry, the iron and steel industry is one of 
the 'old' industries. Initially symbolising progress and providing many jobs, the 
international position of a country's steel industry has always been liable to draw 
public attention. Some of the industry's particular importance stems from its historical 
significance in respect of a country's industrial development (Gienow, 1985: 308, 
M6ny and Wright, 1987, Hogan, 1983), but there are also pseudo-nationalistic reasons 
(as they can be found in statements such as 'no country worthy of note should be 
without a steel industry') that highlight the existence of a special relationship between 
steel and the state (M6ny and Wright, 1987). This is based on the special importance 
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of steel in relation to defence (Hayward 1974: 255) and its crucial place in heavy 
industry. 
Supremacy over the steel industry changed hands from century to century. The British 
steel industry was dominant from the outset of the industrial revolution, but lost its 
supremacy over the international market in the late 19th century to the US and 
Germany (Hudson, 1989; Hogan, 1983). In the first half of the 20th century, the US 
steel industry dominated 50 percent of world steel output. The early stages of steel 
production in the original centres of industrialisation in Northwest Europe and the US 
were closely linked to the growth in other industries within the national territory. 
These inter-sectoral linkages were often constructed within the same region and 
helped to create that region. Particularly during the early stages of growth in the 
nineteenth century, these input-output relationships were paralleled by those of 
ownership and possession. Steel production took place within large oligopolistic 
conglomerates, tied together by complex webs of financial linkages. Moreover, the 
input-output relationships extended both backwards and forwards to raw materials and 
steel-consuming industries respectively. Steel production remained crucial in the 
production of means for warfare and dependence upon imports of this key raw 
material for defence was unthinkable for the major industrial powers, and/or colonial 
powers and would-be-powers alike. National governments were therefore extremely 
anxious to ensure that what was a perceived as a strategically significant industry was 
prominently developed within their national territory. 
Steel was of course still exported and internationally traded. In so far as it was, 
directly or indirectly, this took place within the context of the international division of 
labour. However, while an upsurge in protectionist trade measures during the 1920s 
and 1930s made national markets all the more important, things began to change after 
the Second World War. The liberalisation of international trade that characterised the 
post-war period created a new setting for steel trade (M6ny and Wright, 1987; 
Hudson, 1989). Although the new politically-negotiated trade and monetary 
frameworks of the Bretton Woods agreement and the GATT had little immediate 
effect, it nevertheless guided the steel industry in the long post-war boom as the 
growing steel demand was sustained by steel-using industries with strong connections 
to the booming market for consumer goods and particularly motor vehicles. As the 
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constraints on international steel trade loosened, growing steel-consuming industries 
located within their national territories absorbed much of the increased output within 
the old industrial countries. Since modernisation of a key industry could evidently not 
be left to the private sector, not least because of steel's position the centre of more far 
reaching industrial restructuring policies, the result was that in some countries state 
involvement increased, either through closer private-public sector collaboration or by 
nationalisation. At the same time, the international structure of steel production began 
to alter as fon-ner colonies gained formal political independence and embarked on, 
revived or strengthened plans for autonomous industrial development in order to 
break away from the economic dependency of the colonial era. This often involved 
heavy state support for embryonic steel producers since these were seen as central to 
evolving strategies of industrialisation and modernisation (Barnett and Schorsch, 
1983). 
While global capacity and output grew in the 1960s, increasing attention came to be 
directed towards export markets from both old and newly industrialising countries. 
Following a phenomenal post-war resurgence of steel production, this was most 
evident in Japan (Shepherd, 1982). The time between the end of the Second World 
War and the mid-70s can be divided into two different periods 20 . During the 
first 
period, from 1945 to 1955, reconstruction was the priority in the European countries 
and Japan. Owing to the production standstill in most of Europe and Japan, because of 
wartime damage and acute shortages of raw materials, steel output was concentrated 
amongst a few leading producers. The leading steel producing countries were the US, 
Germany, the USSR, the UK, France, Japan, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Italy and 
Luxembourg. Together these countries accounted for more than 90 percent of world 
steel production. The world steel production was heavily concentrated in North 
America and Europe (95 percent), with the US producing well over half of world steel 
output. During these years, the US became the leading exporter at a time of scarcity, 
retaining this position until European producers began to recover in the 1950s. There 
were only seven other steel producing countries outside this region. The following 20 
years, due to a heavy steel demand during the post-war era that put considerable strain 
on the available steel-producing facilities, were two decades of unprecedented 
20'rhc figures presented for the period from 1945 to 1975 are taken from the report of the Economic Commission 
for Europe (1989). 
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expansion. While the number of steel producing countries nearly doubled, existing 
steel producers like Japan expanded and newly emerging countries entered the 
industry. From 1955 to 1975, world steel demand grew at a rate almost without 
parallel before or since as a consequence of rapid economic growth. While world 
crude steel production peaked in 1974 at just over 700 million tonnes, overall steel 
output rose at about six percent a year during the previous two decades. Similarly, the 
number of steel producing countries rose from 35 in 1945 to 60 in 1975. While the 
established producers continued to expand their capacities, the number of new 
entrants to the industry grew at an even higher pace following their rapidly growing 
steel consumption which stimulated the development of the domestic iron and steel 
industries. This development was also buttressed by the prospect of high returns as 
steel was selling extremely well and at high prices during this period. Furthennore, 
the long-established steel making centres saw rising concentration of production in 
order to realise the technical economies of scale brought by new technology. 
In the mid-1970s, triggered by the 1973 oil crisis, the situation changed significantly 
and the long post-war boom transformed into a deep recession. Thereafter, the steel 
industry became characterised by global over-production crises, chronic over- 
capacity, and plummeting profits as well as burgeoning losses from steel production. 
Given the major expansion plans of both old and newly-industrialised countries, 
formulated in response to extrapolations of the growth trends of the 1960s, these 
problems were sharply exacerbated as the time-scale involved in the development of 
new production facilities meant that yet more capacity was to enter international steel 
trade just as global demand collapsed (Jones, 1986; Dyson and Wilks, 1983). Partial 
and uneven recoveries from recession subsequently resulted in the periodic resurgence 
of protectionist demands and policies, especially among the old steel-producing 
countries of Europe and the US, and gave rise to heightened and new forms of state 
involvement in the steel industry (Meny and Wright, 1987). As increasingly more 
steel was traded internationally, the balance of production shifted away from the old 
production areas in the US and Europe towards Japan and other newly industrialising 
countries. Because of the increasing volume of intemationally-traded steel, the variety 
of low-cost producers from whom steel could be imported, and the decreasing 
importance of steel in defence-related industries given an increasing reliance on the 
strategic sectors of computes and electronics, the significance of the role of steel in 
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political and economic matters ceased and national governments became more willing 
to accept the decline of steel production within their national territories. 
The notion of steel as strategic industry has thus undergone some significant changes, 
and so has its economic importance. From a purely statistical point of view, today's 
steel production has only fairly minor significance within national economies 
(Wienert, 1995a. ). Its importance lies rather in their varied interrelations with 
downstream and upstream activities, which have become visible since the mid-80s. 
Overall, however, steel remains the most important industrial material. It supplies a 
number of sectors that together account for half of all economic activities. These 
sectors are mining, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, construction, transport 
and communications. With the exception of cement, which together with steel is the 
most important material for construction, no other industrial material has ever 
surpassed the output of steel (Economic Commission for Europe, 1989: 21). Although 
this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, the traditional role of steel has also 
been threatened in specific sectors by a number of alternative products with which 
steel must compete, including aluminium, other non-ferrous metals, plastic and a wide 
range of new composite materials. Yet none of these really threatens the use of steel 
as a mass basic material since no other material possesses its favourable combination 
of availability, cost, mechanical properties and durability. The Economic 
Commission's report comes to the general conclusion that while the contribution of 
the steel industry itself to the creation of national wealth and trade is rather small, the 
combined contribution of steel consumers is much greater, approaching and in some 
cases surpassing half of the total national value added or export earnings. While in the 
majority of countries and particularly the big traditional steel producing countries 
there is a clear decreasing trend in the contribution of steel industries to national value 
added, this is not as visible as in some smaller countries or countries that are still 
developing their steel industries. Generally, the steel industries all over the world are 
larger in size and total volume of production than they are efficient generators of 
value added. Although this is particularly the case at times of financial crisis in the 
steel industry, the report acknowledges that this may be quite the opposite in 
improved the conditions. This is illustrated by the steel industries of France and 
Germany: during the 1980s, their steel industries contributed more to the industrial 
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value added of their countries than to the total industrial turnover (Economic 
Commission for Europe, 1989: 29). 
Despite the steel industry's decline as a prestigious, industrially significant, and, in 
terms of national security, strategically important industry, the steel industry remains 
an important industry. It thus remained close to the centres of political and economic 
power, although industrial change had deprived the steel industry of its previously 
undisputed pre-eminence by the early 1970s. The steel industry's classification as a 
key industry throughout its history is justified in so far as it has always been deemed 
of great importance by political authorities (Oberender and Rilter, 1993: 65; M6ny and 
Wright, 1987; Hayward, 1974). The significance that national governments attach to 
the steel industry is reflected in the high degree of government intervention that 
continues to prevail to varying extents in steel industries around the globe. What has 
changed, however, is the motivation behind attempts to exercise control over the steel 
industry. From protectionist intervention justified by the significance of the steel 
industry in relation to the national defence and industrial development, this motivation 
has broadly shifled to the prevention of social unrest, regional decline and other socio- 
economic reasons related to structural change and world-wide over-capacity. 
Notwithstanding, intervention in the steel industry continues to be justified under the 
umbrella of the right of sovereign nations to take measures in order to protect their 
national security interests, which remains widely recognised in multilateral and 
bilateral trade agreements. 
Policy-making in the steel sector consequently has to be analysed against the 
background of external and internal developments influential upon the market 
structure and the domestic policy-making environment. With the beginning of 
supranational regulation in Europe following World War Two, however, policy- 
making in the European steel industry has undergone a special development. In order 
account fully for the internal policy-making environment of the European steel 
industry, it is therefore necessary to trace the origins of the ECSC and the policy- 
making and market environment that was created in Europe. 
3.2 The Establishment of the ECSC 
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In Europe, the steel industry acquired a special status following the signing of the 
Schuman plan on 9 May 1950. Thereafter, the steel industry, together with the coal 
industry, developed into the first building bloc of European integration. The original 
members were Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. The plan to unify the European coal and steel industries originated from 
the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, and indicated the way towards a 
European unification by federative measures (Spierenburg and Poidevin, 1994; 
Gillingham, 1991; Haas, 1958,1968). Up until this point, economic unions intended 
to bring together highly developed industrial countries producing the same products in 
previously protected national markets were extremely rare. The Schuman Plan and the 
ECSC therefore provided for a psychological shock and initially aroused more 
political than economic interest (Lister, 1960: 3). The great political importance of the 
ECSC treaty derives from its role as a predecessor of the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the idea of a Common Market and a unified Europe (Schneider, 
1985: 348). The immediate economic objectives of the ECSC Treaty were to achieve a 
high growth, to secure employment, and to increase living standards. Moreover, the 
Treaty was intended to facilitate rational distribution of steel, to keep prices for coal 
and steel on low levels, and to improve the supply of coal and steel. Politically, the 
ECSC for and foremost promised peace and political integration in Europe. Shared 
responsibility in two key sectors of the economy appeared to be viable way to prevent 
future war among the European nation states and the clear indications of further 
intentions contained in the Treaty in the direction of a shared future revealed that the 
Treaty was to be instrumental in this aim (Robertson, 1973: 152). While there are a 
number of complex and interrelated factors that eventually led to the establishment of 
the ECSC in particular and the beginnings of European integration in general (see for 
instance Diebold, 1959; Milward, 1984; Spierenburg and Poidevin, 1994; Statz, 1975; 
Gillingham, 1991; Gasteyger, 1994; Story, 1993; Schmitt, 1962; Haas, 1958,1968), 
not all of these can be address in detail in the context of the present study. Instead, a 
concentration is made on the broad factors in the context of which the establishment 
of the ECSC has to be seen. 
The Second World War marked the turning point in the West European State system. 
Politically, the Second World War produced a realisation that unfettered and 
uninhibited nationalism was a recipe for war, which at the political level resulted in 
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calls for a larger and more powerful body than the pre-war league of nations, played 
into the establishment of the United Nations in 1944, and brought several initiatives 
aiming at specifically European arrangements. The end of the war also brought a 
division between East and West in Europe as well as a shift in the international 
balance of power away from the European states and to relations between the US and 
the Soviet Union. Given the distinct possibility of Europe becoming the future 
battleground between East and West, there was a growing desire that Europe should 
be heard on the world stage and a belief that this could only be achieved through unity 
and by speaking with one voice. Moreover, the question as to how to contain 
Germany's past aggressive and expansionist tendencies loomed large in the minds of 
those having to deal with Europe's post-war reconstruction. The foundations of the 
ECSC have therefore been developed in the context of French-German relations and 
the question of Germany in post-war Europe, divergent opinions between Europe's 
continental powers concerning the process of integration, system competition between 
the US and the USSR, and a US interest in reconstructing world markets through 
pushing Western Europe into a coherent policy of reconstruction, which served the 
US interest in bigger markets as well as the interest in containing the USSR. 
Economically, the war and wartime experiences produced a set of factors that enabled 
Western European co-operation and integration of the ground during the 1940s and 
1950s. Here, the movement towards increased co-operation and integration needs to 
be seen against the background of the interconnectedness and interdependence 
between states, especially in the economic and monetary spheres. In particular, 
economic interdependence arises from three features of the post-war world: the 
enormously increased volume of world trade; the internationalisation of production, 
and uncertainties associated with currency exchange rates and international monetary 
agreements. In Western Europe, especially the growth of intra-European trade after 
the war and monetary interdependence came to bear on the movement towards 
increased co-operation and integration. While the war stimulated an increased interest 
in international economic and financial agreements and resulted in the creation of the 
international Monetary Fund (M4F), the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (the 'World Banle), and the GATT, there was also a perceived need for 
specifically West European-based economic initiatives and organisation. When the 
rapid post-war recovery threatened to come to a halt due to massive balance of 
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payments deficits and dollar shortages, the United States devised the Marshall Plan 
and attached to it the condition that recipient states must seek greater economic co- 
operation among themselves. This led to the establishment of the organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), of the OECD and eventually of the ECSC 
and other specifically European arrangements (EDC, Euratom). Of course, there was 
no general consensus as to what the new spirit for co-operation should attempt to 
achieve and how to tackle the particular issues, problems and requirements of the 
post-war economic situation. Yet, the post-war economic situation produced new 
realities and changed attitudes, which led the European states to recognise at least 
some commonalties and shared interests, and initially resulted in greater co-operation 
on a purely sectoral basis. 
The European steel industries offered a particularly good target for integration since 
they represented the sort of industry necessary for fighting wars and which could 
cause concern if built up in former axis countries. Furthermore, the steel industry in 
continental Western Europe had important linkages, particularly as regards France and 
Germany, which were now tied together through the ECSC. One important aim of the 
ECSC was hence to establish as strong a link between Germany and France in 
industries regarded as basic to defence and economic growth (Messerlin and 
Saunders, 1983: 59). For France, embedded in its post-war goals of containing 
Germany and securing economic growth, the prospect of larger export markets, access 
to German raw materials and the possibility to exercise joint control over the German 
steel industry became decisive reasons to adopt the Schuman Plan (Diebold, 1959: 16). 
For Germany, which had been the subject of political developments during the 
immediate post-war era, the ECSC provided the possibility to establish itself in the 
international mainstream, to regain national self-respect, and, alongside the Atlantic 
Alliance, provide a much-needed buttress against the perceived threat from the East. 
More specifically, however, the ECSC offered Germany the chance to reduce Allied 
interference and restrictions in its economic development. VAlile France attempted to 
overcome its economic weakness of the immediate post-war years through exercising 
political influence in the ECSC, for Germany the establishment of the ECSC in the 
first place created the conditions that enabled it to compete as an economic and 
political partner (Statz, 1975: 135). Once France and Germany had come to agree on 
the principle of the ECSC, the joining motives of the Benelux countries and Italy 
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formed as a consequence of the economic situation in Europe after the war, the 
political and economic advantages associated with participation in bigger markets. 
Another reason for integrating the European Steel industry can be derived from its 
market structure. The steel industry is generally characterised by an oligopolistic 
structure, regional concentration, and strong government intervention. Since the steel 
industry has a long history of cartellisation (Hexner, 1943), another purpose for 
establishing the ECSC was to encounter the perceived threat of a renewed 
cartellisation of the steel industry. Giving the steel industry a framework based on 
competition was therefore also intended to avoid a situation in which national 
governments would find it hard to control the industry (Statz, 1975: 131-35; Archer, 
1993, Mestmkker, 1983). 
In summary, a number of inter-related objectives that emerged during the post-war era 
made the steel industry, together with the coal industry, to what appeared to be an 
ideal target for attempts to introduce elements of supranational regulation into the 
interplay between the European nation states. The ECSC attempted to establish new 
norms of behaviour between a group of European states by making the sinews of war 
unavailable for exclusive national use. With a view to competition policy, the ECSC 
Treaty was (at least formally) established to prevent this traditionally oligopolistic 
industry from returning to cartellisation. Being a key industry in respect to states' 
abilities to conduct war, the steel industry was an ideal vehicle for political ambitions 
to establish the comer stones for a European house built to end the rivalry among 
European nation states. In the following we shall turn our attention to the economic 
and industrial structures that influence the course of policy-making in the steel sector 
under supranational integration. 
3.3 The Market Structure of the European Steel Industry 
The structure of an industry in a particular country determines both the conduct and 
the performance of an industry (Carlsson, 1981: 125). Yet it is difficult to determine 
the structure of the steel industry as it is not well demarcated by technological or 
market characteristics (Klepper, 1991: 374). The steel industry is generally 
characterised by homogeneity of products, high barriers to market exit and entrance, 
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an oligopolistic market structure, large scale economies, a strong dependency on the 
business cycle, and a high degree of government intervention (Oberender and RUter, 
1993; Klepper, 1991; Conrad, 1997, Wienert, 1995b). 
Steel is a relatively homogeneous product and usually produced within the same firm. 
The steel industry encompasses all stages of steel production from raw material to the 
production of finished steel products. Hot rolling makes most of the finished steel 
products. The two main product classes are long products, such as rod and wire, and 
flat products, such as sheer and plate. In order to serve the needs of customers a 
multitude of final and semi-final products of diverging quality are processed. These 
products vary from hot-rolled strip to merchant bars of different thickness and plates, 
sheets and tubes. Most of the rolled products, produced by large integrated firms, are 
mass products. Their production technology does not offer great scope for 
improvement. However, some producers specialise in certain special steel products 
relatively more than others in the industry. Supported by the EC Commission, a far 
reaching homogenisation of products has been achieved over time by means of a 
detailed standardisation of steel and product quality (Oberender and Miter, 1993: 67). 
The technology of producing and processing steel is a decisive component of the 
market structure of new material since the production of steel requires high capital 
investment, which contributes to the exclusivity of the industry in terms of new 
market entrants. Homogeneity of steel products implies that they can be easily 
supplied via world steel markets. Subsequently, the most important aspect of steel 
trade is the price (Conrad, 1997: 19-21; Wienert, 1995b). Moreover, technology does 
not only influence the costs of production, it also contributes to the height of entry and 
exit barriers. Because of long adjustment lags, a wrong decision in such a matter can 
result in a technological gap that is difficult to recover 2 1. As a consequence, the timing 
of decisions on technological matters is a crucial matter and the competitiveness of 
steel producers generally depends on their steel-production and steel-casting 
techniques. These differ considerably between individual firms and countries. The 
closure of steel plants is linked to extremely high costs, notable in connection to the 
necessity to devise social plans in order to soften far-reaching social and regional 
repercussions. Since these costs are extremely high, there has been a tendency to 
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delay plant closures and to continue operations by means of subsidies (Conrad, 
1997: 20). Large economies of scale, on the other hand, imply that in times of low 
capacity utilisation producers sell at full costs on home markets and dump excess 
capacity of markets abroad (Conrad, 1997: 21). The industry has also traditionally 
been characterised by a relatively low level of technological and product 
differentiation. Since the technology needed in the steel industry can hardly be used 
for the production of other goods, the degree of fusion with other industries has been 
low until recently. Over the past ten years, however, EC steel producers have started 
to adapt themselves progressively to structural changes in world steel production and 
developed new steel products as well as they moved into other related business sectors 
(Klepper, 1991). 
Since the European steel industries had been devastated by the war, it was necessary 
to restore and expand capacity in order to meet the needs of post-war reconstruction 
and development. Driven by industrial growth, the EC steel subsequently expanded 
throughout the 1960s, until it peaked in 1974 with an unprecedented annual output of 
132,6 million tonnes for the then nine Member States. The economic importance of 
steel during this period was reflected in its share in value of the ECSC products in 
total trade of the EC countries, which varied between 4.7 and 5.9 percent from 1951 
to1970 (Cockerill, 1993: 52). Thereafter, however, the steel intensity began to fall and 
a more tenuous relationship developed between movements in overall economic 
activity and the demand in steel as the economies of the Member States matured and 
demand shifted towards services and away from manufacturers. Related to the energy 
crises, the growth trend in output reversed and chronic excess capacity emerged in the 
EC (Strange and Tooze, 1981). The European steel industry lost international 
competitiveness, particularly to Japan and newly industrialising countries such as 
South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, and Mexico, accompanied by a pronounced decline in 
market shares both at home and abroad. Imports to Western Europe from third 
countries to Western Europe rose from less than three percent apparent consumption 
in 1960 to eight percent in 1970. During the same period, West European exports to 
third countries as a percentage of world exports net of intra-regional trade fell be half, 
from 45 percent to 22 percent between 1960 to 1970. The West European share of 
"For instance, from 1945 to 1955 a big expansion of the steel industry took place in the US, yet towards a 
technology which proved to be wrong in the long run (Tiffany, 1988). This bad far reaching consequences for the 
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world crude steel production fell from 31 percent in 1960 to 23 percent in 1977 
(Carlsson, 1981: 152). Weak demand and excess capacity continued to characterise the 
steel industry in the first half of the 1980s, but stronger economic activity and the 
effects of rationalisation improved prices and price margins in the second half of the 
1980s. In the 1990s, however, these improvements were undermined by a slowdown 
in activity and resulted in another steel crisis. Following a market recovery in the mid- 
1990s, the European steel industry in 1998 for the first time in its history recorded a 
steel trade deficit in volume. Though in value terms the European steel industry 
remained a net exporter (COM(1999) 453 of 5 October 1999: 3). 
In the EC, Germany is the largest producer of crude steel with a share of around 28 
percent of Community production, followed by Italy and France. The UK and Spain, 
who joined in the EC in 1983, accounted for 12 and just over 10 percent of EC 
production in 1994 (for the shares of the Member States of EC steel production, see 
table 4 in the appendix). The high levels of steel production across the Member States 
add up to a strong overall export dependency. Following the restructuring efforts after 
the 1980s steel crisis, the EC remains the second biggest producer of steel in the 
world. The founding members of the EC are also the biggest steel producers, 
accounting for more than two-thirds of Community output. The accession of Spain 
and the UK, both significant steel producers, added to the importance of steel 
production in the Community. In 1995, the EU15 were the world's largest producer of 
crude steel with 155.8m tons. In comparison, Japan who had became the most 
competitive steel-producing nation by the 1980s and the world's second largest crude 
steel producer accounting for over 100m tons was surpassed in terms of output only 
by the former USSR. It was followed by China and the US with each producing just 
over 90m tons of crude steel. The world production of pig iron is led by China, 
closely followed by the EU1 5, both accounting for just over 1 00m tons of pig iron. 
Japan follows with approx. 75m tons; the US takes fourth place with ca. 50m tons of 
pig iron (Eurostat Statistical Yearbook, 1996: 439-440). Most of the ECSC steel 
production is imported/consumed by European states. (89 percent of total EU steel 
imports). Here, the largest proportion is going to the EFTA countries. The US and 
Japan both account for approx. I percent of imported ECSC steel. Today, the EC is 
competitiveness of the American steel industry and fuelled heavily into the EC-US steel conflict of the 1980s. 
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both the world's biggest producer of steel and the largest single steel market 
(COM(1999) 453 of 5 October 1999: 2). 
Despite its overall size, the structure of the European steel industry is nationalistic, 
undiversified and fragmented, with each steel-producing Member State supplying the 
bulk of domestic demand from its own resources (Wienert, 1983). Towards the end of 
the 1980s, a third of steel output of the industrialised countries was made by state- 
owned companies (Wienert, 1989). Public ownership dominated bulk steel making in 
France, Spain, Sweden, and Austria as well as most of the developing countries. 
Given national government's consideration of the steel industry as strategically 
important in relation to their industrial base, government ownership and control of 
national steel producers is thus a distinct feature of the EC's market structure in steel 
(Oberender and Miter, 1993). Particularly in the post-war period, national 
governments have been directly or indirectly responsible for the greater part of output 
in the EC, with the exemption of Germany and the Netherlands where steel 
production has been privately organised. In the UK, the British Steel Corporation has 
been re-privatised after two decades of public ownership in 1989. Over time, national 
governments tendency to intervene in the steel industry varied according to the 
perceived need to increase capital expenditure, to reduce excess capacity, to 
encourage rationalisation and to support losses. 
An important reason for continued government intervention in the world in general 
and the EC in specifically the reduction of employment that followed structural 
change and restructuring efforts associated with successive steel crises (Carlson, 
1982; Dicke, 1983; Hogan, 1983; Keeling, 1982; Wienert, 1983). Until the mid- 
1970s, world steel employment arguably rose as a result of rising steel consumption. 
Thereafter, the adoption of new technology, the rising efficiency and a slower growth 
in output have contributed to sinking levels of employment. The main adjustment in 
employment has taken place among the OECD countries, where some three quarters 
of a million jobs have been lost from 1975 to the late 1980s. Approximately 20 
percent of job losses across the EC were caused by technological change and the 
associated organisational change that came with the new technology. The declining 
steel demand also contributed to the employment effect of technical progress. As the 
oldest, smallest, and hence most labour-intensive, plants are generally closed down 
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first, it is suggested that about half the drop in employment in European steel over the 
1980s is associated with falling output (Economic Commission for Europe, 1989: 15; 
see also table 6 in the appendix). 
The steel industry, if only for its economies of scale, has long been an industry of 
great firms. The main players in the present world steel industry are large 
conglomerates with widespread activities within the iron and steel industry (Klepper, 
1991). Most European steel companies have integrated steel plants, i. e. they include 
blast-furnaces, steel plants, rolling mills and sometimes processing plants in one form 
of group of companies. The size of EC steel producers cannot only be attributed to 
internal growth, but is also a result of successive mergers (Oberender and Miter, 
1993: 72). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the established producers were placed at a 
competitive disadvantage as few could match the advantages of high productivity 
displayed by Japan, the Netherlands and Italy. Moreover, compared with the 
successful European and Japanese producers, the US and the UK had become 
fundamentally uncompetitive by the end of the 1960s. The established producers were 
thus forced to re-construct in order to maintain their competitiveness. In the UK, the 
British Steel Corporation was formed by a giant merger of 14 steel companies in 
1967. In West Germany, a series of mergers took place over time and consolidated the 
steel industry. In France, there was a dramatic outburst of mergers in the 1960s which 
eventually led to the formation of one single group in which almost all French steel- 
making was concentrated (Usinor-Sacilor). Since 1975, a significant decrease in the 
number of companies has been recorded and this development is also reflected on the 
plant level (Wienert, 1995b). While the international. steel market is characterised by a 
low concentration, national steel markets within the EC are therefore highly 
concentrated. In each major steel-producing Member State, the four largest firms (or 
fewer) account for at least 80 percent of steel production. Frequently encouraged as 
well as financed by national governments, the concentration of large firms in the EC 
is the outcome of a wave of mergers and acquisitions. This development implies that 
restructuring and rationalisation will lead to even fewer and larger firms as well as 
higher degrees of cross-national organisation (Cockerill, 1993: 57-8). 
Yet the changes in steel-making technology led to a polarisation of the steel industry. 
Co-existing alongside each other, steel production is now either carried out on a very 
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large scale or in fairly small-scale electric-arc-based works, so-called mini-mills 
(Barnett and Crandall; 1986; Hogan, 1987). Significantly, mini-mills are getting larger 
in order to realise economies of scale too. Leading operators of this process include 
Venezuela, Mexico, Malaysia and the former USSR, which together accounted for 
almost half of the world's active installed capacity in 1987. Not only in Europe, mini- 
mills have enjoyed varied degrees of success. They are mainly concentrated in 
Northern Italy round Brescia (the Bresciani). During the 1980s steel crisis, their high 
competitiveness has won them a place on the domestic and export markets. Yet the 
activity of mini-mills located in Europe has also decli 
, 
ned since the early 1980s, taking 
advantage of EC measures designed to facilitate the closure of surplus plants. 
In summary, the European steel industry can be characterised as an oligopolistic 
industry that has undergone structural change since the mid-1970s. With technology 
as a prime factor influencing their competitiveness, steel producers have resorted to 
specialisation, diversification and integration of production structures in order to 
adjust to structural change. The European steel industry combines some of the largest 
steel producers in the world, making the EC the second biggest steel market in the 
world. However, since the 1970s, the EC has lost in competitiveness largely because 
the performance of its industries has been poor following a failure to adopt to 
structural changes in a timely fashion. The diversity of the individual industry 
structures within the EC contributed extensively to this failure to restructure the 
European steel industry in a co-ordinated fashion. Moreover, being a net exporter of 
steel, the European steel industries are particularly dependent on exports, which led to 
an increased tendency to protect the European steel market from third country 
imports. 
3.4 Decision-Making in the ECSC 
Next to determinants derived from the market structure, EC steel policy is influenced 
by political determinants. The political framework of the ECSC is set through the 
ECSC Treaty, which specifies the aims as well as the instruments available to pursue 
these aims. Signed in 1952, it forms the basis of European steel policy until the year 
2002, when the treaty runs out and the ECSC will become part of the Single European 
Market. In order to make the supranational regulation of the steel industry work, the 
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ECSC provides common institutions for the articulation and aggregation of interests 
and establishes a system of decision-making and adjudication for the steel industries 
of the Member States. Since an analysis of decision-making processes in subsequent 
chapters is only possible when all the acting units and participating groups are known, 
we will now turn out attention to the actors and institutions involved in the policy- 
making process in the steel sector. In particular, the analysis will focus on the division 
of competence and the interplay between the Commission and the various participants 
in the policy-making process in the steel sector 22 . This analysis is completed by an 
outline of the various policy-making instruments available for the Commission to 
achieve objectives generated through the operation of the decision-making process. 
In the area of the ECSC, one needs to distinguish between nine principal actors. On 
the EC level, there are the Commission (formerly called the High Authority), the 
Council of Ministers, The EP, the Consultative Committee, the EJC, as well as the 
EC-level interest organisations; of the steel producers (Eurofer and EISA). On the 
national level, we find the national governments, national interest organisations and 
individual steel producers. Table 3 gives an overview of the division of competences 
in the ECSC- 
22 For a comprehensive and detailed description of the organisational aspects see Grunert (1987). 
131 
Council of 
Ministers 
-proposesto 
comInISS1011 
-partial right of 
assent 
"'t 
-hearing, 
-Art. 33 'Art 35 
European 
Parliament 
-questions to 
Comrnission 
-can force 
resignation -Art. 33 /Art. 35 
-x -confirms /dismisses 
/ 
Commission decisions 
European 
Court of 
Justice 
I 
Commission 
II 
-issues decisions, 
regulations and 
recommendations 
FC-Level Consultative 
Steel Committee 
Organisation 
-sends representation 
-hearings -partial right of 
-Art. 33 / Art 35 consultations 
opinions 
-advises Commission 
on its work 
Note: Under Art. 33 Commission decisions and recommendations can be made invalid. 
Under Art. 35 the Commission can be attacked for failure to act. 
X: the rights of the EP remain unchanged under the TEU. 
Table 3: Division of Competences in the ECSC. 
Within the decision-making framework of the ECSC, the Commission is the central 
actor. It represents the Community interest and is the only really common institution. 
Its main task is the implementation of Community treaties (Art. 88 ECSQ, to issue 
regulations for their implementation (Art. 155 ECSQ to put before the Council 
proposals, regulations and decisions, and to implement measures passed by the 
Council. However, it is obliged to take into account the diverse interests of the 
Member States when formulating its policies (Ar-t. 155 ECSQ. Thus it is the 
Commission's duty to ensure that the objectives set out in the treaty are attained in 
accordance its provisions (Art. 8 ECSC). 
in order to perform its tasks, the Commission is empowered to take a decision, make 
recommendations or deliver opinions. Although only decisions are binding in their 
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entirety, the Commission is asked to use this power cautiously in areas where it is 
empowered to take a decision and to consider confining itself to making 
recommendations (Art. 114 ECSQ. Like many other articles, the wording of this 
article suggests a reservation on part of the signatory parties towards assigning the 
Commission full decision-taking autonomy. Instead, contentious issues are left subject 
to the approval of Member States. Hence, in the areas in which the Commission has 
been given the legal powers to take decisions, it is therefore up to its own judgement 
how to use the scope for action it is given in the treaty. With regard to the ECSC, the 
Commission has the supreme responsibility in that it possesses the formal decision- 
making competence. In important questions, e. g. the implementation of Art. 58 ECSC, 
it depends on previous agreement by the Council (avis conforme) so that in matters of 
'vital importance' no decision can be made against the vote of any one Member State. 
Among the various DGs of the Commission, the steel policy-making process is led by 
DG III (Industry) which, particularly until approximately the beginning 1990s, was 
the main protagonist in the industrial and structural politics of the Community. As the 
number of exogenous and endogenous factors influential upon the direction decision- 
making of steel within the EC changed during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the role 
performed by DG III in co-ordinating steel polices decreased in the wake of a 
declining hold of industrial patriotism on business, bureaucratic and political decision 
makers (Dudley and Richardson, 1999: 236-8; Dudley and Richardson, 1997). As 
these developments will be detailed in subsequent chapters, it is sufficient to note that 
as far as the internal composition of the Commission is concerned, DG III overtime 
lost its over-riding influence to DG IV and DG I. 
Representing the interests of the Member States collectively and individually at 
ministerial level, the Council of Ministers is the main counterpart of the Commission. 
Vniile the Council generally has decision-making competence for the EEC (Art. 145 
EEC), this (formal) competence for the area of the ECSC Treaty belongs to the 
Commission. However, in practice the Council has the decision-making competence 
for the coal and steel sector since the issuing of regulations is normally dependent on 
its agreement. The Council's voting rules (Art. 28 ECSC) are of great importance in 
decision-making processes. The ECSC treaty stipulates the areas in which the assent 
of the Council is required and whether unanimity, absolute majority or qualified 
133 
majority is required to adopt a proposal. Proposals submitted by the Commission 
receive approval when supported by an absolute majority of the Council members. 
This vote must include the votes of the representatives of two member states which 
each produce at least one tenth of the total value of the coal and steel output of the 
EC. Alternatively, in the event of an equal division of votes, and if the Commission 
maintains its proposal after a second discussion, it must be supported by the 
representatives of three Member States which each produce at least one tenth of the 
total value of the coal and steel output of the Community. Decisions of the Council of 
Ministers, other than those for which a qualified majority or unanimity is required, 
need to be approved by the majority of its members must also include the votes of the 
two member states accounting for at least one tenth each of the total value of the coal 
and steel output of the Community. Considering both that Germany, the LJK, Italy, 
France and Spain are the largest producers of coal and steel and that in qualified 
majority voting procedures their votes are weighted most, this makes them the key 
members states of the ECSC. Depending on the stipulated voting procedure, the 
Commission thus needs to make sure that it finds a sufficient power base in these 
states in order to secure approval for its proposals. The structure of the national steel 
industry and the resulting preferences have a large impact on voting outcomes, i. e. the 
direction of and coherence of EC policy-making (for overviews of the interest 
determinants of the Member States at the beginning of the 1980s and 1990s steel 
crisis, see tables 7 and 8 in the appendix). Nevertheless, the Commission gains in 
weight vis-6-vis the Member States in that the Council of Ministers can accept a 
proposal of the Commission by majority vote, but it can only make a decision 
unanimously (Grunert, 1987: 246). 
Closely attached to the Council of Ministers, the Committee of the Permanent 
Representatives (Coreper) has a key role in the decision-making process since it is 
involved in the harmonisation of political standpoints on two levels. These are firstly 
between individual delegates of the Member States and, secondly, between national 
interests and the Community interest, as represented by the Commission. Coreper 
should not only be regarded an intergovernmental agent, but also a body partly 
operating in the Community interest (Lodge, 1993; Grunert, 1987). This is because 
their permanent placement in Brussels puts its members in a position where they can 
gauge the chances of their own national policies being accepted. As they can estimate 
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the strength of opposition and accordingly conclude alliances of interests in order to 
work out compromises on the basis of viable bargaining positions, they can act as an 
important agent for the Community interest. Coreper's function of clarifying and 
mediating between interests is an essential element of the decision-making process. 
Outside the Council, the relationship between the Commission and Member States is 
partly developed in Chapter 7 ECSC. In view of the industry's history of goverm-nent 
intervention, its socio-political and national importance, this chapter requires 
governments to announce their interference with conditions of competition. The 
relationship between Commission and national governments is furthermore carved out 
in chapter 10 ECSC and holds that the powers of governments are not affected in 
matters of commercial policy unless the treaty stipulates this. The EC does not hold 
more powers in commercial policy-making towards third countries than Member 
States. Minimum and maximum rates for duties on steel can be fixed by unanimous 
Council decision, but within these limits governments can determine their own tariffs 
(Art. 72 ECSQ. Generally, the administration of import and export licences with third 
countries lies with the governments. The Commission is nevertheless empowered to 
supervise the administration and verification of these licences with respect to steel 
products (Art 73 ECSC). 
Despite the large degree of autonomy the ECSC treaty grants to the Commission, the 
performance of the Commission to a great extent depends on way the Council 
exercises the formal control over the Commission's actions. The Commission's action 
capacities are therefore not only influenced by voting procedures, but also by Member 
States' reluctance to surrender too much decision-making power. Yet, the Commission 
has a considerable degree of independence over its actions when political convenience 
(such as the implementation of unpopular measures on the national level) or 
practicalities make such an approach appear more favourable to the Council members. 
Art. 18 ECSC attaches a Consultative Committee to the Commission, its members 
being appointed by the Council. These are composed equally of representatives of 
producers, employers, consumers and traders. Although its role is purely advisory, it 
has a sectoral responsibility for the coal and steel industries in representing group 
interests from the sector vis-6-vis the Commission. The Commission may consult the 
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Committee whenever it considers it appropriate, but must do so as concerns the 
general objectives and programmes drawn up under Art. 46 ECSC as well as it is to 
keep the Committee informed on the broad lines of its actions. Apart from the right of 
consultation, the Committee does not hold any legal powers over the Commission. . 
The Consultative Committee has a double function in the formulation of a common 
steel policy in that it both brings the ideas of affected interest groups of the sector into 
the decision-making process and legitimises measures already decided or yet to be 
decided by the Commission. As it often backs the Commission and strengthens its 
political position vis-ii-vis the Council of Ministers, the Commission subsequently 
wins in political influence and legitimises its role through its close co-operation with 
the Consultative Committee (Grunert, 1987: 264). 
The role of the EP (formerly the Common Assembly) is firstly to provide a 
democratic input into ECSC decision-making and secondly to exercise the 
supervisory powers conferred upon it by the treaty. Although the EP can hardly said 
to have provided much democratic impact during the early years of European 
integration, both roles have gradually been reshaped towards the function of a 
supervisory body over the years. Nevertheless, its role and powers have been of an 
advisory nature for most of its history, with its real control being limited to the power 
to express, by a two-thirds majority, its lack of confidence in the Commission and 
thus force its resignation (Art. 24 ECSC). 
The EJC is primarily concerned with the interpretation of Community law, but many 
of its decisions have a bearing on the ECSC. The Member States, the Council of 
Ministers or the steel producers have the right to sue against decisions or 
recommendations of the Commission (Art. 33 ECSC). The same applies if the 
aforementioned hold the opinion that the Commission should become active in a 
given area (Art. 35 ECSC). Conversely, the Commission and the Member States are 
given the chance to sue against decisions of the Council of Ministers and the EP. 
The ECSC Treaty requires the Commission to hear and consult affected interest 
groups, especially when important decisions are imminent. Therefore, prior to 
important decisions, mutual consultations and conununication on all levels take place 
on a virtually permanent basis. In general, interest representation of steel producers on 
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matters relating to the ECSC is done through the Consultative Committee and 
lobbying of the national governments and the Commission. On the EC level, interest 
representation is furthermore subject of the work of Eurofer, an organisation created 
exclusively for the co-ordination and representation of the large steel-producers of the 
Community (see section 4.2.1). Its founding members were the the steel 
confederations of the nine member states, at the time representing 80 percent of the 
steel producers of the Common Market (Fendel, 1981: 370). Despite the 
fundamentally different objectives of Commission and Eurofer, their common interest 
provides for intensive interactions and co-operation between them. Eurofer is linked 
to the decision-making process by a network which facilitates intensive and constant 
co-operation and contact especially with DG III. In the lobbying of important matters, 
Eurofer also seeks ad-hoc meetings between Eurofer members and national delegates 
in the Council. There are no official links between Eurofer and EP, the Economic and 
Social Committee or the Consultative Committee, but overlapping membership of 
some members contributes to the harmonisation of steel policies. Since the big 
integrated and state-owned companies were over-represented on the EC level, this led 
to the foundation of EISA, the organisation of the independent small and medium- 
sized steel producers. Representing approximately ten percent of steel production, 
EISA was intended to create a counterweight to the national steel industries, 
particularly in view of larger producers benefiting from competition-distorting 
practices resulting from national subsidies. Other actors in ECSC decision-making 
processes include steel traders, trade unions and steel consumers. Organised in the 
Federation Europ6enne du N6goce d'Acier (FENA), steel traders only have an 
information function and their political influence is considerably lesser compared to 
steel producers as there is little employment dependent solely on steel trade. The 
influence of both FENA and EISA are subsequently rated lesser within the 
Commission than that of steel producers (Conrad, 1997: 63). Moreover, under the 
ECSC Treaty steel traders do not enjoy the same rights as steel producers. Trade 
unions and steel consumers are both represented through the Consultative 
Committee 23 . 
23 On the international level, the European steel interest organisations are furthermore organised in the 
International Iron and Steel Institute (IISI), which incorporates the steel productions of 41 countries with a share of 
65 percent of world crude steel production and also has its offices in Brussels (Fendel, 1981: 371). 
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3.5 ECSC Policy Instruments 
In order to realise its objectives, the ECSC Treaty provides the Commission with a 
range of policy instruments (for a detailed overview see Kuhns, 1988). An 
indispensable caveat for the Commission's work to co-ordinate policies in the steel 
sector is staked out in Art. 47 ECSC and holds that the Commission may obtain the 
information it requires to carry out its tasks. The Commission may have any necessary 
checks made and impose fines on undertakings that evade their obligations or 
knowingly fumish false information. Importantly, the Commission also has the right 
to demand information on the policies of companies (Art. 60 §2 ECSC) and this forms 
an essential prerequisite of its work. 
The Commission can take measures in order to aid structural adjustment through 
subsidies for investment programmes. Drawing its resources from imposed levies, 
contracted loans and gifts (Art. 49 ECSC), the Commission may facilitate the 
carrying-out of investment programmes (Art. 54 ECSQ and, with the unanimous 
assent of the Council, assist the financing of projects aimed at increasing the 
production, reducing the production costs, or facilitating the marketing of products. It 
may also require companies to inform it of any projects in advance. Should the 
Conunission find that such projects would involve subsidies, aids, protection or 
discriminations contrary to the ECSC Treaty, its adverse opinion has the force of a 
decision and effectively prohibits the undertaking concerned from drawing on these 
resources, and the Commission can fine companies disregarding this provision. 
Furthermore, the Commission can take measures aimed at structural adjustment 
through R&D programmes. Art. 55 ECSC stipulates the Commission's role in 
promoting technical and economic research relating the production of steel. In 
addition, the Commission can take measures for laid-off workers and for the 
prevention of plant closures (Art. 57 ECSQ. On the basis of Art. 56 (§l, c), the 
Member States can request the Commission to assist with the re-employment of work 
forces. The Member States usually take over half of the costs involved. 
In the field of market steering instruments, the ECSC Treaty empowers the 
Commission to a number of measures. The outstanding tool of the Commission is 
without doubt Art. 58 ECSC- Though being reminded by Art. 57 ECSC that it should 
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give preference to indirect means of action, the Commission obtains the right to 
establish a system of production quotas when confronted with a period of manifest 
crisis. This requires the Commission to consult the Committee and to seek unanimous 
consent of the Council. In setting up a system of production quotas, it needs to take 
account of principles of the ECSC treaty (as stipulated in Art. 2,3, and 4 ECSC) and 
determines the quotas in conjunction with the steel producers. The crisis measures can 
be ended by the Council; either acting unanimously when the Commission proposes 
this, or by simple majority when after a Member State proposal. The Commission is 
entitled to fine producers that can be shown not to have complied with the crisis 
regime (Art. 58 '§4 ECSC). The Commission furthermore holds far-reaching 
competence in the field of price regulation (Art. 60 ECSC). It has to take action 
against unfair competitive practices, such as the formation of monopolies and 
discriminatory practices. Furthermore, with a view to the competitiveness of the 
industry, the Commission may fix maximum and minimum prices within the 
Common Market as well as it may determine minimum and maximum export prices 
after consultations with Committee and Council (Art. 61 ECSC). 
The system for regulating the Community market was supplemented by an external 
branch in order to prevent mass uncontrolled imports from third countries replacing 
Community production. Commercial policy instruments were not foreseen by the 
ECSC Treaty (see section 2.3.2.2), but Art. 74 ECSC empowers the Commission to 
take any measure that is in accordance with the ECSC Treaty against dumping and to 
make recommendations to the Member States. Since the Commission's anti-dumping 
recommendation of 1977 specified dumping by transferring EEC provisions to the 
coal and steel sector (L114 of 5 May 1977c), these recommendations have been 
amended several times, notably in the context of successive GATT Rounds (see 
Dominick, 1884). The multilateral trade negotiations concluded in 1994, however, 
have led to new arrangements on the implementation of Article VI GATT, with which 
previous legislation on dumped imports to the EC conformed. In the light of the new 
and detailed rules brought about by the conclusion of the so-called 1994 Anti- 
Dumping Agreement as part of the GATT, the EC subsequently decided to change its 
legislation (L308 of 29 July 1996). Currently, anti-dumping is specified by 
recommendation No. 384/96 of 22 December 1995 (L56 of 6 March 1996). The 
GATT anti-dumping code has been applied to the ECSC in order to ensure the 
139 
homogeneity of the external trade legislation of the EC, whilst taking account of the 
decision-making processes of the ECSC. 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide the foundations of the longitudinal study 
of the European steel industry in terms of the EC's strategic action capacities. The 
chapter therefore provided an overview of the development of international steel 
trade, the structural changes that affected international steel trade and the changing 
circumstances that let to continued government intervention in the steel industry. 
After outlining the special circumstances of the post-war situation, which in Europe 
resulted in the establishment of supranational regulation in the steel industry within 
the framework of the ECSC, the chapter then proceeded with the introduction of the 
fundamental features and institutional developments of policy-making within the 
ECSC. Subsequent sections showed the market structure of the European steel 
industry, introduced the main elements of the decision-making process and 
competence of the main actors involved in decision-making in the ECSC, and lastly 
outlined the policy instruments that the ECSC provides for the supranational 
management of the European steel industry. This overview set the scene for the in- 
depth analysis that begins in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: EC POLICY-MAEJNG IN STEEL FROM THE 1950s TO 
THE 1970s 
Introduction 
In order to complement the basic understanding of policy-making processes in the 
steel sector that has been developed in chapter three, this chapter is concerned with 
tracing the complex external and internal dynamics that led to the EC's direct 
management of EC steel politics during the 1980s. Furthermore, the chapter aims to 
show the development of both the interactions between the main actors within the 
ECSC and the interactions between the EC and its external competitors. The 
organisation of this chapter differs from those in part IH and IV in that the latter 
maintain a distinction between internal and external fields of EC activity. The reason 
for this is that in order to trace the magnitude of interrelated internal and external 
developments that gradually led to the EC assuming and utilising the extensive 
powers granted to the EC through the ECSC Treaty, it is useful to distinguish between 
three stages of Commission involvement. Hence, after an outline of the developments 
affecting the European steel industry following the establishment of the ECSC (the 
, landscape'), which includes the conclusion of orderly market arrangements for the 
European steel industry without EC involvement, the chapter proceeds with its task by 
analysing the gradual development of Community involvement during three periods. 
During these periods, Commissioners Simonelli, Simonet and Davignon were 
successively in charge of the DG IH portfolio and the progression of Community 
involvement is illustrated in the light of the extent that Community involvement took 
when they were in office. 
4.1. Landscape of the Steel Industry from the 1950s to the 1970s 
During the years following the establishment of the ECSC, there was hardly a need 
for the High Authority to intervene and the ECSC experienced a long period of 
growth and little intervention (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 190; Lister, 1960). The 
five year transitional period that followed the establishment of the ECSC was 
characterised by the abolition of tariffs, quotas and other restrictions to intra-European 
trade. Demand for steel rose steadily, and so did the EC' steel output. In the 1960s, the 
rapid economic growth experienced by all six ECSC countries sustained the increase 
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in demand for steel and thus an ever-expanding production. VA-iile the activities of the 
High Authority concentrated on granting aids to help retrain and relocate steel 
workers made redundant by the closing of old plants, it was mainly concerned with 
cartel practices in the Community and it gradually flexed its muscles in order to tackle 
this problem. During these early years, the tone of the policy style of the ECSC was 
set by Jean Monnet. In order to promote the idea of political and economic 
integration, the High Authority focused on establishing the Common Market. 
Monnet's international prestige was a key factor in enhancing the political stature of 
the High Authority. Since Monnet himself was more interested in the High Authority 
as a forerunner of a federal government, however, he left the supervision of the coal 
and steel industries in the hands of High Authority officials (Dudley and Richardson, 
1999: 23 1; Spierenbourg and Poidevin, 1994). 
During the 1950s, the ECSC Treaty played a fairly positive role in that it allowed the 
creation of the Common Market in steel and still only generated weak pressures in the 
direction of national cartellisation. Paradoxically, the ECSC created a European 
dynamism in favour of free trade, while being itself fundamentally protectionist and 
anti-competitive. During the 1960s, however, the Treaty gradually lost this dynamic 
role and at the same time started to re-enforce the tendencies to create 'national 
champions' at the centre of the national steel industries (Hayward, 1974: 260; 
Tsoukalis and da Silva Ferreira, 1980: 258; Joliet, 1981). The ECSC Treaty later gave 
rise to two sorts of behaviour: On the one hand, it slowed down the pace of the 
disappearance or elimination of firms by its tendency to stabilise market shares. On 
the other, the Treaty encouraged each state to act as a privileged investor and 
subsequently to increase production capacity by unreasonable amounts since each 
Member State wanted to maintain future market shares at pre-crisis levels. Together, 
these factors contributed to the over-capacity problem that the EC had to face during 
the following decades. 
Despite the supranational fervour and political idealism of the early years and the 
wide range of powers allocated to the High Authority, the process of establishing the 
Common Market already met with what has been termed the national policy 
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'hinterland'24 , i. e. national policies, styles and traditions, and often clashed with these. 
For much of the early years, the Commission (then the High Authority) thus had to 
concentrate on establishing its authority by trying to get national governments to 
accept its supervision of the steel industry by stressing the 'surveillance of collusion 
rather than its prevention' (Grunert, 1987: 224). Ultimately resulting in increasing 
surplus production, the failure to shift control of the steel industry to the supranational 
level left the EC with a timid and ambiguous policy of harmonisation (Hayward, 
1974: 270). Given that the Member States perceived of the steel industry as a key 
strategic industry, it became apparent that the steel sector was not an ideal industry to 
introduce supranational regulation (Dudley and Richardson, 1999: 232). Given that the 
growth of EC production was accompanied by a steady growth in intra-Community 
trade, however, an important development during the first two decades of the ECSC 
was the growing economic importance of the Community to the Member States 
(Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 191). 
4.1.1 EarlY VRAS 
As national steel markets around the world became increasingly sensitive to world 
market developments, a series of orderly market arrangements (VRAs) was 
concluded, mainly between the leading producers of steel. During 1967 and 1968, the 
US industry lobbied Congress for quantitative restrictions on steel imports, which 
resulted in a bill proposing 35 comprehensive bilateral imports on all supplying 
countries. Alleging subsidisation of steel exports and calling for countervailing duties, 
the US Steel Corporation filed complaints against France, West Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. The demands of the US steel producers 
caused President Lyndon's administration considerable problems. Most importantly, 
the imposition of the proposed non-tariff barriers raised questions concerning the 
credibility of the US's commitment to multilateral trade agreements in the context of 
the GATT Kennedy Round, where the harmonisation of steel tariffs had been 
achieved (Jones, 1986: 93). Yet the strong pressure within the US, from producers and 
Congress, led the US to consider alternative policies. Japanese steel producers, the 
prime 'disrupters', were eventually led to propose a voluntary export restraint as a 
24 Quoted in Dudley and Richardson (1999: 232). 
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means of neutralising protectionist sentiments in the US. As the European steel 
producers also agreed to this approach, the proposed quota bill was subsequently 
shelved. 
The negotiations to the agreement featured Japanese and Community producers, 
representatives of the US steel industry and members of the US Congress. The EC 
remained absent from the negotiation of these since the peculiarities of the EC policy- 
making prevented the negotiation of VRAs by EC officials. At the time, the EC as a 
supranational organisation had neither developed the authority nor the bureaucratic 
structure to carry out sectoral trade negotiations or restrictions in the steel industry 
(Jones, 1983: 22). The pursuit of a voluntary agreement therefore represented a 
convergence of interests among foreign producers, import-competing US producers 
and US trade policy officials (Jones, 1983: 7; Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 141). 
On 14 January 1969, the 'statements of intent', as they were called for reasons 
relating to domestic US anti-trust legislation, were officially announced in Congress 
and simply represented a promise not to exceed given export levels of total steel mills 
products (by weight) to the US from 1969 to 1971. 
Initially, the arrangement served its purpose well. However, during the final year of 
the agreement imports to the US markets rose sharply. An import ratio of 17.9 percent 
represented the highest steel import figures to the US recorded to that date. Imports 
from the EC and Japan exceeded their limits by 1.5 million tons. A subsequent VRA 
was therefore concluded in May 1972. Steel producers in the EC and Japan were 
content to negotiate another agreement, because it gave them the possibility to keep 
US protectionist sentiments in check. A renewed VRA also offered a generous 
accommodation for the interests of foreign suppliers as it opened access to the large 
US market free of further import barriers as well as the possibility to win scarcity 
gains if the restraints were effective. Though more detailed in their provisions, the 
arrangements principally kept their simple forinat, but envisaged a much more 
stringent and comprehensive control of steel supplies to the US (Van Der Ven and 
Grunert, 1987: 141). Ironically, the second EC-US VRA was essentially non- 
restrictive in character. External factors, such as the dollar devaluations of 1971 and 
1973, which made the US market far less attractive as an export outlet. Furthermore, ' 
the world-wide steel shortage in 1973-4, which led to a concentration of steel in 
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domestic markets, eventually allowed US policy-makers to let the VRA expire quietly 
just before the 1974/75 downtum of the world steel market (Van Der Ven, 1987: 142). 
The VRAs of the US with the rest of the steel producing world led, as noted above, to 
a diversion of steel exports away from the US to the EC market. During the 5 years 
between 1967 and 1971, the share of Japanese deliveries to the Community rose from 
6.0 percent to 10.2 percent. The increasing Japanese import penetration alanned EC 
steel producers, who subsequently demanded VRA-type arrangements with Japanese 
exporters. Yet, import penetration in EC countries was at a level that prevented 
general protectionist feelings against Japanese producers in the EC from reaching the 
necessary threshold to make Member States consider trade restrictions along the lines 
of the US arrangements (Jones, 1983: 3-24). Inspired by the relative success of the US 
experience with themselves and the non-existence of a Community framework that 
could provide for the protection producers aspired, EC steel producers therefore again 
undertook voluntary restraint negotiations of their own. In December 1971, the 
Japanese Iron and Steel Federation announced that Japanese steel producers intended 
to limit their exports to the EC to 1.25m tons in 1972, with quotas for shipments in 
1973 and 1974 to be set in future negotiations. As it was only the Japanese who 
announced the arrangement, it allowed Community producers to keep a low profile, 
which reflected both the political and legal problems of the arrangement (Jones, 
1983: 34). Politically, the agreement was exposed as a patent accommodation of 
producer interest by the absence of a wide-spread projectionist sentiment across the 
EC. On the legal plane, the agreement was questionable since it represented a 
collusive arrangement on the producer-level that projected into the sphere of 
international trade agreements. Hence participants' endeavour to portray an image of 
the 'true voluntary spirit' of Japanese producers. 
Although the steel arrangement between EC producers and Japan had little economic 
effect as the favourable conditions on the steel market of 1973 and 1974 rendered the 
agreement superfluous, it nevertheless set an important precedent for subsequent 
restraint negotiations. This is reflected in the spread of voluntary agreements in the 
world economy thereafter and found its expression in the proliferation of voluntary 
steel arrangements in the 1980s. In the context of the development of EC policy- 
making in steel, the importance of the two steel arrangements lies in the fact that it 
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shows the readiness of EC producers to regulate steel trade in the absence of 
governmental readiness for action. With no governmental bodies within Member 
States or the EC available or willing to conduct negotiations at the time, producers 
were ready to pursue their aims through direct negotiations with their competitors. 
During this time, the tendency towards protectionism and regulation in steel trade 
blossomed once again. However, the burgeoning protectionism displayed nationalistic 
forms of protectionism rather than a supranational one. With the creation of more and 
more national champions, public servants across the EEC demonstrated that 
protecting one's home market was clearly seen as more important than creating a 
common European policy for steel trade and production (Hayward, 1974: 271). 
4.2 The Development of EC Involvement in the Steel Sector 
1975 was the year the world steel market drifted off into recession. Thereafter, the EC 
became actively involved in the management of the steel sector. Against the 
background of cyclical market conditions, misdirected investment, and an improved 
competitiveness of Japanese producers which started to erode the Community's export 
market shares, European producers became increasingly vulnerable to the developing 
market decline. This, in conjunction with a growing protectionist tendency of the US 
market, resulted in increasingly protectionist sentiments not only among European 
steel producers, but also across the Member States. In contrast to the previous 
agreements and for the first time in the after-war period, steel producers did not seek 
to regulate trade in steel by attempting to negotiate further agreements themselves. 
Instead, their burgeoning protectionist sentiments motivated an approach to the crisis 
that followed the structure of ECSC policy-making and the provisions set out in the 
ECSC Treaty. The following sections show that the factors and developments 
influential upon the EC's approach to the problems of the steel crisis are compounded 
in external pressures and developments, changing internal requirements and attitudes, 
and the problematic activation of the measures provided by the ECSC Treaty. 
4.2.1 The Spinelli Years (until the end of 1976) 
In March 1975, Jaques Ferry, the President of the French iron and steel association, 
was the first to request the declaration of a manifest crisis, as set out in Art. 58 ECSC 
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(Heusden and de Hom, 19 8 0: 4 1) -Commissioner Spinelli showed a hesitate attitude 
regarding the responsibility for the EC steel industry as it rested on the Commission 
and Spinelli himself (Jones, 1983: 34). At the same time, even the steel industry itself 
had no unanimous opinion as to how the crisis should be dealt with. Member States 
had until then kept somewhat aloof in the Council (Heusdens; and de Horn, 1980: 43). 
Moreover, the Commission was neither prepared, in ideas and material, to assume far- 
reaching functions (Grunert, 1987: 231). Furthermore, for a mix of external and 
internal reasons, the Commission was extremely hesitant to intervene in the first 
place: Internally, the declaration of a manifest crisis met with severe ideological 
differences among the Member States (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 197-8). The 
British and Italians joined the French and asked for external protection and internal 
stabilisation measures. The Germans, on the other hand, seemed more worried about 
the subsidies given by the three governments to their respective industries. They 
argued as late as September 1975 that the problem affecting the steel industry was 
cyclical and not structural and opposed state control on both the national and EC level 
(Tsoukalis and da Silva Ferreira, 1980: 360; Martin, 1979: 854). The re-negotiation of 
British entry to the Community posed another problem. While the British Labour 
government would not have been opposed to any measure that would restrict 
competition in the steel sector, the Commission under Spinelli felt that as little as 
possible should be done to change the existing EC framework and thus risk upsetting 
the process of re-negotiation (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 198). Moreover, the 
Commission felt that creating a cartel of European steel subsidies was a difficult 
undertaking that spelled nothing but trouble in terms of co-ordinating the actions of 
the various steel producers across the EC. Yet the conflicting attitudes towards a 
cartellisation among the Member States and the diversity of the European steel 
industry in terms of structure and efficiency was the greatest obstacle, raising 
problems over distribution of capacity cuts as well as over compliance to crisis 
measures. In addition, DG IV (Competition) opposed any measure that would restrict 
competition in the steel sector. However, the reluctance to formally control the 
European market had clearly more to do with the heavy role of foreign trade and a 
reluctance to move toward overt protection for fear of escalation, and not from a 
commitment to competition (Martin, 1979: 860). 
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On the international plane, the Commission faced problems similar to those the US 
administration faced during the negotiation of the first US VRA 1969-72. Firstly, 
crisis measures were problematic in two respects in the context of the GATT. At the 
time, the Community was engaged in the early stages of the Tokyo Round. The valid 
application of Article XIX GATT was dubious as the EC's problems were caused by 
general market conditions and not by imports per se. Secondly, the use of quotas 
would have meant a direct violation of Article XI GATT. Moreover, an overt 
protectionist stance of the EC in steel seemed bound to provoke a counteraction of the 
US aimed at damaging the EC's export opportunities. For these reasons, it was 
important for the Commission not to make the first move towards an active import 
control system. The Commission thus suggested to use the OECD in order to achieve 
a greater discipline in international steel trade (Axt, 1978: 180). This course of action 
was in line with the Commission! s opinion that an improved market information 
system would enable steel producers to master the crisis themselves. Spinelli thus 
came to the conclusion that the crisis was cyclical and not structural and that it was 
subsequently not appropriate to declare a manifest crisis (Heusden and de Horn, 
1980: 42) 
Short of establishing a crisis cartel, the EC eventually resorted to a number of indirect 
measures. The Commission set up a system of warning signals, the so-called 
'clignotants', to indicate whether action should be taken in the future. These signals 
included the level of prices, sales and imports. Moreover, the Commission resorted to 
Art. 46 (2) ECSC and introduced a voluntary forward programme which called for 
self-discipline and careful planning of production and investment decisions (L304 of 
24 December 1975). In addition, the Commission in December 1975 announced 
voluntary minimum reference prices on certain steel products (L7 of 14 January 
1976). The introduction of minimum prices was fiercely contested, not only among 
the members of the Consultative Committee, but also among the national 
governments (Agence Europe, 24.1.1976: 7). Minimum prices were principally 
welcomed by Ireland, Luxembourg and, above all, France, which intended to give 
complete freedom of action to the Commission concerning the methods for 
introducing the minimum prices. Germany and the Netherlands considered the time 
not opportune considering the emerging recovery in several sectors which in its view 
was endangered by the introduction of minimum prices. The hostility of some 
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governments reflected the opposition to any intervention by any public authorities. 
While some objections among the Member States were derived from doubts 
concerning the possibility of the Commission's checking of the effective application 
of these prices, others centred on the danger of the EC's external trade suffering 
negative repercussions. 
The threat of job losses being a serious consideration, the Commission only 
introduced statistical monitoring of imports (L344 of 10 December 1976), but no 
additional direct restraints. However, given the concern with possible US 
counteractions should the EC turn overtly protectionist, VRAs seemed to provide a 
way out of the dilemma of how to regulate exports to the EC while avoiding the 
imposition of unilateral quotas. In summer 1975, talks were held with Spain, Japan 
and Australia in an effort to persuade them to reduce their steel exports to the EC and 
in November 1975 the Commission concluded a VRA with Japanese steel exporters, 
limiting Japanese imports to the Community to 1.2m tons for 1976. As a consequence 
of the previous threat of direct export restraints, reinforced by the EC's growing 
intervention in the steel sector, this agreement seems to have provided an effective 
means of import intimidation (Walter, 1979: 172). 
On the company level, steel managers had meanwhile come to the conclusion that a 
new approach was needed. Since the European markets were highly interconnected, 
they realised that the rather loose connections between national solutions were 
insufficient to fight the crisis. Based on the so-called Rationalisierungsgruppen, the 
German producers in particular attempted to create a new international system of co- 
operation, where the input for crisis measures would come from the company level. 
The creation of transnational pressure groups at the European level can be seen as the 
result of the realisation by private interests that political power was no longer 
completely monopolised by the nation state (Tsoukalis and da Silva Ferreira, 
1980: 374). Given the divide between private and state-owned companies, however, 
they were aware from the outset that the undertaking to bring all European companies 
under one common roof was going to be extremely difficult (Spethmann, 1985: 359- 
60). In particular, French fears of a German-led cartel had to be overcome. 
Subsequently, early attempts to bring together European steel producers in the form of 
rationalisation groups had to settle first for the creation of Denelux, an association 
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compromising German and Benelux producers. One of its first actions was to ask the 
Commission to allow certain co-operation and specialisation agreements. As this was 
readily agreed, it seemed that the Commission was not hostile to the idea of 
companies entering into agreements which went as far as setting mutually acceptable 
prices (Spethmann, 1985: 368-9). Although the Commission stated objections based 
on competition rules of the ECSC Treaty from an early stage (Agence Europe, 
18.2.1976: 8), it also needed a 'interlocuteur valable' from the producer's side for the 
effective implementation of the Commission's crisis policy (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 
1987: 200; Tsoukalis and da Silva Ferreira, 1980: 360-1). Taking into account the 
possible future weight of a EC-wide steel association, the Commission therefore 
stated that it would make sure that its activity does not contribute to the formation of a 
bloc which would harm the unity of the Common market as well as the basic aims of 
the Treaty. 
This important development on the company level eventually led to the creation of 
Eurofer. In July 1976, Jaques Ferry called for a solution to the problems in a 
Community context, between equal partners' (Agence Europe, 15.7.1979: 10). 
Crucially, the organisation to be set up included the French steel industry. On 10 
December, the Council took a favourable view of the setting up of Eurofer, but set the 
condition that Eurofer was to respect the competition rules of the ECSC Treaty 
(Agence Europe, 11.12.1976: 5). While there was no implication that the members of 
Eurofer had to cease to operate on the national level, Eurofer had the task to represent 
the national steel federations on the EC-level and to co-ordinate the actions of the 
steel producers aimed at a voluntary reduction of steel capacity. To this end, the 
Commission and Eurofer agreed to make use of consultations, exchanges of 
information and all legal activities that could contribute to the balanced development 
of the Community's steel industry (Heusdens and de Horn, 1980: 49, Grunert, 1987). 
Of course, the Commission's approach of managing the crisis by means of a 
rationalisation/crisis cartel came under strong criticism (for instance Jones, 1979; 
Joliet, 1981). Yet this approach seemed to make sense given the threat of a surge of 
national protectionist measures implying a serious threat to the existence of the 
Common Market. The Commission also supported the formation of Eurofer as it 
needed it to stop the price war among European steel producers (Conrad, 1997: 88). 
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Thereafter, a 'symbiotic relationship' rapidly developed between the new association 
of steel producers and the Commission (Howell et al., 1988: 76; Grunert, 1987). In 
theory, the formation of Eurofer provided the Commission with the opportunity to 
secure industry compliance, based on its increasingly stringent market control 
directives. Although the relationship was that entirely straight forward, as can be seen 
in subsequent chapters (see section 5.2), Eurofer played an important part in shaping 
and enforcing the Commission' s measures to control the steel market. 
4.2.2 The Simonet Years (1976-77) 
After Spinelli's resignation in 1976, the industry portfolio of DG III was taken over by 
the Belgian Henri Simonet. In July 1976, the Commission declared that production 
quotas, import restrictions and minimum prices were difficult to put in practice (SEC 
(76) 2813def. of 21 July 1976). Simonet thus prepared a series of measures that were 
intended to restore normal conditions for the steel sector, covering permanent 
measures, crisis measures, relations with third countries, and regional and social 
issues. Nevertheless, the creation of a European steel policy did not only meet with 
some problems from the international plane, it also encountered more legal obstacles. 
The Commission wanted to avoid recourse to the use of Arts. 58 and 61 ECSC whilst 
obtaining the same effect, i. e. a harmonisation at EC level of the indispensable 
production reductions and the maintenance of an absolutely necessary minimum of 
prices. For such a system to work, it was important that it be given a certain binding 
or obligatory character. However, the Treaty did not provide for a half-measure 
between purely indicative recommendations and the public interventions obligatory 
for everybody. The Treaty, despite advocating in Art. 48 ECSC that the Commission 
may resort to producer associations in order to obtain information or to facilitate the 
execution of the missions entrusted to it, did not provide for the intervention of 
associations and the individual commitments by these that were envisioned at this 
time. An important step in overcoming this legalistic obstacle was taken when the 
Commission in late July 1976 issued guidelines in order to cope with the problems of 
the steel sector (SEC (76) 2813def, of 21 July 1976). 
In the so-called 'Simonet Plan', the first more or less complete proposal for a crisis 
policy was made. All measures were based on the Treaty, but the methods for their 
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implementation were to be refined and adapted more closely to the conditions of the 
market. Anti-crisis measures would be triggered off on the basis of predetermined 
indicators and quantitative regulation be achieved through the sharpening of the 
forward steel programmes and making them more compulsory in character. Moreover, 
for the event of a steel crisis, the production and delivery tonnages published for the 
markets in the forward programme, which at this stage were broken down on Member 
State level, would be transposed to the company level. It became possible to ask the 
companies to make individual commitments to the Commission in respect to the 
productions mentioned in the programme. With this set of measures, the Commission 
hoped that a harmonised reduction of production could be reached at the Community 
level in the event of a crisis, without having to resort to the cumbersome procedure of 
setting the production quotas. The crisis would therefore be handled in a sort of 
understanding supervised by the Community, with the Commission closely co- 
operating with producers, workers representatives, users, dealers, and representatives 
of the Member States. The producers were to respect the tonnages set this way, while 
the measures would be confined to the duration of the crisis. This way, there would 
not be a need to resort to Art. 95 ECSC, which presupposed the assent of the Council. 
As for relations with third countries, already determined by a growing amount of 
interaction by the major steel-producing industries, the Commission set out to join in 
common efforts made by the main steel-producing countries to find orderly solutions 
to trade problems in steel on the world level. The intention here was to avoid crisis 
situations and 'beggar thy neighbour' politics through co-ordination and co-operation 
(Heusdens and de Hom, 1980: 47). The Commission would furthermore endeavour to 
align imports from third countries with the absorption of capacities of the EC whilst 
avoiding unilateral actions, particularly from the US. 
The Simonet Plan met with split reactions as the Germans found the proposals too 
dirigiste, while the French found them not far reaching enough (Tsoukalis and 
Strauss, 1987: 200). Simonet justified his interpretation of the ECSC Treaty by 
pointing out that a cartellisation of the industry could not be ruled out in the case of 
crisis since the crisis provisions of the Treaty turned out to be inapplicable because of 
the slow and weighty procedures laid out in Arts. 58 and 61. The state of 'manifest 
crisis' meant that such a sharp deterioration in the situation that the measures in 
question could not be taken in time, i. e. when the depression in the market begins to 
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become apparent. To overcome this obstacle, the text presented by the Commission 
was placed outside the Treaty of Paris: it applied to a stage prior to a manifest crisis 
and reflected a different political attitude from that in the Treaty, which was deemed 
too rigid to meet the needs of the steel industry. The indicators to be used would not 
constitute an automatic crisis-triggering device. With respect to the compatibility of 
the new provisions to the Treaty, Simonet pointed out that the individual commitment 
of the producers vis-ý-vis the Commission to respect, in the event of a crisis, the 
recommendations on production contained in the forward programmes, were not 
prohibited by Art. 65 of the Treaty. The co-operation sought with the associations of 
steel producers aimed at a balanced and equitable application of the tonnage fixed by 
the Commission and would not constitute a delegation of power. He did admit, 
however, that the mechanism did not provide for any sanctions against those failing to 
observe it. Yet the very structure of the steel market would give reason to believe that 
its operation would be fully guaranteed by certain 'psychological pressures' and 
perhaps political pressures (Agence Europe, 24.7.1976: 11). 
Meanwhile, external events had already contributed to the growing pressure for a 
crisis mechanism of some sort within the Community. In March 1976, the US 
International Trade Commission (ITC) had ruled that imports of stainless steels 
injured domestic producers. Despite the tariff-rate quota system introduced in 1971 
(to expire at the end of September), it found that imports of these products continued 
to increase. On 16 March, President Ford called for the conclusion of bilateral 
agreements for orderly marketing. Without the conclusion of these within the 
following 90 days, the US would impose import quotas for a period of three years 
(Agence Europe, 18.3.1976: 7). While Japan was ready to negotiate with Washington 
on the terms of a VER, the Commission was opposed to the President's decision, but 
faced the problem that it had no negotiation powers as the ECSC Treaty left trade 
policy within the competence of the Member States. Hence, Japan concluded an 
agreement with the US, whereas the EC reserved the right to take retaliatory measures 
under Art. XIX of the GATT (Agence Europe, 14/15.6.1976: 9). At the GATT, the EC 
complained that Community exporters had already supplied the full quotas imposed 
by the US on speciality steel and called upon the US to dismantle the restrictions, as 
these meant that it would be practically impossible for European steel producers to 
make any further exports in the forthcoming quarter. Moreover, two more 
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troublesome developments appeared in the deterioration in the Community balance of 
steel trade with third countries and in increase in the stocks of the steel merchants. 
Together, these developments represented a considerable threat to the fragile balance 
of the weak and uncertain Community market (Agence Europe, 2.10.1976: 8). 
The steel producers were quick to request the Commission to urgently take necessary 
stringent safeguard measures and singled out Spanish and especially Japanese 
producers as causing the disruption. In Commission circles, the possibility of genuine 
protection measures was instantly dismissed since the EC as a prime exporter of 
industrial products could not depart from its basically liberal stance to international 
trade (Agence Europe, 6.10.1976: 10). The Commission therefore resorted to bilateral 
contacts and re-launched negotiations in the context of the OECD in November 1976. 
Although the results were kept secret, it emerged that the Japanese delegations were 
sympathetic to the complaints. Given the overall fragile nature of EC-Japan trade 
relations at the time 25 , the problem was not. so much a question of an agreement for 
the voluntary restriction of imports, but rather a statement of goodwill and self- 
discipline on the Common Market. In an 'atmosphere of good-will and co-operation', 
an agreement was reached that was considered satisfactory to both sides. The 
Japanese presented steel export forecasts that showed that the volume of Japanese 
imports would not exceed the 1976 level or even be on a slightly diminished level and 
welcomed the fact that threatened actions against Japanese supplies were not to be 
carried in the Community (Agence Europe, 15/16.10.1976: 6). Fearing that the EC- 
Japan agreement on steel would result in some 1.5 million tonnes of Japanese steel 
being diverted to the US, however, the US steel industry asked the President to use all 
his influence, and retaliatory measures if necessary, to make the Community and 
Japan renounce the idea of applying their agreement (Agence Europe, 10.11.1976: 8). 
Now both the EC and Japan had to deal with the threat that the US President could 
suspend all privileges granted in the GATT or other trade agreements between the US, 
Japan and the Community. 
25 At the time, the overall trade balance with Japan was regarded within the EC as highly problematic. In particular 
ship-building and non-tariff barriers impeding the penetration of the Japanese market with European products gave 
much reason for concern to Brussels and the individual member state governments. In this situation, Community 
was bracing itself for a more restrictive trade with Japan, whilst avoiding the use of unilateral measures (Agence 
Europe, 18.11.1976: 5). 
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Thus, in December 1976, the decision on the Community's anti-crisis plan was finally 
made. Having secured a positive opinion of the Consultative Committee, the 
Commission decided to apply the anti-crisis device as of 1 January 1977. Against the 
background of an abnormally low level of prices and increasing employment, the 
Commission approved a communication to the companies (L334 of 20 December 
1976) that laid down: Firstly, the obligation for steel producers to groups to send the 
Commission certain figures every month concerning their deliveries in the previous 
month. Secondly, an invitation to undersign a voluntary and confidential commitment 
to respect the rates of reduction laid down for their products and deliveries. Lastly, the 
rates of reduction planned for the various producers and groups on a confidential 
basis. The first months of the application of the mechanism were set out as being 
mainly experimental in character. The Commission urged producers to respect the 
self-restraint commitments on the basis of the reduction rates imparted to them 
because a lack of solidarity, even by a small number of companies, could seriously 
jeopardise the success of the actions taken. It indicated that non-respect would almost 
certainly result in the use of the stringent rules of the ECSC Treaty concerning a 
'manifest crisis' with all the disadvantages of procedural rigidity which this would 
entail. As the anti-crisis arrangements essentially only concerned the internal 
harmonisation of the production and delivery targets, which as the Commission 
admitted could be endangered and destabilised by an increasing import penetration, 
the Commission announced its commitment to undertake further bilateral contacts 
with the administrations of the main steel supplying countries. Hence, Simonet did not 
rule out the possibility that trade policy measures could be envisaged by the EC in the 
event where the main steel exporting countries failed to respect their commitments to 
the Common Market and where violations of the commitments compromised 
destabilising effects on the anti-crisis measures (Agence Europe, 16.12.1976: 7). 
The EC's reaction was thus cautious, or rather it had to be cautious given the ECSC 
Treaty provisions and the external pressures facing it. As the proposals on the anti- 
crisis mechanism were developed and went through the decision-making process, it 
emerged that the Commission was not only increasingly engaged in its role as an 
interlocutor between the EC and the international sphere, but also carving out its 
primacy in the internal decision-making process in implementing of the crisis 
measures. Yet government involvement in the European steel industry did its part to 
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delay adjustment in the steel industry. The scope of government intervention in the 
steel industry triggered off a process of internalised protectionist expectations, which 
moved firms further away from market adjustment and towards a plea for government 
intervention in trade (Walter, 1983: 488). Moreover, the ideological splits between the 
major Member States created considerable problems to arrive at a harmonised and 
coherent Community approach. The Commission's gradual assumption of the powers 
granted through the ECSC Treaty changed the structure of policy-making process in 
that the steel producers were increasingly incorporated and exposed a bias towards 
protectionist policy-making in the EC's steel sector. During this period, the 
Commission began to establish a mechanism to intervene in the steel sector and 
created an official framework for obtaining trade agreements on behalf of the 
European steel industries. As a result, a rather complex steel policy developed that 
combined internal arrangements, where the Commission had to rely on the co- 
operation of the Eurofer members, complemented by a series of commercial policy 
measures designed to control steel imports from third countries. 
4.2.3 Th e Da vign on Yea rs (19 7 7- 79) 
The portfolio of DG IIII was taken over by Count Etienne Davignon in January 1977. 
Davignon's arrival in office brought a quantitative and qualitative extension of the 
Community's steel policies (Grunert, 1987: 232). Favouring an interventionist 
approach to the problems of the steel industry, Davignon responded to the demands of 
the national governments and steel producers more than any Commissioner before and 
since. Moreover, sometimes labelled 'Stevie Wonder' for his ability to broker deals 
where others had failed, Davingon was a policy entrepreneur and broker par 
excellence, who provided leadership from Brussels to the whole of the industry 
(Dudley and Richardson, 1999: 234-5). 
Within the EC, national governments had come under increasing pressure from steel 
workers and trade unions. As a result, subsidy payments towards the covering of 
company losses from France, Italy and Belgium increased (Conrad, 1997: 90, Howell 
et al., 1988). As the Commission did not hold any powers in the field of controlling 
these, it became clear that the newly-appointed Davignon had to work towards a 
greater say of the Commission in the implementation and application of national 
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restructuring plans if the Community was to achieve a coherent structural policy 
(Agence Europe, 14/15.3.1977: 7). Similarly, the deteriorating situation in late 1977 
brought moves from the Member State governments to protect their national steel 
industries externally. With low priced steel imports from third countries (17 percent 
above the already high imports from the second quarter of 1977) and an imminent US 
ban against the important European steel exports (introduction of the Solomon Plan), 
the pressure for Community action increased for both the Commission and the 
Member States. Prior to this, the discussion about announcing a manifest crisis had 
come to life again. Countries such as France and Italy threatened to take national 
measures, through which the Community approach would have been greatly 
endangered, with all the political consequences thereof (Heusden and de Horn, 
1980: 57)26 . The Commission therefore decided in favour of a strategy that aimed at 
enabling as many companies as possible to survive the restructuring process, whilst 
creating conditions in which less competitive companies could restore their 
competitiveness. At the same time, Davignon acknowledged that the ECSC Treaty 
stipulated to take into account the social and regional aspects of the restructuring 
process, which made creating a framework to buffer the social consequences of 
necessary redundancies another aim of the Commission's policy (Davingon, 
1980: 512). Thus the Commission preferred to co-ordinate the restructuring in co- 
operation with the companies and the Member States, rather than leaving the 
reduction of over-capacities to market forces. According to the Commission, leaving 
the reduction of over capacity to market forces, would have resulted in an even more 
increased price war among the steel producers given the tendencies of producer's to 
wait for their competitors to reduce their capacities first (Commission 1982, SEC (82) 
1564fin: 10f). 
Aiming at reorganising the internal market and keeping it protected from the external 
world economy (Grunert, 1987: 232), Davignon gradually tightened the regulatory 
regime in the period from 1977 to 1980. As prices continued to fall it had became 
26 Davignon saw the continuation of the common market for steel as prerequisite for the future course of European 
integration. He subsequently perceived a real danger for continuation of European integration in national Member 
States' tendency to prevent the social consequences of the restructuring process by adopting national import 
restrictions and paying out subsidies. Given the severity of the steel crisis, a possible break-away of some Member 
States was a serious concern for the determination of the Commission's crisis policy. For this reason, finding a 
common solution that could include all Member States' individual interests was the ultimate objective for the 
Commission's crisis policy (Davignon, 1980). 
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clear that the Simonet Plan did not work according to plan. Price-cutting continued in 
the world export market and imports into the EC prevented producers from expanding 
their capacity utilisation. Prices collapsed rapidly, thereby triggering a fierce price war 
among producers. This involved false invoices describing low grade products that 
were in fact of a higher quality and pretending that steel quantities were to be sold 
outside the EC (thereby qualifying for discounts) and afterwards selling them within 
the EC. Moreover, Eurofer suppliers increasingly penetrated the UK market in 
apparent violation of secret penetration-ratio limits (Walter, 1979: 176) 27 . Under the 
pressure of the intra-European price war, Eurofer was difficult to hold together and 
producers refused to co-operate, while the Commission's policy proved to be 
insufficient to restore normal market conditions on the European steel market (Axt, 
1978: 183ff). 
4.2.3.1 Internal Measures 
Initially intended to buy time (Walter, 1979: 174) and ostensibly aimed at making the 
EC more competitive on world markets (Jones, 1983: 57), the first Davignon Plan 
aimed at matching EC capacity to its internal needs at higher levels of efficiency and 
to reduce the European steel industries dependency on exports, including government 
aids to developing steel-making capacity aimed directly at export markets. 
Meanwhile, however, the usual market channels of adjustment, namely determining 
the excess value of steel capacity, closing down plants and laying off redundant 
workers, were rejected as to painful politically to be bom by the Member State 
governments. Therefore, in February 1977 Davignon confirmed that the measures of 
the Simonet Plan were insufficient to bring about a recovery in the steel market. This 
required supplementary measures to be taken aimed at price recovery and the creation 
of middle-term instruments. With this Davignon introduced the idea that besides a 
better working system of market measures, an initiative should be taken in order to 
retain a modem production capacity by means of a restructuring policy on a European 
scale. The Commission's market policy should give the steel industry the breathing 
27 The developing price war in the Community also deeply affected Japan. The reduced costs at which Japan was 
able to offer steel were well below those prevalent in the US of Europe. I'lle Japanese understood very well the risk 
of a repetition of past patterns that would lead to new restrictions and were thus willing to respond to the signals - 
or specific proposals - from the US and the Community about not pushing too deeply into those markets. At one 
point, according to Diebold (1980: 109), they were even in a position of complaining that when they stuck to the 
agreed prices they were undersold by Community producers who cheated. 
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space to restructure itself. This was the first time that the Commission admitted that 
the crisis was structural and not cyclical. Using Art. 4 ECSC, which allows for 
investments grants for rationalisation and extension if at the same time excess 
capacity is scrapped, the Commission supported local restructuring efforts (Fendel, 
1981: 41). Moreover, a common policy was to be carried out in consultations with the 
unions, the producers, the Member States, and the other EC institutions. Following 
extensive consultations with the steel industry and the unions, Davignon laid before 
the Commission a packet of supplementary measures intended to preserve the unity 
and openness of the European steel market. In the Council of Ministers session on 4 
May 1977, the Member States were unable to unanimously agree to Davignon! s 
proposal. Yet the growing pressure for unilateral measures in the most seriously 
affected countries of the Community as well as the increasing opposition to 
redundancies eventually forced Germany, followed by the Benelux countries, to adopt 
the Commission's Plan (Tsoukalis and da Silva Ferreira, 1980: 361). This marked the 
beginning of the EC's direct involvement in the steel sector. 
The Davignon Plan invoked Art. 61 ECSC for the first time and set a mandatory 
minimum price for a product particularly vulnerable to price-cutting, concrete 
reinforcing bars, prohibited the introduction of new price rebates and fixed voluntary 
'guidance prices' on other steel products (L114 of 4 May 1977b, c, d). Ensuring the 
compliance of European steel producers with the measures of the Davignon Plan was 
a difficult undertaking. Already under the Simonet Plan many companies had refused 
to comply with the voluntary production quotas (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 201). 
Reinforcing bars were subjected to a system of minimum prices since voluntary 
restrictions did not work for this category (L1 14 of 5 May 1977a). These prices were 
mandatory and agreed upon by Commission and Eurofer. However, the small and 
independent producers of reinforcing bars, and especially the Bresciani of Northern 
Italy, were not members of Eurofer. Refusing to obey any voluntary restrictions, they 
were in fact expanding their production by undercutting the major steel producers 
organised in Eurofer (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 202). Since the Bresciani continued 
to ignore the Commission's decisions, it first tried the policy of the carrot by raising 
the guide prices. Since this did not work, the Commission under strong pressure from 
Eurofer tried the stick and took firms before the EJC, with the result that they were 
fined and eventually agreed to channel all their sales through a single, largely 
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Community-run, sales agency (Howell et al., 1988: 79). During 1978 and in 1979, the 
Commission brought at least 20 more cases for infringing price rules to the EJC 
(Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 202), though not all of them involved the Bresciani (for 
example, Usinor of France was fted in July 1978 for selling below agreed priceS)28. 
Yet by early 1979, price-cutting by the Bresciani had moderated (Howell, et al., 
1988: 79). 
The Davignon Plan furthermore included a voluntary agreement on production. They 
were non-binding since the Commission would have needed to declare a manifest 
crisis, which was impossible given German opposition at the time (Tsoukalis and da 
Silva Ferreira, 1980: 361). In co-operation with the Commission, voluntary delivery 
quotas and minimum prices were fixed and allocated to the individual producers. In 
order to avoid a price war among the steel producers, the Commission also supported 
the formation of price and production cartels. Eurofer was particularly useful for the 
administration of the voluntary quotas, especially as previous negotiations among the 
national organisations had not brought sufficient results. With the support of the 
Commission and the foundation of the Eurofer I cartel, a sharing key of delivery 
quotas for the Community market and the export markets was achieved (Stotz, 
1983: 55-6). Henceforth, the producers were obliged to notify the Commission of their 
deliveries, but their was no enforcement mechanism that compelled them to stick to 
the commitments vis-6-vis the Commission. 
Organising the crisis measures of the Davignon Plan involved an intensive 
administrational and organisational effort, into which the Commission was 
subsequently drawn into for the rest of the 1980s (see chapter five). Although initially 
fixed for only one product category, minimum prices and the control of them had to 
be extended to increasingly more product categories as producers started to shift their 
production into non-regulated categories. Likewise, the Commission was compelled 
to extend its controls to the steel traders. Between May 1977 and October 1979, the 
Commission subsequently conducted 181 checks of operations at producers and 
traders (Conrad, 1997: 90-1). Given the serious situation on the steel market and both 
the industry's divisions over, and dissatisfaction with, the Commission's response 
28 As Davignon tried to impose discipline among European producers by levying fines on price-cutting firms, he is 
supposed to have said'I live in a world without laws' (Diebold, 1980: 109). 
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(Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 198), it was by no means surprising that the producers 
did not adhere to the recommendations of the Commission and sold their steel below 
production costs. In fact, the producers did not even respect the recommendations of 
the Commission. Of 91 steel producers, only 50 agreed on the reductions, while 35 
producers did not answer, and 5 Italian producers disapproved of the 
recommendations. Moreover, the steel producers only insufficiently respected their 
obligation to notify the Commission of their production, delivery and export data 
(Axt, 1978: 183ff). Since the more competitive producers, such as Italy's Bresciani and 
Germany's Korf, refused to undertake voluntary production restraints, the Community 
steel industry continued an excessive price war. 
4.2.3.2 External Measures 
The control of imports was assured in the Davignon Plan by a number of measures. 
Initially, the Commission tried to control imports by introducing import licences 
which were valid for three months (Conrad, 1997: 91). The Commission also made 
efforts to increase the effectiveness of the EC anti-dumping procedures and 
negotiating bilateral agreements with the EC's main external suppliers. Several 
amendments were introduced to the EC's anti-dumping procedures (L209 of 17 
August 1977; L352 of 31 December 1977) - along the lines of the US Trigger Price 
Mechanism - in order to assure a more effective application of anti-dumping 
procedures and to use anti-dumping procedures in order to put pressure on foreign 
suppliers. 
Penetration rates of the EC market had risen from 6.0 percent in 1973 to 11.3 percent 
in 1977. The Commission's efforts to establish control on internal competition would 
clearly have failed had this influx not been stemmed (Howell, et aL 1988: 95). In order 
to secure its internal crisis measures, which would have been fatally compromised by 
an unregulated flow of imports, the Commission aspired to a comprehensive set of 
import controls to protect the producers organised in Eurofer. In view of the potential 
protectionist backlash from the US, however, the EC was forced to handle the 
situation carefully. After all, in 1977 the EC was a net-exporter of steel trying to 
recapture lost market shares in the US. Yet the EC had to avoid EC import restrictions 
having the effect that more world trade in steel was diverted into the US as this would 
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have fuelled protectionist sentiments within the US, possibly leading to import 
restrictions on EC exports to the US. For these reasons, the EC waited with the 
announcement of its basic price mechanism on I January 1978 until the US had 
introduced its trigger price mechanism (L353 of 31 December 1977; Jones, 1983: 61). 
The EC thus avoided retaliatory action by waiting for the US to take the first step. 
Additionally, EC policy-makers were in a position to model their basic price 
mechanism on the American 'original' for their own purposes. Given the internal and 
external constraints of the Commission in its attempts to regulate the steel sector, the 
general shortage of ideas for politically and legally viable policy-instruments to deal 
with the steel industry's problems, the copying of the US move appears to have been 
the best possible policy alternative for the Commission at the time (Jones, 1983: 62). 
Thereafter, EC producers filed a large number of anti-dumping complaints with the 
Commission upon the implementation of the basic price mechanism on I January 
1978 (Agence Europe, 2.1.1978: 4) and within a few months detailed VRAs were 
agreed with the EC's main steel suppliers (see table 9 in the appendix). While EFTA 
producers negotiated amicable voluntary restraint agreements and did not receive anti- 
dumping fines, the persuasive power of these fines brought Japan, South Africa, 
Czechoslovakia and Spain to the negotiation table within a few months (Lowenfeld, 
1979: 292). More stubborn suppliers, such as Hungary, Romania, Poland, Australia 
and South Korea, were the last to eventually yield to the threat of definitive anti- 
dumping fines and concluded VRAs. In return for the VRAs, the Commission granted 
the signatories a penetration margin of 6 percent under the internal prices and 
European steel producers were prohibited from aligning their prices to imports from 
countries that had entered a VRA. Under the threat of anti-dumping procedures, 15 
countries agreed in 1978 to restrict their exports to the EC to levels set by the 
Commission (Conrad, 1997: 93, Howell et al., 1988: 79). In addition, within the OECD 
Permanent Steel Committee, the EC as well as Japan expressed their favour for 
organised trade through price controls and agreed market shares in international trade. 
Yet progress was marred by major differences of view as to the desirability. of 
quantitative shares to various steel markets, with the US taking a decidedly negative 
stand (Walter, 1979: 184-6). 
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Overall, the Commission through the establishment of basic price mechanism and its 
deterrence potential successfully managed to regulate steel imports to the EC at fixed 
levels. Thus the basic price mechanism also achieved its aim of protecting the 
members of Eurofer from foreign competition. The Commission regarded the import 
system as a success, although individual Member States have sometimes taken a less 
sanguine view (Howell, et al., 1988: 97). The agreements were re-negotiated annually, 
upon mandate from the Council to the Commission, and the system as a whole 
continued in operation up until 1988. Overall, imports to the EC have been 
substantially reduced through the system and all parties agreed that the success of the 
import controls was essential to the continued functioning of the Community cartel 
(Howell, et al., 1988: 98). Chapter six investigates the EC's external relations during 
the 1980s and focuses strongly on the steel conflict with the US. Given this focus, the 
regulation of imports receives less attention in chapter six, which makes it appropriate 
to reflect a little further on the impact of import regulation at this stage. 
The imposed external measures did not reflect the shifting patterns of international 
competitiveness and were destined to contribute to a delay of the necessary 
restructuring process in the EC steel sector (Tsoukalis and da Silva Ferreira, 
1980: 364). Furthermore, as concerns the imports from Japan, it has to be questioned 
whether the Community was able to keep imports under control since declining 
imports from Japan had more to do with Japanese rationalisation and less with EC 
measures (Shepperd, 1982; Abegglen, 1982). An additional Point against the 
effectiveness of EC external measures can be found in the argument that it was the 
very low level of prices in the EC that kept foreign suppliers out of the market. Yet by 
subjecting steel to investigations of 'fair value', trade authorities in both US and EC 
reduced the politically volatile issue of protectionism to a technical question of guilt 
under existing trade laws. This allowed policy-makers not only to achieve a relatively 
low profile, but also greater flexibility in targeting restrictions than conventional, non- 
discriminatory import barriers would have had (Jones, 1983: 64). Through selective 
enforcement, the setting of 'fair value' prices and negotiated export quotes, these 
policies enabled the EC to target the most disruptive suppliers or those least likely to 
retaliate. 
163 
Despite its initial success in controlling imports to the EC, the system of induced 
export restraints was nonetheless unable to revive the EC steel industry. In 1979, 
internal demand remained in a slump and capacity utilisation did not surpass 65 
percent. Moreover, faced with losses and lay-offs in their national steel industries and 
stable import penetration as a result of the EC's external protection, some Member 
States, i. e. France and Belgium, resorted to subjecting steel companies to national 
control, with the result that 50 percent of the EC steel industry was thereafter under 
state control (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 206). The diverse market structure of the 
EC steel industry continued to prevent Eurofer from maintaining market discipline 
and co-operation within Eurofer remained difficult to achieve. In particular, the 
reference prices and even mandatory minimum prices defied effective enforcement of 
the crisis cartel (Jones, 1983: 66). The argument that the EC was able to alleviate the 
pressures of the crisis through effectively controlling imports therefore needs to be 
carefully considered. 
4.2.3.3 Extensions of the Davignon Plan 1977-79 
Although the system of minimum prices initially seemed to work successfully, the 
fixing of prices did not extend to production quantities. Since the measures taken 
concentrated on the market and the trading side of the industry, one cannot talk of an 
active structural policy of the Commission (Grunert, 1987: 233). The slow up-turn in 
the business cycle of the steel industry after 1977 then had the effect that prices rose, 
but also brought an incentive for producers to extend their production and 
consequently to undermine the system of minimum prices (see above paragraph on 
the Bresciani; also Conrad, 1997: 91: Howell et al., 1988, Tsoukalis and Strauss, 
1987). 
In March 1977, the Commission extended the crisis measures and allocated delivery 
quotas directly to the producers. Aiming at the reduction of production capacities and 
modernising production facilities, the Commission now concluded bilateral 
agreements between the Commission and the individual producers. Yet the terms of 
the agreements continued to be of a non-binding nature and based on so-called 
orientations. In order to make the producers follow these orientations, the 
Commission relied on Eurofer' ability to make its members adhere to the orientations 
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(Conrad, 1998: 89; Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 201). In 1978, the Commission 
consolidated and extended voluntary delivery quotas for the home market and 
obligatory minimum prices. In addition, it recommended prices for various product 
categories and produced regulations for external protection. The basic price 
mechanism was applied to new products (L126 of 13 May 1978) and minimum and 
recommended prices were adjusted several times in order to stabilise the profits of 
firms (L87 of I April 1978; L176 of 30 June 1978; L370 of 30 December 1978). 
Moreover, aiming at the establishment of a binding system of information, new moves 
were made in the field of restructuring and production control. Also in 1978, the 
Commission set up a system of consultation and communication between 
governments, firms and industrial federations in the steel sector, which went beyond 
the scope of the ECSC Treaty. The Commission not only organised ad-hoc meetings, 
but also more formal ones, such as the committee of high officials with 
responsibilities for industrial policies (ministerial civil servants and Commission 
officials), the task force for internal co-ordination between DGs, the liaison committee 
for the harmonisation of foreign trade strategy between the Commission and national 
representatives, and the 'monitoring group' of DG HI and Eurofer which had the task 
of keeping the major producers to the agreed delivery quotas (Grunert, 1987: 234). 
Although the year 1978 was marked by the largely successful implementation of crisis 
measures taken by the Commission during the previous year, the Commissiods 
success in introducing a binding system of control and harmonisation of national aids 
remained as uncertain as its attempts to achieve capacity cuts (Fendel, 1981: 450ff). In 
fact, the general economic recovery in 1978-79 was largely responsible for the 
improvement in the steel market (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 204). Thus market 
recovery was a consequence of external factors and the fact that the whole system 
collapsed in 1980 testifies to the ineffectiveness of the Davignon Plan. However, the 
Commission needs to attributed with at least some credit for its attempts to guide the 
steel sector and to exercise a leadership role in agreeing prices and quotas. It must be 
deemed impossible for Eurofer to arrive at prices and production quotas without the 
crucial role played by the Commission in this process (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 
1987: 204). Although the Commission was constantly criticised to be indecisive, it 
demonstrated that it could play an important role in a system of collective restraints 
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on competition (Howell et al., 1988: 78-9). Moreover, although the Commission was 
forced to give its blessing to open-ended subsidies, such as those in the UK and Italy, 
the Commission was not entirely powerless vis-a-vis the national governments and 
steel producers. The EC had some real influence on investment decisions as the 
Community's contribution to total investment in the steel industry in 1977 accounted 
to over 20 percent in addition to other forms of assistance coming from various 
Community Funds (Tsoukalis and da Silva Ferreira, 1980: 363). 1978 was hence the 
year in which the Commission developed into a relevant industrial-political actor in 
functional and institutional terms (Grunert, 1987: 234). 
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Conclusions 
The EC did not get actively (directly) involved with policy-making in the steel sector 
before 1975, but thereafter a qualitative and quantitative change in the involvement of 
European institutions in the management of the ECSC can be observed. The EC 
experienced enormous difficulties in making the transition from trade liberalisation to 
the forms of joint economic management that were required in the face of the steel 
crisis that began to grip the steel sector during the 1970s. During the years from 1975 
to 1979, characterised by a steadily deteriorating situation on the steel market, a 
burgeoning price war among European producers, and increasing import penetration, 
the importance of the ECSC gradually increased. Given the concentration of 
Community activity on the liberalisation of steel trade during the early years, the 
predominance of national forms of protectionism over supranational ones, and the 
absence of Community structures to negotiate and administer sectoral trade 
agreements, the EC's gradually assumed its responsibilities. In the wake of 
considerable pressure from steel producers and growing protectionist sentiments 
across the Member States from 1975 onwards, the Commission nevertheless gradually 
emerged as an interlocutor on the international level and mediator within the EC. . 
However, the Commission under Commissioner Spinelli only hesitantly set the 
precedent for supranational regulation of the steel industry. Initially, it was felt that as 
little as possible ought to be done to change the existing framework that had been 
operated for two decades. Since an increased EC involvement ran up against problems 
such as ideological differences among the Member States, existing competition policy 
provisions, the prospect of having to co-ordinate internal preferences under 
consideration of diverse and fragmented national steel markets, the Commission under 
Spinelli gave preference to indirect and voluntary measures. The process of agreeing 
these was facilitated by the worsening situation in the steel sector, which suggested 
the use of the crisis instruments that ECSC Treaty attached to the steel sector. Adding 
to the complexity of agreeing crisis measures was the fact that these had to be 
developed under consideration of the important external constraints of having to avoid 
an overtly protectionist stance in view of US protectionist/unilateralist sentiments and 
simultaneous GATT commitments. This resulted in a preference and set a precedent 
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for the use of orderly market arrangements in order to regulate international steel 
trade. 
When it became apparent that the stopgap measures adopted under Commissioner 
Spinelli did not work, one important problem that had to be overcome in intensifying 
the crisis measures was that the ECSC Treaty did not allow for half-measure between 
purely indicative recommendations and obligatory Art. 58 measures. Another problem 
was that the Treaty did not provide for the intervention of associations and individual 
commitments by these. The crisis measures were therefore carefully re-defined under 
Commissioner Simonet and placed outside the ECSC Treaty. In order to avoid the 
disturbance of the internal balance of power that the intensified measures implied, the 
Simonet Plan was designed to work on the basis of mutual understanding between the 
affected parties (Member States, steel producers, dealers, workers). An appeal was 
made for solidarity as there was no enforcement mechanism and a fear that the market 
situation would worsen should the Simonet Plan fail. The external measures of the 
Simonet Plan reflected the absence of negotiation powers on part of the Commission 
and were derived under pressure by the US. Hence, the Commission resorted to 
GATT and OECD proceedings against US measures as it was keen not to leave its 
basically liberal stance on international steel trade. In addition, the Commission joined 
steel producers attempts to arrive at orderly market arrangements and assumed 
bilateral contacts with countries whose exports affected the fragile balance of the 
internal steel market. 
Yet it was under Commissioner Davignon that the Commission turned into a relevant 
industrial-political actor. It could be debated whether it was ECSC powers or the 
needs of the moment that enabled Davignon to extent the Commission's influence. He 
was leading and partly shaping a process by which the Commission, the national 
governments, and especially the steel producers, nationalised or private, were trying 
to deal with the recession. Moreover, whether all were agreed that they should also 
work toward a more lasting adjustment is less clear, especially if it meant a 
contraction of the industry. Nonetheless, with close public supervision and indeed 
leadership the Commission tried to raise prices while keeping production as high as 
possible in order to give the industry the best return possible under the circumstances. 
Of course, the allocation of burdens and benefits among companies and countries was 
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by no means easy as the structure of European steel industries remained highly 
fragmented and the industry, while generally welcoming Davignon's approach, was 
tempted to gain a larger share of the market by cutting its prices, thereby undermining 
the Community approach. 
The chances for success for the necessary restructuring of the European steel industry 
were therefore essentially limited and uncertain from the outset. Afler all, 
restructuring measures were based on non-binding agreements between the 
Commission and producers, relied on co-ordination and co-operation between the 
members of Eurofer, and had to be taken under conditions of cut-throat competition 
between European steel producers, between which solidarity was elusive. 
Furthermore, the beginning of a large scale subsidisation of national steel producers, 
against which the Commission was powerless, shows that the national industries 
looked more to their own governments than to the Community on these matters. It 
was thus the powers derived from the ECSC Treaty that had to be wielded by 
Davignon in the late 1970s as he tried to get the Community steel producers to adopt 
measures to cope with recession and then bring about structural change. 
Consequently, there was more support for the Commission's efforts to control imports 
of foreign steel. The external measures adopted under Davignon (and Simonet) 
generally reflected the need not to upset the US and its steel producers and a desire to 
maintain a basically liberal approach to international steel trade within international 
fora. Subsequently, measures in this area were modelled along US lines of trade 
protection, whereas the rest of the steel suppliers to the Community were subjected to 
a system of VRAs. In general, it becomes apparent that pressures derived from 
international trade developments, in particular the growing readiness of the US to 
resort to more protectionist measures, contributed to the process of defining the EC's 
anti-crisis policy and increased the readiness to agree to Community crisis measures. 
However, problems to activate these derived from the diverging needs and structures 
of the diverse national steel industries, the Member States' preferences for either a 
more dirigiste or a more laissez-faire application of the crisis measures, the 
peculiarities of the ECSC Treaty, and the problem of establishing a consensus among 
the European steel producers. As far as external measures are concerned, however, it 
can be concluded that despite the limitation of not having a negotiation mandate the 
I- 
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measures taken by the Commission were comprehensive and effective. With the 
exception of the US, the EC managed to force all main suppliers to reduce their 
imports to the EC by concluding self-restraint agreements. In order to achieve this, the 
EC made elaborate use of anti-dumping legislation and used the scope for action these 
provide in order to establish a comprehensive and regulated import system. Yet, as it 
has been indicated in this chapter and will be seen in subsequent chapters, the 
effectiveness of the EC's management of the steel crisis depends to a great extent on 
the coherence of external and internal measures. 
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EVALUATION PART 11: STRATEGIC ACTION IN STEEL FROM THE 
1950s TO THE LATE 1970s 
Looking back at this first part as a whole, it is perhaps appropriate to refer to the case 
of the EC between the 1950s and the late 1970s as an 'infant strategic actor'. The first 
point to make here is clearly that in the case of EC crisis policy in steel the decisive 
thrust for the development of the EC into a relevant industrial-political actor came as 
a consequence of a mix of interwoven external and internal factors relating to market 
developments, and not as a consequence of a designed and planned process that goes 
back to the establishment of the ECSC. When the need for an active Community 
approach became apparent, the strong location of steel within national structures, 
structural differences between national steel markets, ideological differences among 
Member States concerning crisis measures and methods, and the Commission's 
considerations concerning the balance of power within the Community all acted as a 
break to the development of an active, comprehensive strategy. As the EC had to 
undergo a complex process of developing action capacities in the field of steel policy- 
making in the late 1970s, it is thus justified to characterise strategic action capacities 
during the period of investigation as mostly reactive. 
It is helpful to distinguish between strategic action relating to the setting of a 
Community framework and strategic action relating to specific measures designed and 
implemented to deal with external and internal challenges arising in the context of 
steel market developments. As for the first, it has to be stressed that the ECSC Treaty 
had already established the broad institutional framework for strategic action on the 
EC level via the establishment of EC institutions and provided the EC with powerful 
economic instruments to achieve its internally-generated objectives. It was therefore 
'merely' a matter of activation and refinement of EC structures and instruments that 
had to be achieved. As this part showed, however, despite the supra-national fervour 
and the recognition of mutual interests and interdependence that helped in the 
establishment of the ECSC, the transition from national to supranational regulation of 
an strategically important industry like steel was complex and contested, especially as 
it touched heavily on the issue of national power and sovereignty. Here, Member State 
differences concerning the choice and extent of methods and the divide between 
privately-organised and state-owned steel industries within Member States were 
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important obstacles in agreeing a Community approach. Given these divides, 
establishing Community measures was hindered by the strong position of the Council 
of Ministers in the decision-making process. Since the Council of Ministers has the 
final say in important decisions, the fact that steel producers themselves favoured a 
Community approach did not facilitate the establishment of an effective Community 
framework to the problems of the steel industry. 
The slow development of a Community framework for strategic action in the steel 
sector is also a consequence of the contradictions inherent in the ECSC Treaty. 
Firstly, the Treaty had contributed to the creation of national champions and strong 
ties between national steel producers and governments through investment links. This 
re-enforced the nationalised structure of the EC steel industry despite the existence of 
a Common Market in steel and ultimately caused problems to arrive at a Community 
approach. Secondly, the Treaty did not provide for half measure between indicative 
and obligatory regulation. In the absence of a general recognition that a Con-ununity 
approach was needed to tackle the structural problems of the steel industry, which 
would have facilitated the design of a Community approach, and given a general 
preference for national measures across the EC, crisis measures had to be developed 
that stopped short of activating the most powerful instruments available to the ECSC. 
Moreover, competition policy provisions contained in the ECSC Treaty complicated 
the establishment of a Community mechanism for the restructuring as Art. 65 ECSC 
had to be circumvented in order to achieve a harmonisation of EC production. Given 
the cut-throat conditions on European steel markets, establishing a harmonisation of 
production on the EC-level by the means of voluntary production agreements between 
the Commission and producers was extremely difficult. In terms of institutional and 
decision-making capacity, the Community was therefore essentially underdeveloped 
and ill-prepared to act. 
Moreover, the development of a Community framework was shaped by external 
factors. The single most important factor was without doubt the predominant position 
of the US in the international system. The overall political and economic importance 
of the US in Europe, international institutions and the wider world economy, as well 
as the associated thrust for trade liberalisation and free trade, had to be taken into 
account when the EC began to shape its response and contributed to the essentially 
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limited preparedness of Member States and Commission to resort to the more dirigiste 
ECSC measures. Specifically relating to steel trade, and considering the export 
dependency of the European steel industry, the condition of the US steel market and 
the protectionist attitudes on part of the US steel producers were important factors that 
shaped the Community's response to the steel crisis (chapters six and eight further 
detail how these came to bear on EC steel policies). In addition, the Community 
developed its approach in the wider context of the GATT/OECD. Sticking to its 
basically liberal stance on international steel trade, the Commission not only 
attempted to find solutions to the steel problem within these frameworks, but also to 
utilise these for the defence of the ECs steel producers. On the whole, the 
development of the EC's action capacities during these years was therefore embedded 
in and conformed with its international obligations. 
The difficulties involved in developing a Community framework for strategic action 
shaped and limited the choice of specific actions. External and internal crisis measures 
since Commissioner Spinelli reflected the limited powers of the Commission. As a 
result, internal measures were based on voluntary agreements, which, given the 
seriousness of the situation on the Community steel market and the powerlessness of 
the Commission vis-ý-vis the Member States in the area of subsidisation, were bound 
to be largely ineffective (with the exception of investment decisions). The hesitant 
attitude towards Community measures on the part of Commissioner Spinelli (and to 
some extent of Commissioner Simonet) did not facilitate the design of effective crisis 
measures. Under Davignon, for either his personality or the persistence of the steel 
crisis and its social and regional effects, the Commission was able to develop a more 
assertive stance in terms of crisis measures. Yet the complexities involved in 
establishing a supranational approach to the problems of the European steel industry 
reflected into the choice and effectiveness of crisis measures. As a result, measures 
aimed at stabilising the common steel market were highly contested, undermined by 
the behaviour of the producers on the markets and the political behaviour of the 
national governments, and limited their effectiveness. 
As for external crisis measures, the Commission enjoyed relatively more scope for 
action as it was much easier to find support for these from both industry and Member 
States. Hence, the Community succeeded in refining its system of external protection 
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by establishing a system of 'voluntary' export restraints with the major steel suppliers 
under the threat of sharpened anti-dumping action. US predominance was a decisive 
factor in shaping the EC's actions. The Commission had to consider the importance of 
the US steel market as an export outlet, avoid a redirection of steel imports to the US 
and be mindful of overall US free trade interest. Given the shortage of legally viable 
policy options and the need to keep a relatively low profile concerning the politically 
volatile issue of protectionism, the Commission thus modelled its prix de base system 
on the US TPM and waited for the US to take the first step towards an active trade 
protection. It accompanied these steps by parallel initiatives within the OECD. 
Leaving the effectiveness of external measures aside, it is therefore justified to 
conclude that EC's external strategic action capacities were developed faster and made 
more comprehensive in scope. 
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PART III: STRATEGIC ACTION IN STEEL IN THE 1980s 
In part IIII, the thesis turns to EC policy-making in steel during the 1980s. Against the 
background of a worsening of the steel crisis at the beginning of 1980, the 
Commission in October declared a manifest crisis and activated the far-reaching crisis 
measures contained in Art. 58 ECSC. After the analysis of the gradual development of 
the Commission into a relevant industrial-political actor in the context of complex and 
interconnected external and internal factors and developments, from here on the thesis 
establishes a distinction between internal and external actions taken by the 
Community. Following on from the internal crisis measures devised by Commissioner 
Davignon in the late 1970s, the present chapter focuses especially on the internal 
aspects of the EC policy process in steel during the 1980s. In contrast, though 
departing from the same point in time, chapter six pursues a focus on the external 
measures taken by the Community in the context of the 1980s EC-US steel dispute as 
well as in the wider GATT context. The part concludes with an evaluation on the 
EC's strategic action capacities during the 1980s. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: INTERNAL POLICY-MAIUNG IN STEEL IN THE 1980s 
Introduction 
Hitherto, the thesis has explored the gradual development of EC crisis measures, the 
increasing involvement of the Commission in the management of the steel sector 
under successive Commissioners and the complex and interwoven internal and 
external factors influential upon this process. In this chapter, we are concerned with 
the further refinement of internal measures aimed at the steel sector and in particular 
the transition from indirect measures to direct measures based on the activation of Art. 
58 ECSC. In this context, the present chapter will explore two main strands of EC 
activity: Firstly, the continuation of internal crisis measures aimed at the regulation of 
the EC's steel market by establishing and maintaining a system of production quotas. 
And secondly, the EC's efforts aimed at bringing about a restructuring of the 
European steel industry by bringing under the burgeoning subsidisation of steel 
national producers. In the last section, analysis turns to the Commission's attempts to 
retreat from the direct management of the steel sector in the second half of the 1980s. 
5.1 Landscape of the Steel Industry in the 1980s 
From 1977 to 1979, the system established by Davignon had been progressively 
strengthened and functioned reasonably well in 1978 and 1979. Following the slight 
economic upturn 1977-80, the situation on the EC's steel market improved and the 
measures that had been taken in 1978 were merely retained and not extended in 1979. 
After prices rose above orientation prices in 1979, the Commission was able to 
propose to abolish most of the system of minimum prices as of 1 January 1980. The 
Council of Ministers accepted the Commission's proposals and, after pressure from 
Germany, declared itself in favour of a code on subsidies (Agence Europe, 
10.11.1979: 4). Furthermore, the Commission asked Eurofer to take concrete steps 
towards the reduction of capacity, but the gradual stabilisation of the market and 
differences in national interests prevented progress on this matter (Grunert, 
1987: 234). Notwithstanding, the Commission had progressively assumed the role of 
the administering authority of a Community-wide steel cartel (Howell et al., 1988: 72) 
and performed an important role in setting up a framework for the regulation of the 
steel industry. Although the first measures were of an emergency nature, many of 
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them became institutionalised and proved politically difficult to phase out, especially 
after the crisis worsened during the early 1980s. 
Despite the measures taken by Davignon and the Commission in the late 1970s and 
the slight recovery in steel demand, capacity utilisation rates nevertheless sank in the 
course of 1980. In summer 1980, US steel producers started anti-dumping actions 
against the Community, which caused a sharp fall in EC exports to the US. In 
addition, steel demand in the auto and construction industries also fell sharply 
(Howell et al., 1988: 80). As a major surplus in steel developed, European steel 
producers struggled for market shares, including wide-spread attempts to maintain 
sales volumes through price discounting 29 . In August and September, producers 
started to indicate that they were not interested in following the Commission's policy 
anymore and with the collapse of the voluntary agreements on prices and production 
quotas in the third quarter of 1980, Eurofer collapsed (Schaal, 1985: 41), mainly 
because the German producer Kl6ckner felt that the Eurofer had outgrown its 
usefulness and refused to tie itself what it considered were measures propping up the 
weakest (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 203). It became evident that the original 
voluntary measures of the Davingnon plan had no lasting effect. 
Following various attempts to restore the consensus among Eurofer members, which 
failed mainly due to opposition from German producers, Davignon felt that the 
Commission had no option but to invoke Art. 58 ECSC. The Commission had come 
to the conclusion that the indirect measures of the ECSC Treaty that it had applied up 
until this point were insufficient to reintroduce stability into the steel market while 
undertaking a simultaneous restructuring process (SEC (82)1564fin. of 29 October 
1982: 4). It felt that it had no choice but to activate the provisions of Art. 58 ECSC 
since it was unwilling to sacrifice the restructuring programme to cut-throat 
competition within the European steel industry (MUller, Loeber and Dey, 1983: 194). 
29 Davignon saw this as a'senseless, self-destroying battle! and called upon European steel producers to learn from 
Japan, where overproduction had been swiftly reduced by a close consensus between all parties concerned (Howell 
el al., 1988: 80). 
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5.2. EC Market Regulation in the 1980s 
The Commission had thus arrived at the opinion that the excess capacities could not 
be brought down by the means of indirect market-controlling instruments. By the 
means of a production quota system, minimum prices and import restrictions, it 
intended to temporarily unhinge the market forces on the Common steel market and to 
co-ordinate the market policies of the steel companies. Given the tendency of the 
producer to wait for their competitors to reduce their capacities first, the Commission 
concluded that leaving the reduction of over-capacity to market forces would have 
resulted in an even more increased price war on the steel markets (SEC (82) 1564fin 
of 29 October 1982: 5). On 6 October 1980, the Commission declared a 'manifest 
crisis' in the steel sector and approached the Council of Ministers for approval of the 
introduction of a system of production quotas based on Art. 58 ECSC. Vniffe eight 
Member States were ready to follow the Commission's proposal, the German 
delegation insisted on referring back to the German government (Milller, Loeber and 
Dey, 1983: 194; Grunert, 1987: 274)30. Likewise, on 16 October the Consultative 
Committee agreed to the proposal with the exemption of the German members. The 
Commission immediately started its preparations for the quota system by obliging 
steel producers to notify the Commission daily of their production figures for the 
month of October and announced that October would be fully included in the 
production quotas for the fourth quarter. Yet the process of fixing production quotas 
was interrupted by the German request for an emergency session of the Council of 
Ministers. In the Council of Ministers, Germany found itself isolated as eight Member 
States were willing to go ahead, with Italy remaining rather apprehensive at least so in 
the beginning. On 22 October, the German delegates demanded additional 
information and some amendments to the regulation of the quotas. After the Council 
members agreed to the changes proposed by the Germans, the Council was able to 
agree unanimously to activate Art. 58 ECSC on 30. October 1980. The fear of being 
politically-isolated, the need for a common European solution in order to preserve the 
common European steel market, which was of great importance to the German 
industry, and the growing financial losses of German steel producers eventually seem 
to have zipped the balance and the Gennan government accepted the Commission's 
proposal (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 211; MUller, Loeber and Dey, 1983). In co- 
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ordination with Eurofer, the Commission now introduced mandatory production 
quotas that affected about four-fifths of the EC's steel production (Howell et al., 
1985: 81). The introduction of the quota system was accompanied by a significant 
degree of bureaucratic expansion, in the course of which the staff of DG HI rose 
quickly from 20 to 30 to over 100 (Dudley and Richardson, 1999: 235). 
5.2.1 The System ofProduction Quotas 
Within the framework of the production quota system (L291 of 31 October 1980), the 
Commission fixed the quantity of steel that companies were allowed to produce on an 
annual basis. Mandatory quotas were introduced for coil and coated sheets, flat plate, 
heavy mouldings and light mouldings. Delivery quotas fixed the quantity of steel per 
product category that producers were allowed to sell within the EC. The remaining 
quantities were to be sold outside the EC. Companies were obliged to notify the 
Commission of their production and deliveries on a monthly basis. In order to ensure 
compliance with the allocated quotas and on instances when producers refused to give 
the required information on production and deliveries, the Commission had the right 
to impose fines on those producers who exceeded their allocated quotas (Art. 47 
ECSQ. In order to achieve the necessary capacity cuts, the Commission decided on 
cuts in production on a quarterly basis, but the producers had the option to exceed 
individual product quotas by a3 percent margin as long as they produced less than the 
sum of all product-specific quotas. Another element of flexibility was introduced with 
the option for producers to transfer up to 50 percent of those quotas not fully used into 
the next quarter. 
As it was not possible to terminate the crisis measures in 1981 and 1982, the 
Commission successively reintroduced compulsory quotas for a further 12 months. 
Import restrictions signed in 1981 with 14 major supplier countries included a 
reduction of 15 percent compared with quotas in 1980. These measures eventually 
resulted in an even bigger fall in steel imports to the EC in 198 1. The strengthening of 
both internal and external measures since the worsening of the crisis in 1980 was 
coupled with a renewed emphasis on restructuring and with wider powers exercised 
30 For a very detailed account of the decision-making processes that led to the activation of Art. 58, and especially 
the German position, see Grunert (1987: 274-92). 
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by the Commission on state aids and new investments. The decline in prices was 
finally arrested and was followed by successive price increases during the second half 
of 1981 and early 1982. Demand, on the other hand, continued to decline. The 
Commission was forced to introduce a further reduction of quotas in the fourth quarter 
of 1982. Previously, the Council had again empowered the Commission to issue 
legally-binding decisions in accordance with the ECSC Treaty and the compulsory 
production quotas by now covered almost the entire steel production (Tsoukalis and 
Strauss, 1987: 211-13; Howell, et aL 1988). 
In 1984, the Commission was forced to re-introduce minimum prices until 1985. The 
Commission aimed at helping the European steel producers that had suffered from 
another price collapse by raising minimum prices step by step (L373 of 31 December 
1983). With the higher prices, the producers were expected to finance their 
restructuring measures themselves. In order to impose fines on producers who 
undermined the system of minimum prices, the Commission ordered producers to pay 
a deposit to the Commission. However, producers offered their steel products at 
below minimum prices yet again (Commission, 1985: 110). Furthermore, the process 
of annual bargaining on quotas, a'game of bluff and counterbluff, remained an issue 
of high political salience for most of the 1980s, with its outcomes dictated by criteria 
that had little to do with efficiency (Rhodes, 1989: 76). Between 1984 and 1988, 
disagreements between producers and national governments created a stalemate in EC 
decision-making, which cost the Commission some credibility as its bluffs were 
always called. The stabilisation of the Community steel market was eventually 
achieved after the steel market experienced an up-tum in the course of 1984. While 
minimum prices remained in force, the Commission increasingly came to represent 
the interests of the Community's steel industry in the field of foreign trade (see 
chapter six). This role of the Commission was paralleled by the considerable 
responsibility the Commission assumed in financing and controlling restructuring 
measures and in deciding the shape of a new steel industry (Granert, 1987: 239; 
Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987). 
5.2.1.1 Enforcement Problems of the Quota System 
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The system of production quotas relied on the principle of proportional sacrifices of 
all Community steel producers. Since the Commission fixed quotas not on the basis of 
productivity or competitiveness, but on past production and deliveries, European steel 
producers were called upon to comply with the quotas in the spirit of 'European 
solidarity'. Davignon stressed that the success of the restructuring process depended 
on the sacrifices of all European steel companies (Davignon, 1980: 508ff). 
Concerned with a possible break-up of the EC's internal steel market in the face of a 
worsening market situation, he justified the temporary suspension of competitive 
advantages for some European producers by the need to maintain the competitiveness 
of those more affected by restructuring measures. Moreover, Davignon also saw the 
continuation of the common market for steel as prerequisite for the future course of 
European integration. He subsequently perceived Member States' tendency to prevent 
the social consequences of the restructuring process by adopting national import 
restrictions and paying out subsidies as a real danger for the continuation of European 
integration. Given the severity of the steel crisis, a possible break-away of some 
Member States was a serious concern for the determination of the Commission's crisis 
policy. For this reason, finding a common solution that could include all Member 
States' individual interests was the ultimate objective for the Commission's crisis 
policy. The Commission therefore decided in favour of a strategy that aimed at 
enabling as many companies as possible to survive the restructuring process, whilst 
creating conditions in which less competitive companies could restore their 
competitiveness. 
The effective operation of a system of mandatory production quotas depends also to a 
great extent on the accuracy of market forecasts. In this respect, the Commission was 
dependent on the co-operation of the steel producers. Since the producers had an 
inherent interest in cheating and undermining the quota system in order to gain a 
better share of the market for themselves, however, the Commission was bound to 
encounter severe problems in achieving capacity reductions (Wienert, 1993a: 149). 
Moreover, as the system of production quotas developed its own dynamic (Wienert, 
1990: 210; Conrad, 1997: 99), the problems the Commission encountered in enforcing 
capacity reductions were subsequently essentially the same as with the system of 
voluntary production restraints. 
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The Commission initially expected the measures to ran for a few months. Yet the 
system not only had to be extended to over eight years, but over time also had to be 
extended to more and more product categories. It faced an extremely intensive 
organisational effort in allocating and administering company-specific production 
quotas. This was complicated by steel producers' attempts to influence the allocation 
of their specific quotas, which resulted in numerous exceptions to the system and 
increasing problems to ensuring the operationalisation of the system. The Commission 
was forced to employ 100 additional inspectors (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 212) and 
consistently had to impose fines on producers that had exceeded their quotas. Former 
Commission officials also concede that the Commission was unable to effectively 
administer the system given its administrational burdens (Conrad, 1997: 101). In 
addition, the Commission was dependent upon the administrative help of the national 
governments, which in the light of the severe situation on the steel markets was not 
forthcoming. Albeit, there still was a big difference between imposing fines and their 
final payments as producers who were penalised had the right to go to the EJC. 
Though the Commission showed some resolve to make the quota system work by 
imposing heavy fines companies like Kl6ckner (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1985: 218), the 
ECJ in its rulings amended some of the quotas and lowered some of the fines imposed 
by the Commission. Although the situation had hardly improved by the end of 1982, 
nearly all parties concerned recognised that the crisis measures on 1982 were a step 
into the right direction. Despite criticism from all sides and the many inadequacies of 
the dirigiste arrangements, a tacit agreement seemed to have emerged that there was 
no alternative to the system put into operation (Grunert, 1987: 240). 
5.2.1.2 Co-operation with and within Eurofer 
Both the size of the EC steel industry under direct state control (mainly France and 
Belgium) and the links between steel producers and national governments had 
increased considerably in the course of the crisis (M6ny and Wright, 1987: 23-32). To 
optimise their chances of success, steel producers lobbied intensively (individually 
and collectively through national steel associations) on both the national and the EC 
level. Through their national governments they brought pressure to bear on the 
Council of Ministers. In their direct interactions with the Commission, steel producers 
operated through Eurofer (and EISA in the case of smaller producers). While the 
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Conunission did not have the effective means to enforce its decisions, it could draw 
on its position as arbiter and mediator among different corporate and national 
interests, which in the case of Eurofer translated into a clear leadership role (Tsoukalis 
and Strauss, 1987: 217). 
With the support of the Commission, the 19 largest Community producers founded 
Eurofer II in 1981. The Eurofer members shared the 30 percent of steel products not 
previously covered by the quota system (Stotz, 1983: 70; Spethmann, 1985: 73). The 
production and delivery quotas shared out this way could be traded among the 
members and, against protests from steel-manufacturing branches of the economy, the 
Commission even supported pricing agreements among the Eurofer II members 
(Conrad, 1998: 102). Although the Commission tied the allocation of new quarterly 
production quotas to realised capacity reductions, capacity reductions remained under 
the Commissions projections. Therefore, the Commission reduced the allocated 
quotas for individual producers. Since the Eurofer H members were unable to agree 
among themselves on a new sharing key for the cuts in their quotas, Eurofer H 
collapsed in 1983 and the Commission had lost the collective support of the large 
producers over its anti-crisis policies. Although Davignon stated that the Commission 
did not depend on a placate from Eurofer to implement the measures, he recognised at 
the same time that co-operation with the producer organisation would make his task 
easier (Howell et al., 1988: 860. 
In 1982, some producers started to ignore their quotas, claiming that they had been 
assessed incorrectly or unjustly (Krupp) or even questioning the legality of the quota 
system altogether (Kl6ckner). Consequently, the Commission increasingly had to put 
aside active regulating functions in favour of reactive sanctioning ones (Grunert, 
1987: 237). Given the deplorable state of the European steel industry and strong 
controversy concerning production figures and their individual interpretation by the 
Member States (Grunert, 1987: 241), the arrangements made between the Commission 
and Eurofer were hardly observed at all during 1984. Just as numerous steel producers 
exceeded their quotas, many ignored the pricing arrangements. A number of finns 
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even declared that they did not feel bound at all by the arrangements made at the 
Council meeting of 28 July 1983 31 (Agence Europe, 30.7.1983: 12). 
Thereafter, co-operation with Eurofer was even less successful. Ultimately, the 
differences between national steel producers have meant that Eurofer was extremely 
restricted in its endeavours to develop into an effective cartel (Woolcock, 1981b: 72). 
The fact the restructuring took place inside national boundaries with strong 
government involvement meant that transnational co-operation on the production 
level was difficult to sustain and brought about a situation in which national 
champions dominated rather than the Common Market (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 
1987: 218). The process of intra-European co-operation on the company level has been 
hindered by the development of mistrust among the producers as a consequence of the 
harsh controversies concerning quotas and capacity reductions. The national bias of 
steel policies also had the consequence that transnational co-operation appeared too 
risky or burdened by regulations (Wienert, 1989: 262-3; Tsoukalis and Strauss, 
1987: 218) 
Following an increase in steel demand after 1984, Eurofer was able to agree on an 
internal compromise and founded the Eurofer IIII cartel (Howell et al., 1988: 88). Like 
Eurofer H, however, Eurofer IH collapsed shortly afterwards. The members could not 
agree on a sharing key for cuts in production quotas imposed by the Commission on 
some Member States for insufficient capacity reductions. The Commission then 
attempted to continue the production quota system and allocated quotas without the 
co-operation of Eurofer. This did not work because the quotas allocated by the 
Commission were either to high or because companies did not comply with them. As 
a consequence, steel prices plummeted again. Since the Commission viewed 
subsequent cartels like Eurofer IV and Eurofer V (in place up until 1988) as structural 
crisis cartels that did not succeed in agreeing the desired capacity reductions, the 
Commission eventually abandoned the idea of regulating the European steel market in 
close co-operation with Eurofer and presented its own system for the reduction of 
capacities to the Council of Ministers in 1987 (Conrad, 1997: 103). 
3 'These were the British Steel Corporation, Usinor, Sacilor, K16ckner, Krupp, and Badische Stahlwerke. 
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5.3 EC Restructuring in the 1980s 
The objective to give the steel industry some breathing space survived the 
introduction of the system of production quotas in 1980 and the Commission's efforts 
were in fact intensified with the worsening of the crisis. The Commission thus 
considered its main task as promoting the process of rationalisation and restructuring. 
Although the Treaty of Paris strictly prohibited aids, the period prior to the mid- 1 970s 
had already experienced a 'gradual whittling away of clear-cut prohibition of 
subsidies' as during the years of rapid growth in the steel industry government aids 
facilitated the addition of new steel building capacity and enabled the producers to 
keep alive obsolete capacities (Howell et al., 1988: 64). By the time the steel market 
collapsed in 1974, a defacto pattern of large-scale government aid had already been 
established and the Commission only belatedly recognised the threat that the subsidy 
race posed to the Common Market. 
The Commission thus considered a strict code on subsidies an important cornerstone 
of its restructuring policy. However, a subsidy code required the unanimous consent 
of the Member States under Art. 94 ECSC, which was difficult to achieve since many 
governments during the 1980s continued to subsidise their national steel producers. 
The motives of national governments were not only the prevention of mass-scale job 
losses, but also the perceived need to preserve a certain degree of national self- 
sufficiency (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 207; see also the interest determinants of the 
Member States in table 7 in the appendix). Hence, those Member States with state- 
owned steel industries (France, the UK, Italy and Belgium) attempted to prevent the 
imposition of a strict code on subsidies and blocked votes in the Council of Ministers 
until they had obtained a proposal that fitted their interests. In contrast, the Dutch and 
the Danish governments threatened to withdraw from a Community approach to the 
steel crisis in order to obtain a very restrictive code (Stotz, 1983: 63; Fendel, 
1981: 481) Since a total prohibition of subsidies appeared impossible, the German 
government decided to yield to pressure from German producers and subsequently not 
only increased its subsidies to the German steel industry, but also supported the 
system of production quotas (Conrad, 1997: 123). During this time, the Commission 
was the only institution that tried to identify the Community interest and to protect it 
against national governments and steel producers. Since rules on state aids are a 
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cornerstone of restructuring policy, the sections below analyse the developments and 
effects of the successive codes on subsidies produced by the EC. 
After the manifest crisis had been declared in 1980, the Commission repeatedly 
pointed out that the crisis measures imposed under Art. 58 were of a temporary nature 
and were only to be maintained as long as was necessary to allow the industry to 
restructure. The Simonet and the Davignon Plan had symbolised the first attempts at 
formulating restructuring objectives (see chapter four). In December 1978, the 
Council formulated a number of coherent restructuring principles and stated that while 
the responsibility for restructuring programmes lie primarily at the company level, 
aspects concerning the control of the social, regional, economic and financial effects 
fell outside the framework of the producers and required a special solidarity (Agence 
Europe, 14.12.1978: 5). Subsequently, accompanying actions had to be undertaken on 
both Member State and EC level. While the first problem with restructuring is that it 
touched upon a great number of aspects (such as the dismantling of over-capacity, 
financial reconstruction, the restoration of international competitiveness through cost 
reduction, modernisation and rationalisation and the accommodation of social 
consequences for employees). Another problem was that the provisions of the ECSC 
Treaty on the restructuring process were less obvious than the ones on crisis policy. 
The main exception here is the provisions of Art. 56 ECSC (readjustment and social 
aid), and the Commission was subsequently forced to resort to the basic articles of the 
Treaty and to a few provisions which are not especially directed at restructuring as an 
integral matter (Heusden and de Horn, 1980: 68). The process of restructuring hence 
needed to be furthered by the Commission through its policies in particular areas 
(market, investment, price, social and financial aid policies). Considering both the 
individual conditions in each of the steel product categories and the peculiarities of 
steel-producing regions (such as geographical situation, degree of modernisation, 
debts, employment opportunities), it was difficult for the Commission to bring its 
steel restructuring policy under a comprehensive plan. These reasons as well as 
measures taken by individual Member States in the national steel industries, prevented 
the Commission from developing an all-embracing master plan (Heusden and de 
Horn, 1980: 68). Since the Commission had moved away from the clear-cut 
prohibition of subsidies, as laid down in Art. 4c ECSC, before the declaration of the 
manifest crisis, it was in need of new legal instruments in order to bring any future 
186 
growth of subsidies and national government intervention under control and to make 
them subservient to the objectives of EC restructuring. 
5.3.1 The Control ofSubsidies (1980-89) 
Closely related to the Commission's market control measures, subsidies were the most 
divisive aspect of the steel crisis in the EC. Furthermore, along with cartellisation and 
regulation, subsidies belong to the 'traditional' part of steel politics in most European 
countries. According to estimates of the Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl, the German 
Iron and Steel Federation, the governments of the Member States granted $44.8 
billion in subsidies to the steel industry between 1975 and 1985 (quoted in Howell et 
al., 1988: 63). Whatever restructuring had occurred before 1980 was more the result of 
financial losses than of pressure from the EC. Between 1980 and 1985, the 
Commission approved over $35.5 billion in subsidies to the steel industry. Nearly two 
thirds of which was 'aid for'continued operation, i. e. money injections to keep failing 
companies afloat. During the same period, there were substantial subsidies that were 
neither reported to nor approved by the Commission. Unfortunately for EC producers, 
subsidy payments to producers in the EC fuelled heavily the foreign trade dispute with 
the US (see chapter six). In this respect, the most unifying factor was the need to 
preserve the Common market since the Member States found it in their interest to 
negotiate as a unit with third countries in order to bring imports under control. Despite 
the divergent approaches of the individual Member States, it is noteworthy that they 
succeeded in keeping a united front vis-a-vis the US (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 
1987: 216). As far as internal restructuring is concerned, however, they were 
confronted with a fundamentally more controversial situation, which centred mostly 
on the issue of subsidies. 
The question was therefore whether action should be taken on the EC or the national 
level, or, more precisely, -what would be the distribution of functions on the various 
levels (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987: 204). Under Davignon, the Commission's 
restructuring policy had taken a purely national fonn and, with no political institution 
capable of taking such a decision, there was no agreement on a sharing key for the 
burdens of adjustment linked to restructuring. The Council was able to perform such a 
function, but was deeply divided due to the divides between the various steel 
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industries and the diverging national approaches to steel crisis management (see table 
7 in the appendix). Member State policies towards restructuring varied according to 
patterns of foreign trade, competitiveness, and ownership structure. Those countries 
that paid out most subsidies (France, the UK, Belgium and Italy) were also the ones 
that cut least of their capacity (Conrad, 1997: 114). The Commission, on the other 
hand, had no powers vested into it. Hence, many governments took the easy option of 
just sitting on the problem and doing nothing. The German government was rather 
isolated in its determination to link the production quota system with setting a 
deadline for subsidiation (Dudley and Richardson, 1999: 235). The Commission then 
tried to prevent the spreading of uncontrolled state aids in order to maintain the unity 
of the common steel market. As the Commission tried to emphasise the need for 
adjustment and argued that protectionist measures against third countries were of a 
temporary nature, the Commission! s proposals reminded Tsoukalis and da Silva and 
Ferreira (1980: 373) of what Haas (1964: 111) had called the 'upgrading of common 
interests'. 
Although the Commission proposed a first code on subsidies as early as 1978, the first 
binding code on subsidies was only approved in February 1980, following continual 
pressure from both German producers and the German government to bring the 
subsidy competition under control. Since two previous proposals did not find the 
approval of the Member States, the Commission initially resorted to the publication of 
guidelines for the treatment of national aids to the steel industry, which permitted 
subsidies only for the purpose of temporary restructuring (Howell et al., 1988: 65). 
Finally facing reality and fulfilling its Treaty obligations, the Commission produced 
the first subsidy code in order to phase out national subsidies by the end of 1985 and 
to create conditions which would incite companies to reduce their capacities 
(COM(81) 71 final of 23 February 1981). Thereafter, the payment of subsidies by 
national governments to their steel producers was subjected to the Commission's 
approval. Aids for restructuring were also linked to a restructuring plan to be 
approved by the Commission. The conditions set through the restructuring plan, i. e. 
limited duration and digressive allocation of payments, could be circumvented on 
instances where social problems occurred or in order to facilitate closures. 
Investments aids continued to be permissible. Given that Art. 95 ECSC required 
unanimous consent from the Member States, the first subsidy code represented only a 
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weak compromise (Conrad, 1998: 106) and, given the large number of redundancies 
and plummeting steel prices while the volume of subsidies actually grew, proved 
'spectacularly ineffective' (Howell et al., 1988: 65). In 1982, following German threats 
of imposing compensationary duties and import quotas for subsidised steel on other 
Community steel imports, the Commission conceded the insufficiency of the first 
subsidy code as those subsidies granted slowed down the restructuring process and 
hindered competition (COM (81) 71fin. of 5 February 1981: 2). 
After lengthy legal and parliamentary examinations,, an improved code on subsidies 
was approved unanimously by the Council of Ministers in August 1981 (L228 of 13 
August 1981). While the provisions of the first code were strengthened, the 
Commission decided in favour of a German initiative and included the concept of 
binding subsidies to capacity reductions. Informally, Germany made its continued co- 
operation dependent on a legally binding limitation of competition-distorting 
subsidies practised in other Member States (Grunert, 1987: 237; Tsoukalis and Strauss, 
1985: 219). The new code enabled Brussels to intervene in restructuring programmes 
as it stipulated that aids would only be allowed if the recipient producers were 
applying a concrete and precise plan of restructuring. The Commission expected that 
through linking aids to capacity reductions, companies would predominantly 
withdraw unprofitable capacities from the market and that the restructuring plans 
would eventually ensure the competitiveness of producers and hence the financial 
viability of producers under normal market conditions (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 
1987: 209). Yet the Commission was forced to take legal steps against France, Italy 
and Belgium for offences against the subsidy code (Grunert, 1987: 237). At the same 
time, pressure mounted on the stability of the European steel market following the 
trade measures initiated by the US against subsidised European steel and the 
Commission found itself engaged in continuous negotiations with the US from the 
end of 1981 onwards (see chapter seven). 
Implementing the subsidy code and the production quota system took up most of the 
time and efforts of Commission officials concerned with steel policy (Grunert, 
1987: 238). In addition, the Commission had to approach its work with a very 
pragmatic attitude. Under the new code, all aids were to be notified to the 
Commission by 30 September 1982 and all aids were supposed to end by 1985. The 
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final decision regarding their compatibility with the restructuring programme would 
be reached by 1 July 1983. However, the Member State governments failed to submit 
the restructuring plans required for the allocation of subsidies and the Commission 
decided to provisionally pay out a part of the subsidies and set a new dead-line for 
July 1983. Again, the deadline expired as the Commission did not receive any 
restructuring plans. The Commission then decided to set yet another deadline for 
January 1984 and retrospectively approved the subsidies. The Commission received 
the restructuring plans in January 1984 and thereby avoided a confrontation with the 
those Member States that illegally handed out subsidies to their steel producers 
(Conrad, 1997: 107). All producers in receipt of subsidies proved to be state-owned 
companies (Cockerill-Sambre, Usinor and Sacilor, Irish Steel, Finsider, British Steel, 
and Germany's Saarstahl). Furthermore, since the aids paid out already were 
insufficient, the Council of Ministers based on Art. 95 ECSC approved of another 
round of subsidies in 1983. 
The Commission also allowed the Member States to take over the debts of their 
national steel producers as this in the view of the Commission had no bearing on the 
market (Howell et al., 1988: 67). Conrad (1998: 107) suspects that this concession was 
given to the Member States in return for their approval of the tightened code on 
subsidies. The Member States, however, continued to undermine the code on 
subsidies. For instance, in 1985 the Commission discovered that France and Belgium 
had respectively paid $338,5 million and $185 million in subsidies to national 
producers (Howell et al., 1988: 66). While the Germans continued to be dissatisfied 
with the regulation of state aids to the steel industry, France in 1984 adopted a new 
steel plan that featured an infusion of $1,7 billion from the government to Usinor and 
Sacilor through 1987. As France and Italy formally requested an extension of the 
1985 deadline and companies such as Usinor, Sacilor, Cockerill-Sambre, Finsider and 
British Steel reportedly required continuing operating aid (Howell et al., 1988: 67), it 
became evident that the complete phase-out by 1985 would be a difficult and 
problematic undertaking. 
Following heated debates in spring 1985 and the expiry of the second code on 
subsidies, the Council of Ministers nevertheless unanimously approved a third code of 
subsidies based on Art. 95 ECSC (L340 of 18 December 1985). Again, the code 
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represented a compromise as subsidies were prohibited unless they were intended to 
facilitate plant closures. Regional aids, R&D aids and state participation in 
environmental measures were also allowed. Two important changes were introduced: 
Firstly, capital increases of state-owned companies were classified as subsidies where 
national governments did not act like private providers of capital. Secondly, and more 
importantly, restructuring aids were only permissible when unanimously approved by 
the Council of Ministers on the basis of Art. 95 ECSC. Also in 1985, the Council of 
Ministers agreed on the termination of all subsidy payments to the steel industry as of 
1986. Yet this decision represented another compromise as it gave France and Italy 
the opportunity to financially strengthen their highly indebted national steel producers 
before the ban on subsidies came into effect (Conrad, 1997: 110). 
Nevertheless, many forms of state aid to the steel industry continued after 1985. For 
instance, France, Belgium and Italy changed the form of subsidy payments. While 
France resorted to indirect capital increases through the state-owned Credit Lyonnais, 
Italy granted loans to its state-owned companies through the state-holding IRI. In the 
French case, the Commission approved of the capital increases because a Swiss 
constancy, employed on behalf of the Commission, came to the conclusion that the 
behaviour of the Credit Lyonnais was that of a private investor under normal market 
conditions (SEC (92) 2438final of 23 December 1992). In 1987, Italy's government 
granted a $1,5bn loan from government banks, which triggered strong German 
protests and an investigation by the Commission. Germany continued its fight against 
subsidies, alleging that France, Italy and Belgium continued to subsidise their steel 
industries covertly and illegally (Howell et al., 1988: 70-1). By mid-1987, the steel 
producers of many Member States were openly requesting that the Commission once 
again permit subsidies to the steel industry, claiming that they were unable to survive 
the year without subsidies. Thus the third code on subsidies was largely taken over 
into the fourth code. 
In approving national subsidies, the Commission continuously violated against Art. 4c 
ECSC. The Commission justified this practice by pointing out that the objectives 
contained in the ECSC Treaty (Arts. 2§2 and 3c, d, e ECSC) obliged the Commission 
to ensure that no disruption or discontinuation affected the economic activity in the 
steel sector and that according to Art. 3e ECSC its aim was to work towards the 
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improvement of life and working conditions. Since steel producers were not capable 
of ensuring this themselves and the Commission itself did not have the necessary 
financial means, the Commission concluded that this could only be achieved by 
allowing national subsidies (Conrad, 1997: 110). The Commission thus only 
considered national subsidies that did not adhere with EC steel policy and subsidies 
that served other ends than the pursuit of the aims contained in the ECSC Treaty as 
violations against the general prohibition of subsidies. As chapter six shows, this 
practice contributed significantly to the EC-US steel conflict and, as a result, was 
dropped at the beginning of the 1990s (see chapter seven). 
5.4 Phasing-Out the 1980s Crisis Measures 
In 1985, Davignon was succeeded by Karl-Heinz Naýes as Commissioner of DG III. 
Under Naý es, who was less inclined to assume the role of a 'Mr Fix-it' (Dudley and 
Richardson, 1999: 237) and favoured a freer market (Rhodes, 1989: 70), the 
Commission initiated a change in its policy since it realised the negative side-effects 
of its previous policies (Conrad, 1997: 116). Furthermore, when Davignon left office, 
the policy community he had created on the basis of a perception of a special 
relationship between steel and the state gave way to a certain 'power vacuum' in EC 
steel politics. During this period, EC policy-making in steel took place in the context 
of a latent struggle between competing policy demands, i. e. persistent 'interventionist' 
demands and new 'free-market' demands. Furthermore a transnational shift in policy 
fashion emphasised a reduced role of the state (through deregulation and privatisation) 
and led to a policy transfer across national boundaries (Dudley and Richardson, 
1999: 235). 
A number of factors contributed to this development: Firstly, the market situation in 
the Community gradually improved and weakened the justification for an 
interventionist crisis policy. Since some of the major European steel producers, 
including the BSC and Usinor Sacilor, started writing black figures again, there was 
less need seen for restructuring and the continuation of crisis measures. Secondly, the 
Single Market Programme had considerable symbolic importance not only in overall 
political terms, but also specifically for the steel sector since it promoted the idea of 
subjecting subsidies to commonly agreed principles and disciplines. Thirdly, 
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commercial considerations and the rise of other defence-related industries contributed 
to a decline of the notion of steel as a special strategic industry within national policy 
arenas. Fourthly, the experiences of the early 1980s had led to an already mentioned 
disillusionment within the Commission. Particularly the obstructive attitudes that 
national governments and steel producers alike had displayed in the context of EC 
restructuring contributed to an increasing acceptance of free-market ideas within the 
Commission. This process was facilitated by several changes in Commission 
personnel, most notably the appointment of Sir Leon Brittan, the former Conservative 
Secretary for Trade and Industry, as Competition Commissioner, and Martin 
Bangemann, a former German finance minister, as Commissioner for both Internal 
Market and Industry. As Bangemann's dual role and broad-brush approach diverted 
some of his attention, the intra-institutional balance within the Commission shifted. 
Under Brittan, who was a political heavyweight and policy entrepreneur favouring 
free-market ideas, DG IV henceforth asserted itself much more over DG III on 
questions relating to the steel sector than in former years. The somewhat diluted role 
of DG III towards the end of the decade enabled Brittan to increasingly question the 
image of steel as a special case. He subsequently tried to make steel a test case for the 
adoption of free market values (Dudley and Richardson, 1999: 236-8,1997; see also 
chapter seven). 
over time, the above developments had the effect that the Commission's steel policy 
gradually pursued more free-market ideas. The Commission concluded that the steel 
producers made no significant efforts to restore their international competitiveness as 
the external protection of the EC market assured them of their sales (COM(86) 585 of 
13 November 1986: 10). From then on, the Commission was poised to achieve the 
necessary reduction of over-capacities through market forces if an agreement of 
capacity reductions could not be reached in co-operation with Eurofer. Furthermore, 
under Nades the Commission was not prepared to accept anymore that national 
governments enabled steel companies to cover their losses with subsidies (COM(86) 
585 of 13 November 1986: 3). However, the liberalisation of the EC steel market 
planned for 1986 was delayed by the Council of Ministers because of the economic 
situation of the French and Italian state-owned steel companies. Instead, the Council 
decided to impose a temporary regulation until the steel market was due liberalisation 
in 1988 and to improve the code on subsidies (KrNgenau, 1986: 55). 
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In the course of 1986, Naýes indicated that the anti-crisis measures were not to be 
renewed when they expired at the end of 1987 (Agence Europe, 22.9.1986: 9). Yet by 
presenting a restructuring plan that foresaw a voluntary reduction of production 
capacities by 25m tonnes, Eurofer was able to forestall the measures as this was the 
tonnage the Commission considered necessary for a restructuring of the steel industry 
(Agence Europe, 16.9.1985: 10). Therefore, pending the development of Eurofer's 
plan, the Council of Ministers decided to postpone a decision on the final 
liberalisation of the Community's steel market until March 1987 (Howell et al., 
1988: 88). Yet, Eurofer failed once again to reach a consensus among its members 
concerning the individual shares in the proposed capacity cuts. The Commission 
reacted by suspending the production qupta for one product category, galvanised 
sheets, but retained the others. Eurofer's renewed failure to implement a restructuring 
scheme had provided a convenient excuse for the Member States to defer the 
politically uncomfortable decision to abandon the quota system. After all, the quota 
system had supported prices and helped to keep inefficient producers alive 32 . 
In July 1987, the Commission recommended the abolition of the quota system 
altogether (Agence Europe, 17.7.1987: 5). The Council of Ministers, however, while 
agreeing that an extension of the quotas system should be linked to capacity cuts, 
voted for retention of the quota system and at the end of 1987 agreed on an extension 
of the regime for six months for four product categories. In addition, the Commission 
was asked to appoint 'Three Wise Men' in order to advise the Commission and the 
Council on how to secure firm commitments from steel producers on capacity 
reductions (Agence Europe, 9.10.1987: 5). Following the investigation carried out by 
the 'Three Wise Men', the Commission reported that the industry was not in a position 
to agree sufficient restructuring agreements or to give undertakings in this direction. 
Moreover, possible arrangements proved to be to a large extent independent of the 
continuation of the quota system (COM(87) 640 fin. of 26 November 1987). Like 
Naýes, the 'Three Wise Men' disapproved of the production quotas system and 
demanded the whole system be scrapped as it conveniently shielded steel producers 
from competition and necessary production adjustment. Yet Member State pressure 
for retention of the quota system was substantial and the Council of Ministers at the 
32 Financial Times, 6.8.1986; quoted in Howell ef aL (1988: 89) 
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end of 1987 agreed on another extension of the quota system by six months. The steel 
producers were given a deadline of 10 June 1988 to agree on additional capacity cuts. 
Yet an upturn in the business cycle towards the end of 1987 had a negative effect on 
the steel producers' interest in achieving the capacity reductions. EC steel prices 
slowly rose to almost level world market steel prices in the course of 1988 and steel 
producers by March 1988 still had not agreed on the necessary capacity reductions. 
Thus, the Commission, against the demands of steel producers, eventually declared 
that the improved market situation did not justify a continuation of the system of 
production quotas (Financial Times, 24.6.1988: 2). Subsequently, the Commission did 
not propose the continuation of the system to the Council of Ministers. The Council of 
Ministers could not find the necessary unanimous vote to overturn the Commission's 
decision and the quota system was abolished (Conrad, 1998: 118; L25 of 29 January 
1988). The Commission estimated the remaining over-capacity for 1988 at 30 million 
tonnes per annurn (Commission, 1988: 82). The Commission nevertheless emphasised 
that it would continue to protect the steel industry against unfair competition from 
third countries (Howell et al., 1988: 93). However, the obstructive attitudes of national 
governments and steel producers alongside the extremely negative experiences with 
the production quota system in the 1980s created an element of disillusionment within 
the Commission and later contributed to an even further shift in the Commission's 
crisis policies (see chapter seven). 
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Conclusions 
The 1980s were a decisive decade for the development of the European Community. 
The large financial losses of European steel producers triggered unprecedented levels 
of EC involvement in the steel industry and forced producers, national governments 
and the Commission to find immediate solutions to the structural problems of the 
European steel industry. In the course of the steel crisis, the approaches selected 
varied from initial liberal and non-interventionist measures to the direct interventions 
under Art. 58 ECSC. Under successive Commissioners responsible for steel, the 
degree of EC involvement and competence constantly increased and then peaked 
under Commissioner Davignon. It was therefore mainly political pressure from within 
the Member States, the need to preserve the Common Market and the fear of national 
protectionist policies that led the Commission to develop into an active industrial- 
political actor. Yet, this development cannot be detached from the development of the 
steel markets. At times, these provided decisive impulses for the Commission to step- 
up its efforts in the endeavour to enable as many European steel producers as possible 
to survive the crises and to create the often-quoted 'breathing space' needed for 
European producers to restore their competitiveness. After half a decade of negative 
experiences with interventionist crisis management and the establishment of a high 
degree of external protection, the EC in the second half of the 1980s was set to 
gradually return to a liberal framework for the management of the steel industry. 
However, it found itself deeply entangled in a web of constraints that had developed 
during the EC's direct steering of European steel policy. 
The CommissioWs management of the steel industry was often hesitant, ad hoc and 
characterised by fragile compromises. The peculiarities of the EC decision-making 
process, with the Member States holding the final say through the Council of 
Ministers, coupled with the need to accommodate as many producers as possible were 
strong factors behind the EC's limitations in achieving a comprehensive, effective and 
long-term policy on restructuring. From the outset in the mid-1970s, the EC was 
constrained by a number of factors, such as German opposition to direct interventions, 
the objective to safeguard competition in the steel sector, international commitments 
of the EC, and the general lack of preparation of the Community for interventions in 
institutional terms. Nevertheless, in the system of collective management that did 
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develop in the European steel sector, the Commission played a crucial role. Since it 
had little political power, however, it had to strive hard at each instance to build a 
coalition of interest in order to act. The important legal powers the Commission was 
given by the ECSC Treaty did not easily translate into political action. Crucially, the 
Commission lacked the effective means to enforce its decisions, which meant that it 
had to draw on its position as an arbiter and mediator between corporate and national 
interests and its right on information provided by the ECSC Treaty in order to carry 
out its work. Moreover, factors that enabled the Comm ission to carry out its work in 
the face of wide-spread opposition to EC measures included the 'scapegoat' function 
for unpopular decisions vis-&vis national electorates and the personality of 
Commissioner Davignon in reconciling divergent interest among the numerous 
stakeholders participating in EC steel policies. 
The Commission's prohibitive measures were unable to eliminate subsidies and had 
the effect that national state aid measures were driven under ground or extended in 
different forms. Furthermore, the Commission was often forced to turn a blind eye to 
open-ended subsidies which were meant to keep obsolete plants alive. Using Art. 95 
ECSC, which provided for exemptions to the ECSC Treaty, enabled the Member 
States to circumvent the prohibition of subsidies contained in the ECSC Treaty. It can 
also be argued that much of the restructuring that did take place was the result of huge 
financial losses and national government's unwillingness to continue indefinitely 
subsidising their industries, rather than the pressure exercised by the Commission. 
After all, the restructuring plans were adopted and implemented on a purely national 
basis. 
There is a learning curve in the EC's attempts to manage the steel sector. The 
extremely negative experience of the production quota system, as expressed in the 
obstructive behaviour of national governments and producers alike, paved the way for 
a realisation that EC involvement had gone too far and that the overall aim of 
improving the situation of the European steel industry might best be left to the power 
of market forces. However, the de facto pattern of subsidisation that had been 
established since the mid-1970s was re-enforced through successive slumps in the 
development of demand and became an integral part of the EC's restructuring policy 
through continuous practice on the part of the Member States. Once these patterns had 
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been established, it was extremely difficult in political and economic terms to contain 
subsidisation. Again, swings for the better in the market development provided the 
foundation for the most promising steps to break the deadlock that had affected the 
EC steel policy throughout the 1980s. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE 1980s EC-US STEEL CONFLICT 
Introduction 
The ECs sheer size, in terms of its consumption and production and its volume of 
trade., made it inevitable that the EC's market interventions since the beginning of the 
crisis in the 1970s had a strong impact on world steel trade. Reflecting the dominant 
position of the US in the world economy, EC's external steel policies from the outset 
in the 1970s had been shaped with possible counteractions by the US in mind. 
Therefore, rather than treating EC-US interactions in steel as just one feature of the 
EC's external crisis measures, this chapter focuses strongly on EC-US interactions in 
steel throughout the 1980s. While the steel problem between the EC and the US also 
transpired onto the multilateral plane, the impetus of US policy on EC steel policy 
intensified during the 1980s and, as this chapter will show, contributed significantly to 
the shaping of the Community's global approach to steel policy. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. After a brief background section that puts 
EC-US relations in steel in context, the second section shows how the EC in the early 
1980s was drawn into negotiations on a VRA by strong pressure from the US steel 
industry. The third section is primarily concerned with analysing the negotiation 
process of the 1982 steel VRA, but gives particular attention to the process of 
establishing a global Community approach. In the fourth section, a number of 
contested issues that caused problems between the EC and the US after the conclusion 
of the 1982 VRA are analysed. The last section, then analyses the 1989 renegotiations 
of the VRA(s) in the context of the on-going GATT Uruguay Round. 
6.1 The Background of the EC-US Steel Problem 
The EC-US conflict in steel in the 1980s has to be seen against the background of a 
number of factors. A central factor was the structural decline of steel consumption in 
both Europe and the US (Messerlin, 1987; Hogan, 1983; Goldberg, 1986). Steel 
producers on both sides of the Atlantic faced slow growth in demand, low prices and 
constant warfare over market share of world consumption. In addition, new entrants 
disrupted international steel markets and competitive materials had shrunk particularly 
the US steel industry (see section 3.1). More specifically, since 1974 very slow 
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growth in both OECD and developing countries had combined with a tendency of 
governments, and many consumers, to shift away from investment aimed at the 
infrastructure, while at the same time many consumers had started to substitute lighter 
materials for steel. The result was negligible growth in world steel consumption from 
1974 to 1979 and a decline from 1979 to 1983. The world steel industry subsequently 
operated with a substantial overhang of excess capacity. Also, the less developed 
countries had expanded their share of Western world steel production to nearly 16 
percent and thereby reduced their dependency upon imports at the same time that 
some had become exporters of important selected products. As the developing 
countries continued to expand their export capacities, American and European 
producers were subsequently forced to retrench. 
Another important factor was the competitive decline of the US steel industry. 
Contrasting with the otherwise prevailing free-trade ethos of the US, the US steel 
industry had enjoyed almost constant protection for more than twenty years (Conrad, 
1995; Levine, 1985; Tiffany, 1988) as US steel producers successfully lobbied 
American governments to introduce a variety of import regulation devices. The 
degree of this decline cannot solely be attributed to cyclical effects, structural changes 
and supply side complications. Factors such as the investment policy of the US steel 
industry, the technological performance of the US steel industry, periodical strikes 
that affected patterns of consumption, and increases in employment costs also played 
a role (Barnett and Schorch, 1983; Mueller and Van Der Ven, 1982; Tiffany, 1988; 
Goldberg, 1986). In the course of this decline, the US turned into a net importer of 
steel in 1959 and remained one ever since. 
The EC was a net exporter of steel and depended on the US market for its exports. 
From the outset, the EC was thus in a somewhat weaker position because it wished to 
keep as much of the US steel export market as possible. The US, on the other hand, as 
a net importer of steel, was not constrained by the threat of retaliation (Woolcock, et 
al, 1985: 50). Moreover, the excess capacity now generated by European producers 
resulted in an enormous downward pressure on prices within the Community and 
forced producers to operate at uneconomically low rates. In the EC and elsewhere, the 
natural outlet for the internal pressures was therefore exports (Shepherd, 1982: 132). 
They enabled the European producers to operate at higher utilisation rates and 
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facilitated efforts to stabilise internal prices by removing surplus inventories from the 
EC. In addition, they permitted the Member States to avoid, or at least delay, 
confronting the political and social problems that capacity reductions throw up 
(Howell, et al., 1988: 99). European steel products were generally sold at prices below 
those prevailing within the EC and below the costs of productions of European 
producers, thereby creating problems with many other established steel-exporting 
nations seeking sales in an increasingly crowded international steel market. Given the 
divergent degrees of export dependence of the European steel producing countries and 
the fragile state of the EC steel market, the loss of the US market, even to few EC 
producers, could have implied the collapse of the EC's crisis programme. The EC-US 
dispute thus drove a wedge between various European steel industries (Woolcock et 
al., 1985: 50, Howell, et aL 1988). 
Once the US government had granted the US steel industry protection because of its 
political importance at the end of the 1960s, the integrated US producers recognised 
the value of good political representation. The US government had therefore pointed 
the way to a 'rent-seeking society' (Conrad, 1995: 156). Rather than taking internal 
measures to ensure an overdue restructuring process 33 , the US government addressed 
the 1980s steel problem by again granting protection of foreign steel imports 
(Woolcock, 1982: 615; Benyon and Bourgeois, 1984: 311; Conrad, 1995, Levine, 
1985). Since both US producers and foreign exporters now had an interest in reaping 
the supra-competitive prices from the US market, the US government frequently 
found itself pushed towards negotiating voluntary restraint agreements that fix 
quantitative limits to steel imports (Goldberg, 1986, Tiffany, 1988). The US 
government was a more or less passive recipient of difficult foreign trade suits and 
under constant pressure to negotiate bilateral restraint agreements. Given the 
traditionally strong links between US steel producers and Congress, the relationship 
between the US steel industry and the US government often amounted to a situation in 
which the industry was able to hold the government hostage 34 . The protectionist spiral 
in the US took another turn when the US steel industry saw the total penetration rate 
33US policy made no attempt to link protection to industrial performance. The Salomon Plan of 1977, which came 
closest to a comprehensive restructuring policy for the US steel industry, was in essence a short-term political 
expediency (Woolcock, el aL 1985: 42). 34 For an extensive accounts of protectionist decision-making processes in the US see Jones (1986) and especially 
the definitive account on the 1980s EC-US steel conflict by Van Der Ven and Grunert (1987). 
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of the US steel market rise from under 3 percent in 1958 to more than 20 percent in 
1982 (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 139). Re-enforced through an increase in the 
value of the dollar vis-a-vis European currencies, imports from Member States of the 
EC increased dramatically in 1981 (Conrad, 1997: 127). By 1982, the average price 
differential between US producers and the world export market had risen to over $100 
per tonne - far more than the difference required for inducing increased import 
penetration. However, the degree of penetration was not the main cause of the US 
producer's concern. Rather it was the depressing effect of imports upon domestic 
prices and profit margins in the high-cost US market. 
The US and the EC had pursued divergent approaches in response to the steel crisis 
during the 1970s. Both the EC and the US had supported domestic prices (TPM and 
basic price mechanism) and the fragile international consensus that had been achieved 
was to be consolidated in the newly created OECD Steel Committee. But EC and US 
attempts to work out a compromise did not last long as the OECD was not fully used 
apart from offering both sides a forum to vent its frustrations about the unfair 
practices of the other (Woolcock et al, 1985: 29). Subsidies became the central bone of 
contention (Conrad, 1995,1997; Dominick, 1984, Benyon and Bourgeois, 1984). The 
chance to settle the question of domestic subsidies had been missed during the GATT 
Tokyo Round (Dominick, 1984: 356). Now this question became even more 
controversial in the light of the US tendency to define subsidies unilaterally in the 
absence of a clear definition of subsidies within the GATT subsidy code (Benyon and 
Bourgeois, 1984: 319ff, Conrad, 1995). In general, the GATT subsidy code explicitly 
prohibited export subsidies and rendered these countervailable (Art. VI, 3 and 3a). Yet 
it approved of the allocation of subsidies for restructuring purposes, which created a 
problem of interpretation. While the Commission justified the allocation of subsidies 
in the EC with restructuring purposes, the US justified its countervailing action 
against EC exports by pointing to the injury EC exports caused to the US industry 
(Benyon and Bourgeois, 1984: 323ff, Dominick, 1984). Under strong domestic 
protectionist pressure from the steel industry and Congress in the early 1980s, the 
Reagan administration was poised to settle, once and for all, the argument about 
harassment and unfairness of dumped and subsidised steel exports to the US. 
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Lastly, the early 1980s were a politically difficult period for EC-US relations. The 
emerging steel dispute, while generally deemed the least difficult to resolve, evolved 
in the context of other political issues that put pressure on the overall transatlantic 
relationship. East-West trade issues, such as the Siberian gas-pipeline conflict, and 
above all serious disagreements between the US and the Community over agricultural 
trade, overshadowed foreign relations between the US and the Community during this 
time (Woolcock, 1982; Grunert, 1985). 
6.2 From the TPM to the Announcement of Countervailing Duty Margins 
Preceding the negotiation of the 1982 EC-US steel agreement was a controversy 
between the US and the EC that centred on the adequacy of the US TPM in the late 
1970s (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987; Jones, 1986). The TPM was widely regarded 
as insufficient and gradually proved inadequate (Hudson and Sadler, 1989: 50), US 
steel producers put pressure on the US administration by threatening to file anti- 
dumping suits. The Carter administration was tom between its basic neo-liberal stance 
on trade, its determination to fight inflation, protectionist pressure in Congress and the 
prospect of seriously troubled relations with Europe and Japan (Van Der Ven and 
Grunert, 1987: 146; Woolcock, 1982: 614). Thus it maintained and adapted the TPM 
for as long as possible. In Europe, despite the divergent interests of European steel 
producers, the stability and predictability of the TPM was preferred to the uncertainty 
and disruption that would come with anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions. In 
addition, the Commission was opposed to the idea of a VRA, with Davignon taking 
the view that no steel market, no matter how big, could entertain the idea of a policy 
that did not take account of other markets (Agence Europe, 1.3.1980: 12). 
Subsequently, the Commission, pursuing the Community interest, strongly favoured 
the principle of the TPM and tried to-co-operate with the Department of Commerce in 
adapting the TPM. 
When the total of steel imports in October 1981 appeared to be 62 percent higher than 
in August 1980, the US Steel Corporation threatened to file anti-dumping suits and, 
for the first time, countervailing suits as well (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 150). 
Although Secretary of Commerce Baldwin made an effort to persuade the US industry 
of the administration's willingness and ability to administer the TPM effectively, the 
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industry continued the preparation of suits as. Yet for both the US steel industry and 
the bipartisan US Congress the only possible choice was between a far reaching 
voluntary restraint of exports or a unilateral scheme of quantitative limitations. Since 
for ideological reasons any type of VRAs were initially ruled out, the US 
administration was caught between the ruling free trade ideology and immense 
domestic political pressure. The new Reagan administration thus transmitted a 
message to Brussels at the end of 1981 that made it clear that a solution to the 
problem had to be found on the European side. Despite intense shuttle diplomacy 
between Brussels and Washington during this time, both administrations lacked the 
persuasive power to bring about an agreement between the two industries which 
would avoid the need for either law suits or severe self restraints (Van Der Ven and 
Grunert, 1987: 150). 
In January 1982, the US steel industry brought the debate on the TPM to an end and 
filed 38 anti-dumping cases and, for the first time, 94 countervailing duty cases 35. it 
was the highest number of suits that had ever been filed at the same time (Austmann, 
1989: 169). The alleged subsidy and dumping margins were so high that, if upheld, the 
US market would have been completely shut off as an export outlet. From the outset, 
it was clear that the US industry was never really interested in the imposition of duties 
and that the filing of the suits merely provided the US industry with the means to 
obtain a system of import quotas (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 151; Austmann, 
1989)36 . Amongst others, seven EC countries were subjected to US investigations 
(Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK). 
The US steel producers' allegations of export subsidies were aimed particularly at the 
UK, France, Belgium and Italy (Kulms, 1988; Grunert, 1985). The German and Dutch 
producers supported the US claims since punitive duties would have implied a 
competitive advantage of these producers on the US market (Conrad, 1997: 127). 
Claiming full competitiveness with other steel producing nations, the US industry 
blamed its problems solely on external factors, such as government policies and unfair 
trade practices on part of foreign producers. The Commission's argument in 
" The concentration on countervailing duties can be explained by the fact that in times of an overvalued dollar 
anti-dumping actions are not particularly cffcctive. 
"For a detailed description of the US procedures involved in investigating anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
suits see Benyon and Bourgeois (1984). 
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encountering the US allegations are surnmarised by Van Der Ven and Grunert 
(1987: 152) as follows: firstly, the Commission argued that the American complaints 
contravened the November 1977 OECD steel agreement, which stated the need of a 
thorough restructuring of the steel sector and the principle of sharing sacrifices 
equally in a way that avoided jeopardising the traditional trade flows. The EC was not 
guilty of subsidised exports as it operated a close monitoring system and those 
subsidies granted by the Member States to their steel industries were subject to 
compliance with the EC's subsidy code which tied restructuring aids to capacity 
reductions. As these subsidies were not export subsidies and did not stimulate exports 
to the US, they were subsequently not countervailable. Secondly, claims maintaining 
that the Community was exporting unemployment into the US were unfair, since 
unemployment had fallen by 20 percent in the EC compared to only 13 percent in the 
US. Thirdly, claims of material injury 37 were unfounded since the poor performance 
of the US steel industry was a consequence of the deterioration of the US economy as 
a whole. Finally, the Commission argued that the proceedings of the US 
administration were not in harmony with international agreements, such as the 
GATT 38 . 
During the following nine months, the time span in which the countervailing duty 
investigations were to be determined, the Commission acted as the spokesman for the 
European steel industry. However, it always had to refer back to EC institutions to 
obtain approval or mandates to negotiate. The first stage of the transatlantic steel 
conflict was thus 'characterised by positional manoeuvring rather than serious 
bargaining, and more public posturing than problem solving' (Van Der Ven and 
Grunert, 1987: 155). Given that the determination of countervailing duty margins was 
a matter that was handled by the US authorities, the EC was confined to waiting for 
the outcome and voicing a strong protest. In the light of the structural and political 
divisions among the European steel industry and the pressures under which EC 
"The injury test applied by the ITC had been a major bone of contention already during the Tokyo Round. Here, 
the US had sought to tighten the rules governing subsidies, while the Community had tried to ensure that the injury 
test was made harder. The Community had insisted on introducing the term material injury into the US legislation 
implementing the Tokyo Round since if the US was to be allowed to take countervailing action against subsidies 
when its industry was injured, the EC wanted to make sure the US did not find injury to easy, At the time, material 
injury was considered to be a harder test to pass than the existing US injury test (Woolcock el aL, 1985: 47). 
"Moreover, within the Community there was an impression that the US steel industry had intentionally embarked 
on a massive harassment campaign, which was specifically directed at the European steel industry. Although many 
cases were later withdrawn, this impression lasted among European steel producers until today (Interview with 
German company official, April 1997; see chapter eight). 
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producers operated in implementing the internal restructuring efforts, the Commission 
was concerned with creating a joint (global) European approach, since such an 
approach constituted an important prerequisite for the success of its Common market 
steel policies (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 150- 1)39. Thus, the Commission 
preferred a process of burdensharing among the European steel producers as part of a 
voluntary restraint agreement with the US (Benyon and Bourgeois, 1984: 314; 
Grunert, 1985: 31). 
The details of the events that eventually led to the EC and the US to begin 
negotiations on a VRA are comprehensively described in the account of Van Der Ven 
and Grunert (1987: 150-60). It suffices to point out that in the course of this 
investigation, the findings of the International Trade Commission (ITC) reduced the 
number of cases from 132 to 55, but kept the bulk of steel trade under litigation (Van 
Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 155). The turning point in transatlantic dialogue on the 
steel problem came in June 1982, when the Department of Commerce announced its 
preliminary finding that seven Member State governments had unfairly subsidised 
steel export to the US. Although the US industry had charged in its petitions that 
subsidies were substantially higher for the European steel industry the preliminary 
findings were still disastrous since the countervailing duties effectively closed the US 
market for many European producers (Mueller and Van Der Ven, 1982: 260; 
Woolcock, 1982: 616). Deeply angered, they reproached the US for what in their view 
constituted a violation of international trade conventions. The European Council 
called for an immediate meeting of the GATT subsidy committee in order to contest 
the 'major innovation in world trading law' and the Department of Commerce 'extreme 
and unilateral' findings on subsidies (Woolcock, 1982: 616). It also broadened the 
scope of its response by announcing that it would examine measures against 
American exporters that benefited from the US Domestic International Sales 
Corporation Programme4o. Rather than examining the exact sequence of events 
leading up to the beginning of official negotiations, however, we shall concentrate 
"in trying to establish a common European approach the Commission took account of the problems and interests 
of the steel traders, but gave priority to the concerns of steel producers (Interview with DG III Official, 28.4.1998). 
This is a consequence of the Commissi&s over-riding concern to enable the steel producers to export and sell 
their products abroad. 
40This was an export subsidy programme worth over one billion dollars per year and not allowed under GATT 
rules. 
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here on a number of important points that explain the dynamics of interactions 
between the Cormnunity and the US during this time. 
The first point to make is that issues such as the interpretation of the concept of a 
domestic subsidy, the valuation of subsidies, and definitions of government equity 
participation went well beyond the sectional interests of the steel industry and 
transcended into the multilateral plane4l. Here, the EC-US steel conflict revealed a 
clash in economic ideologies (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 160) and was a result 
of fundamental differences in both sides' approaches to trade and industry (Woolcock 
et al., 1985: 45). The main obstacle was the perinissiveness of the existing GATT 
provisions and the divergent interpretations by the US and the Community. The so- 
called 'traffic light' principle, developed during the Tokyo Round, had proven 
inadequate as the GATT code on subsidies allowed each side to put their own rules 
and legislation to use (Woolcock, et aL, 1985: 51). In the face of both past experience 
and failure to agree on some of the most important interpretations of the GATT 
subsidy code, neither the US nor the EC expected to find a timely solution within the 
framework of the GATT dispute settlement procedure. Moreover, there was never any 
question of the US and the EC referring the steel issue to the dispute settlement 
procedures of the GATT (Mueller and Van Der Ven, 1882: 277). They therefore 
decided in favour of seeking a bilateral agreement and to side-step a GATT solution. 
Before official negotiations could begin, the US government had to change its attitude 
towards a negotiated settlement. The approach of the US government to the problems 
of the US steel industry underwent significant changes over time (Conrad, 1995; 
Woolcock, 1982) and successive administrations varied in their interpretation and 
application of US trade law. Importantly, the idea of negotiating VRAs runs up 
against US anti-trust laws as any agreement among firins which fix prices or restricts 
supply violated Art. 1 of the Sherman Anti-trust Act. Ever since the first 1969-71 
VRA (see section 4.1.1) this consideration provided for an important input to the 
actions of US administrations. Moreover, under the Carter government, the US had 
tried to establish effective multilateral codes on subsidies and countervailing duties 
within the GATT, stopped legal actions initiated by the US steel industry from 
4'The divergent views on subsidies between the US and the EC are outlined in detail in Dominick (1984) or 
Benyon and Bourgeois (1984). 
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running their course in 1977 and 1980, and refrained from the adoption of tough 
foreign trade remedies in steel as this would have weakened the multilateral regime 
(Woolcock, 1982: 614). Under the Reagan administration, in particular the Department 
of Commerce (DOC) was keen to show to be seen by steel industry and Congress as a 
keen enforcer of US trade law (Van Der Ven and Granert, 1987: 157). Although other 
US departments were concerned about the possible impact of a tough stance on the 
US's trading partners, the Reagan government in 1982 became politically committed 
to ensuring that US trade legislation was rigorously enforced and that other countries 
lived up to the spirit of international trade agreements (Woolcock et al, 1985: 44, 
Mueller and Van Der Ven, 1982: 262). In addition, the Reagan administration was 
keen to let the investigation ran their cause as higher countervailing duty margins, 
which were expected to be quite high in any case, implied greater US bargaining 
power for a possible settlement (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 157). Yet as overall 
transatlantic relations worsened over the gas-pipeline conflict, disagreements among 
the allies over the terms of East-West Trade in general, and the Community's CAP, 
the Reagan, administration changed its mind in view of the state of the Atlantic 
Alliance (Woolcock, et aL, 1985: 16). Since the steel dispute was deemed the least 
important issue on the transatlantic agenda and the most easy to settle (Van Der Ven 
and Grunert, 1987: 157), a negotiated agreement became desirable for the Reagan 
administration. 
Regardless of the outcome of the countervailing duty cases, the EC-US steel dispute 
accentuated the divisions within the EC steel industry and jeopardised the 
Commission's crisis and restructuring measures. Given the volumes of European 
excess capacity and the economic pressure on EC producers, particularly after the 
imposition of production restraints, European steel producers were under enormous 
pressure as the application of US trade remedies threatened to result in a virtual 
exclusion of European steel from the US market. Within the EC, the knowledge of the 
preliminary countervailing duty margins then posed considerable problems since it 
'threatened to undermine the carefully orchestrated and painfully achieved crisis 
regime' (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 161). As the highest duties were imposed on 
producers in the countries with high levels of subsidies (the UK, France, Belgium, and 
Italy), countries with bearable burdens (Germany and the Netherlands) were re- 
enforced in their claims that competition within the European steel market was 
208 
seriously distorted because of state aid elsewhere in the Community. With producers 
in the non-affected countries expected to profit from the duties imposed on their 
European competitors, finding an internal agreement on any negotiated settlement 
with the US among Eurofer members with such a clear-cut division of interests was 
thus all the more difficult. 
In the wake of the announcement of countervailing duty margins by the DOC 
attention therefore eventually shifted to real attempts to achieve a negotiated 
settlement. Previous, half-hearted attempts to achieve one had brought no results 
despite intense'shuttle diplomacy'in June 1982. Here, European proposals for a VRA 
had fallen far short of the US steel industry's aspirations (see Van Der Ven and 
Grunert, 1987: 158). For Davignon, the US limitation demands were too drastic. In 
particular, he could not agree to the US industry's demand to include pipes and tubes. 
On the other hand, the hands of Baldridge, the Secretary of Commerce, were tied by 
the US industry and by the consideration that the Department of Commerce needed to 
be seen as a strict enforcer of US law. Before the real negotiations could begin, 
however, the Commission needed a broader negotiation mandate than the one it held. 
Hitherto, all interactions between the Commission and its US counterparts had taken 
place under regular high-level consultations. 
6.3 The Negotiation of the 1982 EC-US VRA 
In the Commission's attempt to negotiate an agreement the disunity of the European 
steel industry was a central problem. Agreeing a key for the burden sharing among the 
members of Eurofer was extremely difficult given that the countervailing duty 
margins divided European steel producers into two camps: a group of four highly 
affected countries (the UK, Italy, France and Belgium) and a group whose burdens 
were quite bearable (Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Earlier, in March 
1982, an agreement on a sharing key for EC carbon steel exports to the US had been 
agreed by using maximum concessions in US market share, which would have been 
acceptable to individual companies. Since the US industry by now demanded both 
wider product coverage and lower quantitative export limits, prospects to reach a new 
internal agreement on the sharing key or on additional concessions became extremely 
complicated, if not impossible (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 161). Again, it needs 
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to be stressed that the unequal countervailing duty margins imposed by the US 
threatened to undermine the carefully-orchestrated internal crisis measures. In order to 
negotiate an agreement, it thus became necessary that the Commission was given a 
broader mandate from the Member States to negotiate than the one held in the talks up 
to 10 June. However, within those countries less affected by the countervailing duty 
margins, especially Germany and the Netherlands, the interest in a global Community 
approach decreased. It became unlikely that the Council of Ministers would 
unanimously agree on negotiation mandate for the Commission (Conrad, 1997: 128). 
Although the incentives to conclude an overall agreement between the EC as a whole 
and the US were greater than before following the imposition of the preliminary 
margins, the opportunities for doing so were simultaneously diminished for internal 
European reasons (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 161). 
6.3.1 Obtaining a Negotiation Mandate 
The previous section already indicated that that the EC in its interactions with the US 
was almost exclusively in a reactionary position. While this is primarily a 
consequence of the nature of the problem, i. e. steel trade flows from the EC to the US, 
it is also a consequence of the fact that the Reagan administration allowed US trade 
legislation to run its course. The attempts to arrive at a EC solution in summer 1982 
were again overshadowed by the impact of US trade law since Art. 1704 of the Trade 
Agreement Act of 1979 determined that the US governinent could itself, and without 
the consent of the industry, dismiss the suits up to thirty days before the final 
imposition of the countervailing duties. Thereafter, only the US industry was able to 
dismiss the suits by explicit consent. Given the well-known demands and intentions of 
the US steel industry and the fact that in contrast to the US government, for which a 
wide range of responsibilities linked the steel question to other issues, the industry 
was only concerned with its own well-being. This left the Europeans with a strong 
preference to negotiate a settlement before the new deadline of 23 July 1982. VAlile 
the Community might have overestimated the urgency of the situation, as it was 
legally questionable whether or not the Department of Commerce could withdraw a 
suit by claiming that a settlement out of court was 'equally beneficial' to the 
imposition of duties, the need to arrive at a settlement was nevertheless real for the 
Europeans (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 162). 
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However, negotiations in early July 1982 failed completely and the Europeans started 
to panic. In order to beat the 23 July deadline, the Council of General Affairs on 19 
July therefore decided to abandon the global approach and to replace it by a country- 
by-country approach assisted and overseen by the Commission. In the course of this 
'bilateral joint action' approach (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 162), the UK, 
France, Belgium and Italy proposed to reduce their exports by 10 percent, with the 
other Member States promising not to fill the gaps resulting from the self restrictions. 
The offer was rejected flatly by the US administration since the US required 
significantly higher margins and, above all, preferred a global agreement with the EC 
(Conrad, 1987: 128). In an emergency session, the EC ministers of Industry and 
Foreign Affairs then rejected an American counterproposal since the affected Member 
States in turn were not prepared or willing to accept the proposed drastic reductions of 
their exports on a voluntary basis 42 . 
The global approach was therefore restored in the light of the US industry's preference 
for an agreement that encompassed the whole of the EC. The point was made in a 
message from Baldridge to Davignon, which stated his refusal to seriously consider 
bilateral deals in the future (Van Der Ven and. Grunert, 1987: 163). On 24 July 1982, 
the Council consequently decided to give the Commission the 'exclusive mandate' to 
negotiate an overall agreement with the US (Agence Europe, 26.7.1982: 5). When the 
Commission had previously raised the countervailing duty matter with its US 
counterparts, it had done this as part of 'high level consultations' (Benyon and 
Bourgeois, 1984: 340). The results had been reported to the Council as if the matter 
had been governed by the EEC treaty. Benyon and Bourgeois (1984: 340) found three 
remarks from a legal perspective. Firstly, the decision was taken by a Community 
institution, and not the representatives of the Member States' governments. Secondly, 
by giving the Commission the 'exclusive mandate', unusual terms have been used. 
Technically speaking, the EEC Treaty authorises the Commission to negotiate, but the 
Commission is not 'mandated'. According to Benyon and Bourgeois (1984: 341) the 
term 'exclusive' can only be explained by reference to the preceding talks, which 
42 During the brief episode of the'bilateral joint approach', the UK had caused considerable irritation among other 
Member States by attempting the conclusion of a separate last minute agreement with the US. The US, however, 
rejected the British approach as a partial solution of the steel problem would not have guaranteed the security and 
stability the US was aiming for. 
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would have been entered into by the EC and the interested Member States. Thirdly, 
the Council did not refer to either ECSC or EEC Treaty provisions, leaving out the 
question under which Treaty an agreement would be concluded. Without going into 
the depths of a legal analysis, it can be suggested that these remarks indicate that in 
order to arrive at a settlement of the question of transatlantic steel trade, the EC bodies 
displayed not only a certain inventiveness and flexibility in the interpretation of 
relevant Treaty provisions, but also used the grey areas in Community legislation in a 
fashion that must have been deemed suitable to carve out a better negotiating position. 
Now the official mandate to negotiate on behalf of the EC ended the Commission's 
previous role of exploration and lifted Davignon and his staff to the position of formal 
negotiators. The fact that the short-lived 'joint bilateral' approach had not only failed, 
but had also led to an even stronger re-emergence of the global approach, were 
characterised by Van Der Ven and Grunert (1987: 163) as 'a remarkable victory for 
Davignon and the Community at a time of stagnating European integration'. Although 
European solidarity had almost collapsed, the Member States reverted to a common 
approach and acted on the principle that Europe was stronger as a single negotiation 
unit (Woolcock et al., 1985: 51). The point to be made here is that this major 
development was influenced to a considerable degree by external factors, i. e. the 
interests of the US administration and particularly of the US steel industry (see also 
Grunert, 1985). Thus the American rejection of bilateral deals underlined the US view 
of the Community as a unified market place and implicitly gave more weight to the 
idea of the Community as one single trading partner, spearheaded by the Commission. 
6.3.2 The First TentativeAgreement 
Despite this fundamental change in the decision-making structure of the Community, 
the process of agreeing the European position was still an extremely difficult task. 
Progress was now achieved through discussions between the Commission and the 
Member States within the framework of the Art. 113 Committee (see Benyon and 
Bourgeois, 1984: 341). Although the Commission was able to insist on receiving a 
clear position from Eurofer, the divisions among Eurofer members were still the same 
as the translation of the verbal solidarity within the Community into concrete 
solidarity among the producers continued to be difficult (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 
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1987: 164). The main obstacles to achieving solidarity and a clear position among 
Eurofer members could be found in the areas of product coverage of an agreement, 
product mix and particularly the reference periods, which determine the degree to 
which the individual firms would be affected by the voluntary restrictions. In the 
process of agreeing on a burden-sharing key, the German opposition also posed 
numerous problems among Eurofer Members as well as within the Council of 
Ministers. In the face of considerable divisions among the Europeans on the details of 
the aspired agreement, the Commission decided to slightly change their approach to 
the negotiations in early August 1982. Following strong German resistance to 
accepting a larger share of European self-limitation than agreed to in March 1982, the 
US steel industry's resistance to any change whatsoever and the imminence of 
preliminary anti-dumping determinations, Davignon's staff started negotiating with 
their US counterparts without continuously checking with their constituencies (Van 
Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 164). A first round of negotiations between officials in 
Brussels from 29 July to 2 August resulted in a draft text of a series of major 
outstanding points (Benyon and Bourgeois, 1984: 334-36). 
A tentative agreement was subsequently reached on 5 August 1982, but depended on 
approval by the Member States and the US steel industry (Agence Europe, 5.8.1982: 3; 
9.8,1982: 2). At the same time that this agreement did not cover the full product range, 
i. e. it did not extent to pipes and tubes, its operationalisation also depended on US 
steel industry's withdrawal of countervailing, anti-dumping and section 301 suits 
before 15 September and the receipt by the US of an understanding from the industry 
that no new initiatives seeking import relief under US trade law would be undertaken 
in the future. Considering that the US steel industry aspired an agreement that covered 
go percent of all European exports (while only 45 percent was affected by the findings 
of the DOC, the US industry rejected the agreement flatly. The US industry demanded 
lower quotas, the inclusion of alloyed steels and a separate VRA for pipes and tubes 
(Agence Europe, 28.8.1982: 4). 
Now facing even more pressure from Europeans and Americans alike, the US State 
Department and the US Treasury wanted Baldridge to continue his efforts to manage 
the steel problem on part of the US. Van Der Ven and Granert (1987: 165) suspect that 
despite Baldridge's claims that he should have waited for positive feedback from the 
213 
US steel industry before publicly announcing an agreement could have been a 
calculated move. Negotiating a deal with a high chance of being rejected by the US 
steel industry left Baldridge with three specific advantages. Firstly, he was able to 
demonstrate the goodwill of the US administration towards the Community. 
Secondly, he was able to put the blame squarely on the US steel industry, enabling 
him to increase his political leverage over an otherwise highly uncooperative industry 
in order to improve his chances to achieve a deal next time around. Van Der Ven and 
Granert's suspicion that Baldridge's main opponent was indeed the US steel industry 
is given further weight by comments of one Commission official (Interview with DG 
III Official, 28.4.1998), who pointed out that relations during negotiations between 
US and Community officials have been very positive and indeed personal. Thirdly, 
the looming imposition of preliminary anti-dumping duties would at least not harm 
his bargaining position. While chances were that the restlessness within the European 
group of four might grow so as to get a better deal from the Community with the final 
deadline approaching, the US steel industry nevertheless continued to use the 
advantage given to it by generous provisions in US trade law (Van Der Ven and 
Grunert, 1987: 165). 
Following the US industry's rejection of the tentative agreement, the DOC announced 
its preliminary findings in the anti-dumping cases in August 1982 (Agence Europe, 
12.8.1982: 2). They included artificially inflated margins and served the purpose of not 
only enhancing the US steel industry's bargaining power, since a negotiated settlement 
still remained the industry's ultimate aim, but also to protect the US steel industry 
from foreign competition during the final month of investigation. 
The final determinations on subsidies and countervailing duty margins were 
announced by the Department of Commerce on 24 August 1982, were significantly 
lower than expected (Agence Europe, 26.8.1982: 3), and showed that the DOC had 
taken account of earlier European complaints about the methods it used in calculating 
subsidies. Nevertheless, the fundamental disagreement about the interpretation of the 
GATT subsidy code remained. A significant point in this context is that in the absence 
of an independent legal body to determine which interpretation of a subsidy was the 
correct one, the US judgement prevailed automatically (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 
1987: 167). This left the EC in a position where it could only accept or not accept the 
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US determination of what constituted a subsidy and what did not. Once again, US 
trade law and US interpretations of trade issues unilaterally set the boundaries of the 
EC's scope of action. To some extent, however, the announcement of the findings of 
the DOC also helped to clarify the situation and to find a solution. Since overall 50 
percent of European exports would have been able to continue penetrating the US 
market and several companies were totally unaffected (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 
1987: 168), the findings re-enforced the US steel industry's desire to find a settlement. 
The EC even tried to foster this process by discussing market swaps among European 
companies and with the final countervailing duty determinations known, the stage was 
now set for decisive last negotiation rounds. 
6.3.3 The September 1982 Deal 
The final stages of the negotiations were characterised by 'more intra European than 
transatlantic negotiations', with the political authorities on both sides of the Atlantic 
were more willing to reach an agreement than the respective industries (Van Der Ven 
and Grunert, 1987: 168). Since Davignon and Baldridge decided to stick to the terms 
agreed in the August 1982 agreement (Agence Europe, 1.9.1982: 4) and the US 
industry remained unwilling to compromise, the final stages concentrated more on 
intra-European deliberations on finding a compromise among European steel 
producers and creating a legal framework for the implementation of an agreement 
(Benyon and Bourgeois, 1984: 337-50; Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 168). As for 
the latter, the process of introducing a regulatory framework in order to implement the 
arrangement turned problematic when in September 1982 several legislative drafts 
had to be passed and the British and Dutch governments questioned the legal basis for 
supra-national decision-making in this area. Moreover, controversial issues, such as 
the granting of export licences to trade companies or individual firms, the function of 
a Community reserve and the role of Member States in the administration of a quota 
system, had to be addressed (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 168). The outstanding 
bone of contention, however, was the US steel industry's demand to include alloyed 
steels and tubes into the agreement and its consequences for the internal burden- 
sharing. 
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With the exemption of alloyed products, Eurofer managed to solve most of its 
problems concerning the burden-sharing, leaving only 1.5 percent of total Community 
steel exports contested among its members (Agence Europe, 15.9.1982: 5). On the 
basis of these results, the Commission approached the Council in order to establish 
another common European approach to the US demands (Agence Europe, 
18.9.1982: 5). The proposal was based on the August 5 tentative agreement, but 
broader in scope. On 19 October, Baldridge and Davignon were able to reach a 
second tentative agreement. In contrast to the first agreement, this time Baldridge had 
obtained the prior consent of the US steel industry, so that the conclusion of the deal 
depended on the approval of the Member States. The total package as laid out in the 
agreement was accepted by all the delegations. However, the German delegation 
resisted the inclusion of pipes and tubes, mainly because the Gen-nan steel industry 
had a market share of approximately 70 percent in this segment (Conrad, 1997: 128; 
Agence Europe, 16-10.1982: 7). It pointed out that only the German cabinet could 
decide on such an important matter. 
Internal disagreement between Genscher, the Minister of Foreign Affairs who was in 
favour of the agreement for the sake of improving overall transatlantic relations, and 
Graf Lambsdorff, the Minister of Economy, led the German cabinet to eventually 
tabling three conditions upon which German approval of the deal depended (Van Der 
Ven and Grunert, 1987: 170). Firstly, any extension of product coverage under the 
arrangement would be prohibited without prior unanimous agreement of the Council 
of Ministers. Secondly, Germany must be compensated for the negative impact of the 
inclusion of alloyed and Eurofer must agree on a burden-sharing formula for all 
products before the conclusion of an agreement. Thirdly, both the US and the EC had 
to accept the German interpretation of the consultation clause contained in the 
agreement. Under intense time pressure and following emergency sessions of Eurofer 
and the Council, Germany's condition were fulfilled. Its annual export share was 
raised by 17-000 tonnes, Eurofer found a solution to the remaining contingents in the 
burden-sharing key, and under time pressure the Council also yielded to Germany's 
request that the arrangement was not to be extended to include other products without 
the approval of all Member States. The US and the European Member States also 
accepted the German interpretation of the consultation clause, which in effect meant 
that the clause was not binding at all (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 170-1). 
216 
Having satisfied Germany's demands, Baldridge and Davignon were able to conclude 
an agreement that regulated steel exports from the Community to the US between 1 
October 1982 and the end of 1985. The agreement limited exports of carbon and alloy 
steels to an average of 5.44 percent of projected apparent consumption. (C285 of 26 
October 1982). In addition to the fixed share of the US market, there were also a 
number of flexibilities to these ceilings. These include provisions for carry-overs, 
advance use, and product switches. All of these aimed at establishing a degree of 
flexibility in order to enable the Community and the US to administer the system in a 
smooth fashion and to cater for fluctuations in demand and supply. In addition, a short 
supply clause was included. The ceilings were to be assured by a system of export 
licences, covering all products of the arrangement, for which the Community was 
responsible. In order to enforce the arrangement, the Member States were to ensure 
that appropriate sanctions were applied to all those who export without licences or 
otherwise breach the provisions relating to these licences. In order to enable the 
Commission to make sure that the Community fulfils its obligation to the US, the 
Member States were to keep the Commission informed of their administration of the 
licences and to take measures aimed at the enforcement of the arrangement pursuant 
to their respective national law on export or customs matters (Benyon and Bourgeois, 
1984: 349). The Commission proceeded to manage the agreement, fixing exports for 
each Member State on a quarterly basis. 
The US steel industry withdrew all pending countervailing duty and anti-dumping 
investigations for the products concerned (Kulms, 1988: 92). Furthermore, it 
undertook not to file any new suits under US trade law while the agreement was in 
place. While the reactions of both industries were rather reserved, politicians on both 
side of the Atlantic hailed the deal as it eliminated a major problem from the 
transatlantic agenda. President Reagan announced that the mutual understanding that 
had been achieved was 'reassuring evidence that America and her Allies and her 
trading partners can work together for the amicable settlement of differences in an 
atmosphere of cooperation and understanding' (Benyon and Bourgeois, 1984: 350). 
Commission officials presented the deal as a victory for the EC steel industry. 
(Agence Europe, 23.10.1982: 10; Benyon and Bourgeois, 1984: 350-51). Nonetheless, 
there were still some areas of conflict as the agreement established only vague terms 
on the inclusion of pipes and tubes and excluded speciality steels (see section 6.4). 
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Following the conclusion of the 1982 VRA, the EC increased its external protection 
by the means of VRAs- It justified this step with the necessity of having to 
compensate for the reduction of EC exports to the US (Jones, 1985: 396). Moreover, in 
1983 the Commission observed that the effective application of the quota system 
required that the external measures remained in force (COM(83) 589fin of 10 October 
1983). The trump card of the Commission in negotiations with foreign suppliers was 
access to its market and the exporting countries generally felt compelled, after an 
initial period of protest, to accede to the terms offered by the Commission (Howell, et 
al., 1988: 99). In addition, the Commission initiated anti-dumping investigations when 
it felt that this was necessary in order to ease the pressure on the internal market 
(Conrad, 1997: 95). Table 8 in the appendix shows the development of anti-dumping 
and anti-subsidy cases as well as VRAs negotiated by the Commission for the steel 
sector. 
Compared to the possible loss of 50 percent of the US steel market through imposition 
of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, the conclusion of a VER certainly 
represented a successful negotiation for the Commission. Moreover, the promise not 
to file any further legal suits against steel exports from the EC decreased the risks of 
European producers to export to the US. However, as the EC-US steel conflict 
provided for the first major test of the multilateral rules on subsidies and 
countervailing duties and was resolved by a VRA, doubts were cast on the credibility 
of the multilateral regime. Those who drafted the codes might have hoped that the 
EC-US conflict would prove to be the first step toward the operationalisation of 
multilateral rules by the evolution of a kind of GATT case law. However, the steel 
dispute resulted in the operationalisation of divergent US and EC rules, so that it 
weakened the multilateral regime in general and set an important precedent for other 
industries and services (Woolcock, et A, 1985: 15). 
6.4 Contested Issues after the 1982 Agreement 
Despite the wide-spread relief on both sides of the Atlantic that a formal agreement 
had finally been reached, it soon became clear that the trouble was not yet over 
(Mueller and Van Der Ven, 1982). There were three main problems: firstly, the terms 
of the agreement on pipes and tubes were only vague. Secondly, speciality steels had 
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not been included. Thirdly, in agreeing the 1982 VRA, the US had only regulated one 
third of its steel imports (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 172). It was therefore only a 
matter of time before the US steel industry would attempt to complete its shield of 
protection. As a result, the rest of the 1980s continued to be characterised by intense 
interactions between the EC and the US in the steel sector, with the initiation of 
problems almost exclusively stemming from the US steel industry and the 
Commission almost constantly engaged in negotiations with its US counterparts. 
In the case of speciality steel, President Reagan in July 1983 granted four years of 
import protection to US special steel producers, involving a doubling of tariffs and the 
imposition of quotas (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 1987: 174). The European producers, 
whose exports to the US had jumped from 350,000 tonnes in 1980 to 880,000 tonnes 
in 1982, were the main victims of the new measures (Agence Europe, 22.7.1983: 8). A 
trade war ensued between the EC and the US (Conrad, 1997: 129), in the course of 
which the EC took the US to the GATT. The EC demanded a compensation of 150m 
dollars per annum. to offset the damage caused by the US measures. Should this 
demand be declined, the EC was inclined to retaliate against US exports to the EC 
countries. The EC had the backing of the OECD's steel committee, where the US 
found itself completely isolated from the other 23 countries. The US, in accordance 
with the US steel industry which again aimed for a negotiated settlement, offered 
another VRA for speciality steel, but the EC immediately rejected the offer and 
demanded reduced US tariffs on steel-related products, chemicals and textiles, to 
compensate for the speciality steel measures (Agence Europe, 7.7.1983: 14). The US, 
which meanwhile had negotiated orderly market arrangements with most of the 
countries supplying speciality steel to the US, tried to put pressure on the EC to move 
into the same direction. Yet this time the EC was unwilling to yield (Van Der Ven and 
Grunert, 1987: 17) and in late November 1983, the Council of Ministers decided on 
retaliatory measures against the US as of 15 January 1984. On 14 January, the EC 
deposited a list of compensatory duties it intended to take against the US at the World 
Trade Court in Geneva (Handelsblatt, 16.1.1984: 13). Negotiations were eventually 
resumed and led to a settlement of the speciality steel conflict out of Court. At the end 
of 1984, in a GATT Council meeting, the US and the EC agreed to raise quotas and 
tariffs on US exports of various chemical products, security devises, sporting guns 
and athletic equipment in order to compensate for the US special steel measures. The 
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US steel industry had its way again and the EC was compensated. Thus speciality 
steel dispute between the EC and the US had been settled following a determined 
posture of the Commission. 
Despite the evident advantages of the 1982 agreement, the US industry continued its 
legal campaign against carbon steel imports. Particularly the small Gilmore Steel 
Company did not feel bound to the agreement and opened anti-dumping suits against 
hot-rolled carbon steel plate from Germany and Belgium. As these suits affected 
products covered by the 1982 agreement, the suits represented an open violation of 
the terrns of the 1982 agreement. In addition to protests from the Commission, 
European interests such as the German Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl threatened to 
contravene the steel agreement because of the Gilmoore suits and called upon the 
German government to give notice of termination to the 1983 agreement (Van Der 
Ven and Grunert, 1987: 176). While the Gilmore's complaint went through the 
administrational process, the DOC eventually decided not did not impose sanctions 
since it wanted to avoid a new steel conflict with the EC (Van Der Ven and Grunert, 
1987: 176; Agence Europe, 18.4.1984: 5). 
Similarly, in January 1984 Bethlehem Steel, the second biggest US steel producer, 
filed a complaint calling for a 15 percent limit on all steel import for five years. 
Again, the petition represented an open violation of the 1982 agreement and risked the 
collapse of the whole agreement. The Commission immediately stated that should the 
US administration respond to the renewed protectionist demands by the US industry it 
would have a disastrous effect on world trade and on EC-US relations in general 
(Agence Europe, 26.1.1984: 7). Following the ITC's recommendation to impose 
protectionist measures in the form of tariffs and quantitative restrictions, the 
Commission re-enforced its call on the US government in July 1984 (Agence Europe 
13.7.1984: 7; 16.7.1984: 11), stating that non-compliance with the 1982 agreement 
would endanger trade relations between the US and the EC. On 18 September 1984, 
the US President turned down the ITC's recommendation to restrict the Community's 
market share to 15 percent. He justified his decision by pointing out that such a 
solution to the steel problem was not in accordance with the US's national trade 
interests. At the same time, however, he announced vigorous prosecution of alleged 
unfair trade practices by foreign producers, a strict enforcement and monitoring of the 
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1982 agreement, and the negotiation of additional restraint arrangements with those 
supplier countries that previously had rapidly increased their deliveries to the US 
(Agence Europe, 19.9.1984: 8; 20.9.1984: 11). The authority to enforce VRAs was 
granted to the President by the 'Steel Import Stabilization Act' contained in Title VIH 
of the US Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. This new powerful tool represented a 
compromise between protectionism and liberal interests in the US. It contained a 
'sense of the Congress' that the national policy for the steel industry should, when 
implemented, result in a foreign share of the US steel market of between 17.0 and 
20.2 percent. For up to five years, it authorised the US President to carry out those 
actions that may be necessary or appropriate to enforce quantitative limitations and 
other terms agreed to in bilateral agreements (Kulms, 1988: 39). The act even 
legitimised the extension of managed trade mechanisms to steel outside the Escape 
Clause, countervailing duty legislation, section 301, and multilateral arrangements or 
commitments, regardless of a link between the accordance of temporary protection 
and structural adjustment commitments of the industry (Wetter, 1986: 492). With such 
powerful legislation in place, it seemed that only overall political interests of the US 
enabled the EC to announce that the terms of the 1982 agreement were to remain 
unchanged and in place. 
on pipes and tubes, Davignon and Baldridge had only agreed on a vague formula 
within an exchange of letters that accompanied the 1982 carbon steel agreement 
(Wetter, 1986: 494). It had been agreed that in case of a distortion of US trade patterns 
within the pipe and tube segment consultations would take place. Negotiations began 
when EC exports represented more than 14 percent in 1984. It soon became clear the 
EC and the US differed concerning the interpretation of the exchange of letters: While 
the US Congress and administration regarded the pact as a serious commitment, the 
EC considered the percentage of 5.9 percent as a forecast/guideline (Wetter, 
1986: 494). In November 1984, the delegations from the US government and the 
Commission were able to agree on a compromise (Agence Europe, 21.11.1984: 9). 
However, in November 1984, based on the authority of the Steel Import Stabilization 
Act, which in accordance with the terms of the 1982 agreement provided the 
Secretary of the Department of Commerce with the authority to enforce restrictions on 
tubes and pipes, the US government rejected the arrangement and imposed total 
embargo on EC exports of this segment until the end of the calendar year. The US 
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also imposed a unilateral ceiling for EC exports to the US of 5.9 percent of US 
consumption. The reaction of the EC authorities was to give the Commission the 
mandate to terminate the exchange of letters on the 1982 steel agreement (Agence 
Europe, 28.11.1984: 7; 29.11.1984: 7). On 7 January 1985, again against the 
background of very tense transatlantic relations, the Commission and the US 
government arrived at an agreement that limited the Community's exports of pipes 
and tubes to 7.6 percent for two years (Wetter, 1986: 494). 
However, during the negotiations on pipes and tubes, the European steel exporters 
started to ignore their quotas and substantially increased their exports to the US. In 
response, US customs were instructed to 'arrest' the excess deliveries on their entry 
into the US (Agence Europe, 22.5.1985: 8). This US measure triggered strong protest 
from the pipes and tubes producers, who sent large lorries with pipes and tubes to 
block the Round Point Schuman in Brussels in order to increase the pressure on the 
Commission. The Commission had to establish which producer had exported which 
quality and that no accurate monitoring system was in place. Of course, 
accommodating the excess deliveries posed another serious threat to the burden- 
sharing system between the members of Eurofer. In this situation, the Commission 
officials, with the co-operation of their American counterparts, resorted to a trick in 
order to establish the amount of excess deliveries (Interview with DG III Official, 
28.4.1998; Agence Europe, 5.3.1985: 12). The producers were instructed to ask the 
national authorities to issue a postori licences for the deliveries held in US customs. 
The national authorities issued the licences and necessary certificates. Then the 
national authorities were asked to come to Brussels with the customs stamps and the 
Commission took account of the amounts blocked by the US. The customs block was 
lifted and the European producers could sell their exports on the US market. The a 
posteri system was organised within a week and the Commission was able to 
established the amounts that had to be taken into account for the negotiation of a 
separate agreement on pipes and tubes. With this problem out of the way, an 
agreement on pipes and tubes an agreement could be found. On 6 August 1985, the 
Council of Ministers agreed on a sharing key for pipe and tube exports to the US and 
a separate deal on pipes and tubes was concluded (Agence Europe, 24.7.1985: 7; L9 of 
January 1985). The pipe and tubes problem thus provides further evidence of the 
extreme complexities that were involved in the Commission's work. While it had to 
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work towards solutions that were acceptable to the members of Eurofer and the 
Member States, it was undermined in its efforts by the market behaviour of EC steel 
producers. On the other hand, the Commission was constantly forced to adapt along 
the lines of US enforcement of domestic trade legislation. 
After the inclusion of pipes and tubes into a separate agreement, the US steel industry 
still continued its drive to seek quantitative restrictions to European imports for all 
steel categories. In the course of negotiations, the Commission sought to obtain more 
flexibility each time the arrangements were extended (Interview with DG III Official, 
28.4.1998)43 . These flexibilities were especially sought in the field of transfers of 
quotas between categories and the advance use of carry-overs as they enabled the 
Commission to manage some of the difficulties occurring among the Member States. 
However, the US turned increasingly unilateral in its measures and also sought new 
restrictions on products that had not been covered by agreements. On 31 October 
1985, the Commission and the US government agreed on another series of self 
restraint agreements, limiting Community exports to the US until the end of October 
1989 (Agence Europe, 1.11.1985: 8; 22.11.1985: 5). Having established a much more 
comprehensive shield protecting the US market from imports than in the 1982 
agreement, it could have been expected that new arrangement was to regulate steel 
trade between the EC and the US until 1989. However, on the last day of 1985 the US 
government, unilaterally and without consultations, restricted the European exports in 
semi-finished steels to 400,000 tonnes, plus a special contingent of 200,000 tonnes 
granted to the British Steel Corporation, for the same period as the new agreements. 
Similar to its response to the import protection granted to US. speciality steel 
producers in July 1983, the Council of Ministers decided to restrict US exports to the 
EC of certain non-steel products (Agence Europe 10.1.1986: 12; 17.2.1986: 10; 
21.2.1986: 5). These measures were planned for the period from 15.2.1986 to 
15.2.1989. Given that it was two weeks before the retaliatory measures were to take 
effect, it seems that the Community was hoping that during these two weeks an 
43 Both the rigidity of the US in protecting the US steel market and the Commission's strategy of including more 
and more flexibilitics can also evidenced in a rather bizarre incident involving British telephone boxes. Stating that 
the telephone boxes were fabricated structurals, and therefore covered by the EC-US steel agreement, US 
authorities blocked their export. In order to settle this issue, the Commission was forced to play'strange games', 
which were nor at all covered by the existing legislation, but accepted by the US and within the Community 
(Interview with DG III official, 28.4.1998). In agreement with the Member States, the Commission decided to 
issue their own certificates for the boxes, created its own stamps and sent them to the US. The products were then 
allowed to enter the US and the system continued its operations smoothly. 
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agreement could be achieved with the US government. Since the US did not yield, the 
Council on 9 June 1986 gave the mandate to the Commission to enter negotiations on 
semi-finished steels with the US government. The aim was to include semi-finished 
steels into the series of agreements that regulated steel trade until the end of 1989. On 
15 July 1986, the Council of Ministers approved of an agreement based on an 
exchange of letters between the US and the EC. As part of the settlement, the EC 
agreed to drop the retaliatory measures in place since 15 February (Agence Europe, 
17.7.1986: 8). At this point, the US steel industry had achieved its aim of establishing 
a comprehensive shield of protection for the US steel market. All important steel 
exports to the US were subjected to VRAs until 30 September 1989 (Austmann, 
1989: 162). 
6.5 The 1989 Re-Negotiation of the EC-US VRAs 
When the VRAs were about to expire, it soon became clear that the leaders of the US 
steel industry wanted a5 year extension of the VRAs. The US industry had earned 
$2bn in profits the previous year, but considered that continued financial recovery was 
necessary to off-set the losses from the beginning of the decade (Financial Times, 
31.5.1989: 3). Already in February 1989, a draft bill had been submitted to Congress 
to extend these arrangements for another five years. Although it was considered that 
there was enough support in both houses, there were also many US legislators in 
favour of changing the existing scheme (Agence Europe, 27.5.1988: 7). Although the 
intentions of the new US administration were unclear, steel consumers in the US were 
expected to support a liberalisation of the arrangements for the steel industry. Trade 
Representative Carla Hill thus promised an innovative renewal of the VRAs, 
incorporating the needs of both US steel producers and users (Financial Times, 
13.4.1989: 2; Economist, 20.5.1989: 34; International Herald Tribune, 28.2.1989: 7) 
The re-negotiation of the VRAs developed in the context of the GATT Uruguay 
Round (see also chapter eight). While talks were the most ambitious ever and well 
under way, it was clear that the most difficult stages were yet to come. The EC was 
now pressing other nations to take account of the forthcoming Single Market and to 
incorporate the 'reciprocity principle' since it was anticipated that in the future it was 
going to be much easier for supplier countries to penetrate Community markets. On 
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the other hand, there was a growing suspicion, particularly in the US that the EC 
wanted to use the completion of the Internal Market to increase protectionist elements 
in its trade policy (Financial Times, 8.4.1989: 4). Commissioner Nades argued that 
there was a risk that it would be harder for the EC to defend its legitimate interests 
and cited a series of cases of strategic importance in which the Community was 
refused reciprocal arrangements and urged the Member States to find solutions to the 
obstacles placed before the Community for political reasons (Agence Europe, 
27.5.1988: 7). On the other hand, Commissioner Bangemann declared that the time 
had come to return to normal GATT rules governing international steel trade and to 
progressively put an end to voluntary restrictions between the Community and third 
countries. This should also apply to the VRAs between the Community and the US. 
He now called for the principle of 'standstill and roll back', agreed in Punta del Este, 
to be applied to the steel industry (Commission Press Release, IP/89/358,19.5.1989). 
Among those working within the GATT negotiations, the idea of a renewed VRA in 
steel was clearly not appreciated since 'another VRA would not have set a good 
example' (Interview with DG III Official, 6.5.1998). The Commission hence initially 
decided not to agree to another VRA with the US. Moreover, since the US was the 
strongest player in the world economy and the Commission had already experienced 
the power of the US foreign trade legislation, the Commission decided that only 
chance the EC stood was to align its policies with GATT provisions and try to push 
the US to sign up to it (Interview with DG III Official, 6.5.1998). The Commission 
had realised that it would be advantageous to tackle the steel problems with the US at 
the source. Since subsidies created the conditions of selling dumped products, the 
Commission subsequently tried to deny the possibility of exporting subsidised 
products and then be exposed to anti-dumping or countervailing duty cases. Thus the 
steel aids code was extended in 1989, allowing for state aids only in the fields of R&D 
and environmental protection (L38 of 21 March 1989). However, given the strong 
pressure from the US steel industry and within Congress to renew the old VRAs, it 
became clear that the Community would be forced to sign up to another agreement. If 
there was going to be another VRA, then the Community wanted it to be accompanied 
by a bilateral consensus on subsidies. The US administration agreed to making efforts 
to find this consensus on subsidies, but it was clear from the outset that achieving it 
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was going to be a very difficult process and that subsidies would continue to pose the 
biggest obstacle. 
Aware of the complexities surrounding the steel quotas and to the disappointment of 
the US steel producers, President Bush at the end July 1989 eventually announced 
what he called a Steel Trade Liberalisation Programme, which extended US steel 
restrictions for a further 2 Y2years. The quotas were to be raised by I percent a year 
while the US was also to seek an international agreement to eliminate unfair practices 
in steel trade. For EC steel producers, Bush's proposition was hence a good deal better 
than it might have been as it reflected a slightly more liberal approach to US trade 
policy than previously expected. The proposals nevertheless drew an unpopular 
response from the EC. Aware of the fact that the well-working EC market could 
weaken any time, the Commission expressed the opinion that the US industry was in a 
healthy state that did not require a renewal of the VRAs (Financial Times, 27.7.89: 4). 
The Commission pointed out that EC steel products have had only limited access to 
the US market while a number of other exports to the US have not been subject to 
such limitations. Furthennore, EC exports to the US had fallen substantially and the 
EC's share of the US market has likewise been considerably reduced since 1982 
(Commission Press Release, IP/89/607,26.7.1989). The Community on the whole had 
generally no problem with the idea of establishing an international steel consensus, 
though some Member States resented the implication of the proposal that subsidies 
and protection were all one-sided. Overall, however, there was a strong feeling in the 
EC that continuing the VRAs was unnecessary. Within the Council of Ministers most 
Member States, with the exception of Britain and Germany who saw no justification 
for such a step, indicated that they would agree to a temporary extension of the 
restraint agreement with the US. Yet it was felt that the German and British 
opposition was more of a tactical move, since the general assumption was that the EC 
would not categorically block an new arrangement in the light of mounting anti- 
dumping threats by US producers. Here, the continuation of the existing arrangement 
appeared a preferable alternative (Neue ZtIricher Zeitung, 28.9.1989: 7). 
The VRA talks proved difficult and politically charged. In the ran up to the 
negotiations, Trade Representative Carla Hills stressed the US desire to phase out 
steel quotas in return for an international agreement to end subsidies (Times, 
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22.9.1989: 5). Although there was no direct link, the Commission's efforts to persuade 
Italy to shut down its Bagnoli liquid steel plant became entangled in the negotiations. 
In 1988, the Commission had given its blessing to Italy's provision of a E2,3bn debt 
write-off on condition that the plant was shut. As this involved issues relating to 
subsidies and market access, the closure of the plant became a bargaining point in the 
negotiations of the new system of VRAs. Since Italy refused to accept the 
restructuring plan on 26 September, anger at the Italians was mounting because their 
attitude was thought to weaken the EC position in the EC-US talks. This gave rise to a 
feeling within the Council of Ministers that the Italians were 'letting the side down' 
(Financial Times, 26.9.1989: 4) or, as one diplomat put it, the Italians '[were] leading 
us by the nose' (International Herald Tribune, 26.10.1989: 7). 
The initial offer of the US was greeted by the EC with fury. Its terms involved 15-20 
percent cuts in export quantities, depending on which of the product categories were 
chosen. The US indicated that it intented to match the new arrangements with the 
previous ones, namely an 18.4 percent global figure with a possible 1 percent tied to 
consensus pact conditions. The EC, on the other hand, was looking for an 
improvement in terms of the flexibility between products (the existing arrangements 
allowed for transfers up to five percent), more generous rules for carrying quotas into 
the following year, and advance use of the quantities of the next year. One EC official 
was quoted as saying that 'What they had in mind on the agreement was far from 
compatible with GATT principles' (Financial Times, 26.9.1989: 4). Subsequently, 
chances that the US revised its quantity demands upwards were considered unlikely. 
One day before the negotiation deadline on 30 September 1989, only a few small steel 
producers of the 29 nations involved agreed to sign new voluntary restraint 
agreements. Yet none of the big five, Japan, the EC, South Korea Brazil and Mexico, 
which held 87 percent of the US import market, had signed up. 
On 12 October 1989, after weeks of tough bargaining, the EC reached an agreement 
that preserved its share of the US steel market (Commission Press Release, IP/89/761, 
12.10.1989). The new VRA raised the share of the EC from 6.68 to 7 percent of the 
US market and represented an improvement on the initial offer. Improvements were 
made in the area of flexibility, mainly concerning the short supply clause which 
enabled the Community to export extra quantities in cases where the US steel industry 
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was unable to satisfy the specific needs of US consumers. All bilateral agreements 
included a prohibition against future subsidies and other forms of government support 
for steel, prohibitions against the establishment or reinstatement of non-tariff 
measures, commitments to eliminate subsidies and to work for a reduction of 'trade- 
distorting' assistance for steel within the Uruguay Round, and a dispute settlement 
provision involving binding arbitration when a violation of the agreement occurs. The 
agreement was approved by the Council of Ministers (L368 of 18 December 1988). 
After the Community had signed the deal, the other countries followed suit and 
entered into VRAs with the US. They had watched the Community agree a settlement 
before agreeing their own. 
As part of its negotiations on trade with the US, the EC also agreed to phase out its 
VRAs with all third countries (Commission, 1991: 359). This was in line with existing 
EC steel policy, since the effect on the steel market was deemed minimal given that 
imports accounted for only 10 percent of European steel demand and only a fifth of 
which originated from countries covered by import quotas. Moreover, in the light of 
the 1992 Single Market, a liberalisation of these was already on the way given their 
incompatibility with the dismantling of internal trade barriers (Handelsblatt, 
2.10.1989: 6). The continuation of the existing licensing system would not have been 
suitable in these conditions as producers exporting steel to the Single Market would 
simply face one big market. 
While the new US steel pacts were celebrated by the US administration as a triumph, 
hailing an end to 'the cycles of government intervention followed by restrictions in 
this country [the US] and others' (Financial Times, 14.12.1989: 6), US producers were 
more cautious but welcomed the achievement. However, although the bilateral 
agreements included provisions for future subsidies, the agreement on subsidies did 
not change. The EC thus suffered a drawback as the US did not approve of basing the 
consensus pact on the EC Steel Aids code as favoured by European producers. Yet, 
the US conceeded new arrangements that would have extended the application of the 
agreement to 39 steel products. It settled for an arrangement that applied to the 
previously existing range of 15 products. Although the agreement did not open the US 
market as European producers had wanted, negotiators were reported to have felt that 
what they had achieved was the best they could have hoped for. The Commission 
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called the pact a 'credible step towards liberalising steel trade' (Financial Times, 
13.10.1989: 12). It stressed that the deal was better than the previous agreement, not 
only because of the increase in the EC' market share, but also because the clause of 
'short supply' had been revised to make easier above-quota shipments in advance of 
actual shortages in the US market. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed EC steel policy-making vis-a-vis the US throughout the 
1980s. It has shown in great detail how the EC was forced into a comprehensive 
system of VRAs with the US, how the Community's global approach was shaped and 
developed in response to US pressure, how it responded on a number of contested 
steel issues, and how the Community was forced to re-enter into VRAs in 1989. An 
interesting insight of this chapter is that the US approach to the steel problem, which 
was decidedly shaped by the preferences of the US steel industry, in some ways 
fostered or made it necessary that the Commission spearheaded the Community's 
global approach. The US preference to treat the EC as a cohesive trading bloc in order 
to negotiate overall quotas for steel, the US administration's tendency to resort to the 
arbitrary application of unilateral measures that affected the whole of the EC, the US 
rejection of bilateral negotiations all amounted to pressure on the EC Member States 
to stick to and develop a global Community approach. Of course, this is not to suggest 
that the Community approach was not based in the need to ensure coherence between 
internal and external measures in order to make the Community's anti-crisis 
programme succeed. Yet at times when negotiations with the US were deadlocked, 
US actions provided crucial incentives for the Member States to restore and maintain 
a unified approach and to achieve the necessary degree of consensus and compromise. 
Without such a global Community approach, the conclusion of the 1982 VRA would 
have been unlikely and the successful functioning of the internal crisis measures 
jeopardised. 
The EC-US steel dispute was partly solved because the difficult overall political 
situation between the US and the EC required the resolution of at least one of the 
contentious issues on the Transatlantic agenda. The steel issue was chosen because it 
was deemed to be the easiest to resolve. While the existence of the Atlantic alliance 
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therefore helped to contain the dispute, it is remarkable that the EC and the US were 
able to achieve solutions to their conflicts largely by way of discussion. Despite the 
often arbitrary and unilateral nature of many US actions, this seems to suggest that the 
EC despite its underdeveloped status was deemed by the US government too 
important a political counterpart to let the steel issue escalate. One of the few relative 
advantages of the EC was that in contrast to the US administration, the EC did not 
have an 'ideological problem' in negotiating a system of managed trade. As the EC 
had already established an administered market within the EC, it was not unduly 
concerned by a further extension of external regulation. Moreover, it is remarkable 
that conflicts were often taken out not between the American and European 
negotiators themselves, but between the negotiators and their respective domestic 
industries. In fact, in trying to find a solution, negotiators from both sides were sitting 
in the same boat as they had to please the often exaggerated and legally conflicting 
demands of their respective industries. It is therefore suggested that these conflicting 
relationships between administration and industry on both sides of the Atlantic also 
helped to facilitate the negotiation process on a practical level. 
Concerning the operationalisation of the EC's competence, it can be concluded that 
despite the difficult circumstances and limitations of the Commission's negotiation 
competence, the EC showed itself able to adapt to external and internal pressures and 
to creatively fill and interpret loopholes in ECSC Treaty provisions. In practice, the 
Treaty assured the permanence of spheres of influence for each national steel industry, 
corresponding more or less to the borders of the Member States. Given that the 
provisions of Art. 74 ECSC do not give the powers of negotiation in matters of 
foreign trade to the EC, that the Community was subsequently required to obtain 
consent from all national ministers concerned with industrial affairs, and that national 
interests needed to subordinate to a common Community goal, the Commission's 
management of the EC-US steel conflict can be deemed a remarkable success. Again, 
it needs to be stressed that US pressure provided much input to this process. 
Due to the severity of the steel crisis, the strong demands of the US steel industry and 
most importantly due to the permissiveness of the GATT mechanism, the steel dispute 
could not be resolved on the GATT level. On the contrary, the steel dispute lcft open 
the important question as to what extent a signatory party can unilaterally interpret the 
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subsidy code and the question as to when and to what extent subsidies can be 
countervailed. Therefore, the steel dispute did not produce a step towards a common 
multilateral interpretation of the codes on subsidies. Rather the steel dispute brought a 
clear move towards divergent US and European interpretations, with both sides being 
able to claim that they were acting within the bounds of the code. Since both the US' 
and EC's support was needed to make the GATT provisions work and the steel 
question was settled through VRAs, the multilateral regime was undermined. 
However, the Commission recognised that the question of subsidies was to remain a 
irreconcilable issue between the EC and the US and subsequently made efforts to 
align its policies with GATT provisions in order to improve its stance vis-a-vis the 
US. Yet the interconnections between internal restructuring and agreeing an 
international consensus on steel prevented the Community from making progress in 
this direction. The restructuring of the EC steel industry, marked by both an 
overriding national interest of the Member States and interference with the 
Commission's subsidy regime, and the US unilateral interpretation of GATT 
provisions posed immense problems to improving the EC's international stance. While 
the EC was consequently unable to introduce its Steel Aids Code into multilateral 
practice, and therefore failed to improve its international position by structuring 
international norms, there is nevertheless evidence that over the 1980s the EC had 
developed into the main counterpart of the US, not only in steel but also in the larger 
GATT context. Of course, to a large extent this is a consequence of the growing 
magnitude and leverage the Single Market Programme gave to the EC. 
That the Commission developed the principles and operations of its foreign trade 
instruments along the lines of US legislation has been pointed out in chapter four 
already. During the 1980s, and based on the size of the internal market, 'the EC 
successfully continued its external trade regime by offering the dismissal of anti- 
dumping and countervailing duty cases in return for orderly market arrangements with 
third country suppliers. On the other hand, the EC successfully tried to encounter the 
pressure it faced from the pending US countervailing duty and anti-dumping cases by 
pressing for commitments of the US to withdraw anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty suits and not to file new suits in the future. Here, the US seemed to recognise the 
importance of the EC in that it worked towards convincing the US steel industry to 
enter such a commitment. 
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Overall, this chapter showed that the EC was able to act strategicIly once the Member 
States showed the political will and solidarity to act in unison and enabled the 
Commission to negotiate with the US on a more or less equal footing. Seen against 
the background of the complexities of the EC's decision-making process in steel and 
the fact the EC had practically no choice but entering VRAs with the US, the 
Commission has to be credited with obtaining a result that guaranteed not only the 
continuation of the Community's internal steel restructuring programme, but also 
allowed for a number of flexibilities that reduced the complexities involved in 
reconciling external constraints with internal crisis and restructuring measures. 
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EVALUATION PART III: STRATEGIC ACTION IN STEEL IN THE 1980s 
The 1980s were a decisive decade for the European steel community and the EC as a 
whole. Given the cyclical effects of the steel crisis on the national economies and the 
high degree of economic and political interdependence within Europe, the Member 
States and the Commission had to accept many compromises. To that extent, and 
despite the numerous disagreements and obstacles, the developments affecting the EC 
steel sector have resulted in a certain convergence of approaches and a strengthening 
of the European regime. As a result of the effects of the steel crisis, the national 
governments and steel producers united in their demand for the Commission to adopt 
a dirigiste and interventionist policy. Despite contrasting perceptions as to how the 
steel crisis should be resolved on the supranational level, wide-spread political 
support for the adoption of Art. 58 measures pushed the Commission to the political 
forefront. On the basis of a perception of steel as a special case and despite the 
obstructive behaviour of national governments and steel producers, Davignon, for a 
while at least, succeeded in creating a policy community in the steel sector, where 
consensus, however fragile, was achieved by mutual adjustment and accommodation 
between Commission, Eurofer and the Council of Ministers. More than any 
Commissioner before and since, Davignon responded to the demands from national 
governments and companies and provided a high degree of leadership to the European 
steel industry. On the basis of the powerful provisions contained in the ECSC Treaty, 
the EC, spearheaded by the Commission, consequently increased its strategic action 
capacities in the steel sector. 
Nonetheless, throughout the 1980s, decision-making processes within the EC were 
highly complicated, involved actors on many levels, and had to be carried out under 
strong external constraints (see below). Moreover, the actions of national 
governments and steel producers in respect to subsidisation and market behaviour 
complicated, if not at times ridiculed, the entire decision-making process. As a 
consequence, the Commission's management of the steel industry was characterised 
by fragile compromises, often of an hesitant and ad hoc nature, and ultimately lacked 
long-term vision. The strong position of the Council of Ministers in EC decision- 
making processes often acted as a break to the effectiveness and thoroughness of 
internal crisis measures. Moreover, the important powers that the ECSC Treaty 
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confers upon the Commission did not easily translate into political action and the 
Commission lacked the effective means to enforce decisions. As a result, the 
Commission had to strive hard in its efforts to bring about and co-ordinate the 
restructuring process. Despite Davignon's remarkable ability to broker deals where 
others had failed, the Commission encountered massive problems in agreeing 
rationalisation measures with national governments and steel producers alike. As 
these problems transcended into interactions with the US, they highlighted the clash 
of domestic restructuring politics with international politics and ultimately limited the 
EC's strategic action capacities. 
In the light of these limitations, a certain learning curve occurred within the 
Commission and the wider steel policy community during the second half of the 
1980s. Facilitated by changes in personnel, most notably the arrival in office of 
Commissioners Nades in DG III (in 1985) and Brittan in DG IV (in 1988), a 
realisation grew stronger that Community involvement in the steel industry had gone 
too far and that the interventionist direction of steel policy-making ultimately limited 
what the EC could achieve internationally. Internally, factors such as the improvement 
in steel market conditions, the commitment to the Single Market Programme, the 
gradual demise of the notion of steel as a special sector, changes in national policy 
lines, and, within the Commission, disillusionment with the obstructive behaviour of 
steel companies and national governments contributed to this development. As a 
result, the balance of intra-institutional competition within the Commission altered, 
i. e. DG IV increasingly asserted itself over DG III, and the Commission started to 
alter its internal as well as external policies towards the incorporation of free-market 
ideas. This significant policy development not only gradually liberated the 
Commission from internal commitments and complications in connection with the on- 
going restructuring process, but also enlarged its international scope for action by 
aligning steel policies with the broader thrust of the Single Market Programme. 
However, the strengthening of the internal regime during the early 1980s did not 
result in an ability to actively shape its trading environment per se. While the EC was 
able to develop and shape its means to impose its preferences on all major steel- 
supplying countries, the same is not true for the case of the US. In steel policies vis-a- 
vis the US, the EC throughout the 1980s has been forced to react rather than it has 
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been able to act. Of course, this was not only a consequence of the fact that the EC 
being dependent on the US market had the objective preserving as much of the US 
market as possible in order to secure the functioning and stability of the internal steel 
market, but also a consequence of the complexities involved in the EC's decision- 
making process. 
Under Davignon, the Commission largely succeeded in reconciling the divergent 
interests of the EC's Member States and their respective producers during negotiations 
with the US administration. This was no easy task given the economic and ideological 
differences among the Member States and the number of political and legal 
uncertainties the Commission faced in establishing a global approach of the 
Community vis-b-vis the US. Considering that the US used its foreign trade legislation 
and the interpretation of which to fuel the intra-European conflict concerning 
subsidies among the Community's Member States, Davignon created and maintained 
a remarkable degree of cohesion within the European steel industry. The market 
behaviour of the European steel producers, who readily used every loophole available 
to survive the cut-throat competition of the domestic market did not facilitate the 
Commission' s negotiation stance and added to the complexity of the Commission's 
mandate. Equally, the complications the Commission encountered in organising the 
successive crisis cartels and in facilitating the process of agreeing to a burden-sharing 
key added to the complexity of the task. The fact that a global arrangement was 
eventually finalised showed that the Europeans were able to achieve favourable 
results when acting as a single negotiation entity and to create an element of stability 
in times of acute crisis for the export-dependent EC steel producers. 
The development of the Community's global approach was strongly influenced by the 
insistence of the US to reach an overall agreement with the EC. Furthermore, it has 
been shown that the EC's global approach has been decidedly shaped by and along the 
lines of US trade legislation as well as the US' interpretation of which. For most of the 
time during the 1980s, the EC found itself in a position in which it had to 
accommodate US action, i. e. the application of US trade remedies, and to construct a 
consensus among the Member States and producers. Only on occasions, particularly 
concerning incidents involving unilateral measures of the US, was the EC able to 
reverse the direction of negotiations towards the inclusion of European interests by 
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addressing steel trade issues within multilateral organisations. In the second half of 
the 1980s, a policy learning effect took place and the Commission realised that if it 
was to improve its international position it had to tackle the subsidy problem at the 
source and align its policies with the GATT. Although efforts aimed at agreeing an 
international steel consensus on subsidies failed in the late 1980s, it had become clear 
by this time that in the wake of the SEM Programme the EC had matured into a major 
player in the international political economy, second only to the US. 
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PART IV: STRATEGIC ACTION IN STEEL IN THE 1990S 
In parts H and III of the case study, the thesis has investigated EC strategic action up 
until the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s. It has been shown how the EC has 
gradually assumed the responsibility to manage policy-making in the steel sector (in 
chapter four) and how the EC has resorted to an interventionist policy-making style 
during the 1980s (chapters five and six). The latter two chapters also shown the 
beginnings of a transition in policy-making in the steel sector, i. e. the departure from 
interventionist policy-making towards efforts to liberalise the steel sector and 
international steel trade. In part IV, the thesis turns to EC steel policies during the 
1990s and continues to investigate the transition of policy-making in steel. As in part 
III, the chapter distinguishes between the EC's internal and external policy-making 
and the focus adopted in part III is extended here in that analysis concentrates on the 
EC's interactions with steel producers and Member States during the 1990s steel crisis 
and the ECs approach to the 1990s EC-US trade conflict in steel on both the bilateral 
and multilateral level. Conclusions with regards to the EC's capacity to act 
strategically in steel during the 1990s at the end of this part bring the longitudinal 
study of the EC steel industry to a close. 
237 
CHAPTER Sl, ' WEN: INTERNAL POLICY-MAKING IN STEEL IN THE 1990s 
Infrodaidlott 
'Mis chaptcr analyses internal EC policy-making in the context of tile 1990s steel 
crisis. Aflcr a brief review of the landscape of the steel industry and the beginning of 
the 1990s, the chaptcr nnaly= the Commission's new, liberal approach to market 
regulation in the steel industry at thc beginning of the 1990s. Similar to events in the 
1980s, a worsening in the market situation during 1992/3 then led to calls for flic 
Commission to once again activate the crisis provisions of Art. 58 ECSC. This chapter 
shows how, as a consequence of a number of changes internal and external to the EC 
(see also chapter cight), the Commission decided against direct intervention in the 
steel industry and ottcniptcd to restructure the steel industry by the means of a steel 
rcscuc plan. I'lic structurc of this chapter closely mirrors the structure adopted in 
chaptcr rivc and distinguislics bctwccit two major sections on the EC's rcgulation of 
the stccl mark-ct and thc H Cs rcstructudng cfforts. 
7.1 Landscape of the Stcel Industry In the 1990s 
In 1991, the EC accounted for 18.7 percent ortotai world steel production, compared 
with 10.8 pcrccnt for thc US and 14.9 percent for Japan. Between 1974 and 1993, 
cinployinctit in the steel industry fell from 870,000 to approximately 320,000. The 
capacity utilisation rate stood at an avcn. gc of 69 percent in 1992. While the capacity 
or the European steel industries had declined only moderately, thcre was a 
considerable increase in productivity (from 170 tonnes per worker in 1975 to 400 
tomics in 1993) following the substantial investment of an estimated 65bn ECU in 
subsidies between 1975 and 1993 (Wicncrt, 1995a: 324). Of course, a substantial part 
of these payments went towards the covering of losses and social measures in the steel 
sector. 
While ovcr-capacities continued to exist, the Community's steel industry had 
undergone a proccss of concentration (Wicnert, 1995a, b). In France, the two 
dominating rtccl produccrs Usinor and Sacilor had been united into Usinor-Sacilor in 
1987, aflcr they had individually swallowed up a great number of smaller producers. 
As it result, practically the cntirc French steel production was state-owned. With a 
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production of 23m tonnes (Oberender and Rilter, 1993: 73) and share of 21.1 percent 
of the Community market in 1992 (Wienert, 1995b: 325), Usinor-Sacilor was by far 
the most important steel producer in the EC. In the UK, British Steel emerged as the 
dominating steel producer (12.4 percent in 1992), again as a consequence of a 
concentration policy of the government. In contrast to France, however, the Thatcher 
government had poured billions of pounds into the company and then privatised it. 
The share of the Italian state-owned Ilva group (formerly Finsider) was about 11.0 
percent of the EC market. Since Ilva had to share the national market with many 
successfully operating electro-minimills, its share of the Italian market was only 45 
percent. In the privately organised German steel industry, Thyssen was traditionally 
the biggest producer. Yet after the merger of Krupp and Hoesch it had to share this 
position (10.2 and 8.6 percent of the EC market in 1992). In the EC steel industry as a 
whole, no company had a market dominating position (see table 5 in the appendix). 
The slow process of privatisation that had begun in the late 1980s continued in the 
1990s. The privatisation of British Steel through approximately f8bn of public money 
not only enabled the British government to take a decidedly anti-subsidy stance 
during the 1990s, but also bad repercussions in countries such as France. In parallel to 
gradual changes in French industrial culture away from Colbertism, the newly 
appointed chairman of Usinor-Sacilor, Francis Mer, instituted policies that had strong 
echoes of those carried out at British Steel (Dudley and Richardson, 1999: 239-40). 
These significant developments in two of the most influential Member States had the 
effect that free-market ideas slowly gathered support across the EC and within the 
Commission. 
7.2 EC Market Regulation in the 1990s 
In the Getieral Objectives Steel - 1995, the Commission set out the political and legal 
framework for the EC steel industry in the 1990s. The Commission concluded that the 
steel crisis had finally come an end and that in the future steel producers would have 
to determine their strategies without the help of the Member States (COM(90) 201 
final of 7 May 1990). Officials from DG III made a big contribution to this report, 
reflecting their own weariness and disillusionment following their long-standing 
involvement with the active management of the steel industry as well as their belief 
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that steel companies should undergo a change of heart (Dudley and Richardson, 
1997: 7). 
In an economic climate deemed totally different from previous ones, the Community's 
steel policy was to be characterised firstly by 'continuing liberalisation of economic 
policies, a clearly less interventionist stance on part of the Community and a fully 
competitive environment' (COM(90) 201 final of 7 May 1990: 9). This new 
framework was intended to give steel producers not only the initiative, but also the 
responsibility, for all decisions affecting their industrial structures and commercial 
practices. Secondly, the Commission announced 'a greater commitment by the 
Commission to secure compliance with the rules of free competition both within the 
Community, by firms (agreements or concerted practices) and by Member States 
(state aids), and in international trade' (COM(90) 201 final of 7 May 1990: 9). Thirdly, 
the Commission stated its 'genuine detennination ... to support, if necessary, corporate 
initiatives using the instruments of the ECSC Treaty, which will bring steel closer to 
the industrial sectors by the EEC Treaty' (Commission, 1990: 9). Specifically 
addressing steel companies, the Commission made it plain that the new policy 
framework implied for them that the Commission would 'pursue a very strict policy 
regarding state aids and monitoring compliance with Articles 65 and 66 of the Treaty'. 
Similarly, companies would 'no longer be able to count on an interventionist policy 
for the organisation of the Community market (based on Art. 58)', since Art. 58 
provisions were not applicable in the event of normal cyclical fluctuations in a period 
of economic stability, as was expected for the steel market over the forthcoming years 
(COM(90) 201 final of 7 May 1990: 11). Nevertheless, the Commission did not 
outrule the possibility of non-nal cyclical fluctuations. 
The Single Market was expected to have a strong positive - though indirect - effect on 
the steel industry. Although steel was acknowledged to have been a special case, the 
thrust for deregulation coming with the 1992 Programme was expected to make the 
emphasis on the free market irreversible. In particular, the Commission expected the 
1992 Programme to have repercussions on competition, cost structure 44 and the 
strategies of European steel producers. The Commission subsequently expected from 
44 The Commission expected that the 1992 Programme would provide windfalls for the industry, with considerable 
effects on energy costs and financing costs, thus enabling steel prices to come down without squeezing benefits. 
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companies that they show a new dynamism. The Commission report claimed that 
companies' management had undergone a fundamental reappraisal and that they had 
already taken action in order to protect themselves against future downturns and 
strong competition from outside. More specifically, companies paid increasingly 
attention to customer service and commercial investment, diversified into areas other 
than steel, had already carried out a number of take-overs and mergers, and 
increasingly specialised in high-quality products and more integrated production 
techniques. As the Economist (10.3.1990: 7) put it: '[T]hc real revolution in the EC's 
steel industry ... has been the rediscovery of the customer'. The Commission pointed 
out that bid mergers, especially cross-border ones, were necessary in order to succeed 
in restructuring the industry. The emphasis of Commission policies on the 
liberalisation of the steel industry is furthermore underlined in the report's suggestion 
that big steel firms would do well to consider expanding further into distribution into 
other Member States, while making it clear that it would not tolerate steel companies' 
attempts to tighten their grip on distribution in their home markets. 
The Steel Objectives 1995 also made it clear that there were no grounds for 
complacency since the European steel industry still lagged behind its two most 
important competitors and the Commission urged companies to use the good years 
ahead to invest in the future. Nonetheless, it was also clear that the industry continued 
to look for the Member States to provide subsidies in order to maintain and improve 
their position should another crisis hit the steel sector. The 'collective reasoning' of 
European steel producers (Handlesblatt, 2.10.1989: 5), i. e. their readiness to scale their 
production back should demand slow down and not resort to price competition with 
other European producers, was still questionable as differences in competitiveness 
among European producers were bound to lead to reiteration of the 1980s subsidy 
cycle. Moreover, even at this time of relative recovery, European steel producers 
continued to display a certain readiness to make full use of the crisis measures of the 
ECSC treaty. Despite the gradual disappearance of over-capacity, Francis Mer, the 
chairman of Usinor-Sacilor, warned that steel demand would inevitably wane again 
and that a re-imposition of the production quotas by the Commission may be 
necessary (Financial Times, 26.4.89: 3). However, the Commission's policy statement 
for the first part of the 1990s clearly rebuffed such hopes on the part of steel makers. 
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In July 1990, the Commission's emphasis on competition within the steel sector was 
underlined by its announcement of a fine against producers of cold-rolled stainless 
steel products 45 , which had never been covered by the quota system. The investigation 
had been initiated in 1988 (Commission Press Release, IP/88/261,4.5.1988) and the 
Commission's decision to fine seven producers a total of 425,000 ECU was the first of 
its kind since 1980. Yet the fines were very much reduced from the levels that would 
normally have been appropriate in cases of serious infringements of competition rules. 
In its decision, the Commission explained that the quota system established for the 
other steel products may have given the companies concerned the impression that the 
normal operation of the rules of competition had been modified, but that the unusual 
circumstances in this case would not apply in the future. Since steel was not 
considered a special case anymore, the Commission expressed its intention to take 
severe action against any steel producers attempting to form cartels or make less 
formal arrangements to restrict or control markets or prices under the EEC Treaty 
(Commission Press Release IP/90/584,18.7.1990). Underlining that times had 
changed and despite its moderate treatment of the Art. 60 violation, the Commission 
nevertheless made it clear that it regarded cartels to be glaring contradictions to the 
Community's campaign to create the Single Market by 1992 and that it could not 
tolerate any substitution of the Community system by unofficial and illegal 
arrangements. 
The Commission henceforth continued its tough line on violations of Art. 65 ECSC. 
For instance, in February 1994, when the Community was engaged in crucial and 
politically charged negotiations on the implementation of its steel rescue plan, the 
Commission had no hesitation to announce fines amounting to ECU 104.4 million 
against a cartel of 16 steel producers supplying steel beams to the construction 
industry (Financial Times, 15.2.1994b: 3; FAZ, 18.2.1994: 14). Here, the timing of the 
announcement of the decision appeared to have been chosen by the Commission in 
order to put additional pressure on EC steel producers to agree on the Commission's 
steel rescue plan (Silddeutsche Zeitung, 17.2.1994: 10; see section 7.3.3). In a novel 
case, ten of these companies and Eurofer applied to the Court of First Instance for 
45 The so-called 'Sendzimir Club', named after a stainless steel production method, included eight leading stainless 
steel producers (British Steel, Thyssen and Krupp from Germany, Acerinox from Spain, Temi Speciali from Italy, 
ALZ from Belgium and Ugine from France). 
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annulment of the decision on the grounds that the Commission had infringed their 
procedural rights and misinterpreted ECSC competition rules. They also claimed that 
the Commission had been implicated in the producer's practices and that the fines 
were disproportionate. Following the review of a total of some 11000 documents, the 
Court in March 1999 upheld most of the Commission's findings and rejected the 
accusations that the Commission had been involved in the infringements. The Court 
none the less ruled that the Commission had to some extent exaggerated the anti- 
competitive effect and reduced the fines accordingly (EJC Press Release No 14/99, 
11.3.1999). In the last case of this kind to date, the Commission in January 1998 fined 
another stainless steel cartel a total of ECU 32.67m for concerted practices since 
December 1993. The agreement contributed to what was almost a doubling of steel 
prices between January 1994 and March 1995 (Commission Press Release, IP/98/70, 
21.1.1998). 
7.2.1 ECSC Question 
In the end of August 1990, the Commission's emphasis on deregulation and 
liberalisation was further underlined by Competition Commissioner Brittan's attack on 
steel's special status within the EC. Together with sympathetic officials, members of 
the new policy advocacy coalition that favoured free-market ideas, he proposed to 
abolish the ECSC Treaty and to align the steel sector with other sectors of the 
European economy. He made it clear that with the upcoming establishment of the 
Single Market, steel should be treated like any other industry covered by the 1957 
Treaty of Rome (Financial Times, 31.8.1990: 6). His move came as a consequence of 
both the huge costs the steel industry had accounted for since the 1970s and the 
recovery in the steel sector that made the powers of the Treaty unnecessary. His prime 
intention was thus to stop the industry from using the Treaty's interventionist 
provisions in crisis situations and to prevent the Commission from once again getting 
involved in managing possible steel crises. Moreover, he took the view that the Treaty 
only slowed down the industry's adjustment to lower demand. The abolition of the 
Treaty would create a more competitive market place and force the industry to 
quicken the pace of reconstruction. Inspired by the modest fine the Commission was 
forced to levy on the cold-rolled steel cartel, he also suggested that price rules 
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imposed under Art. 60 ECSC could be replaced by Arts. 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty 
(Financial Times, 31.8.1990: 6). 
Although steel consumers strongly supported Sir Leon's initiative, the proposal was 
not only opposed by industry and Member States, but also faced opposition from 
within the Commission. Industry Commissioner Bangemann, who was by no means 
opposed to free-market ideas but also saw the need for an industrial policy on the 
grounds of practical politics (Dudley and Richardson, 1999: 238), at most seemed 
prepared to accept minor modifications to the Treaty (Financial Times, 31.8.1990: 6). 
Trade unions, participating through the ECSC Committee, were heavily opposed to 
the proposal. Apart from British Steel, the industry rejected the proposal not least 
because of the downturn many expected to hit the industry in the near future. Since 
the industry was still burdened with an estimated over-capacity of 20-35in tonnes and 
only the buoyant markets of the previous three years had liRed producers into profits, 
most companies argued that Art. 58 ECSC should be kept in case it was needed later. 
The industry was largely prepared to consider some amendments, such as the way the 
Treaty was applied and in respect to Art. 60 ECSC, but not concerning its principles 
and rules or the abolition of Art. 58. The opposition was led by the German producers, 
with Ruprecht Vondran, chairman of the German steel federation, arguing that in view 
of the heavy burdens on the steel industry as a result of the changes in Eastern Europe, 
it was especially important to maintain the stability the ECSC treaty provided for the 
industry (Financial Times, 31.8.1990: 6). In a series of meetings with Sir Leon, the 
industry pointed out that the Davignon Plan had ensured that the European steel 
industry emerged strong enough to compete internationally in the 1990s and that steel 
required special treatment due to the special characteristics of the industry. The Treaty 
should therefore be allowed to naturally expire in 2002. 
in the end, the opinion of most companies, namely that abolishing the Treaty would 
be virtually impossible on a political level since it required a unanimous vote in the 
Council of Ministers and ratification by the EP, held- true. Since the German 
government reected the idea of abolishing the Treaty, the plan was eventually 
dropped at the Council meeting on 29 April 1991. Instead, the Commission 
recommended that the Treaty should be maintained until its expiry in 2002, but 
revised so that it gradually dovetailed with the EEC Treaty (Financial Times, 
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19.11.1990: 9). In its March 1991 communication on the future of the treaty, the 
Commission decided 'to adopt, as its political position, the general option which 
provides for the ECSC Treaty to expire as scheduled in 2002, taking advantage of the 
flexibility which this provides in order to modify the application of the Treaty, as far 
as possible, to the two industries so that they are gradually taken over by the EEC 
Treaty in 2002'(SEC(91) 407 final of 15 March 1991. 
In the stark confrontation of the old and new policy advocacy coalitions, for which 
Brittan's initiative is an early example, it became obvious that national governments 
and the majority of steel companies were still not prepared to forgo the industry's 
ultimate status as a special case. Yet it showed that, as Dudley and Richardson 
(1999: 240) put it, the policy discourse had shifted fundamentally while the usual 
constraints were still in place. After Sir Leon's original plan failed there were two 
alternatives available to achieve the same end: Firstly, subjecting the industry to more 
stringent competition rules, and secondly, using multilateral steel talks (the MSA 
talks) to commit the EC to a liberal regime. The Commission ensured the first already 
in its communication, by making the point that it 'in the event of a revision of the 
ECSC Treaty were to take place before its expiration, [was] to ensure that the 
provisions of the ECSC Treaty related to price rules (Art. 60) and trade policy (Art. 
71-75) are repealed, with it understood that these areas would then automatically fall 
under the corresponding provisions of the EEC Treaty' (SEC(91) 407 final of 15 
March 1991). The second alternative, to incorporate the steel industry in a 
multinational agreement in order commit the steel industry to a liberal regime, is 
treated in the context of chapter eight. 
7.3 EC Restructuring during the 1990s 
In 1989, the positive trend in steel prices that had previously characterised EC steel 
markets reversed. Against the background of a decline in steel demand, steel prices 
fell by an average of 20 percent between 1989 to 1992. Between 1989 and 1991, 
company profits fell by an estimated average of 65 percent. Increased imports from 
the CEECs, which rose from 1991 to 1992 by 34 percent had an additional downward 
effect on EC steel prices (Conrad, 1994: 338-9). Therefore, in mid-1992, many EC 
steel producers therefore once again demanded Commission intervention. However, 
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this time, the industry was not almost unanimous in its demand for the declaration of a 
manifest crisis and even Eurofer resisted calls from some members to press for more 
intervention by the Community (Financial Times, 15.2.1993: 2). Even more 
significantly, the situation in Brussels had changed profoundly and the Commission 
was unwilling to return to the interventionist management of the steel industry for a 
situation which was clearly of a cyclical nature. As Dudley and Richardson (1997: 8) 
point out, the situation was additionally complicated by exogenous factors such as the 
end of the cold war and the unification of Germany. It should be added that the 
Commission's commitment to the SEM, the liberalisation of steel trade in general, and 
the efforts vis-a-vis the US at arriving at an multilateral agreement added to the 
complexity of the situation (see chapter eight). All these factors had repercussions on 
the Commission's unfavourable response to demands to declare another manifest 
crisis. 
The new steel crisis had diverse effects on the national steel industries (Conrad, 
1997: 139-40). Hit by the largest reduction of their capacity utilisation rate, the 
Gen-nan and the Spanish steel industry were affected most. While these development 
partly explain the individual reactions and policies pursued by the Member States (see 
also the interest determinants of Member States at the beginning of the 1990s steel 
crisis in table 8 in the appendix), it is also important to consider the effect of the new 
policy ideas on Member State strategies. Germany, while generally being a firm 
member of the free-market coalition had the problem that the steel producers in 
eastern Germany required large-scale subsidies in order to pay for restructuring. 
Social and regional considerations linked to German unification thus somewhat 
undermined the German government's traditional anti-subsidy stance. Nevertheless, 
Germany joined ranks with the UK and France in opposing the old subsidy system 
(Dudley and Richardson, 1999: 241). The British and French opposition to a another 
circle of large-scale subsidies can be explained by political changes in both countries 
and a transnational policy convergence that led British Steel and Usinor-Sacilor to 
campaign vigorously against subsidies in the steel sector during the 1990s (Dudley 
and Richardson, 1999: 238-40). 
As a result of this new constellation of preferences across the EC, Member States and 
steel producers, the Commission decided in favour of indirect measures. The 
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Commission estimated that a restructuring of the EC's steel sector required the 
shedding of 31-42 million tonnes; per year in crude steel products and 19-26 million 
tonnes per year in hot-rolled products (SEC(92) 930fin. of 1991: 3). In addition, the 
Conunission wanted to improve the competitiveness of the steel industry by tying 
subsidies not covered by the subsidy code to capacity reductions. The following 
section examines the Commissions efforts in respect to these two aspects. 
7.3.1 The Steel Rescue Plan 
At the end of February 1993, the Council accepted a rescue plan proposed by the 
Commission. The package contained a number of individual measures aimed at a 
reduction of production capacity and a restructuring of the European steel industry. 
Conrad (1994: 341-2) summarised the measures as follows: Firstly, the Commission 
was to pre-finance capacity reductions through loans granted under Art. 53 ECSC. 
These loans were due for repayment once the producers started to profit from capacity 
reductions or at the latest in June 2002. Secondly, the Commission was to approve of 
subsidies outside the EC's Steel Aids Code, but strictly in connection to capacity 
reductions. Thirdly, the Commission was to take measures aimed at improving market 
transparency, i. e. publish quarterly, product-specific production and delivery 
forecasts. Fourthly, in accordance with ECSC competition rules the Commission was 
to support company fusions and production co-operation. Fifthly, the Commission 
was to provide social aid measures as incentives for capacity reductions. Sub ect to 
the approval of the Council of Ministers, the Commission decided to provide the 
amount of ECU 240m in addition to the ECU 210m provided through Art. 56 ECSC. 
For the period from 1993 to 1995, and including Member State contributions, the 
Commission planned to provide a total of ECU 900m for the social aspects of 
restructuring. However, the provision of these aids were tied to steel companies 
agreeing to binding commitments on capacity reductions. 
In order to secure short-term sales of Community steel producers, the Commission 
established temporary import protection, especially for CEEC and Russian steel 
imports. However, establishing protection against the prospective future Member 
States in Central and Eastern Europe was a politically sensitive issue and coincided 
with the negotiation of the EAs. The steel crisis and the loss of the US market 
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(through renewed US anti-dumping and countervailing actions; see chapter eight), and 
the on-going structural crisis of the EC Steel industry subsequently cast a shadow over 
the negotiations of the EAs (for detailed treatments of the negotiation process see 
Sedelmeier, 1995 and Torreblanca Payd, 1997; on the treatment of ECSC products 
under the EAs see Wang and Winter, 1993; Winters, 1992; Montaguti, 1997; Van den 
Hende, 1997). Due to different starting points, the regulation of Eastern European 
steel imports within the context of enlargement and recession caused some tensions 
between DG 1, DG III and DG IV (Interview with DG IV Official, 27.4.1998). DGI 
performed a central role in these negotiations, supporting a broad-based trade 
liberalisation and responsible for the Commission's general reluctance to apply trade 
defence measures against CEECs. DG I was also supportive of including some 
flexibility concerning state aids in the case of Poland , which met with resistance from 
DG IV since it tried to establish a degree of Community discipline in regard of state 
aids. DG-III, on the other hand, displayed a tendency to raise arguments in favour of 
trade defence instruments against CEEC steel imports. Moreover, in the context of the 
negotiation of the special protocols of the EAs, DG III actually allowed Eurofer 
official's immediate input by placing them 'in the room next door' throughout the 
crucial stages (Wang and Winter, 1993: 22). Overall, however, and influenced by 
changes in the economic climate, the emergence and later unravelling of restructuring 
plans, and the influence of lobbying, DG III oscillated between market-opening and 
market protection arguments between 1990 and 1994 (Sedelmeier, 1995: 12). 
Agreeing the external measures of the rescue plan provided for a political battle 
between Commissioner Brittan, who had taken of the DG I portfolio, and 
Commissioner Bangemann. Brittan as a committed free trader and now even more 
concerned with looking at the broader picture of EC foreign trade, took the view that 
in threatening to restrict steel imports the EC was neglecting its promises to the 
prospective EC members in Eastern Europe. Bangemann, under pressure from 
German steel producers, argued that unless cheap imports from Eastern Europe were 
brought under control, restructuring was difficult to achieve (Financial Times, 
20.3.1993: 2). Eventually, tariff quotas were negotiated with the Czech and Slovak 
Republics and Poland and ceilings established for CIS imports (COM(94)125final of 
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13 April 1994)46 . Between January and April 1993, these restrictions raised intemal 
steel prices and between 1992 and 1993 imports from Eastern Europe dropped by 28.7 
percent (Conrad, 1997: 136). 
With the external protection in place, the Commission's attention shifted to the 
implementation of the other measures contained in the rescue plan. The restructuring 
of the Community's private steel producers overlapped with the restructuring of the 
state-owned subsidised steel producers, who were set to receive another (last) round 
of subsidies. This led to much political controversy and a gulf between the private and 
state-owned steel producers, which was mirrored on the Member State level (see for 
instance Times 22.2.1993: 3; FAZ 23.2.1993: 5; Financial Times, 25.2.1993: 3; 
Handelsblatt, 26.2.1993: 4; Die Zeit, 5.3.1993: 22). Here, Germany found itself in a 
peculiar situation given the contradictions between the political imperatives attached 
to the Eastern German steel producer EKO-Stahl and its traditional anti-subsidy 
stance as demanded by the private West German steel industry. Since the private steel 
producers were not prepared to agree on capacity cuts among themselves in the light 
of these subsidies, the aid cases hence became 'a bit of a stumbling-block towards the 
wider restructuring' (Interview with DG IV Official, 27.4.1998)47. In the following, 
analysis turns first to the Commission's application of the Aids Steel Code vis-a-vis 
the state-owned companies and then to the process of agreeing capacity cuts with 
private companies. 
7.3.2 The Control ofSubsidies in the 1990s 
The Commission's subsidy policy during the 1980s had been unable to contain the 
subsidy race among the Member States, in the course of which the Commission had 
been forced to approve of many operating aids in order to maintain the stability of the 
EC steel market. Although the Commission tried to progressively tighten the rules on 
state aids through the publication of successive subsidy codes, the Member States' 
tendency to delay the necessary restructuring through operational subsidies had led to 
substantial over-capacities (see chapter five). Since 1988, DG IV had started to assert 
46 The quotas for Poland were negotiated but not realised. 
47 Moreover, some of the cases were later legally attacked by individual steel producers and steel associations 
(British Steel, EISA, and Wirtschaftsvereiningung Stahl), but the European Court of Justice in 1997 upheld the 
Commission's decisions. 
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itself more on matters relating to the steel sector and in 1991 the Commission 
announced that under the new fifth Steel Aids Code operating aids were strictly 
forbidden. However, the new code did allow for aid to be granted for R&D in 
accordance with the normal rules and also contained special provisions permitting 
limited aid for environmental protection and plant closures (L362 of 31 of December 
1991). In 1992, the Commission was notified of six major restructuring plans for 
publicly-owned steel companies, involving large amounts of state aid. These cases 
concerned two companies in Spain (CSI and Sidenor), two in Germany (SEW Frcital 
and EKO-Stahl), Italy's Ilva and Portugal's Siderurgia Naticional. In the case of Italy's 
Ilva, the government had already paid out without awaiting the Commission's 
decision". None of these cases could be approved under the Steel Aids Code and the 
Commission duly refused to forward the proposals to the Council of Ministers for 
approval under Art. 94 ECSC. 
For each of these cases, the Commission had to make sure that there were sound 
justifications for granting aids. Apart from cases where the objective was to privatise 
the company, the Commission employed independent consultants in order to assess 
the viability. The Commission attempted to strike a balance between the amounts of 
aid authorised and the size of the capacity reduction (a rough rule of thumb used by 
the Commission stipulated that for each billion of ECU in aid there should be a 
capacity reduction of 750,000 tonnes). Yet after allowance was made for special 
circumstances, there was a wide variation in the amount of aid per tonne of capacity 
reduction (Interview with DG IV Official, 27.4.1998). In order to receive the 
subsidies determined this way, Spain, Italy and Germany had to agree to privatise 
their state-owned steel companies (Agence Europe, 16.9.1993: 8) 49 . After negotiating 
appropriate adjustments to the proposals with the Member States concerned (Agence 
Europe, 7.7.1993: 5; 8.9.1993: 6; 20/21.9.1993: 7), the Commission concluded that the 
plans could make a significant contribution to EC objectives to justify granting state 
aid to ease the restructuring process. 
48 For the peculiarities involved in the case of the Italian sector see Masi (1996) and SEC(91) 930fin. of 10 June 
1991. 
49 Spain privatiscd CDI fully and Sidcnor partially; Italy privatised Ilva, and Germany privatised EKO-Stahl. 
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Due to the interference between the process of approving subsidy proposals and the 
process of agreeing capacity reductions among private producers (see also next 
section), the approval of the rescue plan by the Council of Ministers was delayed. In 
tile run-up to the crucial December Council meeting the German Minister for Trade 
and Economics, Rexrodt, declared that the German government could only agree to 
the aids for Italy's Ilva and Spain's CSI if the aids for Gennan's EKO-Stahl would be 
approved too. Another obstacle was that some Member States were late in submitting 
their restructuring plans. The UK, Gennany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal 
thus demanded to vote on all subsidy proposals simultaneously once all restructuring 
plans had been received (Agence Europe, 20/21.9.1993: 7). In December 1993, the 
Council of Ministers eventually agreed unanimously to all restructuring plans and 
granted E5.33bn in subsidies under Art. 95 ECSC. Neither the old nor the new 
advocacy coalition were able to realise their ideas to the full, but both received side 
payments as part of the deal (Dudley and Richardson, 1999: 241). The subsidies were 
granted, but strict monitoring conditions were imposed and the Council of Ministers 
declared that on no account would any further subsidies be granted (hence the notion 
of one last subsidy'). In return for the Commission's positive reaction to the 
restructuring plans, the Member States had to agree to shed 5.4 million tonnes in hot- 
rollcd and 2 million tonnes in crude steel production as well as to partly privatise 
state-owned producers (Agence Europe, 14.1.1994: 5). 
Following intense negotiations over several months, the Council gave its assent under 
Art. 95 to adopt the current 5 th Steel Aid Code in December 1996 (L338 of 28 
December 1996). It covers the period from 1997 to the expiry of the ECSC Treaty in 
2002 and includes some modifications to the Commission's initial proposal. Under the 
same rules that are in force for other sectors falling under the EC Treaty, Member 
States may grant aid to steel companies only for R&D, environmental protection and 
full or partial capacity closures. A special provision allows Greece to grant up to ECU 
50m for the restructuring of its steel companies up until the end of the year 2000. The 
code also establishes a strict procedure to ensure transparency and to prevent 
circumvention. The Commission may now require the provisional recovery of aid that 
was, contrary to the rules, granted without prior notification and authorisation by the 
Commission even before a final decision regarding its compatibility is taken. Thus, 
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the procedural rights of the Commission have been strengthened to allow for an even 
more strict and efficient prohibition of subsidies in the future. 
Thereafter, the Commission asserted itself more with regard to illegal subsidies paid 
out by the Member States. For instance, in May 1996, the Commission ordered the 
German steel company Walzwerk Ilsenberg in Saxony Anhalt to pay back DM 6.8m 
plus interest, which it received illegally in 1994. Similarly, the Commission ordered 
the return of around LIT 125bn in aid illegally received by the Italian company Fucine 
Meridionali. The Commission concluded that the aid was granted by Italian 
authorities with the sole aim of artificially keeping the company alive (Commission 
Press Release, IP/96/458,30.5.1996). Despite this firm line taken by the Commission, 
some Member States continued to by-pass the subsidy code. For instance, the 
Commission in 1998 found that aid granted by Italy to steel firms by way of tax relief 
was incompatible with the Steel Aid Code. The aid had not been notified and was 
therefore not authorised by the Commission (Commission Press Release, IP/98/434, 
13.5.1998). In a different case, the Commission found that aid paid by the German 
privatisation agency Trcuhandanstalt to the company Gr6ditzer Stahlwerke fell partly 
under the Steel Aids Code and ordered the return of drn 176AM. Here, Germany had 
made use of legal distinctions that separate products falling under the ECSC Treaty 
from those failing under the EU Treaty (Commission Press Release, IP/99/477, 
8.7.1999). There is thus a continuing trend to subsidisc steel national steel producers 
despite the Commission's efforts and the progressive enhancement of the subsidy 
codes. 
7.3.3,4greeing Capacity Cutsfor Private Producers 
In dispatching the former Commission official Fernand Braun, who was to engage 
private steel companies in discussions on capacity cuts and, if necessary, to act as a 
'father confessoe to the private producers (Financial Times, 15.2.1993: 2), the 
Commission opted for a consensual policy style (see also Dudley and Richardson, 
1999: 241-3). The steel producers also welcomed the Commission's proposal to both 
pre-finance capacity reductions and to provide assistance for the social costs involved 
(FAZ, 10.2.1993: 13). Encouraged by the positive reaction of the producers, the 
Commission moved the closing date for the end of the rescue plan back from 1995 to 
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1994 and send Braun to collect the offers by 30 September 1993 (Agence Europe, 
27.2.1993: 7)ý 
Braun soon encountered difficulties in persuading the private producers to commit 
themselves to definitive cuts, but eventually tentatively suggested that the industry 
was prepared to cut 25.8 million tonrics in crude steel capacity and 17.9 million in 
hot-rolled products. However, the successful implementation of the Braun plan 
required a high degree of transnational co-ordination and political will at both EC and 
national levels. This was clearly lacking because Commissioners Bangemann and Van 
Miert refused to apply direct ECSC provisions (Dudley and Richardson, 1999: 242)50. 
With the industry split into private and subsidised producers, the process of agreeing 
capacity cuts turned out to be both long and complicated. Neither side was able to 
secure what H6retier (1996) termed a 'home run' and each side demanded side 
payments as part of a deal (Dudley and Richardson, 1999: 241). Between 1993 and 
1994, the Commission not only had to call repeatedly upon steel producers to assume 
their responsibilities and to make their contributions to the restructuring (SUddeutsche 
Zcitung, 18.2.1993: 8 Commission Press Release, IP/93/1096,7.12.1993), but also had 
to remind the Member States of their role in this process (COM(94) 466 final. of 25 
October 1994: 5). 
Arguing that the restructuring efforts of the state-owned companies were not 
enforceable (Financial Times 15.2.1994a: 5), the private producers were not able to 
identify any more capacity reductions than those notified to Braun in 1993 (COM(94) 
466 final. of 25 October 1994: 2). In addition, the private producers demanded that in 
return for their offer to take over a share of the costs associated with the closures of 
capacity-reducing producers, the Commission should grant them fixed market shares. 
However, the Commission denied this request by referring to ECSC competition rules 
(Conrad, 1994: 344). As they failed to agree on binding offers for capacity cuts by 
September 1993, the Council of Ministers could subsequently not approve of the pre- 
finance schemes according to Art. 53 ECSC in December as it had been planned and 
the Commission set another dead line for the 27th of January 1994. By mid- 
January1994, the private producers still had not entered binding agreements. Up until 
50 In January 1993, the Belgian Carol Van Miert took over the DG IV portfolio from Leon Brittan, who went on to 
become Commissioner for External Relations (DG 1). 
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this point, the Commission had only finalised the capacity reductions of the state- 
owned steel producers (see previous section). In addition to a slight increase in 
demand in the fourth quarter of 1993 which reduced their interest in undertaking 
capacity cuts (Conrad, 1994: 344), the private producers were incensed that the 
Council of Ministers had granted the subsidies to state-owned producers and staged a 
strong opposition. In an effort to silence this opposition and to make producers enter 
binding agreements, Commissioner Bangemann warned that ECU240rn intended to 
help pay for redundancies and safeguards to limit exports from Eastern Europe would 
be withdrawn if they did not volunteer capacity cuts (Dudley and Richardson, 
1999: 241; Conrad 1994: 344). Given the increase in steel demand during the previous 
quarter, Bangemann in February 1994 reduced the Commission's targets for capacity 
reductions and called upon steel producers to enter binding commitments by 23. 
March 1994. Shortly before this dead-line expired, the producers were able to present 
an offer that met the Commission's minimum target. Because of this positive 
development and the potential negative consequences of an immediate stop of the 
accompanying measures, the Commission in April 1994 suggested to extend all 
measures until September 1994 (Commission Press Release, P/94/30,13.4.1994). 
In May 1994, however, a deep split occurred within the Commission concerning a 
restructuring plan for Italy's Bresciani steel works. Achieving a cut of 5m tonnes at 
the Bresciani was an essential building block of the restructuring process, but the 
restructuring of the Italian steel sector had been one of the most controversial issues 
during the 1990s steel crisis and caused deep resentments on part of Italy vis-a-vis 
Germany, France and the Commission (see Masi, 1996: 78-80). In the event, 
Competition Commissioner Van Miert recommended to the Commission the 
acceptance of a restructuring plan for the privately-owned Bresciani. He was 
challenged by Commissioner Brittan, who argued that the state aid offered to the 
Bresciani contravened European law, jeopardised on-going negotiations on a MSA 
and contravened the subsidy code of the GATT Uruguay Round (Financial Times, 
20.5.1994: 2). With Commissioner Bangemann absent, the Commission cast a vote 
and Van Miert was defeated by 11 votes to four. The result dealt an almost terminal 
blow to the Braun Plan and was a public humiliation for Van Miert. While a deal was 
struck for the Bresciani later that year, the event according to Dudley and Richardson 
(1999: 242-3) was of great importance since it represented an 'open and clear cut 
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defeat of the interventionist advocacy coalition and indicated that the old coalition had 
entered a terminal phase. 
Van Miert consequently declared that the Braun Plan was dead (Financial Times 
20.5.1994: 2) and refused to have anything to do with it in the future (Guardian, 
28.5.1994: 5). In order to avoid a potential subsidy race and to prevent renewed US 
trade sanctions against EC steel exports, Commission President Jacques Delors and 
Commissioner Bangemann unsuccessfully attempted to revive the rescue plan, but by 
October 1994 it was clear that the steel rescue plan was doomed to collapse after two 
years of haggling. Reacting to improvements in demand, German steel producers 
indicated that they were prepared to let the plan collapse and wait for the next 
recession before trying once more to agree on capacity cuts. They were also prepared 
to forcgo the aid package the Commission promised if the cuts were implemented in 
full (Financial Times, 26.10.1994: 4). Since the industry did not agree on the minimum 
level of 19m tonncs in capacity reductions, Commissioners Bangemann and Van 
Miert in late October recommended not to extend the market stabilisation measures 
implemented under Art. 46 ECSC beyond the fourth quarter of 1994, to drop the tariff 
quotas negotiated with the Czech and Slovak Republics, and to abandon the structural 
measures under Art. 53a ECSC. While quarterly production and delivery forecasts 
were replaced with bi-annual forecasts, the Commission nevertheless proposed to 
maintain the ECU 240m from ECSC funds to support the social costs associated with 
plant closures. It also proposed to introduce a system of 'advance' monitoring of 
imports. State aids were to be strictly monitored by the Commission and the industry 
was once again rcminded of its responsibility to complete, with its own resources, the 
adaptation of production structures to changes in demand (Commission Press Release, 
P/94/59,26.10.1994. ). The Commission also announced that the industry could not 
count on Brussels help should another crisis hit the steel industry in the future (Die 
Wclt, 10.11.1994: 7). The Council endorsed the Commission's communication apart 
from the steel quotas for the Czech and Slovak Republics and the rescue plan was 
abandoned. 
In order to improve the industry's competitiveness, and despite the clear prohibition of 
such practices under Art. 65 ECSC, the Commission approved of 29 company fusions 
and specialisation agreements in 1993. Of the initial over-capacities of 23-42m tonnes 
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in crude steel only 13m tonnes were eventually shed. Similarly, of the estimated 19- 
26m tonnes in hot-rolled steel the producers only realised 11.2m tonnes in capacity 
reductions. Reductions of 2m tonnes in crude steel and 4.4m tonnes in hot-rolled steel 
were realised by state-owned producers. It is impossible to estimate which of these 
reductions would have been realised without the activities of the Commission 
(Conrad, 1997: 139). The example and success of British Steel's privatisation in 1995 
inspired the privatisation of Usinor-Sacilor as part of a large-scale French 
privatisation programme as well as the privatisation of Italy's Ilva. Privatisation has 
and is taking place in Portugal and Spain in 1996 approximately 85 percent of the 
Community's steel industry was owned privately (Die Welt, 30.8.1996: 4). In addition, 
the steel industry's tendency to be politically salient has been reduced since the 
controversial closures of steel works such as Bagnoli in Italy and Ravenscraig in 
Scotland removed particularly sensitive regional issues from the domestic agendas of 
the respective countries (Dudley and Richardson, 1999: 244). Modernisation and 
spccialisation have become key words for the industry and resulted in an increase in 
investment and a reconfiguration of the European steel landscape (COM(1999) 453 
fin of October 1999: 2-5). In particular, European producers want to step up 
transnational investment and to speed up the restructuring process in order to avoid 
the possibility of particularly Japanese take-overs of the industry (Masi, 1996: 79). 
Steel imports from Eastern Europe continue to be regulated under the special 
protocols of the EAs. In addition, the Commission is actively involved in the 
restructuring of the steel sectors in CEEC countries. While the Community 
contributes directly to the restructuring through the Phare programme and acts as a 
catalyst to stimulate investment from international financial institutions and the 
private sector (Kramer, 1993: 223), it makes Community assistance conditional upon a 
number of criteria. These include compliance with the Europe agreements, 
compliance with the priorities specified in the Accession partnerships concerning steel 
companies receiving social adjustment assistance and the monitoring of these, the 
adoption of a sound and comprehensive restructuring programme with a clear 
timetable for implementation, and strict compliance with state aid rules (Commission 
Press Release, IP/98/341,7.4.1998). This programme aims at establishing a viable and 
competitive steel industry in CEEC countries and is designed to facilitate this 
industry's integration into the internal market as the Community enlarges to the East. 
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Hence the cyclical nature of the steel industry once again prevented a thorough 
restructuring of the steel industry. Conrad (1997: 143) points out that the 
Commission's efforts to make producers agree to binding agreements on production 
cuts was an attempt to find a solution to the prisoner's dilemma that exists in the 
reduction of over-capacity. While the Commission's approach was a suitable one to 
find a way out of the dilemma, national subsidies offered a way to finance over- 
capacities, which led to a continuation of the dilemma. Accordingly, Conrad 
concludes that the Braun mission was a 'second-best' solution since the Commission 
failed to carry the 'first-best' solution of enforcing the prohibition of subsidies. In 
addition, Masi (1996: 85) points out that it is difficult to estimate whether EC policies 
or globalisation, domestic political change or domestic pressures on public finance 
have been the decisive factors on the restructuring that did take place. 
Conclusions 
In the 1990s, the Community continued its attempts to liberalise the steel industry and 
took steps towards the integration of the steel sectors into the 1992 Single Market. 
However, the Commission was obstructed in achieving this aim by both Member 
States and steel producers throughout the 1990s. Although the perception of steel as a 
special industry waned across the Community, most notably as a consequence of the 
experience of the 1980s and the broader thrust of the Single Market Programme, the 
social and regional effects of restructuring and privatisation meant that a number of 
Member States maintained a strong and privileged relationship with national 
industries. Hence, the attempt early in the 1990s to terminate the special steel status 
for the steel industry under the ECSC Treaty failed. 
Given its objective to liberalisc the steel sector and stated objective to avoid a 
renewed recourse to direct ECSC Treaty provisions, and in the face of the 1992/3 steel 
crisis, the Commission resorted to indirect means and attempted to achieve a 
restructuring of the steel industry by developing a steel rescue plan. Similar to the 
1980s, the Commission's external measures brought the desired results, but it failed 
again to bring about a thorough restructuring of the steel industry. Although the 
process privatisation is almost complete, the substantial over-capacities that continue 
to exist in the steel industry are likely to undermine a co-ordinated Community 
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response should another crisis set in. Notwithstanding this, and looking at the EC's 
steel policies through the 1990s on the whole, it emerges that, despite the familiar 
obstacles it encountered, the Commission has established increasing clarity as to the 
steel sectors status within the Single Market and worked towards improving the 
industry's international competitiveness. 
Despite the Commission's defeat on the issue of the abolishment of the ECSC Treaty, 
the Commission continued its drive to liberalise the steel industry by enforcing 
competition rules with increasing rigour. Over the 1990s, the Commission thus 
levelled increasingly high fines on steel producers for concerted practices. In the 
course of which, the 'symbiotic relationship' that had characterised relations between 
Commission and steel producers especially during the early 1980s broke apart. While 
the industry continued to maintain close relations with DG III, especially in the 
context of the regulation of Eastern European steel imports, the increasing influence 
and involvement of DGs I and IV in matters relating to the steel industry led to an 
increasingly conflictual relationship between EC and industry. This split between 
Commission and (private) producers became even more pronounced in the context of 
the steel rescue plan. The Commission was ultimately dependent on the co-operation 
of the steel producers if it was to achieve its aim of making the European steel 
industry internationally more competitive through a restructuring process. Yet the 
emphasis on free-market policies, supported by a growing number of supporters 
across all levels within the EC, set clear boundaries to what the Commission was 
willing to concede to steel producers. In the end, the waning of the steel crisis and the 
inherent contradictions and complexities involved in agreeing adequate capacity cuts 
among private and public producers led to the abandonment of the rescue plan and the 
continuation of the problem. 
As in the 1980s, the regulation of the EC steel industry was largely a function of the 
interplay between Commission and Member States within the Council of Ministers. 
Throughout the 1990s, the Commission's libcralisation efforts were stalled through 
divergent Member States preferences and the loophole provided through Art. 95 
ECSC. Although the Commission made some considerable advances towards the 
phasing in of the steel sector into the larger Single Market, the backlog of unresolved 
problems from the 1980s and diverse national structures of the steel sector hindered 
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progress and a coherent approach to both the general regulation of the steel industry 
and the EC's restructuring. In respect to subsidisation, some Member States continued 
to circumvent Community rules and, as long as the production of steel is intrinsically 
linked to social and regional considerations in some Member States, this is likely to 
continue despite the progressive enhancement of the Steel Aid Codes. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE 1990s EC-US STEEL CONFLICT 
Introduction 
In continuation of the previous chapter and set against the background of the EC's 
endeavours to liberalise steel trade and the 1990s steel crisis, the present chapter 
analyses the interactions between the EC and the US during the 1990s. While the 
course of events that characterised the 1990s EC-US steel conflict is similar to the 
course of the 1980s steel conflict, this time it was not resolved through the negotiation 
of a VRA. Instead, US steel producers achieved the degree of protection they desired 
by resorting to US anti-dumping and anti-subsidy remedies provided under US 
foreign trade legislation. A further distinction to the 1980s steel conflict is that during 
the 1990s EC-US interactions in steel to a great extent shifled to the multilateral plane 
and became entangled in more general questions relating to the regulation of 
international trade. For this reason, the first section reviews the background of the 
1990s steel conflict by establishing the link between the EC's policies vis-ii-vis the US 
and the EC's internal policies as developed in the previous chapter. The second 
section then concentrates on the 1990s steel conflict between the two adversaries and 
shows how interactions in steel gradually moved from the bilateral plane to the 
multilateral plane. The last section then concentrates on EC interactions in steel 
between the EC and the US in the context of the GATT and the WTO. 
8.1 The Background of the 1990s EC-US Steel Conflict 
Already during the second half of the 1980s, the realisation had grown that if the EC 
wanted to improve its future stance in steel trade vis-ý-vis the US, it had to draw a line 
under the past by phasing out subsidisation, aligning steel regulation with other 
sectors of the European economy under the SEM Programme, and to strengthen the 
multilateral regime of the GATT (see sections 6.5 and 7.2). In the light of the US steel 
industry's unwillingness to forget the 1980s and continuing drive for external 
protection, the existence of strong US trade legislation, and the protectionist mood in 
the US in the second half of the 1980s, establishing a subsidy-free open market, 
strengthening and developing the multilateral regulation steel trade (through GATT 
and WTO) and bringing steel trade under a multilateral steel agreement, appeared the 
only viable way forward. 
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This realisation was written into the Commission's most significant policy document 
relating to the steel sector for the 1990s, the Steel Objectives 1995. It outlined the steel 
sector's new political and economic framework as well as the main policy lines 
(COM(90) 201 final of 7 May 1990: 9-18). Based on the increasing importance of the 
Single Market and the liberalisation of steel trade (see also chapter seven), the 
Commission outlined the external policies it was to pursue during the 1990s: Firstly, 
the Commission undertook, with the US government, to abolish all VRAs on steel 
trade. In order to facilitate the smooth transition to the post-1992 environment, the 
Commission also intended to progressively liberalise its own external steel trade 
policy system, a process that had already started in 1989. Secondly, the Commission 
stated its commitment to seeking to obtain 'a multilateral agreement imposing strict 
and effective discipline in international steel trade as regards state intervention and 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to access to steel markets' within the Uruguay Round and 
in any case before 1992. Thirdly, the Commission was to press for the liberalisation of 
steel trade and the settling of trade conflicts on the multilateral plane. Here, the 
Commission intended to prevent unfair trading practices having a negative effect on 
the EC market by exhausting all the possibilities under GATT to improve the 
effectiveness of anti-dumping procedures (COM(90) 201 final of 7 May 1990: 12). 
The Commission held out hopes for a general freeing of steel trade over the following 
five years and promised to fight hard at the Uruguay Round talks to establish a level 
playing field in the steel market. The Commission had increased the quantities 
permitted under its VRAs since 1989 and also cut down the number of categories to 
which they applied (see also table 9 in the appendix). Instead, the Commission's 
committed itself to continued and even stiffer antidumping measures that would be 
taken against countries unfairly subsidising their industries. In respect to both external 
and internal policy-making, the Commission's policies in the steel sector were 
therefore set to become cleaner and leaner in order to avoid a reiteration of the 
problems of the past and to enable the EC to take a more assertive and proactivc 
stance on international steel issues. 'Cleaner' refers to the notion of bringing 
Community policy practices in line with international norms (as previously almost 
single-handedly determined by the US) and seeking the regulation of steel trade on the 
multilateral level. 'Leanee refers to a less interventionist policy-making style and the 
liberalisation of steel trade based on the Single Market Programme. By phasing out 
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subsidies and privatising the steel industry, the EC could reduce the chances to come 
under attack of protectionist and/or unilateral US trade legislation. In view of both the 
steel sector and the larger thrust of the EC in the 1990s, the cleaner and leaner policy 
style announced in the Steel Objectives 1995 thus represents not only a classic 
example of a policy-learning effect, but also an attempt to enable the EC to take a 
more assertive and proactive stance on international trade issues, particularly vis-6-vis 
the US. 
The US steel industry was well prepared for all possibilities: another steel crisis, the 
expiry of the 1989 VRAs in 1992 and the possible failure of MSA negotiations. From 
the outset, the US steel industry knew anti-dumping and countervailing action would 
produce the degree of protection it aspired. Therefore, according to a spokesman for 
the US speciality steel industry, Bert Delano, '[e]very part of the industry ha[d] kept 
cases in some state of readiness as an insurance policy against the failure of the 
multilateral talks' (Financial Times, 2.4.1992a: 2). For US producers, initiating anti- 
dumping and countervailing duty actions offers a number of opportunities, which in 
turn explains the US' industry's propensity to apply them. Firstly, the actions could, 
and in view of the US steel industry ideally would, be 'traded' for VRAs. Secondly, 
even in cases where only preliminary duties were to be imposed, producers knew that 
they would be benefiting as prices would rise in the aftermath of their imposition and 
foreign suppliers would be put off from exporting to the US. Thirdly, filing a surge of 
suits could be used to exercise strong political pressure within the US towards the 
conclusion of another round of VRAs. In addition, the probability of the ITC 
determining injury increased by the cumulative effect on imports ascertained in its 
investigations. There was also a possibility that the administration, overloaded by a 
flood of actions, would be unable to carry out the preliminary dumping investigation 
meticulously within the fixed time-span of 115 days. Subsequently, it may be inclined 
to impose a provisional anti-dumping duty in order keep its options open. Fourthly, 
for US producers anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions represent a lucrative 
business option. Particularly so since the US is a large market and legal costs remain 
roughly constant (Conrad, 1995: 155-6). Even if a case is finally rejected, the benefits 
of an anti-dumping petition for US producers substantially exceeds the average legal 
costs of $400,000, since foreign producers are temporarily pushed out of the market 
by the provisional duties and price levels increase. In fact, based upon the US 
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integrated steel producers' annual output of approx. 40m tonnes in 1993, even an 
average price increase of $1 per tonne would mean an increase in profit of $40 
million. 
Albeit, the case for relying on US anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws was not 
that clear-cut in the 1990s as for a complaint to be successful, a finding is required by 
the independent ITC that an industry has suffered damage or would suffer damage in 
the future. In addition, there was a feeling among the affected nations that the US 
industry would find it more difficult than in the past to prove that injury had been 
caused by imports as US district courts and the Court of International Trade had 
started to overrule the ITC and forced it to pay close attention to the evidence that was 
in the record. Similarly, the DOC, which determines the existence of subsidies, had 
also been disciplined by the courts. As the rulings of ITC and DOC had become more 
consistent and 'less arbitrary and capricious', the US industry had to take more of a 
gamble than in the past (Financial Times, 22.7.1992: 3). Nevertheless, the US steel 
industry's reliance on US foreign trade legislation, its 'unwillingness to forget the past' 
and its demand to apply anti-dumping and anti-subsidy law retroactively remained a 
thom in the side of EC producers throughout the 1990 (Interview with German 
company official, 14.4.1997; Interview with Eurofer Official, 7.5.1998), with Eurofer 
and the industry consistently accusing the US producers of misusing US trade law to 
harass them. 
8.2 US Anti-Dumping Procedures vs. EC Harassment Claims 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the profits of European, American and Japanese steel 
industries started falling and in May 1991 the US steel industry started to worry. Since 
the US industry thought itself capable of resisting another recession, the approaching 
expiry of the VRAs at the end of March 1992, and not the on-going recession in the 
US steel sector, was its foremost concern (Nachrichten Rir den Aussenhandel, 
27.5.1991: 13). Claiming not to be able to compete internationally, US producers 
started their lobbying activities for a 'safety net' to be installed before the expiry of the 
VRAs on the annual meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute in Washington 
in 1991. Here, the industry expressed its top-priority to maintain and re-enforce US 
trade legislation affecting the steel industry and its readiness to file unfair trading 
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complaints by keeping all its legal and political options open. On the other hand, some 
major steel consumers in the US expected lower costs once the VRAs expired and 
therefore attempted to influence the President and the US public to prevent the 
agreements from being extended. The integrated steel producers were also 
undermined in their demands by the American mini-mills that explicitly distanced 
themselves from the demands for import restrictions, pointing out their high levels of 
competitiveness (Conrad, 1995: 150). 
Fully aware of the US industry's domestic influence and propensity to resort to US 
trade legislation in order to achieve its objectives, steel producers in Europe and 
elsewhere therefore pinned their hopes on the negotiations of an MSA on steel within 
the GATT Uruguay Round. Yet by March 1992 signs were those of another trade 
clash in steel with the US (Financial Times, 26.3.92: 2). While US steel producers 
began to feel the effects of a low in the US domestic market (Conrad, 1997: 145), there 
was also the very real prospect of a failure to negotiate MSA by the March 31 
deadline (which marked the end of the EC's VRAs with the US). Since the EC was a 
net exporter in steel, with ca. 7 percent of the US market, the Commission feared 
another surge of US anti-dumping complains should the deadline not be met and thus 
hoped for a political agreement. Yet the Commission was also aware of the political 
pressure American steel producers would exercise on President Bush in his election 
year in order to maintain some form of protection5l. 
When negotiations on the MSA within the GATT Uruguay Round failed and 
President Bush refused to extend the VRAs, US steel producers opened another series 
of anti-dumping and countervailing duty procedures. The six big integrated steel 
producers submitted a total of 92 anti-dumping and countervailing duty suits with the 
ITC (FAZ, 18.4.1992: 11, Guardian, 2.7.1992: 6). It was the most extensive set of 
unfair trade cases in the industry's history and came at a time when talks about the 
possibility a triangular trade war between the US, the EC and Japan became 
increasingly frequent. After 10 years of continuous import regulation through VRAs, 
it took US producers a mere 16 days to claim that harm had been caused to the US 
51With the concentration of speciality steel in a few key electoral states, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Indiana, the 
possibility that President Bush could be brought around to steel producers views was reportedly very real 
(Financial Times, 28.4.1989: 2). 
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steel industry. Overshadowed by a simmering dispute between the US and the EC 
concerning Airbus, agriculture, oilseeds and shipbuilding within the GATT, the US 
steel industry's actions added to the 'atmospheric tensions' that had already built up 
between the US and the Community (Wienert, 1993b: 6 1)52 . Arguing that world-wide 
over-capacity and a softening steel market had made it attractive for producers to 
'routinely and systematically' dump in the US market 'far below fair market value and 
often below the costs of productiorf, the big six integrated producer alleged that 21 
foreign governments had given massive export subsidies to their national producers, 
causing the US steel industry to a $2.2bn loss in 1991 (Financial Times, 22.7.1992: 3). 
Almost all major steel-producing countries were named, including Germany, France, 
the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain 53 . Overall, 6.5 million tonnes of 
Community steel imports to the US were affected (Financial Times, 1.7.1992: 4). The 
loss of the US market as an export outlet would have had a strong impact on 
employment in the European steel industry since approximately 15,000 jobs depend 
on deliveries to the US market (Wienert, 1993b: 81). Although the US administration's 
decision was still due, there was, according to a Commission official, clear evidence 
that the imminence of the US presidential elections could have grave consequences on 
the Community's trade relations with the US, with the steel issue described by another 
Commission official as'a real time bomb(Guardian, 2.7.1992: 6). 
Given that the steel industry was severely hit by 1992/3 steel crisis, the potential 
closure of the US market to EC steel products aggravated the situation of the EC steel 
industry and incited other steel exporters to redirect their exports to the Community 
(Wienert, 1993b: 76-9). With the US market closed to exports, the duties had a double 
impact, as the Community now feared a flood of diverted imports from CEEC 
countries, which were also hit by the US duties (see section 7.3.1). However, in 
contrast the Canada and Mexico who announced retaliatory action, the Community 
only reacted verbally. Eurofer accused the US anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
measures of being 'blackmail equivalent to starting up a trade war with global 
repercussions' and called upon the Community to use all political and legal means 
52 Japan was deeply 'd isappo intcd and annoyed'by the steel cases since Japanese companies had invested 
technology and capital in US steel companies and helped the US industry modcmising (FAZ, 2.7.1992: 10). 
53 For example, Germany was accused of subsidising its steel production by 5.39 - 64.46 percent and of selling its 
exports in the US market at 1.97-64.46 percent below what US considered fair market value. Britain was accused 
of 20.15 and percent subsidies 18.05 - 114.81 percent dumping margins (Financial Times, 1.7.1992: 4; Wienert 
1993a). 
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possible to defend the interest of the European steel industry (Agence Europe, 
3.7.1992: 12). Usinor Sacilor of France, one of the producers most affected, 
announced that it was to fight back through the French government, the GATT and 
the Commission. It demanded in November 1992 that the Commission took 
retaliatory action, but the Commission declined due to the small scope of the dispute 
(International Herald Tribune, 3.12.1992: 15). The Commission viewed anti-dumping 
and countervailing duty action as having the real objective of either to obstruct 
legitimate steel in trade or to force others to accept the renewal of VRA, rather than to 
sanction the non-respect of normal commercial rules. It stressed that the opening of 
procedures represented a return to the 'practices of harassment' bitterly experienced by 
trading partners of the US in 1982 and 1984, and was clearly at variance with the 
public declarations of the US government emphasising the need to liberalise trade 
flows in steel (Commission Press Release, IP/92/300,15.4.1992). On the informal 
Industry Council in March 1993, several Ministers (France, Belgium, Spain, and 
Luxembourg) actually criticised the attitude adopted by the Commission vis-a-vis the 
US and called for a more determined trade policy vis-6-vis the US and the new 
Clinton administration. The Ministers from Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Portugal, on the other hand, pleaded in favour of a more cautious EC 
approach so as to avoid triggering off a trade war with the US as long as negotiations 
had not been exhausted (Agence Europe, 22.3.1993: 5). 
Commission Vice President Andriessen thus commented that he could not avoid the 
feeling that the US actions were not a consequence of the judicious use of commercial 
defence instruments by the main US Big Six, but a clear attempt to harass trade flows. 
He urged the US government to be severe in the examination of complaints and not to 
admit any cases where the main purpose was to harass legitimate trade. Should the US 
not respect these rules, the Commission advised the US government that it would not 
hesitate to use all methods of recourse available under the GATT. He then re-iterated 
the Community's readiness to resume talks on an MSA and reminded the US that 
during the MSA negotiations all parties, with the exemption of the US, had agreed on 
the need to find an effective mechanism to prevent harassment through misuse of the 
anti-dumping instrument. Furthermore, all had supported the Community's proposal 
for a clause foreseeing meaningful consultations previous to the initiation of an anti- 
dumping investigation (Commission Press Release, IP/92/537,1.7.1992). However, 
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Community circles reportedly found it difficult to imagine that Washington was ready 
embark on serious MSA talks given the US steel industry's strong objections (Agence 
Europe, 21.9.1992: 13). 
In January 1993, the ITA imposed preliminary anti-dumping duties ranging from 0.77 
to 109.22 percent against 19 countries (among them seven Community countries). The 
ITC in March 1993 concluded that injury had been caused to the US steel industry and 
in June imposed final anti-dumping duties. For US producers, the real costs involved 
in filing the suits were substantially offset by the profits resulting from rising prices 
(Conrad, 1995: 155-6). The final duties were considerably increased by the ITA, and 
in some cases even doubled. For instance, the preliminary duties for French exports 
were raised from 11-23 percent to 44-79 percent in the final ruling. Then, at the end of 
July 1993, the ITC delivered its ruling on countervailing duty cases. However, here 
the final duties were reduced substantially, except for those against Italy. In its final 
decision delivered in September 1993, the ITC rejected 42 of the 74 remaining 
actions. The US producers' attempt to establish yet another comprehensive shield of 
protection thus failed (Conrad, 1995: 151). Ultimately, the anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty campaign of the US producers thus ran up against the politically 
independent ITC. For the most part, the various votes within the ITC were relatively 
close. As the 1TC consists of six members, their individual opinions determine 
whether the injury proved is substantial. Their opinions depend not least on their 
personal economic and political beliefs. According to Conrad (1995: 159), two factors 
were supposed to have played a role in the predominantly negative opinion of the 
ITC: Firstly, despite the difficulties experienced by US producers, there were only 
few redundancies. Secondly, by the time of the final detennination of injury the 
situation of the integrated producers had improved considerably as a result of the 
international demand for steel. Most importantly, however, the ITC's decision helped 
to diffuse what had become a very grave trade dispute. 
Although the Community was keen on avoiding a confrontation with the US over 
steel, the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties imposed by the US in January on steel 
exports from seven Member States, which affected 2 million tonnes of exports per 
year and were estimated to cost the Community steel industry $lbn (Agence Europe, 
10.2.1993: 13), eventually made it call for urgent talks with the US under the GATT 
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world trade body. Against the background of a worrisome state of EC-US relations, 
Foreign Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan warned that the duties sent the wrong 
political signals when the world needed reassurance of America's intention to stand by 
its commitment to free global trade (Guardian, 3.3.1993: 5). The Commission was 
positive that a GATT panel, if set up, would rule in its favour as previous 
consultations held in accordance with GATT rules had allegedly confirmed that the 
EC was in a strong position and that the US measures were not justified (Agence 
Europe, 16.4.1993: 5). In its claims that the US industry was trying to claim a second 
time round advantages that they had already reaped, the Community was also 
supported by Japan, Sweden, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Austria (Agence Europe, 
5.6.1993: 11,12). Before the issue came to the panel, however, the US announced the 
determination of the level of duties to be applied to flat-rolled products. Community 
exports of 1.9m tonnes per year were affected representing a value of ; E8 15m, but the 
ITC's ruling on injury, needed to introduce these duties, was still due. Yet US 
measures already showed serious repercussions. The provisional duties essentially 
made exports to the US uneconomic and had the effect that some EC producers gave 
up on the US market. Others were continuing with contracts already begun, but would 
not be able to renew these. Furthermore, since February, EC exports had already 
dropped by 25 percent (Agence Europe, 24.6.1993: 6). 
In the GATT panel, Commission officials questioned the methods used by the US in 
deciding on the duties, including a decision that the privatisation of British Steel 
resulted in unfair government subsidies. Commission officials also complained about 
the DOC systematically taking a hard line in the anti-dumping and subsidy 
investigation, using any of its discretion fully into one direction only. In addition the 
Cornmission pointed out that: Firstly, some of the duties imposed related to subsidies 
that had been granted up to 15 years ago; Secondly, a sharp reduction in steel imports 
to the US had been achieved since 1978 and that European steel producers had not 
used their quotas fully; Thirdly, the US claims were calculated incorrectly as they 
were not based on the actual amount of the subsidy but on the discounted present 
value; Fourthly, ECSC loans should not be classified as subsidies as they were 
financed through the ECSC levy which was raised from the industry itself; and other 
company-specific objections to US countervailing duty actions (for the fall details see 
Conrad 1995: 153-4). 
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In October 1994, the GATT panel substantially agreed with the Community. It 
decided that the US' application of the subsidy code constituted an infringement of the 
GATT. In the case against British Steel, the panel decided that the subsidies received 
by the company were already reflected in its purchasing price. In the case of Usinor 
Sacilor, it ruled that the interest calculation used by the ITA to determine the benefit 
received by Usinor Sacilor from government credits was unjustified, due to the ITA 
not giving sufficient grounds for its decision. As concerns the treatment given by the 
ITA to both credit renouncements from private companies and increases in 
government shareholdings as subsidies, the panel also rejected the ITA's ruling. The 
ITA's ruling was only confirmed in two cases, namely taking into account the amount 
of subsidies granted during a preceding period of 15 years and its general 
classification of increases in government shareholdings as subsidies (Conrad, 
1995: 154). 
Anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties as well as an upturn in the business cycle 
in the US nevertheless enabled the US steel industry to raise its prices. From January 
to February 1993, the preliminary duties caused a decline in imports to the US by 
approx. 45 percent. In fact, the import quota fell to its lowest record since 1975. 
Nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that a low Dollar contributed to this 
development. In the beginning of 1994, the US market actually experienced a steel 
shortage. According to Commission estimates, duties imposed during this time led to 
a reduction of European exports to the US by 25 percent. From January to February 
1993, European exports to the US fell by another 48 percent as a consequence of the 
imposition of the final duties. The duties imposed on non-EC countries led to 
diversion of steel exports amongst others countries into the EC and worsened the 
situation of the already affected Community steel producers (Conrad 1997: 146). 
Dating back to the ITC rulings in 1993/94, in March 1998 15.77 percent of EC 
exports to the US were affected by US anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases 
(Interview with DG III official, 6.5.1998b). One Commission official dealing 
specifically with anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases expects that even if the US 
continues to allocate pre-privatisation subsidies over time, the impact of subsidisation 
of EC-US steel trade will run out by 2002/3 (Interview DG I Official, 4.5.1998). By 
then, the US will not be able to impose duties on subsidies granted around the mid- 
1980s since the subsidies then granted were the most substantial ones. Ever since the 
269 
EC imposed progressively tighter Steel Aid Codes, the subsidisation of the EC steel 
industry has been reduced and the US industry will therefore find it increasingly more 
difficult to claim injury. 
8.3 The EC-US Steel Problem in the Multilateral Context 
In the GATT Uruguay Round, the EC and the US clashed head-on on a number of 
issues, but mostly EC-US relations were dominated by frictions over agricultural 
issues (Croomc, 1995; Pacmen and Busch, 1995; Murphy, 1990a, b). Together with 
Japan, the EC criticised the US' refusal to abandon unilateral measures and to agree 
on a speedier and more effective dispute settlement procedure. While lesser frictions 
existed over aircraft subsidies and restrictions on financial services in the US, frictions 
over agriculture in February 1992 became so heated that a collapse of the GATT 
negotiations appeared imminent (Hopkinson, 1992: 16; Paemen and Busch, 1995). The 
US criticised the EC's lack of vision on trade policy and its ability to carry on a real 
trade negotiation beyond position-taking and rejecting US initiatives. The US also 
viewed enlargement of an inward-looking Community with suspicion. Furthermore, 
minimalism and incrementalism of EC positions contrasted markedly with the 
maximalism of US positions, which Europeans found difficult to take seriously 
(Hopkinson, 1992: 17). 
8.3.1 Steel in the GAYT Context 
In the context of steel, however, the position of the US was complicated by the fact 
that the US steel industry wanted dumping findings to be made easier, whereas 
American export industries wanted it made more difficult. When the Uruguay Round 
was concluded in December 1993, the Commission showed itself pleased with the 
outcome of the new anti-dumping code as it reduced the scope for arbitrary unilateral 
findings against successful foreign competitors and provided greater certainty in 
combating unfair trade practices on a global level (COM(94) 16 final of 15 February 
1994: 92). Although the Community had to accept a compromise, particularly towards 
the establishment of dumping, the new code contained a clearer set of rules, which the 
Commission hoped would help to avoid dispute panels. Moreover, the Commission 
was able to write into the new code a number of rules that reflected existing 
270 
Community practice. For instance, all EC proposals concerning the re-enforcement of 
disciplines and transparency 54 had been adopted in the new code. Furthermore, the 
new code established firm guidelines on the termination of cases where the share of 
import volume held by the exporter is de minimis, thus increasing legal certainty in an 
area that had previously been contentious. Of particular importance in regard of anti- 
dumping action by third countries against the EC was also the introduction of a new 
'sunset' provision. It obliges all countries, including the US which previously did not 
apply such rules, to terminate duties after 5 years unless the need for their continued 
action has been positively established. Nonetheless, both the Commission and the US 
conceded that the result of the Uruguay Round was not sufficient enough as rules 
concerning the circumvention of anti-dumping duties had not been agreed as the 
remedies they were seeking would have constituted a breach of Art. VI of the GATT 55 
(1-lopkinson, 1992: 6). 
As concerns anti-subsidy and compensatory duties, the final text of the agreement 
largely corresponded to the objectives of the EC (COM(95) 16 final of 15 February 
1995: 56). However, in the final rounds of negotiation the EC had to agree on a 
number of changes regarding the 'green list' on actionable and non-countervailable 
subsidies. Albeit, the new agreement contained a number of clarifications and 
improvements concerning the definition of subsidies, their specific availability to 
certain enterprises and on the calculation of a subsidy in terms of benefit to the 
recipient. It prohibited per se export subsidies (de jure and de facto) and subsidies 
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods. All other subsidies were 
actionable or countervailablc if found to cause adverse effects to the interests of 
another WTO member. Unless they meet a number of precise conditions, four 'green' 
subsidy categories were exempted. These include generally available subsidies, 
subsidies for the purpose of R&D 
56 
, regional assistance, and environmental 
57 assistance 
54 Precise rules on initiation, the subsequent investigation and the imposition of provisional or definitive measures. 
55 A GAIT panel had previously ruled that Community legislation in this area was GAIT inconsistent. 
56Hcrc, 75 percent of the costs of industrial research and 50 percent of the costs of pre-competitive development 
may be subsidiscd. 
57 Limited to 20 percent of the cost of adaptation to new environmental requirements. 
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One Commission official commented that during the Uruguay Round negotiations 'we 
were rather suspicious of the US approach which we thought was rather too liberal as 
regards the control of subsidies' (Interview with DG I Official, 4.5.1998) Since the EC 
put in place a very tight code on subsidies, it has become very difficult to subsidise 
European producers (in general). On the other hand, the EC was able to increasingly 
move from a very defensive stance on subsidies to a very aggressive stance in the 
sense that the EC is now able to look very closely at third country subsidisation. 
Accordingly, the EC recently received far more anti-subsidy complaints from the 
industry than before, which reflects that European industries have become much more 
confident about attacking the use of subsidies in other countries (COM(97) 428fin. of 
16 September 1997, see also table 9 in the appendix) 
8.3.2 MSA Negotiations and other EC Initiatives Relating to Steel 
Negotiations on an MSA initially took place within the context of the GATT Uruguay 
Round, but were subsequently separated from these. The 36 nations negotiating on the 
MSA intended to phase out tariffs on steel, eliminate non-tariff barriers and outlaw 
direct state subsidies. Through agreeing on an MSA, the EC wanted its own aids 
discipline and liberal trade policy followed by other countries (Commission Press 
Release, IP/92/241,1.4.1992). The US, on the other hand, wanted to retain unfettered 
rights to pursue disputes through US anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions, 
which represented the greatest concern among European producers and governments. 
This issue unresolved, it became clear by the beginning of March 1992 that the dead 
line to negotiate an MSA would not be met. When the talks officially ended, 
negotiators had agreed on zero tariffs and a long list of forbidden non-tariff barriers, 
with the exception of public procurement restrictions that the US had refused to 
waive. They had also agreed, in principle, to permit state aid to steel companies for 
R&D, environment, and plant closure purposes. But the US refused to exempt such 
aids from possible countervailing duty action under US trade legislation (Financial 
Times, 2.4.1992b: 2). 
The EC hoped for a political settlement to prolong talks, but was still fearful of 
pressure by US steel producers on the Bush administration in the election year to 
maintain some form of protection (Financial Times, 26.3.1992: 2). Although the Bush 
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administration subsequently made it clear that it would not extend the VRAs, it was 
not discouraging governments from offering to keep the quotas in place until an 
agreement was reached (Financial Times, 1.4.1992: 3). With no timetable set, 
negotiators meanwhile continued to meet bilaterally and multilaterally to resolve 
outstanding issues. Commission Vice-President Andriessen hoped that negotiations 
would resume in order to avoid disruptions of the market, which in the absence of 
multinational discipline could be provoked by unilateral measures. He thus called on 
all interested parties to show the flexibility needed to arrive at a timely agreement. 
Furthermore, although talks on the MSA were now technically separate from the on- 
going Uruguay Round, he considered that a rapid conclusion of an MSA could have a 
positive impact on the successful completion of the GATT Round (Commission Press 
Release, IP/92/241,1.4.1992). 
The extent of the deadlock between the US and the EC becomes clear when looking at 
the division of interests. The position of the US industry is well expressed in a 
statement of Bert Delano, a spokesman for the US speciality steel industry, according 
to whom 'the effort to get other nations to give up their regional aids, environmental 
subsidies, assistance to redundant workers and the rest [was] naive'. The other nations 
at the bargaining table took the view that the very country that launched the talks, the 
US, stood as the principal obstacle to finding an agreement as it refused to amend its 
anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws. Consequently, Delano saw the failure of 
the talks as all the fault of the other negotiating parties, who understood that the US 
'badly' wanted an MSA and used the opportunity to try to remove US trade laws 
(Financial Times, 2.4.1992a: 2). 
When talks on an MSA were resumed in December 1992, several delegations, led by 
Japan and Brazil and supported by the Community countries Austria and Sweden 
called upon the US to repeal its anti-dumping and compensation action (Agence 
Europe, 17.12.1992: 16). Yet the US split issues. The MSA talks were to deal with 
future dumping and subsidies, while the steel cases were considered protection against 
uncompetitive practices (Financial Times, 9.12.1992: 6). The Community proposed 
that the MSA should prohibit support subsidies for uncompetitive suppliers if the US 
withdrew the anti-dumping complaints against European producers. Subsidies granted 
for the purpose of restructuring were to be permitted. However, this was rejected by 
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the US integrated producers who did not want to withdraw their files. In addition, the 
Americans feared that support subsidies for uncompetitive firms could be disguised as 
restructuring subsidies. On the initiative of European steel producers, the Community 
withdrew its proposal a short time later and repeated its demand that the MSA be 
conditional on the withdrawal of anti-dumping actions. The US declined by stating 
that an MSA could not deprive US steel producers of their right to pursue anti- 
dumping actions (Conrad, 1995: 153). Overall, it was believed that the resumption of 
talks on the MSA was in itself of little consequence. Sources close to the Commission 
indicated that it was purely formal gesture on part of the US at a time 'when its 
behaviour [was] totally unacceptable, because compensatory amounts [were] applied 
and procedures continuing' (Agence Europe, 12.12.1992: 11). As the General Affairs 
Council of the same month had entrusted the Commission with the mandate to obtain 
the elimination of US anti-subsidy measures and to investigate as soon as possible the 
compatibility of the US approach with the GATT subsidy code, the goodwill of the 
US to re-launch MSA negotiations appear to have been a response to the new steps 
the Commission was going to undertake. 
However, as certain of the Community's objectives in the MSA negotiations, such as 
the legislation of regional aid, R&D subsidies and an increase in the lower limits for 
dumping and injury (de inininds criteria) were already written into the text of the 
Uruguay Round, the interest in a separate MSA eventually waned over time. The only 
point that remains of interest to the Community is an anti-harassment clause. It is 
intended to prevent US producers from excluding EC producers from the US market 
for a given period of time by concentrating a large number of anti-dumping actions at 
one time and by imposing provisional anti-dumping duties, even if the duties are 
consequently proven to be unjustified. US steel producers, however, continue to have 
too much political influence for this bargaining point to stand any chance of success 
(Conrad, 1995: 153). 
Claiming that the EC is itself one of the most open markets in the world, Sir Leon 
Brittan reopened the debate and outlined his objective for an MSA on steel in 1996. 
His objective depended on a 'policy image' of steel as a multinational business in a 
free market, with the state kept at a safe distance, and regulation on a global scale. He 
warned that failure to agree an MSA eliminating all tariff and non-tariff barriers over 
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a number of years and containing strict disciplines banning state subsidies, could 
renew calls for government assistance, which would in turn be followed by requests 
for protection. As a result, the Community would go back to the same old vicious 
circle which would be in nobody's interests (Brittan, 1996: 6). For the foreseeable 
future, however, an MSA seems difficult to imagine as it is likely that the large 
integrated US companies will continue to lobby with some success for the imposition 
of duties on imported steel from a number of countries, including many from the 
Community. US companies continue to claim unfair competition on the grounds of 
state aids and there remains a powerful culture of protectionism within their ranks. In 
fact, the US administration came under strong pressure from industry and Congress to 
stem import following a strong increase in imports in 1998. The US steel industry 
presented another waive of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard complaints and 
Congress launched a series of bills containing provisions that appear at variance with 
WTO rules. Furthermore, a new steel action plan of 1999 proposes a strengthening of 
US trade laws and certain other measures and the Commission fears that this plan may 
lead to new VRAs (COM(1999) 453 final of 5 October 1999: 6). 
There were hopes on the European side that the expanding influence of US mini- 
mills, who are more inclined to free trade than the large integrated steel works, could 
bring at least a Multilateral Speciality Steel Agreement (MSSA). Yet in 1998 
negotiations on both MSA and MSSA deteriorated (Interview DG I Official, 
4.5.1998) since particularly in times of recession US producers tend to resume a 
united protectionist front against imports and because the aim is to go beyond of the 
content of current WTO agreements. Overall, the Community's strategy of pursuing a 
multilateral agreement has therefore been unsuccessful, despite its repeated demands 
and offers to find a multilateral framework for steel trade. Since the collapse of MSA 
talks, the OECD Steel Committee remains the only international foram for dialogue 
on steel (COM(1999) 453 final of 5 October 1.999: 6). 
There is a wide-spread belief in the European steel industry that in view of the US 
steel industry's reliance on US trade legislation the only way to ensure the existence of 
the US market as an export outlet is to develop and utilise the WTO (Interview 
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl, 15.4.1997). The Commission has generally been very 
receptive to the concerns of the European steel producers (Interview with German 
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company official, 14.4.1997) and following a complaint made by Eurofer in January 
1997, the Community investigated the 1916 US Anti-Dumping Act under the TBR 
procedure (Commission, 1998; IP/98/1032,25.11.1998; L126 of 28 April 1998). The 
1916 Anti-Dumping Act is a powerful, but unused piece of US legislation that allows 
for the criminal prosecution of importers that have been found guilty of selling on the 
US market at a price lower than in the country of production. Although a recent case 
under the 1916 Act against the German producer Thyssen has been dismissed in the 
Ohio State Courts, the Community wants this particular piece of legislation removed 
since it believes that the US by keeping it in force breaches its obligation to bring 
existing legislation into conformity with WTO anti-dumping rules and threatens 
European exports. Since bilateral discussions and WTO consultations failed to resolve 
the issue, the Community in November 1998 formally requested a WTO panel. It was 
the first time that a TBR procedure led to a formal request for a WTO panel. There is 
also a second WTO panel, requested by Japan, aiming at the removal of the 1916 Act 
and both are still active at the time of writing. Similarly, there is an active WTO panel 
between the EC and the US concerning sections 301-10 of the US Trade Act of 1974. 
The Community contends that these unilateral provisions in US trade law are 
inconsistent with the GATT and WTO. While the US generally manages to avoid to 
most damaging panels that could take place (Interview with DG I Official, 4.5.1998) 
and although these cases are inconclusive at the time of writing, they provide further 
evidence for both the shift of EC steel policy into the wider framework of EC external 
policy-making as part of the SEM and a more assertive stance of the EC against 
potentially damaging US trade legislation by challenging the US on the multilateral 
level. 
Conclusions 
The EC's approach to the 1990s steel dispute with the US was firmly based on the 
Steel Objectives 1995 and strongly interconnected with internal liberalisation 
measures. In becoming what has been characterised cleaner and leaner, the EC 
attempted to draw a line under the past. It began to withdraw from interventionism in 
the steel sector, to phase out subsidisation, to induce the privatisation of the industry 
and sought the regulation of steel trade on the multilateral level in order to secure the 
US market as an outlet for EC steel exports. Similarly, the EC challenged the US steel 
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industry's anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases by taking the US to dispute settlement 
panels within the GATT and its successor WTO. Furthermore, within the context of 
the Uruguay Round, the EC pressed for clear and standardised rules on state aid and 
anti-dumping procedures. 
The results were mixed and not necessarily a product of the EC's policies. 
Considering the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases brought by the US steel industry 
against Community steel producers, the Commission's initial response was cautious 
and clearly toned down in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the US. Instead, 
the EC attempted to find a solution to the steel cases as part of the MSA negotiations 
and only once these failed, due to the objections of the US steel industry, the EC took 
the cases to a GATT panel. This move was in line with the policy lines stated in the 
Steel Objectives 1995. As a result of both, the ITC final rulings and the GATT panel, 
the problem was then reduced as the independent ITC dismissed some of the cases 
and the GATT panel in most cases found in favour of the EC. Although the US 
industry failed to achieve another comprehensive shield of protection, the imposition 
of temporary duties nevertheless produced higher steel prices in the US, resulted in a 
reduction in EC exports and aggravated the situation in the Community's steel 
industry. Taking into account both the damage caused to the EC steel industry and 
that the cases were substantially reduced by the findings of the ITC, the EC cannot 
claim that its steel policies were particularly successful. 
However, considering the larger picture of EC-US interactions in steel during the 
1990s, i. e. the regulation of steel under the GATT anti-dumping/anti-subsidy code, the 
failed MSA/MSSA negotiations and active WTO panels, it can be concluded that the 
EC's strategy of becoming leaner and cleaner in order to secure access to the US 
market is likely to produce positive effects in the long run. Although the EC failed to 
negotiate the much-wanted MSA, at the very least the strategy of becoming cleaner 
and leaner in the steel sector has increasingly enabled the EC to assert itself much 
more on questions relating to steel vis-a-vis the US and the rest of the world. While 
this chapter demonstrated the interconnectedness between internal and external policy 
making, the future success of EC steel policies vis-a-vis the US is of course also 
dependent on factors beyond the EC's control. Potential problems could arise from the 
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politicisation of steel policy-making in the US especially in the event of another steel 
crisis, the effectiveness of the WTO and the signatories' adherence to WTO rulings. 
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EVALUATION PART IV: STRATEGIC ACTION IN STEEL IN THE 1990s 
When the 1970s witnessed the development of the EC, and particularly of the 
Commission, into a relevant industrial-political actor in steel, the establishment and 
size of the Common Market during the 1980s had made the EC a major player in the 
international political economy. In steel, however, the EC had only been partially able 
to draw on the action capacities thus acquired. Through the imposition of anti- 
dumping procedures all major steel suppliers to the EC were forced to enter VRAs in 
order to stabilise the EC steel market, but vis-a-vis the US the EC found itself on the 
other end of the stick. Here, the Community's interventionist policy style, large-scale 
subsidisation and government involvement within the EC, and divergent Member 
State interests left the EC vulnerable vis-a-vis the strongest player in the international 
political economy. As a result, the EC had to settle for a limited, though guaranteed, 
share of the US market until the early 1990s. In the second half the 1980s and during 
the early 1990s, a process of policy learning started in the steel sector and, facilitated 
by the promotion of free-market ideas through a policy advocacy group that grew 
increasingly influential across the EC and the Member States, the steel industry was 
gradually phased into the framework of the SEM. This often painful and complicated 
process is as yet not fully completed, but, as this part of the thesis has shown, the new 
approach is beginning to pay of some dividends. Consequently, it can be concluded 
that the EC's strategic action capacities in steel have been further increased during the 
1990s. 
This conclusion rests on both factors relating directly to steel and factors concerned to 
the EC's overall development during the 1990s. As for the first, the long-term process 
of becoming cleaner and leaner clearly had a decisive impact on the development of 
strategic action capacities in the steel sector and provided a good example for the 
interconnectedness of internal and external policy-making. Progress towards the 
restructuring and the privatisation of the steel industry, the tightening of the rules on 
state aid, the enforcement of competition rules, and the withdrawal from direct 
intervention in the steel sector provided the foundation for an increasingly assertive 
stance by the EC on steel matters particularly vis-ý-vis the US. Similar to the 1980s, 
however, the Commission's progress in this direction has been limited by the strong 
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position of the Council on Ministers in EC decision-making processes. This strong 
position of the Council of Ministers not only prevented an early and certainly 
advantageous incorporation of the steel sector into the SEM, but also resulted in a 
number of exceptions for state-owned steel industries and subsequently contributed to 
a delay of the necessary restructuring process. Nonetheless, as a result of the progress 
achieved particularly in respect to subsidisation, the EC has decreased its vulnerability 
to countervailing actions by the US steel industry and created the basis for a more 
assertive stance on subsidised steel imports from third countries. 
On the other hand, the improvement of the EC's strategic action capacities in steel 
cannot be separated from its overall development during the 1990s. Based on the 
SEM, the EC was able to assert itself even more than during the 1980s vis-a-vis the 
US as the clashes and deadlocks between the two within the GATT Uruguay Round 
indicate. Although attempts to negotiate an MSA failed, the EC was able to shape the 
content of GATT anti-dumping and anti-subsidy codes and thereby reduced the 
dependency of EC steel producers on the interpretation of US trade legislation. In 
addition, the instalment of the TBR as an aggressive commercial policy-instrument on 
the EC level is currently being used by the EC steel industry to put additional pressure 
on the US to bring its trade legislation into line with GATT and WTO obligations and 
to reduce the scope of US trade legislation in general. Furthermore, the adoption of a 
strict GATT code on subsidies, in conjunction with the strict control of subsidies in 
the Community, now enables the Community to move from defensive to more 
aggressive policies on subsidised steel imports to the EC. 
Although the notion of steel as a special product has declined and although the 
Community's steel industry has largely been privatised, steel remains a vital industrial 
product with some socio-economic and regional importance attached to it. Therefore, 
the possibility cannot be discounted that in the event of another steel crisis Member 
States resort again to a special treatment of national steel industries and subsequently 
undermine the Community regime in steel. 
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CONCLUSIONS: STEEL, THE EC AND STRATEGIC ACTION IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
This thesis adopted a systematic approach to developing a framework for the 
evaluation strategic action capacities in the IPE. In chapter one, the thesis generated a 
framework for the evaluation of strategic action capacities and adopted the concept of 
state economic functions in order to create a level playing field for the actions of 
actors in 11PE. In an initial exploration in chapter two, the framework was applied to 
the case of the special case of the EC as an actor in IPE and a case study approach 
developed that suggested to investigate the EC's strategic action capacities in steel by 
means of a longitudinal study. Parts II, III and IV subsequently analysed EC policy- 
making in steel from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990. The conclusions presented in 
this chapter are arranged in three sections. In the first section, the insights derived 
from the longitudinal study of EC policy-making in steel are summarised by using the 
template of the research framework. The second section looks at the insights gained 
from the steel case study and relates them to the case of the EC as a strategic actor in 
the IPE. Here, reflections are presented on the provision of state economic functions 
through the EC. The third section reviews the lessons that can be derived from the 
analysis of the EC as a strategic actor and puts them into the context of IPE. Together 
with suggestions for other actors wishing to improve their strategic action capacities 
in the IPE, this section reflects on the research framework and presents some 
suggestions for further research. 
9.1 Strategic Action in Steel 
The longitudinal case study of EC policy-making in the steel sector presented detailed 
evidence for the gradual development of the EC's strategic action capacities under 
complex internal and external constraints. The initial 20 years of the Common Market 
in steel were characterised by efforts to liberalise the steel market and to prevent 
cartel practices among EC producers. Given this focus of EC policy-making and the 
post-war boom in steel demand, the EC cannot be said to have been engaged in 
strategic action steel during this initial period. Responding to market developments in 
the second half of the 1970s, the EC then became gradually involved in the 
management of the steel sector and experienced enormous difficulties in making the 
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transition from trade liberalisation to the form of interventionist joint economic 
management that dominated EC policy-making in steel for the next decade. Similarly, 
the EC experienced numerous obstacles to retreat from the interventionist policy- 
making style in steel that had been established during the first half of the 1980s. In the 
light of the four factors of analysis set out at the end of chapter two, the broad 
conclusions on the longitudinal study of policy-making in the steel sector look as 
follows: Firstly, the EC has been very limited in its ability to bring about structural 
adjustment in the steel sector; Secondly, the EC has been highly successful in 
imposing its preferences on steel supplying countries, but this capacity degenerated 
vis-6-vis the US; Thirdly, the EC experienced severe difficulties in setting norms and 
standards in its interactions with the Member States and steel producers; Fourthly, the 
EC found it very difficult to ensure compliance with negotiated agreements within the 
EC. In order to take analysis further and to see what these conclusions mean in respect 
to the EC's capacity to act strategically in the steel sector, the following brings 
together the conclusions of parts H, III, and IV by concentrating on the four elements 
of the framework. 
International Relations 
Generally, it has to be distinguished between EC policy-making in steel vis-6-vis the 
US and EC policy-making in steel vis-ý-vis the rest of the world. In the late 1970s, the 
EC succeeded in controlling deliveries to the EC by copying US trade practices and 
forcing supplier countries into voluntary restrain agreements. Here, the size of the 
Common Market and hints of EC trade policy measures should steel-supplying 
countries not respect EC crisis measures sufficed to convince these countries to 
restrict their deliveries into the EC despite the fact that the Commission was only 
conducting 'talks' and not empowered to conduct proper negotiations. The EC 
subsequently improved its anti-dumping legislation, established the basic price system 
and was thereafter able to press any country exporting into the EC into VRAs. While 
the EC over time undertook various modifications to its anti-dumping and anti 
subsidy legislation and amended it in line with GATT codes, the size of the 
Commonfinternal Market was at all times incentive enough for steel-supplying to 
restrict their steel deliveries should the EC wish so. 
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Early VRAs between the EC steel industry and the Japanese and US steel industry had 
been agreed without EC involvement, partly because of the political and legal 
problems associated with VRAs under GATT, EC and US trade law. It is clear from 
chapter four that the EC's contested position under that GATT and its orientation 
towards trade liberalisation contributed to the hesitant reaction of the EC when the 
crisis worsened after 1975. While the Commission was initially unwilling to depart 
from its essentially liberal stance on steel trade, this changed as the crisis worsened in 
the late 1970s and the EC in parallel to the US started to adopt increasingly 
protectionist policies. By creating a system of VRAs that protected their internal steel 
markets from external competition, both the US and the EC undermined the 
multilateral trading regime. Of course, the permissiveness of the GATT code on 
subsidies eventually contributed to the US and the EC settling outside the GATT 
framework. Subsequently, multilateral channels were hardly used to find solutions to 
the steel problem and attempts at establishing managed steel trade within the 
framework of the OECD did not succeed because of US resistance to such attempts 
and general disagreements as to the desirability of steel quotas. Thus, EC steel 
policies were hardly bound by GATT provisions during the early 1980s and through 
its actions the EC indeed contributed to its ineffectiveness. As a result of a policy 
learning effect, the EC in the late 1980s then realised that if it was to improve its 
strategic action capacities vis-a-vis the US it had to work towards the strengthening of 
the GATT system and to tackle the main constraint on its strategic action capacities at 
its source, i. e. subsidies and government intervention, by becoming what has been 
termed 'leaner and cleaner'. While attempts to negotiate a MSA failed mainly due to 
the obstructive attitude of the integrated US steel industry, the EC was nevertheless 
able to write some of its preferences into the GATT anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
codes and this has, as chapter eight indicated, improved the EC's strategic action 
capacities in steel. 
Not least because the European steel industry is dependent on the US market as an 
export outlet, the situation is not as clear-cut in terms of EC strategic action as regards 
EC-US interactions in steel. From the outset, the determination of the EC's external 
policies had to be handled carefully for the danger of a protectionist backlash of the 
US in response to a redirection to the US of exports originally destined to the EC. 
Furthermore, the US acted as a hegemon in the international system and the GATT 
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system essentially mirrored US free-trade and laissez-faire ideology. As chapters four 
and five showed, the ECs initial approach to steel trade was subsequently shaped 
under strong consideration of US preferences. In the early 1980s, when the steel crisis 
escalated, the EC's dependency on the US market as an export outlet came to bear 
even stronger on the EC as access to the US market was crucial to the success of 
internal crisis measures. This constellation subsequently put the EC into a weaker 
position for strategic action vis-a-vis the US and the EC ultimately had to agree to 
VRAs in steel that limited EC exports to a certain market share up until the 1990s. In 
this context, chapter six showed that in a situation of extremely tense transatlantic 
relations the political will on both sides of the Atlantic to find a solution to the steel 
problem was an important aspect in finding a solution to the steel conflict. The high 
degree of international trade interdependence between the US and the EC made the 
EC too important an economic and political counterpart to let transatlantic tensions 
escalate. Chapter eight in particular showed how the balance of power between the 
US and the EC underwent a transformation towards a greater assertiveness of the EC 
on the basis of the SEM. The EC's greater assertiveness vis-a-vis the US was 
particularly felt in the context the GATT Uruguay Round, where the EC started to live 
up to its economic potential and clashed head-on with the US on numerous issues. 
Chapter eight provided some initial evidence for the conclusion that on the basis of 
the significance of the SEA on the ECs overall position in the international system 
and the liberalisation of the steel sector, the EC was subsequently able to improve its 
strategic action capacities in steel. 
institutional Capacity 
Although the ECSC Treaty in theory gave the EC strong institutional basis for 
strategic action, the development of an institutional capacity to act strategically in the 
steel sector was always hindered by the fact that the ECSC Treaty, in contrast to the 
EEC Treaty, left commercial competences to the Member States. Because of the 
differences among the Member States concerning the form and extent EC 
involvement should take, the establishment and operation of a supranational 
framework for the regulation of the steel industry was difficult and highly-contested. 
A number of factors were influential in this context: Firstly, transferring powers to the 
EC touched heavily on the issues of national sovereignty and the national interest in 
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the steel industry. As the ECSC Treaty had contributed to the formation of national 
champions and strong ties between national governments and steel producers, the 
steel crisis had to create immense social and regional problems within the Member 
States before the political to transfer powers was forthcoming. Secondly, there were 
legal problems that had to be overcome. On the one hand. the Treaty did not provide 
for half measure between indicative and obligatory measures. On the other, 
competition policy provisions had to circumvented in order to establish a crisis cartel 
on the EC level. The establishment of an EC framework was furthermore shaped 
under consideration of possible counteractions of the US, the EC's tenuous status 
under the GATT, and the EC's formal commitment to trade liberalisation. Thus it was 
difficult to summon the political will to resort to the dirigiste provisions contained in 
the ECSC Treaty and it required a high degree of legal creativity to entrust the 
Cominission with the authority to take and implement crisis policy measures. As the 
Member States jealously safeguarded their national interest through the strong 
position in ECSC decision-making processes, the EC's steel polices were 
subsequently charactcrised by fragile compromises and often ineffective. Chapter six 
illustrated that he fragility of the EC's competence in the steel showed most strongly 
when dealing with the US. The point to make here is that the insistence of the US, or 
more specifically the insistence of the US steel industry, on a global agreement with 
the whole of the EC contributed to the continuation of supranational regulation in the 
steel sector. Chapter seven and eight then showed that aligning the steel sector with 
the broader thrust of the SEM improved the EC institutional capacity, mainly because 
the EC was able to increasingly rid itself from the complexities and intricacies 
involved in ECSC decision-making. 
Chapter two showed that the EC has a powerful arsenal of commercial trade 
instruments at its disposal and that these form a substantial part of the EC's strategic 
action capacities. The point that emerged strongly in the case study of the steel sector 
is that the development and application of commercial policy measures by the EC in 
the steel sector has been strongly influenced by the US' use of foreign trade measures 
and US trade legislation. The main commercial policy instrument used in the steel 
sector were anti-dumping procedures and chapters four and five showed how anti- 
dumping procedures were refined along the lines the US TPM and used to press steel 
suppliers into VRAS. Early VRAs were agreed without EC involvement, because: 
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firstly, the EC had not developed the authority or bureaucratic structure to participate 
in negotiations; secondly, the political will of the Member States to consider VRA- 
type arrangements was not existent as the Member States preferred national forms of 
protection; and thirdly; VRAs involved aspects that were legally questionable under 
US law and under GATT law. Once the US had started using VRAs to protect its steel 
market during the 1980, however, the Member States were quickly ready to empower 
the Commission with the mandate to conclude a comprehensive series of VRAs in 
order to stabilise the internal steel market. After VRAs in steel were phased out in the 
late 1980s, the protection of the EC was achieved mainly through the initiation of 
anti-dumping procedures and, in the case of CEEC steel deliveries, through 
safeguards. On the other hand, the EC was able to write somewhat clearer rules into 
the GATT anti-dumping and anti subsidy codes in the context of the Uruguay Round, 
which reduces the possibility to be subjected again to unilateral interpretations and 
findings by the US authorities. 
Furthermore, parts III and IV on the whole showed that the EC's steel aids codes had 
some important repercussions on the EC's capacity for strategic action. During the 
1980s, the Commission's insufficient authority on state aids proved to undermine the 
EC's capacity to act strategically. On the one hand, the EC was forced to approve of 
subsidies and to violate Art. 4c ECSC. On the other hand, the Member States 
continued to subsidise their national steel producers in various forms. Thus, 
subsidisation not only caused legal problems that effected the EC's ability to assert 
itself on subsidised imports from abroad, but also left EC exports to the US vulnerable 
to US countervailing action. As chapters five and eight show, however, the 
establishment of a greater authority of the Commission, the changes in voting 
procedure on state aids, and the establishment of increasingly stricter discipline on 
state aids within the EC and within the GATT enabled the EC to become less 
vulnerable vis-b-vis US countervailing action and to assert itself more on subsidised 
steel imports by other countries in the 1990s. 
Inspired by the existence of powerful US trade legislation, the EC in the second half 
of the 1980s started to develop its own aggressive commercial policy instruments. The 
latest addition to the EC's commercial policy instruments, the TBR, is possibly about 
to show some effect in the steel sector, but the possible repercussions of a possible 
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removal of powerful trade legislation such as 1916 Trade Act from the US body of 
law are far more significant. Although the WTO panel is inconclusive at the time of 
writing, it is clear that the TBR procedure, if successful, has an strong effect on the 
EC's capacity the act strategically and in its repercussions goes well beyond the steel 
sector. In contrast to the 1916 or 1979 US Trade Acts, however, the TBR has been 
developed in the context of and in compliance with GATT provisions, reflecting the 
EC's 'learning curve' and the desire to make better use of multilateral dispute 
settlement procedures. Of course, there is always the question as to the adherence of 
major players like the US and the EC to multilateral rulings, but it can be generally be 
concluded that the EC's strategic action capacities have been usefully complemented 
by the development of the TBR. 
Decisioll-Making Capacity 
On the basis of the measures adopted under the Simonet Plan, the decision-making 
structure of the EC in steel changed in the late 1970s. Chapter four showed how the 
EC's crisis policies were thereafter determined as an understanding based on co- 
operation between producers, workers, dealers, producers and Member States, with 
the Commission emerging as an interlocutor between external and internal spheres of 
policy-making. Chapters four and five then showed how EC steel polices experienced 
a qualitative and quantitative extension and turned increasingly protectionist when 
Davignon was in charge of DG III. From the beginning of active EC involvement in 
steel in the late 1970 up to the mid-1990s, decision-making processes in steel were 
highly contested and often resulted in ineffective policies that lacked long-term 
vision. The problems in agreeing EC policies came from multiple comers: Firstly, the 
conflictual institutional context within which EC decision-making in steel took place 
added complexity to decision-making and slowed the process down. Secondly, 
through jealously pursuing the national interest in the Council of. Ministers and 
actively undermining agreed EC policies the Member States reduced the effectiveness 
of EC policies. Thirdly, ideological differences between the Member States as to the 
extent and form of measures complicated the flnding of compromises. Fourthly, 
voting rules, especially in areas requiring unanimity, required the Member States to 
find difficult compromises. Fifthly, the nationalised market structures and divergent 
social pressures caused divides among the Member States. As a result, the 
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Commission was limited in its capacity to pursue the EC interest and to adopt a 
coherent set of policies. The longitudinal analysis of EC decision-making in steel 
therefore underlines the notion of policy-making as a series of strategic bargaining 
games. As the EC failed to properly to adjust to structural change in steel, decision- 
making during the 1990s was hardly less complex despite the increasing liberalisation 
of the steel sector and general shift in the capacities of the Commission following the 
adoption of the SEA. In general, as parts III and IV show, policy-making concerning 
external matters was generally more effective than policy-making concerning internal 
matters. V&lc different patters of export dependencies and divergent levels of 
subsidisation complicated policy-making vis-a-vis the US, establishing negotiation 
mandates to empower the Commission to take measures against steel suppliers 
generally did not cause a problem. However, the interventionist policy-making style 
created by Davignon may have prevented the breakdown of the Common Market in 
steel during early the 1980s, but this analysis suggests that the interventionist policy- 
making style served only short-term ends and had a negative effect on the EC's 
capacity to act strategically. Especially chapters seven and eight suggest that policy- 
making based on free-market ideas and embedded in a strengthened multilateral 
system is a more promising basis for successful EC strategic action in steel. Overall, it 
therefore has to be concluded that due to numerous problems involved in decision- 
making tile EC's capacity to act strategically has been constrained for most part of the 
EC's active involvement in steel. 
Market Stnicturc 
Pressures derived from the EC's market structure in steel and market developments 
have been decisive elements of EC steel policies and the longitudinal analysis of EC- 
policy-making in steel demonstrated their important ramification on the EC's capacity 
to act strategically. The single most important effect was of course the fact that the 
steel industry was heavily affected by the business cycle. Market developments linked 
to the course of the business cycle not only triggered EC involvement in the steel 
sector and let to the adoption of dirigiste policies on the EC level, but also set 
important limits as to the success of the EC's restructuring efforts. Structural change 
and the resulting high numbers of redundancies had a direct influence on the 
preferences of the Member States, who, based on the nationalised structures of the 
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steel industries within the Common Market clearly preferred national solutions to the 
steel problem. As the social pressures grew, however, it became apparent that EC 
solutions had to be found and the Member States reluctantly agreed to render powers 
to the Commission. By pursuing the national interest through the Council of Ministers 
and simultaneously subsidising national steel industries, however, many Member 
States especially during 1980s limited the chances of bringing about the necessary 
restructuring process. On the other hand, a low demand for steel and over-capacities 
had a devastating effect on steel prices and resulted in cut-throat competition within 
the Common Market for steel. Thus hopes to bring about a restructuring process by 
means of voluntary agreements and close co-operation with Eurofer proved futile and 
the EC resorted to Art. 58 and 61 measures. As the steel crisis persisted, however, 
many Member States continued to subsidise their national steel industries, while the 
producers undermined the carefully orchestrated crisis cartel by offering products 
below production costs. Nationalised market structures and market developments in 
steel thus had a direct influence on political choices of the Member States. 
Moreover, chapter six showed that the dirigiste crisis measures not only failed to 
produce a lasting restructuring process, but also reduced the EC's capacity for 
strategic action vis-ý-vis the US. While the diverse market structures in steel within 
the EC made practically no difference as to the determination of policies aimed at 
getting steel-supplying countries into restricting their steel deliveries to the 
Common/Single Market, they became a major problem in the context of the EC-US 
steel conflict. In the EC's attempts to keep the US steel market open, the divergent 
patters of export dependencies and divergent levels of Member State involvement and 
subsidisation in the national steel industries firstly complicated the decision-making 
process within the Council of Ministers. The strong variations in countervailing duty 
margins imposed by the US authorities then drove an additional wedge into the EC's 
attempts to agree on coherent crisis measures and caused a clear divide between 
subsidised and non-subsidised national steel producers. This contributed to the EC's 
eventually settling for a guaranteed market share of the US market throughout the 
1980s. With the liberalisation efforts brought under way by the Commission in the 
late 1980s and early 1990 and the gradual changes in the steel industries market 
structure, however, the situation began to change. By establishing increasingly stricter 
discipline as regards subsidisation, encouraging transnational co-operation and 
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mergers, pressing for the privatisation of the industry by linking it to investment 
decisions, and increasingly aligning the regulation of the steel sector with the SEM by 
enforcing competition law, the Commission was able to improve its strategic action 
capacities vis-h-vis the US and became less vulnerable to US trade legislation. 
However, the recoveries in steel demand towards the end of the 1980s and in middle 
of the 1990s were significant influences on the EC steel industry only undertaking an 
incomplete restructuring process. Should another steel crisis affect the steel sector 
some time in the next Millennium, it is not difficult to foresee that some Member 
States will be tempted to intervene again despite the process of liberalisation that has 
been under way since the late 1980s. It will then be a matter of timing, i. e. whether the 
steel crisis hits before or after the expiry of the ECSC Treaty, and a matter of the 
extent of the steel crisis that determines the reaction of the Member States and the 
steel industry. The conclusion stands regardless: direct intervention in the steel 
industry and producer's tendency to dump steel products reduce the EC's strategic 
action capacities vis-6-vis the US as it leaves the steel industry vulnerable to attack 
under US trade legislation and increasingly also under GATT/WTO rules. 
A final point to make is that although it could have been expected that the 
oligopolistic structure of the steel industry and almost insignificant level of foreign 
ownership in the EC's steel production would facilitate decision-making processes 
and result in a relatively high level of concerted action, the steel cased study suggests 
a different view. Chapters four, five and seven showed that the nationalised structure 
of the steel industry, the divergent levels of government intervention and state 
ownership, and frictions between competitive and uncompetitive national industries 
made decision-making and the deterinination of a coherent set of crisis policies rather 
unsuccessful. Despite the industry's long standing tendency to cartellise and the 
organisation of an official EC-administered crisis cartel, it was shown that the 
producer's actions in response to market developments in fact undermined the EC's 
efforts to stabilise the steel market. As a result, it cannot be concluded that the 
relatively high concentration of steel production in the EC necessarily translates into 
the ability for concerted action or to agree on coherent strategic policies. 
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It is thus clear that the EC's capacity to act strategically in steel has undergone a 
qualitative transformation over the past 20 or so years. From what has been termed an 
'infant strategic actoe in steel in the late 1970, the EC increased its strategic action 
capacities on the basis of the development of the SEM and as a result of a policy 
learning effect matured into a fully-fledged strategic actor in steel in the 1990s. Of 
course, the transition of the steel sector is as yet incomplete and there is still a chance 
of a possible reversal to interventionist policy-making in steel considering the 
possibility of a future downturn in steel demand and the incomplete restructuring 
process. However, all things considered it is unlikely that the EC will revert to an 
overtly interventionist policy-making style, in steel and render itself vulnerable vis-a- 
vis the US again. 
9.2 The EC's Strategic Action Capacities in RE 
Although there is a number of important constraints on the ECs capacity for strategic 
action, the exploration of the EC's strategic action capacities in chapter two and the 
longitudinal study of EC policy-making in steel show that the EC is a powerful 
strategic actor in the IPE. On the basis of the size of the SEM and its comprehensive 
arsenal of commercial trade instruments, the EC has the potential leverage to get all 
other actors, with the exception of the US, to act in a fashion favourable to the EC. 
The EC can press for reciprocity in trade relations, force others to liberalise and even 
sanction or reward the actions of other actors. Furthermore, since the re-launch of 
European integration and the associated institutional developments, the EC was able 
to become more assertive vis-6-vis the US in the context of the GATT Uruguay 
Round, to co-write international trade rules and to provide leadership in some 
previously underdeveloped areas. The EC's strategic action capacities are surpassed 
only by the United States. Today, the EC interacts more or less on level terms with the 
US and there is a highly institutionalised and even strategic relationship between the 
EC and the US that incorporates elements of both co-operation and conflict. Although 
the US were not a central element of the present thesis, it can be asserted however that 
not least because of the institutional advantages of the US system and its role as a 
provider of global security the US remains the most powerful strategic actor in the 
IPE. 
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However, the broad characterisation of the EC as a powerful strategic actor has to be 
differentiated since the detailed exploration of the EC's strategic action capacities in 
chapter two showed the significant variations and limitations in the EC's strategic 
action capacities in sectors and over time. The effects of these on the EC's capacity to 
act strategically show most prominently in the elements of institutional capacity and 
decision-making capacity. The process of transferring institutional powers to the EC 
has not only been gradual and stagnated at different points in time, it also varied 
according to sectors of European integration. Accordingly, different patterns of 
decision-making processes developed in the various sectors of European integration, 
with varying divisions of competences and varying sets of participating actors with 
varying action capacities over time. Linked to the existence of divergent sectoral 
market structures, these variations resulted in a number of divergent sectoral regimes 
within the EC and created not only tensions between the EC and the global economic 
system, but also as concerns the interplay of functional policies within the European 
market place. The analysis of the EC by means of the research framework helped to 
detail the factors that are influential upon the EC's strategic action capacities, but the 
need to analysc the EC's strategic action capacities on a sectoral. basis emerged 
clearly. Thus the steel sector was chosen for a longitudinal analysis in order to obtain 
a more detailed picture of the EC's strategic action capacities. Some insights derived 
from the longitudinal case study on steel are symptomatic for the case of the EC as a 
strategic actor in the TPE and there are some important lessons that can be drawn from 
the experience of EC policy-making in steel. 
An important way for the EC to increase its strategic action capacities is to model of 
copy the policies of the US. On the one hand, it the steel case study showed that in an 
international system dominated and largely modelled on US free-trade and laissez- 
faire ideology, the EC was well advised to mimic the US. In copying the US TPM in 
the forrn of the basic price mechanism and subsequently refining its anti-dumping 
legislation, the EC was able to force steel suppliers into VRAs. Of course, this way 
the multilateral system was undermined, yet this strategy enabled the EC to achieve 
the short-term objective to protect and stabilise the Common Market in steel. On the 
other hand, it is clear from the ECSC experience that the EC improves its capacity to 
act strategically by adopting non-interventionist policies, establishing strict discipline 
on subsidies, facilitating privatisation in sectors characterised by government 
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intervention and ownership and strictly enforcing competition law within the SEM. 
The ECSC Treaty may have given the EC great powers for intervention in the steel 
sector, but greater powers for intervention do not translate in a greater capacity for 
strategic action in a global system dominated US laissez-faire ideology and enforced 
by its powerful foreign trade legislation. In undertaking a liberalisation process in the 
steel sector and dovetailing the ECSC Treaty with the EEC Treaty, the EC removed a 
, trouble child' that restricted its overall capacity to act strategically. Furthermore, 
modelled on the aggressive trade remedies available to the US, the EC created its own 
aggressive commercial policy instrument in the TBR. Significantly, the TBR provides 
the EC with the opportunity 'go on the counterattack' against the US and may well 
force the US to make amends to some of its most powerful trade legislation. 
The best way of improving the EC's capacity to act strategically vis-a-vis the US is to 
align its policies with GATT and WTO provisions and to work towards the 
strengthening of multilateral dispute settlement procedures. Based on the weight that 
the Single Market gives die EC in the international system, the EC in the 1990s has 
improved its strategic action capacities by starting to co-write the international trade 
rules of the GATT in the context of the Uruguay Round. While the EC was able to 
favourably influence the GATT codes on anti-dumping and states aids, the EC was 
also able to actively shape previously underdeveloped or new areas of the GATT. As 
the steel case study demonstrates, the adoption of a stricter code on subsidies in the 
GATT influenced by EC preferences now enables the European industry to assert 
itself more on subsidised deliveries to the Internal Market. Similarly, the 
strengthening of multilateral dispute settlement procedures reduces the EC's 
vulnerability to unilateral action by the US. 
By working towards the homogenisation of market structures within the Single 
Market and the removal of protectionist regimes, the EC can improve its strategic 
action capacities. A further homogenisation of market structures in the EC implies not 
only smaller divides between the Member States preferences and less complex 
decision-making processes, but also lesser tensions with the international system and 
particularly the US. As the steel case study demonstrates, even a sector characterised 
by a relatively small number of market participants and low levels of foreign 
ownership can pose considerable problems in the determination of mutually 
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acceptable policies. Yet by further shaping and developing the mechanisms 
underlying decision-making and co-ordination processes, and increasing the 
hornogcnisation of modes of regulation and market structures within the SEM, the 
complexity of the process of identifying the Community interest can be 
operationalised. Factors such as divergent market structures and different positions of 
specific industries in the business cycle and their effect on the behaviour of market 
and policy participants within the EC may at all times reduce the effectiveness of 
policies and of the internal dccision-making process. Yet by placing the emphasis on 
competition policy, facilitating the flow of the four freedoms within the Single 
Market, and departing from specialised sectoral regimes, the EC can improve its 
strategic action capacities particularly vis-a-vis the US. 
Although the thesis adopted the concept of state economic functions in the first place 
in order to create a level playing field upon which the EC could be analysed as a 
strategic actor, chapter two showed that the EC has developed into a 'parallel' or 
'complementary' provider of state economic functions in Europe. The steel case study 
provided further evidence for the adjustment strategies and policies adopted by the EC 
ever since the 1970s as well as the EC's activities in the pursuit of state economic 
functions. Mile the case study did not equally focus on the EC's activities in the 
pursuit of state economic functions in the steel sector, it nevertheless transpired that 
the Commission assumed a position in which it effectively shares the responsibility of 
providing state economic functions with the Member States. 
In the case of steel, the Member States in the late 1970s increasingly transferred 
powers to the EC in order to adjust to structural change in the steel industry and 
chapter two stressed that the transfer of powers to the EC level is also linked to 
economic rationale that underpins regional integration. Over time, the Member States 
thus invested the EC with increasingly with the competence to provide state economic 
function in a growing number of sectors, but at all times maintained a controlling 
influence through the Council of Ministers. The fact that the provision of state 
economic functions is handled in shared responsibility between the EC and the 
Member States creates two important problems: Firstly, because the Commission is 
not a passive bureaucratic organisation and therefore not only brings preferences on 
its own into the process, but also tries to expand its competences in order to pursue its 
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objectives, there is a tension in the performance of state economic functions. Similar 
to dccision-making processes in the EC that have been characterised as a 'series of 
strategic bargaining games' or a 'mixed motive' game in chapter two, the provision of 
state economic functions now engages the Member States, acting in the national 
interest, and the Commission in strategic bargaining games, with each side to trying to 
justify its usefulness to the (national and European) public. As the steel case study 
showed, the inherent danger of the arrangement that distributes the provision of state 
economic functions between the Member States and the Commission is that it may 
result in sub-optimal policies. Secondly, there is the problem of legitimacy. The 
Commission is appointed by the Member States, but it is not democratically elected to 
pursue these functions. In acts on behalf of the Member States, but is often creating 
policies that go against the preferences identified by the nationally elected 
governments. Both these tensions are related and constrain the EC's capacity to act 
strategically. 
9.3 Strategic Action in IPE and Reflections on the Framework 
Chapter one developed an integrative framework for the evaluation of strategic action 
capacities of state actors in the IPE. The framework rested on the assertion that all 
state actors act strategically in the pursuit of state economic functions in the age of 
globalisation and internationalisation and that their strategic action capacities can be 
evaluated on a sectoral basis by analysing the interplay of actor's international 
relations, their institutional capacity, their decision-making capacity and the market 
structure. The framework furthermore asserted that the most successful actors are 
those who can complement their resources with collaborative power arrangements 
with state and non-state actors and that regulatory policy, industrial policy and 
competition policy complement commercial policy instruments as the instruments of 
competition in today's IPE. 
Despite the complexities involved in the exercise of power in the IPE, the analysis of 
the EC provides powerful evidence for the claim that the most successful actors in the 
IPE are those who complement their conventional power resources with collaborative 
power arrangements. The thesis demonstrated that the Member States of the EC 
successfully used the framework of collaboration that the ECSC, EEC and SEA 
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offered in order to adjust to changes in the IPE and in order to obtain a greater weight 
in the world economy. As the size of a market is the most important building block to 
any actor's strategic action capacities, smaller and less developed market economies 
are ultimately limited in the influence they can exert in the IPE. Collaborative power 
arrangements such as regional integration increase the leverage actors can exercise on 
the bilateral and multilateral level. There is thus a strong case in addition to the 
associated economic rationale for actors in IPE to enter regional trade agreements in 
order to increase their capacities for strategic action. 
The thesis also provided some evidence for the claim that next to collaborative power 
arrangements commercial trade instruments and functional policies play and 
important role in respect to strategic action capacities. As firms continue to perform a 
crucial role in the creation of wealth within domestic territories, it is important for 
state actors not only to create a business environment that attracts foreign investment, 
but also to enable firms to flourish and to assist them with their expansion into new 
markets. Mile commercial policy instruments, such as the EC's TBR, and regulatory 
and industrial policies play an important part in providing such an environment, it is 
also advisable to remove protectionist sectoral regimes. The predominant free-trade 
and laissez-faire ideologies that underpin the international system make it advisable to 
adopt such principles into the regulation their economic system, because in the 
international system dominated by the US and the EC intervention in economic life 
renders state actors vulnerable to attack from commercial policy instrument of either 
the US or the EC or under multilateral trade rules. As the case of the EC steel policies 
demonstrated, there is a strong rationale towards phasing out protectionist sectoral 
regimes and to work towards the strengthening of multilateral dispute settlement 
procedures. Of course, this presupposes both an economic culture and a market 
structure that supports the adoption of such policies. 
The analysis of the EC as a strategic actor is a particularly challenging case, but the 
thesis showed that it is possible to derive important insights into the factors that 
underpin strategic action capacities from the complex case of the EC. 
Notwithstanding, from the outset of this thesis it was clear that pressing strategic 
action capacities into a template of a framework with four elements could only be 
artificial as there are considerable overlaps and the individual elements are highly 
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interactive. This is particularly obvious when considering the overlaps and 
interactions between the elements of institutional capacity and decision-making 
capacity. Yet as actor's capacities in these have distinguishable ramifications, i. e. 
institutional capacity bears strongly on what an actor can to in the international system 
whereas decision-making capacity bears strongly on the generation of preferences, the 
separation of the two are deemed analytically useful by the author. 
Moreover, the comprehensiveness of the research framework sets limits to the 
thoroughness of the investigation carried out in this thesis. There is an inevitable 
tension between the flexibility for which the framework allows and the demands 
arising on the researcher when attempting to investigate all elements to equal 
measure. While the framework deliberately left some space for variations within the 
individual elements, the broad nature of the four elements and the considerable 
amount of research that has been on the various aspects contained in them made it 
inevitable that not all aspects have been investigated with the same degree of detail. 
For instance, macro-economic variables have generally been taken into account, but 
the longitudinal study of steel did not provide much detail on the economic effects of 
interest rate changes on steel trade or the influence of rising numbers of 
unemployment on Member State preferences. As the latter aspects, which touch on 
the interaction between economic and political action in steel have been treated 
elsewhere in detail (in particular M6ny and Wright (1987a) and Conrad, 1997), were 
not central to this thesis a more thorough analysis of the causality of economic 
variables on policy-making in steel was sacrificed in favour of a concentration on the 
broader thrust in policy-making. This is not to suggest that such an approach can 
necessarily be taken in an application of the framework to other actors and sectors 
since macro-cconomic variables create strong pressures on actors for action and set 
specific limits to their scope for action. Notwithstanding the analytical overlaps and 
the limitations concerning the investigation of particular aspects contained in the four 
elements of the framework, the sometimes delicate balance between 
comprehensiveness and flexibility incorporated in the framework allows to evaluate 
the strategic action capacities of any actor in IPE. 
The framework developed in chapter one a need to approach the strategic action 
capacities of actors on a sectoral basis. Generally, the framework could have been 
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used on either a longitudinal basis or on a cross-sectoral basis. In this thesis, the 
longitudinal approach was adopted as in the case of the EC we are dealing with an 
actor that underwent significant developments in the course of its history and because, 
apart from other reasons presented at the end of chapter two, the steel sector bears a 
particular relevance to European integration and strategic action. On the other hand, 
the comprehensiveness of the elements contained in the research framework puts a 
thorough application of the framework to two or more sectors beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Given the transition of the steel sector from a highly-regulated sector to a 
'normal sector' within the SEM and the conclusion, if accepted, that strategic action 
capacities are enhanced by playing along with the established rules of free trade and 
laissez-faire in the international system, however, it is the belief of the author that 
similar insights would have emerged from an analysis of two sectors with opposed 
modes of regulation. 
As the thesis primarily used the concept of state economic functions as a conceptual 
tool in order to create a level playing field between the variety of actors in IPE, some 
aspects of the EC as a provider of state economic functions inevitably remained 
underdeveloped due to the scope and aims of the thesis. For instance, had the thesis 
aimed at further developing the subject of the EC as a provider of state economic 
functions, more emphasis should have been given on the social aspects of 
restructuring in the steel sector. Both the capacity of the EC to provide the individual 
statc economic functions and the tensions that have been identified in the relationship 
between the E-C and the Member States in the 'parallel' or 'joint' provision of state 
economic functions deserves further research, and this not necessarily in the context 
of the IPE. 
Overall, it is suggested that the concept of strategic action and the analysis of strategic 
action capacities of actors arc a useful way of analysing the complex exercise of 
power in today's IPE and help to explain outcomes in IPE. The empirical application 
of the research framework to the case of the EC captured the basis of the EC's 
strategic action capacities and showed how the EC has developed its strategic action 
capacities in the context of complex internal and external constraints. From the 
longitudinal analysis of EC policy-making in the steel, the thesis was able to produce 
policy recommendations for actors in IPE wishing to improve their strategic action 
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capacities and to improve their chances to influence the outcomes of trade issues in 
today's IPE. 
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Appendix 
Share in 
Percent 
Year 
1960 1975 1981 1985 1993 
Germany 46.7 32.2 33.0 33.6 28.5 
France 23.7 17.2 16.9 15.4 12.9 
Italy 11.6 17.4 19.7 19.8 19.4 
UK x 15.8 12.2 13.1 12.6 
Belgium 9.8 9.2 9.7 8.9 7.7 
Netherlands 2.7 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.5 
Luxembourg 5.5 3.7 3.1 3.3 2.5 
Spain X X X X 9.8 
Table 4: Member State Share of EC Steel Production. 
Source: Conrad (1997: 209). Based on Eurostat Data and Authors Calculations 
(Rounded up to I st Digit after Conuna); Translated by C. G. 
1960 1970 1980 1990 1993 
Share Share Share Share Share Share Share S are Share Share 
in % in, 000 in % in'000 in % in'000 in % in'000 in% in'000 
Ile Largest 3 12 8,704 16 17,960 20 25,910 15 20,903 16 _ 21,075 
'nie Largest 4 15 10,992 20 21,540 24 31,088 19 26,058 20 26,121 
Ile Largest 5 18 13,113 23 24,890 28 36,041 22 30,187 23 29,964 
The Largest 10 30 21,808 36 39,371 41 51,944 36 48,551 36 47,592 
Tle Largest 20 47 23,639 52 1 56,517 1 56 72,028 53 72,486 
. 
54 
1 
70,460 
Table 5: Share of Large Companies of EC Crude Steel Production' 
Source: Conrad (1997: 215); Translated by C. G. 
I EC including the respective Member States. 
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Rounded to 
1000 
1973 1975 A in 
% 
1977 A in 
% 
1979 A in 
% 
1981 A in 
% 
1983 A in 
% 
Germany 228 222 -3 209 -6 205 -2 187 -9 163 -13 France 152 156 3 143 -8 121 -15 97 -20 91 -6 Italy 90 96 7 97 1 99 2 96 -3 87 -9 UK 196 183 -7 179 -2 156 -13 88 -44 64 -27 Belgium 62 59 -5 50 -15 49 -2 44 -10 40 -9 Netherlands 23 25 -5 23 -61 21 -9 21 0 19 -10 Luxembourg 23 21 -9 17 -19 16 -6 13 -19 13 0 EC 775 1 766 1 -1 1 722 1 -6 1 670 1 -7 1 549 1 -18 479 -13 
Roundedto 
1000 
1985 A in 
% 
1987 A in 
% 
1989 A in 
% 
1991 A in 
% 
1993 A in 
% 
A 
1973- 
1993 
in % 
Germany 151 -7 133 -12 130 -2 147 13 110 -25 -52 France 76 -16 58 -24 49 -16 44 -10 40 -9 -74 Italy 67 -23 61 -9 58 -5 55 -5 49 -11 -46 UK 59 -8 55 -7 53 -4 45 -15 39 -13 -80 Belgium 35 -12 29 -17 28 -3 26 -7 24 -8 -61 Netherlands 19 0 19 0 18 -5 17 -6 15 -12 -76 Luxembourg 13 0 11 -15 10 -9 9 -10 7 -22 -70 Spain X X 45 X 40 X 36 -10 27 -25 EC 1 426 1 -11 1 422 1 -1 1 394 1 -7 1 389 1 -1 1 321 1 -17 -56 
Table 6: Development of Employment in the Member States and the EC' 
Source: Conrad (1997: 214); Translated by C. G. 
A : Difference 
X No entry because of objective reasons. 
Entry not possible as no proof available. 
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-IP/98/434, Commission Finds Against Aid Granted by Italy to its Steel Industry, 
13.5.1998. 
-IP/99/477, Commission Orders Recovc! y of 122.2 Million Euro Illejzal Aid to Grdditzer 
Steel Mill-(Saxony. Gennany), 8.7.1999. 
E, JC Press Releases 
(available on the Intemet at littp: //www. curia. eu. int/en/cp/index. htm) 
-EJC Press Release No 14/99, Judgments of the Court of First Instance in Cases T-134/94 
and Officu; NMI-T Stalilwerke -and Others I Commission, 11.3.1999. 
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